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MEDDLING WITH THE MULLAHS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE IRAN AND LIBYA
SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
LUCIEN J. DHOOGE*
"As the dominant power, [the United States] can afford to add the
legitimizing carrot of negotiations to the punitive stick of sanctions."'
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 5, 1996, President William J. Clinton signed the Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 into law.2 This statute, dubbed by some
as the D'Amato-Kennedy Act after its two chief legislative sponsors,
3
was introduced in the United States (U.S.) Senate as Senate Bill 1228
on September 8, 1995 and in the U.S. House of Representatives as
House Bill 3107 on March 19, 1996. 4 The bill received little attention
until the summer of 1996 when two events combined to bring its enact-
ment to fruition. On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb was detonated outside
of Khobar Towers, a U.S. military housing compound located near
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, resulting in the death of nineteen American
servicemen. 5 One month later, on July 17, 1996, Trans-World Airlines
Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of the Pacific; LL.M., International and
Comparative Law, 1995, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., 1983, University of
Denver College of Law; B.A., 1980, University of Colorado; Member, Colorado and District
of Columbia Bars. The author wishes to thank his family and friends for their constant
encouragement and inspiration.
1. Richard W. Murphy, It's Time to Reconsider the Shunning of Iran, WASH. POST,
July 20, 1997, at C1. Murphy served as U.S. Ambassador to Syria and Saudi Arabia and
as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1983 to
1989.
2. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996)
[hereinafter ILSA].
3. The chief legislative sponsor of ILSA was United States Senator Alfonse M.
D'Amato (Republican, New York). See Clay Chandler, U.S. Expects Furor Over Trade
Sanctions at Summit, WASH. POST, June 27, 1996, at A20. See also Urgent Paris Warns
Washington over Sanctions Law, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Sept. 29, 1997, available in 1997
WL 13404030.
4. H.R. REP. No. 104-523(I), at 13-14 (1996).
5. See Saudis Finish Bomb Probe, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1998, at 7, available in 1998
WL 2840770. See also Chandler, supra note 3, at A20. Initial optimism that responsibil-
ity for the bombing could be attributed to Iranian-sponsored terrorists based in Saudi
Arabia has faded as the investigation has proceeded. See Toni Locy, Informant in Bomb-
ing has a Change of Heart, HOUS. CHRON., July 31, 1997, at 5, available in 1997 WL
6570713. Saudi Arabia closed its investigation of the attack on March 30, 1998. See
Saudis Finish Bomb Probe, supra at 7. The U.S. Military now doubts whether it will ever
be able to "establish a 'solid line' tying Iran to the terror attack." Charles J. Hanley, Un-
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Flight 800 inexplicably exploded in mid-air and crashed off the coast of
Long Island, New York resulting in the loss of 230 lives.6 In the atmos-
phere of outrage and panic over the perceived threat of international
terrorism stirred by these incidents, the bill was quickly passed by the
Senate on July 16, 1996 and the House of Representatives on July 23,
1996. 7 In response to the national outcry for retaliatory action - and
perhaps not wishing to appear weak on the issue of international ter-
rorism in an election year - President Clinton endorsed its provisions
two weeks later.8 The U.S. trade embargo against Iran escalated to a
new level at the stroke of the President's pen.
At its core, the Act has four purposes. Initially, ILSA purports to
address the threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives
posed by Iranian and Libyan attempts to acquire weapons of mass de-
struction and sponsorship of acts of international terrorism. 9 However,
the sponsors of ILSA acknowledged that unilateral efforts by the United
States were insufficient to adequately address these threats.10 As a re-
sult, ILSA attempts to multilateralize U.S. efforts to isolate Iran. Ini-
tially, ILSA urges the President to commence diplomatic efforts through
the United Nations and consultation with U.S. allies in order to estab-
lish a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran, including provisions
limiting the development of its petroleum resources. 1 ILSA also
authorizes the imposition of economic sanctions upon persons deter-
mined by the President to have made investments in Iran of at least
$40 million in any one year that directly contributed to Iran's ability to
develop its petroleum resources. 12 Persons subject to sanctions must
have actual knowledge or reason to know that their investment would
answered Questions, Unending Delays in Saudi Bombing Investigation, Assoc. PRESS,
Mar. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4857484. Responsibility for the attack remains unde-
termined as of the time of preparation of this article.
6. Michele Salcedo, Tape Shows Other Pilots Saw TWA 800 Explode, AUsTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Jan. 15, 1998, at A10, available in 1998 WL 3593269. See Paul Blustein,
House Passes Measure Against Foreign Firms Investing in Iranian, Libyan Oil, WASH.
POST, July 24, 1996, at A25. Despite initial speculation that a terrorist bomb brought the
airliner down, an exhaustive investigation by several U.S. agencies including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the National Transportation Safety Board eliminated this
possibility. See TWA Flight 800 Explained, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at A18, available
in 1997 WL 164. The investigation is now focused on mechanical explanations for the ex-
plosion. Id. The cause of the explosion remains undetermined as of the time of prepara-
tion of this article.
7. H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 1.
8. See Eric Pianin, Clinton Approves Sanctions for Investors in Iran, Libya, WASH.
POST, Aug. 6, 1996, at A8, available in 1996 WL 10724877.
9. See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 2(1), 110 Stat. 1541, 1541 (1996). See also H.R.
REP. NO. 104-523(11), at 3 (1996).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(f), at 3. See also H.R. REP. NO.104-523(11), at 2.
11. See ILSA § 4(a). See also H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 3.
12. See ILSA § 5(a). See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 12.
VOL. 27:1
MEDDLING WITH THE MULLAHS
directly contribute to Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources. 13
The President is required to impose at least two sanctions from a list
set forth in ILSA against persons deemed to have violated the invest-
ment prohibition.14 This sanctions regime is designed to discourage for-
eign investment in Iran's petroleum industry, thereby denying it the fi-
nancial means to sustain its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile
weapons programs and sponsorship of international terrorism.' 5 Fi-
nally, ILSA purports to place additional pressure upon the Libyan gov-
ernment to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions
731, 748, and 883 by demanding the cessation of Libyan sponsorship of
international terrorism and efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruc-
tion, 16 and by demanding the surrender of two Libyan intelligence
agents implicated in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on December
21, 1988.17 Furthermore, all provisions of ILSA applicable to Iran are
equally applicable to investments in Libya.' 8 The President must report
to Congress on a regular basis on his efforts to accomplish the purposes
set forth in ILSA.19
13. See id.
14. See ILSA § 5(a). See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 2.
15. See ILSA § 2(2). See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I1), at 3.
16. See S.C. Res 731, S/RES/731 (1992). See also S.C. Res. 748, S/RES/748 (1992).
17. See S.C. Res. 883, S/RES/883 (1993). Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scot-
land on December 21, 1988, killing all 259 people on board as well as eleven people on the
ground. See Khomeini Ordered Bombing Over Lockerbie, Report Says, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 6, 1997, at 17A, available in 1997 WL 11502927.
18. See ILSA § 5(1)(B). See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 7. The effects of ILSA
upon Iran and its trading partners are more controversial than those relating to Libya
due to the prior imposition of economic sanctions upon Libya by the Security Council and
the pledge of United Nations members to enforce those sanctions. See Thomas W.
Lippman, Panel Approves Sanctions for Foreign Firms Investing in Iran, WASH. POST,
June 14, 1996, at Al. As a result, this article will focus on the effects of ILSA upon Iran
and its trading partners. For its part, Libya's official news agency JANA condemned
ILSA as a "flagrant injustice" arising from "satanic designs... designed as a veto on the
independence, freedom and development of nations." Agency Editor Comments on Re-
newal of Sanctions Against Libya, BRITISH BROAD. CORP., Jan. 26, 1996.
19. See ILSA §§ 4(b), 4(d)(2), 4(e), 9(a)(4), 9(c)(1), 10(a) and 10(b). See also H.R. REP.
NO. 104-523(I), at 7; H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 3. The summary of the purposes set
forth in the text are those of the U.S. Congress. In signing ILSA into law, President
Clinton described Iran and Libya as "two of the most dangerous supporters of terrorism in
the world." Pianin, supra note 8, at A8. According to President Clinton, the legislation
was designed to accomplish two purposes with regard to the terrorist threats posed by
Iran and Libya. Initially, ILSA would deny Iran and Libya resources necessary to finance
international terrorism and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Id. Sec-
ondly, ILSA would place the issue of international terrorism upon the agenda of every
state engaging in trade with Iran and Libya by requiring "every advanced country ... to
make up its mind whether it can do business with people by day who turn around and fuel
attacks on their innocent civilians by night." Id. See also Muriel Dobbin, Clinton Signs
Libya, Iran Sanction Bill, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 6, 1996, at A3, available in 1996
WL 7042186. President Clinton may also have been motivated by U.S. outrage over the
execution of a contract between the Iranian government and the French petrochemicals
firm Total SA for the development of two large Iranian oil and gas fields located in the
1998
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The Act attempts to accomplish its purposes with three specific
methods. Initially, Section 4(a) of the Act urges the President to imme-
diately commence diplomatic efforts in appropriate international fo-
rums and in bilateral negotiations to establish a multilateral sanctions
regime against Iran including limitations upon foreign investments in
Iran's petrochemicals industry.
20
The second method by which the Act accomplishes its purposes is
through increased consultation between the President and Congress re-
garding U.S. policy toward Iran. Sections 4(b) and 10(a)(1) require the
President to report to Congress on a periodic basis regarding his efforts
to establish a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran.21 ILSA also
requires the President to report to Congress on whether the European
Union, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Israel and Japan have legisla-
tive or administrative standards providing for the imposition of trade
sanctions against persons doing business or having investments in
Iran.22 The President is additionally required to report to Congress on
Iran's military capabilities and support of international terrorism in-
cluding the extent to which the International Atomic Energy Agency
has established regular inspections of all nuclear facilities in Iran and
Iran's use of its diplomats and representatives to promote acts of ter-
rorism.
23
Finally, ILSA provides for the imposition of economic sanctions
upon persons who, with actual knowledge, make an investment of $40
million or more in any twelve month period which directly and signifi-
cantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop its pe-
troleum resources. 24 These sanctions include prohibitions upon transac-
tions between the sanctioned person, U.S. financial institutions and the
Export-Import Bank of the United States, procurement sanctions, and
import and export sanctions. 25 Sections 4(c), 5(f), 9(a) and 9(c) grant the
President broad authority to grant exceptions and waivers as well as
delays in the imposition of sanctions. 26 In any event, sanctions imposed
pursuant to ILSA must remain in effect for a period of two years or un-
til either Iran or the sanctioned person modifies their objectionable be-
Persian Gulf. This contract was executed on July 13, 1995, four months after President
Clinton barred Conoco and other American companies from participating in the project.
See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 3 C.F.R. § 332 (1995). Executive Order No. 12,957 prohibited
the financing, management or supervision by U.S. persons of the development of Iranian
petroleum resources. See id. at § 1(a)-(c). See also International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A) and (B)(1994) [hereinafter IEEPA].
20. See ILSA § 4(a).
21. See id. §§ 4(b) and 10(a)(1).
22. See id. § 4(e).
23. See id. §§ 10(a)(3)-(4) and 10(b)(1)-(2).
24. See id. § 5(a).
25. See id. § 6(1)-(6).
26. See id. §§ 4(c), 5(f), 9(a), and 9(c).
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International reaction to the adoption of ILSA was universal, im-
mediate and unequivocally hostile. Canada, the largest trading partner
of the United States, amended its Foreign Extraterritoriality Act to
provide for fines and prison terms for company managers who comply
with orders entered pursuant to the Act.28 The European Union filed a
formal protest to ILSA with the United States on August 8, 1996.29
European Union officials objected to ILSA as "an extreme case of extra-
territorial legislation" 30 and an inappropriate and ineffective means of
combating international terrorism.3 1 European Union officials warned
the United States that the imposition of sanctions against European
firms transacting business in Iran would seriously damage relations
and would lead to the enactment and enforcement of retaliatory meas-
ures against American business interests.32 The European Union also
threatened to initiate a challenge to ILSA before the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) as a violation of the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).33
Even U.S. Persian Gulf allies living directly under the threat of
Iranian expansionism expressed doubts about further American at-
tempts to isolate Iran as exemplified by ILSA. A statement issued at
the conclusion of the eighth summit of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, 34 held in Tehran in December 1997, criticized U.S. attempts
to penalize countries doing business with Iran. 35 This criticism was ech-
27. See id. §§ 8(a) and 9(b).
28. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, §§ 5, 7 (1984) (Can.).
29. See EU Protests Law on Iran, Libya Sanctions, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1996, at
30, available in 1996 WL 11558085.
30. Blustein, supra note 6, at A25. See also France Defends Firm's Gas Pact with
Iran, BUFF. NEWS, Sept. 30, 1997, at A2, available in 1997 WL 6464384; U.S. Frustrated
Over French-Iranian Gas Deal, XINHUA ENG. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997
WL 11202513; U.S. Investigating Iranian Gas Deal, Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 29, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 4885712.
31. See EU Protests Law on Iran, supra note 29, at 30.
32. Blustein, supra note 6, at A25. See also Raf Casert, EU Warns U.S. Relations
Will Suffer if French Iran Deal Challenged, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept. 30, 1997, available in
1997 WL 4885966; Bill Mintz, EU Tells Washington not to Meddle, HouS. CHRON., Oct. 1,
1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 13071837; Urgent Paris Warns Washington Over Sanc-
tions Law, supra note 3.
33. Raf Casert, EU Nations "100 Percent" Behind France in Iran Oil Deal, ASSoc.
PRESS, Oct. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4886682. See also Jana Byron, Sanctions Cor-
ner, France's Total Ignores ILSA, EXPORT PRACTITIONER, Oct. 15, 1997, at 13, available in
1997 WL 8530724; EU Protests Law on Iran, Libya Sanctions, supra note 29, at 30; U.S.
to Investigate Total's Deal with Iran, XINHUA ENG. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 6, 1997, available in
1997 WL 11203425.
34. See John Lancaster, Iran Seeks New Image at Summit, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
1997, at A23. The Organization of the Islamic Conference was created in 1969 and meets
every three years. See id. The Conference consists of representatives of Islamic countries
located in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. The eighth summit was the first hosted by
Iran and drew representatives from fifty-five Islamic countries. See id.
35. See Phil Chetwynd, Moslem Leaders Condemn Terrorism, Israel as Summit Ends,
1998
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oed in a statement issued at the end of the annual summit of the Gulf
Cooperation Council 36 in December 1997 welcoming Iranian overtures
to lessen tensions in the Persian Gulf 37 The leader of one of the U.S.
closest Gulf allies, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani of Qatar, called
for dialogue between Iran and the U.S.,38 and Saudi Arabian Crown
Prince Abdullah offered to act as an intermediary in such discussions. 39
This article examines the provisions of ILSA and its consistency
with the U.S. international and national interests. This article first ex-
amines in detail the history preceding the adoption of ILSA with spe-
cific concentration on diplomatic and economic relations between the
U.S. and Iran since 1979 and the resultant imposition of U.S. trade
sanctions against Iran. It then examines the specific provisions of ILSA
with emphasis on its most controversial element - the imposition of
unilateral economic sanctions upon persons who invest in Iran's petro-
chemicals industries. Finally, this article analyzes ILSA in light of the
U.S. international and national interests. This article concludes that
ILSA is inconsistent with the promotion of the international and na-
tional interests of the United States.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT
Although a complete history of the volatile relationship between the
United States and Iran is beyond the scope of this article, a brief review
of the recent highlights of this relationship is in order to place ILSA in
its proper context. Modern Iranian history began in 1921 when Reza
Khan, an Iranian officer of the Persian Cossack Brigade, engineered a
coup d'6tat against the government of Ahmad Shah of the Qajar dy-
nasty.40 Reza Khan ousted Ahmad Shah and gained complete control of
the government in 1925.41 Reza Khan subsequently declared himself
Shah, ruling as Reza Shah Pahlavi until his forced abdication following
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Dec. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13452786.
36. The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. See Ashraf Fouad, Gulf Arabs Cau-
tiously Positive Toward Iran, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1997, at A23.
37. See id.
38. See Rejecting Advice, U.S. Stands Firm on Iran, ASSOC. PRESS, June 12, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4870452.
39. See Anthony Shadid, Despite Hope for Moderation, Iran's Leader Blasts West, Is-
rael, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4895949.
40. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: IRAN 2 (1994), (visited Sept. 12, 1998)
<http:www.state.gov/www/backgroundnotes/iran_794_bgn.html> [hereinafter IRAN:
STATE DEP'T NOTES]. Reza Khan became minister of war as a result of the 1921 coup
d'6tat. Iran's History in Brief, at 10 (visited Sept. 12, 1998) <http://www.salamiran.org/
IranInfo/General/History.html> [hereinafter Iran's History].
41. Iran's History, supra note 40, at 9.
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the occupation of Iran by British and Soviet forces in September 1941.42
Reza Shah Pahlavi was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,
who ruled Iran until January 1979.
43
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime faced two serious threats to its
existence during its thirty-eight year tenure. The first threat occurred
in 1951 when Premier Mohammed Mossadeq, an advocate of the na-
tionalization of British petroleum interests in Iran,44 briefly assumed
power and forced the Shah to flee the country. 45 The Shah returned to
Iran after his supporters succeeded in ousting Mossadeq in a coup d'6tat
in August 1953.46 Mossadeq's ouster remains a contentious issue in pre-
sent-day American-Iranian relations due to the role of the Central In-
telligence Agency in leading and financing the coup. 47 Shortly after his
return to power, the Shah agreed to a new charter that granted Ameri-
can and British oil interests forty percent each of Iranian oil revenues.
48
The Shah also received $85 million in American economic aid.
49
In 1978, domestic turmoil swept Iran as a result of religious and
political opposition to the Shah's increasingly autocratic rule. One ex-
ample of the Shah's tendencies in this regard was his utilization of
SAVAK - the internal security and intelligence service - which con-
ducted operations against political dissidents utilizing summary execu-
tion, disappearance, torture and other human rights violations. 50 Mass
demonstrations against the Shah's regime occurred throughout Iran,
and strikes became more widespread and frequent.5 1 The Shah fled Iran
on January 16, 1979 as confrontations between his supporters and
demonstrators became more violent.52 On February 10, 1979, Shapur
Bakhtiar, the Shah's last prime minister, declared martial law in an at-
tempt to maintain order until a provisional government could be
42. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 3. Reza Shah Pahlavi was forced to
abdicate by the British military force occupying Iran due to his refusal to permit the Al-
lies to supply the Soviet Union through his country. See Iran's History, supra note 40, at
9. Reza Shah Pahlavi died in exile in South Africa in 1944. Id.
43. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 3. See also Iran's History, supra note
40, at 10.
44. Under Mossadeq's leadership as prime minister, the Iranian government expro-
priated the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and formed the National Iranian Oil Company
[hereinafter NIOC] to operate the industry. See The Oil and Gas Industry in Iran (vis-
ited Sept. 12, 1998) <http://www.salamiran.orgtIranInfo/State/Government/Energy/ in-
dex.html>.
45. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 3.
46. See id.
47. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS 284 (1996).
48. See id. at 284-85.
49. See id.
50. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 3.
51. Iran's History, supra note 40, at 10.
52. See id. The Shah subsequently went into exile in Panama, and later Egypt where
he died in July 1980. See Key Dates in Iran's History and Dealings With the United
States, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6641041.
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formed.5 3 However, Bakhtiar's attempt failed in the rising tide of Is-
lamic fervor which swept the country upon the return of its spiritual
leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from
exile in France. 54 Khomeini's opposition to the Shah's regime had re-
sulted in his arrest in June 1963 and exile in April 1964. 55 While in ex-
ile in Turkey, Iraq and France, Khomeini continued to actively oppose
the Shah's regime and developed the principles of Islamic governance
which were to sweep Iran upon the Shah's abdication.5 6 Upon his re-
turn, Khomeini quickly assumed leadership of the revolutionary move-
ment and replaced the Bakhtiar regime with a new theocratic republic
guided by Islamic principles.57 A new constitution enshrining the prin-
ciples of Islamic governance was approved in a general referendum in
December 1979,58 and Khomeini assumed the role of national religious
leader and titular head of state. 59 The president of the Islamic republic,
Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, succeeded Khomeini as national relig-
ious leader upon Khomeini's death on June 3, 1989.60 The speaker of
the national assembly, Ali Akbar-Hashemi Rafsanjani, was elected to
the presidency in August 1989 to replace the outgoing Khamenei. 61 Raf-
sanjani was subsequently re-elected in June 1993.62
The December 1979 constitution defines Iran's political, economic
and social order. The constitution declares Shi'a Islam of the Twelver
Ja'fari sect as Iran's official religion.63 Governance in Iran is based upon
"[d]ivine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws."64
As a result, all laws, regulations and constitutional interpretations
must be based upon Islamic criteria. 65 These criteria include the elimi-
nation of imperialism and prevention of foreign influence in Iran66 as
well as the political, economic and cultural unification of all Moslems in
a single nation.
67
Political power in post-revolutionary Iran is divided amongst four
branches of government. The highest authority is the leader who exer-
53. See Iran's History, supra note 40, at 11.
54. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 4.
55. Biography of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (visited Sept. 12, 1998)
<http://www.salamiran.orglIranInfo/StateALeadershipflmamlImamBiography.html>.
56. See id. at 2-3.
57. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 4.
58. Iran's History, supra note 40, at 11.
59. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 4.
60. See id.
61. See id. See also Iran's History, supra note 40, at 10.
62. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 4.
63. IRAN CONST. § 1, art. 12 (1992). Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity are
the only other religions permitted to be practiced in Iran. Id. § 1, art. 13.
64. Id. § 1, art. 2(2).
65. See id. § 1, art. 4.
66. See id. §§ 1, art. 3(5) and 10, art. 152.
67. See id. § 2, art. 11.
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cises the combined supreme political and religious power.68 The position
of leader embodies the doctrine of vali-efaqih which provides that the
leader is God's vice-regent on Earth.69 The leader is selected by the As-
sembly of Experts whose members are selected by universal suffrage.
70
The leader is responsible for delineation of the general policies of the
country, appointment of the Guardian Council, the supreme judicial
authority, commanders of the armed forces, and resolution of disputes
between the other branches of government. 71 The leader is also the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and retains control over foreign
policy and the interior and intelligence ministries.
72
After the leader, the president is the highest official in the coun-
try.73 The president is elected by universal suffrage to a four year term
and may be reelected once. 74 The president appoints and supervises the
Council of Ministers which acts as his cabinet and is responsible for na-
tional planning and budgetary matters.7 5 Additionally, the president
prepares and submits legislation to the legislative branch through the
Council of Ministers.7 6 The president is also empowered to execute trea-
ties and contracts on behalf of the Iranian government and is obliged to
sign legislation approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.
77
Legislative power is exercised through the Islamic Consultative As-
sembly.78 Members of the Assembly are elected to four year terms by
universal suffrage. 79 The Assembly is competent to establish laws on all
matters as long as such laws are not contrary to Islam or the constitu-
tion.8 0 Most legislation is submitted to the Assembly by the Council of
Ministers although bills sponsored by at least fifteen members may be
introduced independent of the Council.81 All legislation passed by the
Assembly must be submitted to the Guardian Council to ensure its
compatibility with Islamic teachings and the constitution.8 2 All legisla-
68. See id. §§ 5, art. 60, 8, art. 107 and 9.1, art. 113.
69. See id. § 1, art. 5.
70. See id. § 8, art. 107. The qualifications for selection as leader are scholarship, jus-
tice, piety and "adequate capability for leadership." Id. § 8, art. 109.
71. See id. § 8, arts. 110(2),(6) and (8).
72. See id. § 8, arts. 110(3) and (4).
73. See id. § 9.1, art. 113.
74. See id. § 9.1, art. 114. In order to be eligible for election, a presidential candidate
must possess Iranian origin and nationality, administrative capacity and resourcefulness,
a good past record of accomplishments, trustworthiness, piety and belief in the fundamen-
tal principles of Islamic governance as manifested in Iran. Id. § 9.1, art. 115.
75. See id. §§ 9.1, art. 126 and 9.2, arts. 133-34.
76. See id. § 6.2, art. 74.
77. See id. § 9.1, arts. 123 and 125.
78. See id. § 5, art. 58.
79. See id.
80. See id. § 6, arts. 71-72.
81. See id. § 6, art. 74.
82. See id. § 6.2, art. 94. The Guardian Council consists of twelve members. Six of
the Council members are lawyers selected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from
nominations submitted by the head of the judicial branch. These members determine the
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tion approved by the Guardian Council is fully enforceable and must be
submitted to the president for signature.8 3 The Assembly also has the
right to investigate the affairs of the country and must approve all in-
ternational treaties, contracts and agreements.
84
Judicial authority is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court,
the head of the judicial branch and the minister of justice.85 The Su-
preme Court's primary responsibility is supervision of the lower
courts.8 6 The chief judicial officer of the Supreme Court is nominated by
the head of the judicial branch for a period of five years in consultation
with the Court's judges.8 7 The head of the judicial branch is appointed
to a five year term by the leader and is responsible for the appointment
and dismissal of lower court judges.88 The Minister of Justice is selected
by the president from candidates proposed by the head of the judicial
branch.8 9 The Minister's primary responsibility is the coordination of
relations between the executive, legislative and judicial branches. 90 The
constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary, due process,
the right to counsel, the presumption of innocence in criminal cases and
the right to a public trial before a jury.91 In any event, all judicial deci-
sions must conform with Islamic principles.
92
The conflict created by the Iranian constitution between the offices
of national religious leader and president has resulted in considerable
political ferment. 93 Ayatollah Khamenei remains the national religious
leader. A former student of Khomeini and president under his regime,
Khamenei remains hostile to the United States and opposes to any re-
sumption of dialogue between the countries. In recent speeches,
Khamenei has castigated the United States for its "global arrogance 9
4
and accused it of seeking to destabilize the Iranian government at the
constitutionality of proposed legislation. The remaining six members of the Council are
religious scholars selected by the leader to consider the conformity of all proposed legisla-
tion to Islamic principles. Id. § 6.2, art. 91.
83. See id. §§ 6.2, art. 94 and 9.1, art. 123.
84. See id. § 6.1, arts. 76-77.
85. See id. § 11, arts. 157, 160 and 161.
86. See id. § 11, art. 161.
87. See id. § 11, art. 162.
88. See id. § 11, arts. 157-58.
89. See id. § 11, art. 160.
90. See id.
91. See id. §§ 3, arts. 32, 35 and 11, arts. 156, 165 and 168.
92. See id. § 5, art. 61.
93. See John Rossant, The Stakes are Huge as President Khatami Wages a Bitter Bat-
tle Against Hardline Mullahs for the Soul of Iran, BUS. WK., Dec. 8, 1997, at 16, available
in 1997 WL 14814621. See also Iran: Pro-Khatami Backers Clash with Vigilantes, Dow
JONES INT'L NEWS SERV., Mar. 2, 1998.
94. See Iran Opens Summit with a Vengeance: 'Poisonous Breath'of U.S. Threatens
Gulf Security and Islamic Values, Khamenei Charges, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 10, 1997, at
A15.
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behest of a "Zionist network" controlled by Israel. 95 According to
Khamenei, such measures have only served to strengthen Iranian re-
solve to actively oppose American policies in the Middle East.96 Khame-
nei is strongly supported by the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar
Nateq-Nouri, and the head of the judicial branch, Ayatollah Mohammad
Yazdi. 97 Khamenei also has strong support from most of Iran's major
institutions such as the military, the media, the intelligence community
and religious foundations which remain firmly under the control of re-
ligious conservatives. 98
However, the grip of religious conservatives upon the reins of power
in Iran have not gone unchallenged. In an unprecedented statement in
December 1997, former Khomeini ally Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri
openly questioned the legitimacy of Khamenei's role in the government
as national religious leader. 99 Of particular concern to Montazeri was
Khamenei's paramount role in governmental affairs in the absence of
popular election by the Iranian citizenry.100 Montazeri's statement led
to accusations of treason and a crackdown against his supporters by re-
ligious conservatives. 10 1
A greater threat to the conservative's grip upon power was the se-
lection of a religious moderate as president in Iran's recent elections.
Moderate cleric Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the former Minister of
Culture and Islamic Guidance from 1982 until his ouster in 1992,102
swept to an overwhelming victory in Iran's May 23, 1997 presidential
election. Running on a platform of economic centralization and relaxa-
tion of the rigid Islamic social code,' 0 3 Khatami easily defeated three
95. See Afshin Valinejad, Hardline Cleric Says U.S. is Intent on Destabilizing Iran,
Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6635779. See also Afshin Valinejad,
Iran Cleric Opposes U.S. Ties: Ayatollah's Sermon Contrasts Sharply with Tone of Na-
tion's President, PEORIA J. STAR, Jan. 3, 1998, at A3, available in 1998 WL 5749472;
Iran's Khamenei Says U.S. Gov't Controlled by Zionists, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS SERV.,
Dec. 24, 1997.
96. See Khamenei Carps at Idea of Iran-U.S. Talks, FLA. TIMES UNION, Jan. 17, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6180823
97. See Rossant, supra note 93, at 17.
98. Id.
99. See John Lancaster, Iranian Cleric Disputes Ayatollah's Right to Rule, WASH.
POST, Dec. 23, 1997, at A10. Montazeri served as deputy religious leader and Khomeini's
heir apparent until his resignation in 1989 in protest of the perceived despotic tendencies
of the regime. See Rossant, supra note 93, at 17.
100. See Lancaster, supra note 99, at A10.
101. See id. See also Iranian Leader Asserts His Authority to End Political Unrest,
AGENcE FR.-PRESSE, Nov. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13442988.
102. Khatami is a hojatoleslam or middle-ranking cleric. Khatami was removed as
minister by conservative clerics in 1992 for lifting strict state controls on entertainment
such as the prohibition upon live concerts and women singing in public. See President-
Elect of Iran Not Your Typical Mullah, TAMPA TRIB., May 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10788898. See also John Daniszewski, Moderate Wins by a Landslide in Iran's Presiden-
tial Race, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4175518.
103. See Anwar Faruqi, Iran's Election Shaping Up as a Real Contest, ASSOC. PRESS,
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other candidates by capturing 20.7 million of the 29.7 million votes
cast. 104 Khatami's chief rival, Nateq-Nouri, running on a platform of
economic decentralization and strict enforcement of the Islamic social
code, 10 5 was able to garner 7.2 million votes. 10 6 The ease and size of
Khatami's victory constituted a shocking and firm rejection of the sti-
fling rule of the conservative clerics.
107
Khatami was inaugurated on August 3, 1997 and immediately be-
gan to steer a moderate course for the Iranian presidency. 108 Instructive
in this regard was his selection of candidates for his twenty-two person
cabinet. Included in the new president's selections was Kamal Kharrazi,
Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, as the new foreign minis-
ter. 109 Kharrazi was educated in the United States and was instrumen-
tal in securing the release of foreign hostages by pro-Iranian militias in
Lebanon in the early 1990s. 110 At the intelligence ministry, Khatami
replaced Ali Fallahian, who had been linked to anti-Western attacks,
Apr. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4862793.
104. See John Lancaster, Iranians Voted for New Ideas, Not a New System, WASH.
POST, May 26, 1997, at Al. See also John Lancaster, Moderate Iranian Wins; Khatami
Swamps Hardliner, Captures Presidency, WASH. POST, May 25, 1997. Two-hundred
thirty-eight candidates registered to run for the presidency including nine women. See
Iran Selects 4 Candidates for Election, CHINA DAILY, May 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL
8259214. However, the Guardian Council certified only four candidates for inclusion on
the ballot as recognized statesmen committed to the Islamic principles underlying the
Iranian constitution. See Council Sets Guidelines for Iranian Presidential Candidates,
Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4863995. All women candidates were
eliminated as the Iranian constitution does not permit women to run for the presidency.
Id. Ninety percent of the 33 million eligible voters cast ballots in the general election.
See Anwar Faruqi, Moderate Cleric Wins Iranian Presidency: The New President's Sup-
porters Hope He Can Restrain the Conservative Faction Within the Clergy, Fr. WORTH
STAR TELEGRAM, May 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4843997. See also Khatami Prom-
ises More Democracy, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2121502..
Men and women over the age of fifteen years are eligible to vote in Iran. See Facts, Fig-
ures on Iran's Elections, ASSOC. PRESS, May 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 486 7865.
105. See Faruqi, supra note 103.
106. See Faruqi, supra note 104. The other two candidates, former intelligence minis-
ter Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri and deputy head of the judiciary Syed Reza
Zavareie, garnered less than one million votes apiece. Id.
107. See Faruqi, supra note 104, at Al. See also Iran's Khatami Proclaims New Era
for Islamic Nation, ASSOC. PRESS, May 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4844415. Iranian
dissident Abdolkarim Soroush characterized Khatami's electoral victory as "a flood
[against clergy rule] that has been released after years of building up." Iran's Vote Sends
Unusual Message for Political Islam, ASSOC. PRESS, May 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL
2528506.
108. Iran Swears in New President, ASSoc. PRESS, Aug. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL
2164293.
109. Iran Set to Debate Cabinet: Leader's Picks Draw Ire of Hard-Liners, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 13, 1997, at A2, available in 1997 WL 6265411. See Iran's President Faces
Hard-liner Opposition, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 15, 1997, at A12.
110. Iran's President Faces Hard-liner Oppostion, supra note 109, at A12.
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with the less ideological Qorbanali Dorri Najafabadi."' Most controver-
sial of all, Khatami named Ayatollah Mohajerani as head of the Cul-
tural and Islamic Guidance Ministry. 112 Mohajerani ignited a firestorm
of criticism in 1991 when he called for the restoration of diplomatic re-
lations with the United States. 113
Under Khatami's leadership, Iran's dismal human rights record
has improved slightly. Khatami advocates equal rights for women
14
and has appointed women to the judiciary as well as his cabinet.
1 5
Khatami has also called for the loosening of strict governmental con-
trols on individual liberty including freedom of speech and the press.
1 6
Khatami's election improved the United Nations' most recent assess-
ment of human rights in Iran which had noted slight improvements in
its report completed immediately before the presidential election. 117
Of perhaps greater concern to religious conservatives is Khatami's
proposed resumption of dialogue with the United States. At the eighth
summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Khatami called
for understanding of western civilization which he characterized as the
preponderant culture of the late twentieth century. 1 8 Khatami also
111. Id.
112. Id. See Iranian President Loads Cabinet with Pragmatists, Moderates: Some U.S.
Experts See Chance for Warmer Relations, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, available in 1997
WL 2237614.
113. See Iran Set to Debate Cabinet: Leader's Picks Draw Ire of Hard-Liners, supra
note 109, at A2.
114. Iran Leader Backs Women's Rights, COM. APPEAL, Dec. 1, 1997, at A2, available
in 1997 WL 14521183. See President Backs Women, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 1, 1997, at
A13, available in 1997 WL 15807433.
115. See Iran Appoints Women Judge, Its First Since '79, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCE,
Dec. 26, 1997, at A10, available in 1997 WL 15960953. See also First Woman Appointed
to Iranian Cabinet, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1997, at A20. Appointed to the office of vice
president for environmental protection, Masoumeh Ebekar is the first woman to serve in
an Iranian cabinet position since the Islamic revolution.
116. See Faruqi, supra note 104, at Al. See also Carla Hall, Iranians Are Going
Against the Old System, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1998, at B1, available in 1998 WL 2410998;
Iranians Go to Polls Today to Choose President: Race Pits Hard-line Cleric Against Mod-
erate, PATRIOT LEDGER, May 23, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 8178738; Journalists
Criticize Senior Iranian Official in Rare Protest, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 5, 1998, available in
1998 WL 6636160; President Backs Women, supra note 114, at A2.
117. See U.N. Commission Censures Iran, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr. 22, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 2266925. Khatami's dedication to improving human rights protections
has earned him the title of "Ayatollah Gorbachev" amongst some Iranians. See John Lan-
caster, Khatami: Iran's 'Ayatollah Gorbachev" Election Winner Schooled in Islamic Revo-
lution, Western Culture, WASH. POST, May 25, 1997, at A29.
118. See John Lancaster, Iran's Top Leaders Differ on Relations with West; Clashing
Views Air as Islamic Summit Opens, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1997, at Al. By contrast, at
the same summit meeting, Khamenei characterized western civilization as "directing eve-
ryone toward materialism, while money, gluttony, and carnal desires are made the great-
est aspirations." Excerpts of Speeches by Khamenei, Khatami, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 9, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4895959.
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called for "thoughtful dialogue" with the American people.119 Although
Khatami called only for dialogue amongst the American and Iranian
peoples rather than their governments, his remarks suggested that it
was a matter of when rather than if relations between the two govern-
ments would be restored. 120 The United States welcomed Khatami's
calls for dialogue although it preferred public discussions between
authorized governmental representatives.1 21 Additionally, the United
States called for positive action in support of Khatami's conciliatory
statements such as discontinuation of Iranian support for terrorism and
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction as well as its opposition
to the Middle East peace process.
122
President Khatami's overtures progressed further in televised re-
marks addressed to the American people on January 8, 1998. In an ex-
traordinary interview, Khatami "declared his solidarity with the 'es-
sence of American civilization"' 123 and expressed hope that Iran and the
United States could eliminate the causes of the estrangement existing
between the countries. 124 Furthermore, Khatami expressed regret for
the "unorthodox" seizure of American hostages in 1979 which stemmed
from excessive "revolutionary zeal" and American provocation.1 25 How-
ever, Khatami stopped short of calling for diplomatic dialogue and only
endorsed unofficial contacts between educators, writers, artists and
tourists.1 26 The Clinton Administration accepted Khatami's offer of un-
119. See John Lancaster, Khatami Seeks U.S. Dialogue; Iranian Leader Takes Concila-
tory Tone, Praises American People, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at Al. See also Anwar
Faruqi, Iranian President Calls for Dialogue with Americans, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 14,
1997, available in 1997 WL 4896721. By contrast, in his address to the summit, Khame-
nei characterized the United States as "the political designers of arrogance ... breathing
their poisonous breath to make our neighbors in the Persian Gulf fearful of Islamic Iran
which holds the banner of unity and brotherhood." Anthony Shadid, Despite Hope for
Moderation, Iran's Leader Blasts West, Israel, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 9, 1997, available in
1997 WL 4895949. Khatami has not referred to the United States as "the Great Satan"
since he assumed office in August 1997. See Iran President Seeks U.S. Dialogue,
COLUMBIAN, Dec. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 16400146.
120. See Iranian Leader Opens Door, CHI. SUN TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998, available in 1998
WL 5560892.
121. See Lancaster, supra note 119, at Al. See also U.S. Warming to Dialogue,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 1650638.
122. See Iran Gets Clinton's Attention: President Welcomes Call for Dialogue; Clinton
Would Welcome Talks with Iran, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 16, 1997, at A1, available in 1997
WL 15241930. See also Iran Says Clinton Statement May Signal Change in U.S. Position,
ASSOC. PRESS, May 31, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2528985.
123. Iranian Leader Urges Exchanges with U.S.; Khatemi Expresses Regret for 1979
Hostage Taking, Suggests Negotiations, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1998, at Al.
124. See Journalists Criticize Senior Iranian Official in Rare Protest, supra note 116.
125. See Iran's Leader Backs Closer Ties to U.S., ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 8, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 6165601. See also Iran's New President Extends Olive Branch, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1997, at A2, available in 1997 WL 3203372.
126. See Iranian Leader Urges Exchanges with U.S., supra note 123, at Al; see also
Iran's Leader Backs Closer Ties to U.S., supra note 125; Iranian Leader Opens Door, su-
pra note 120, at A12. By contrast, Ayatollah Khamenei branded the United States as an
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official contacts 127 but also reiterated its call for government-to-
government dialogue.128 The United States also announced it would re-
view its visa process for Iranians as a means of encouraging further
dialogue between the countries. 129 Perhaps most importantly, Under-
Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat announced the creation of a com-
mittee to review the Clinton Administration's sanctions policies on
Iran.1
30
Regardless of these recent hopeful developments, relations between
enemy of Iran and Islam. See Iranian Leaders Denounce U.S., Urge Closer Ties With
Europe, ASSOc. PRESS, Apr. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6649257. See also John Lan-
caster, Head Iranian Cleric Rejects Talks with U.S., WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1998, at A18;
Iran Sprititual Leader Condemns U.S., Rejects Dialogue, DOw JONES NEWS SERV., Jan.
16, 1998. Khamenei ruled out any resumption of dialogue with the United States. Id.
See also Ayatollah Rejects Proposal For Talks With U.S., ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 17, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 4115665. Khamenei also defended the seizure of the American Em-
bassy and subsequent hostage crisis as necessary to eliminate American conspiracies to
defeat the Islamic revolution. See Iran Leader Condemns U.S., DOw JONES NEWS SERV.,
Jan. 16, 1998. Perhaps in response to pressure from conservative clerics, Khatami subse-
quently accused the United States of having "damaged [Iranian] freedom, independence,
interests and glory." U.S. Brushes Aside Critical Comments By Iran's President, DOw
JONES NEWS SERV., Jan. 20, 1998. The U.S. State Department chose to ignore these re-
marks and renewed its call for government-to-government dialogue. Id. For its part, For-
eign Minister Kharrazi stated that Khatami's remarks did not constitute a repudiation of
his previous positive statements and that Iran still seeks "relations [with the United
States] based on d6tente and mutual interests." Iranian Official Says Khatami Still
Wants Dtente with U.S., Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Jan. 24, 1998. However, Kharrazi em-
phasized that the resumption of relations between the two countries is dependent upon
"positive deeds and a change of behavior by the United States." Iran Minister: "Positive
Deeds" Needed For U.S. Opening, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL
6639595. See also Iranian Says the Ball is in U.S. Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1998, at
A20.
127. See Thomas W. Lippman, More Signs of Thaw in Icy U.S.-Iran Relations, WASH.
POST, Mar. 27, 1998, at A28. See also Clinton Backs More Contact with Iranians, WASH.
POST, Jan. 30, 1998, at A28; Clinton Makes Holiday Overture to Iranian People, ASSOC.
PRESS, Jan. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6639463; U.S., Iran Move Cautiously Toward
Better Relations, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Mar. 27, 1998; With People-to-People Ex-
changes, U.S.-Iranian Ties Improving, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL
6647772.
128. See Ben Barber, Iranian Overture Is Met With Doubt, State Dept. Urges Govern-
ment Dialogue, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at All. See also Mending Ties With U.S., Ira-
nian President Calls For Dialogue, ASsoc. PRESS, Jan. 7, 1998, available in 1998 WL
6179987; U.S. Looking for Deeds To Back Up Conciliatory Words from Iran, ASSOC.
PRESS, Jan. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7374756.
129. See U.S. to Review Visa Process for Iranians, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 12, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 2461535.
130. See David S. Cloud, U.S. Uncertain How To Respond to Khatami's Overture,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5224974. Citing the
moderate tone of President Khatami's remarks, the European Union called upon the
United States to abandon its unilateral sanctions policy with regard to Iran. See EU To
Press For Less Rigid U.S. Stance On Iran, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 12, 1998, available in 1998
WL 6637201.
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the United States and Iran have been confrontational since the Islamic
revolution. On November 4, 1979, Islamic militants occupied the U.S.
embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two Americans hostage until January
20, 1981.131 Ten days after the seizure of the Embassy, President
Jimmy Carter declared a national emergency with respect to Iran which
has been renewed every year since 1979.132 On April 7, 1980, the United
States broke diplomatic relations with Iran, and, on April 24, 1981, the
Swiss government assumed representation of U.S. interests in Iran. 133
Iranian interests in the United States are represented by the Pakistani
government.134
U.S.-Iranian relations have also been strained as a result of other
events. Iran remains on the list of countries which, according to the
United States, sponsor international terrorism. 135 Iran was first placed
on the list of state sponsors of international terrorism on January 19,
1984 after the Reagan administration determined the existence of Ira-
nian complicity in the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in
Beirut, Lebanon.136 Iran has also been implicated in the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103 in December 1988,137 and the attacks upon the U.S. mili-
tary housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in June 1996138 and
131. IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 8.
132. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980). See also H.R. REP. No. 104-
523(1), at 9 (1996).
133. See IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 8-9.
134. See id. at 9.
135. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, TERRORISM 1
(1996) (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.treas.gov/ofac/tl 1ter.pdf> [hereinafter
TERRORISM]. The list is complied pursuant to Section 2405(o) of the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979. Section 2405(o) provides, in part, that "[tihe Secretary [of Commerce]
shall establish and maintain.., a list of any goods or technology subject to export con-
trols under this section, and the countries to which such controls apply." Export Admini-
stration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(o) (1998). The countries currently designated
as supporting international terrorism are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan
and Syria. See TERRORISM, supra, at 1.
136. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(I), at 9. Placement upon this list disqualified Iran
from receiving U.S. foreign aid, goods on the U.S. munitions list, Export-Import Bank
credits and U.S. support for foreign loans and required strict licensing requirements for
any U.S. exports of controlled goods or technology. See id. The bombing of the Marine
barracks resulted in the death of 298 members of the American/French multinational
force in Lebanon.
137. See Khomeini Ordered Bombing Over Lockerbie, Report Says,, supra note 17. Ac-
cording to the German magazine Der Spiegel, Abolghassem Mesbahi, the co-founder of the
Iranian intelligence service, informed the German Federal Criminal Police Office and the
Frankfurt prosecutor's office that Khomeini ordered the bombing as retaliation for the
downing of an Iranian passenger jet over the Strait of Hormuz by a U.S. warship in July
1988. See id. The explosion of Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988
killed all 259 people on board and 11 on the ground. See id.
138. See Suspects in Saudi Bombing Belong To Iran-Inspired Group, ASSOC. PRESS,
Nov. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4447279. The alleged mastermind of the bombing,
Ahmed Ibrahim Ahmad Mughassil, is believed to have fled to Iran after the attack. See
Iran Denied Saturday It Was Harboring Bombing Suspect, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 29, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4859695. Iran was directly implicated by Hani Abdel Rahim al-
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foreign tourists in Egypt in November 1997.139 Additionally, Iran is al-
leged to be the principal supplier of armaments, money and logistical
support to terrorist groups such as Hizballah, Hamas, the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 140
Iran is further believed to have supported attempts to destabilize the
governments of its Arab neighbors including a failed 1981 coup d'6tat in
Bahrain and the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 1995.141 Finally, Iran has
been accused of attacks upon Iranian dissidents abroad including the
assassination of Iranian Kurdish leader Sadiq Sarafkindi in Berlin,
Sayegh who allegedly conducted surveillance on the target, drove the bomb to the housing
complex and assisted in the bombers' escape. See Pierre Thomas, Saudi Suspect May Co-
operate in Bomb Probe, WASH. POST, June 17, 1997, at A10. See also Canada To Deport
Suspect In Saudi Terror Blast, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 6, 1997, at A18, available in
1997 WL 3131680. However, despite initial optimism that responsibility for the bombing
could be quickly determined, as of the time of the preparation of this article, attribution of
the attack to Iran remains unresolved. See Saudis Still Stymie FBI, WASH. POST, May 1,
1997, at A26. Iran has denied any involvement in the attack. See Iranian Minister: U.S.
Can't 'Divide and Rule,'WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1997, at C4. The June 25, 1996 bombing re-
sulted in the death of 19 U.S. military personnel. See Howard Schneider & Pierre Tho-
mas, Canada Ties Hezbollah to Saudi Attack, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1997, at Al.
139. See Report: U.S. Envoy Says Iran Behind Luxor Massacre, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 24,
1997, available in 1997 WL 4898297. Edward Walker, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, ac-
cused Iran of responsibility for the November 17, 1997 attack which resulted in the death
of 58 tourists in Luxor, Egypt. Id.
140. See IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 8. See also John Lancaster, Iran
Has Strong Links to Anti-West Terror, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1996, at A28; Iranian Arms
Shipments to Allies Reported On Rise, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 13, 1996, at A25, available
in 1996 WL 14032467. Iran claims only to provide humanitarian support to such groups.
See Iranian Minister: U.S. Can't 'Divide and Rule,' supra note 138, at C4. Iran also joined
in the statement issued at the conclusion of the eighth summit of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference in December 1997 condemning terrorism and denying asylum to sus-
pected terrorists. See Chetwynd, supra note 35. See also Conferees Lash Out At Terror-
ists Extremists, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 10, 1997, at 52A, available in 1997 WL
14975038. Khatami reiterated Iran's condemnation of terrorism in his address to the
American people on January 8, 1998. See Iran's Leader Backs Closer Ties to U.S, supra
note 125. See also Mending Ties With U.S. Iranian President Calls For Dialogues, supra
note 128. However, it bears noting that Iran excludes from its definition of terrorists
those groups "supporting peoples who fight for the liberation of their land" such as the
Palestinians. Iranian Leader Urges Exchanges with U.S.; Khatemi Expresses Regret for
1979 Hostage Taking, Suggests Negotiations, supra note 123, at Al. Additionally, the
U.S. Department of State identified Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism in
the world in its annual report on international terrorism in 1997. See Stanley Meisler,
Iran Top Terrorist Nation, U.S. Says, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 1, 1998, at A17, available in
1998 WL 8820737. Nevertheless, Iran's statements condemning acts of international ter-
rorism led Central Intelligence Agency Director George J. Tenet to recently conclude that
the Khatami administration is "sincerely lobbying for an end to government support of
terrorism." R. Jeffrey Smith, Khatami Wants to End Terrorism, Officials Say, WASH.
POST, May 5, 1998, at A9.
141. See IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 8. See also Lancaster, supra note
140, at A28.
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Germany in September 1992.142
Relations have also been strained as a result of Iranian attempts to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. Iran is alleged to be actively pur-
suing development of nuclear weapons primarily with equipment and
technology supplied by the Peoples' Republic of China. 14 3 Iran's first nu-
clear power plant, located in Bushehr in southern Iran and constructed
with Russian assistance, is nearing completion. 144 Iran is also alleged to
have purchased chemical weapons technology and materials from
China. 145 Finally, Iran has purchased billions of dollars of conventional
142. See Iranian Students Clash with Troops, ASSOc. PRESS, Apr. 14, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 6519887. The U.S. State Department estimates that Iran is responsible for
more than fifty murders of political dissidents overseas since 1979. See State Department
Again Lists Iran as Chief Terrorism Sponsor, WASH. POST, May 1, 1997, at A26. A Ger-
man court convicted four men of the assassination of Sarafkindi and specifically found
that the Iranian leadership ordered the murder. See Court Says Iran's Leaders Ordered
Killings, Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4861347. See also German
Court: Tehran Ordered Exile Killings, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1997, at Al.
143. See Edward J. Markey, et al., China and Nuclear Trafficking, WASH. POST, Oct.
29, 1997, at A23. See also Leaders Reach Accord To Clear U.S. Reactors Sales, Assoc.
PRESS, Oct. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2558503. Chinese President Jiang Zemin
pledged to terminate assistance to Iran's nuclear program in October 1997. See R. Jeffrey
Smith, China's Pledge to End Iran Nuclear Aid Yields US. Help, WASH. POST, Oct. 30,
1997, at A15. See also China Ready to End NuHelp for Iran, ASSOc. PRESS, Oct. 25, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7129734. Iran also reportedly attempted to purchase nuclear tech-
nology from South Africa and Kazakhstan. See Report: Iran Trying to Buy South African
Nuclear Technology, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4893813. See
also Pentagon: Iran Has No Soviet Nukes, ASSOc. PRESS, Apr. 9, 1998, available in 1998
WL 7184550; Pentagon: No Evidence To Support Report Iran Got Soviet Nukes, ASSOC.
PRESS, Apr. 9, 1998, available in 1997 WL 6650352; Report: Iran Has Nuclear Warheads,
Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 9, 1998.
144. See Iran to Begin Operating First Nuclear Power Plant, ASSOc. PRESS, July 7,
1997, available in 1997 WL 4873948. See also Ukraine Vows Not to Sell Turbines For
Iranian Reactor, ASSOC. PRESS, Apr. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4862194. The con-
tract for the construction of the nuclear power plant is estimated to be worth $800 million
to Russia. See Iran May Purchase Russia Missles, ASSOc. PRESS, Feb. 25, 1998, available
in 1997 WL 8151007. See also Ukraine Bows to U.S. Pressure, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1998,
at A. 15. The United States opposed construction of the plant, maintaining that training
and technology supplied for it could be used to build nuclear weapons. Iran to Begin Op-
erating First Nuclear Power Plant, supra. See also U.S. Still Opposed To Russian Role In
Iran Project, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 23, 1998, available in 1997 WL 6642670; U.S. Wins
Ukrainian Pledge On Nuclear Export Controls, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Mar. 6, 1998.
Iran has denied allegations that is developing nuclear weapons, pointing to its status as a
signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. See Iranian Leader Urges Exchanges
with U.S., supra note 123, at Al. See also Murphy, supra note 1, at Cl.; U.S. Can't 'Di-
vide and Rule,' supra note 138, at C4. However, John Holum, the director of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has estimated that Iran will be able to deploy
nuclear weapons by 2007. See Iran Running Into Difficulties In Push For Nuclear Capa-
bility, ASSOC. PRESS, May 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4864763.
145. See Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Imposes Sanctions On China Firms, WASH. POST,
May 23, 1997, at Al. See also U.S. To Punish Chinese For Chemical Weapons Shipments
to Iran, ASSOc. PRESS, May 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4867904. Iran has denied
that it is attempting to produce chemical weapons and has ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention. See Iran Signs Pact On Nerve Gas, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 10, 1997, available in
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weapons including anti-ship cruise missiles from China' 46 and missiles,
missile technology, tanks, helicopters and submarines from Russia.
147
Finally, Iran's hostility to the Middle East peace process has
thwarted improvement in its relations with the United States. At the
recent summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Khamenei
derided the Middle East peace process as "unjust, arrogant, contemptu-
ous and illogical."'148 These sentiments were echoed by Foreign Minister
Kharrazi who condemned the peace process for its purported failure to
adequately address issues concerning Palestinian self-determination,
repatriation of refugees and liberation of occupied territories. 149 How-
ever, Khatami recently indicated that, although he believes that peace
in the Middle East is not attainable without adequately addressing the
rights and aspirations of the Palestinians, Iran would not interfere in
the peace process and would "leave the Palestinians to decide their
fate.' 150 U.S. foreign policy analysts have chosen to focus on Khatami's
1997 WL 8406504.
146. See Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Confirms China Missile Sale to Iran, WASH. POST,
May 31, 1997, at A15. Chinese President Jiang Zemin pledged to discontinue sales of
such missiles to Iran in October 1997. See China Promises To Halt Missile Sales To Iran,
Assoc. PRESS., Oct. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2556113. China reaffirmed this
pledge in January 1998. See Cohen Says China Hardens Promise To End Missile Sales To
Iran, ASSOc. PRESS, Jan. 20, 1998, available in 1997 WL 6637990. See also Cohen Warns
China On Iranian Threat to Gulf Shipping, ASSOc. PRESS, Jan. 19, 1998, available in
1997 WL 7377515.
147. Russia reportedly sold Iran the technology necessary to produce SS-4 missiles
which have a range of 1250 miles and carry a standard warhead equivalent to 3000
pounds of dynamite. See Russia Government Aids Iran In Missile Manufacture, Dow
JONES TELERATE ENERGY SERV., Aug. 25, 1997. See also Moscow Has Received A Diplo-
matic Warning, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2499834. Russia also
reportedly transferred technology to Iran to permit it to develop a smaller liquid-fuel mis-
sile with a range of eight hundred miles and a payload of 1550 pounds. See Iran Said to
be Building Missile, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 7, 1998, available in 1997 WL 6636433. See also
Russia Helping Iran Get Missile To Hit Israel, DOW JONES NEWS SERV., Sept. 21, 1997;
Russia Security Service: Iran Failed To Get Missile Know-How, DOw JONES NEWS SERV.,
Oct. 2, 1997. Russia agreed to restrict the transfer of ballistic missile technology to Iran
in January 1998. See U.S. Keeps After Russia To Halt Flow Of Missile Technology to Iran,
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1998, at A9. See also U.S., Russia to Step Up Efforts Against Iran
Missile Program, Dow JONES COMMODITIES SERV., Jan. 17, 1998. Iran has also pur-
chased three submarines, tanks, helicopters and hundreds of anti-aircraft missiles from
Russia in recent years. See Russia Arms Merchants Selling Missiles To Iran, ASSOC.
PRESS, Apr. 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2517553.
148. Lancaster, supra note 118, at Al. See also Anton LaGuardia, Iran Shows Deep
Splits over the West at Islamic Summit, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Dec. 10, 1997, at 13,
available in 1997 WL 2357745.
149. See Iranian Minister: U.S. Can't 'Divide and Rule,' supra note 138, at C4.
150. Iran Pres.-Elect Policy Change, 'No Sign Of U.S. Change,' Dow JONES NEWS
SERV., May 27, 1997. See also Iranian President Takes Plea For Rapprochement To
American Public, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 7, 1998, available in 1997 WL 6636549; Iran's
Leader Backs Closer Ties to U.S, supra note 125; Mending Ties With U.S., Iranian Presi-
dent Calls For Dialogue, supra note 128.
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conciliatory remarks rather than Khamenei's inflammatory statements
and have characterized such remarks as "a nuanced change in a posi-
tive direction."
1 51
In response to these events and perceived Iranian intransigence,
the United States imposed numerous economic sanctions upon Iran
prior to the enactment of ILSA. As previously noted, President Jimmy
Carter declared a national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to
IEEPA on November 14, 1979.152 As a result of President Carter's Or-
der, approximately $12 billion in Iranian government bank deposits,
gold and other properties in the United States were blocked, including
$5.6 billion in deposits and securities held by overseas branches of U.S.
banks. 153 The assets freeze was subsequently expanded to a full trade
embargo, which remained in effect until the signing of the Algiers Ac-
cords on January 19, 1981.154 Pursuant to the Accords, most Iranian as-
sets in the United States were freed from future blockage, the trade
embargo was rescinded 155 and attachments that U.S. persons had se-
cured against Iranian assets in the United States were canceled in or-
der that said assets could be returned to Iran. 15 6 Claims of U.S. nation-
als against Iran or Iranian entities for products shipped or services
rendered prior to the imposition of the embargo and for uncompensated
151. Washington Has Muted Praise For Iran Leader On Mideast Peace, Dow JONES
INT'L NEWS SERV., Dec. 17, 1997. The cited characterization of Khatami's remarks was
that of deputy State Department spokesman James Foley. See also U.S. Encouraged by
Iran's Overture, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 2, 1998, available in 1997 WL 7382079.
152. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, supra note 132. Sections 1702(a)(1)(A) and (B) of
IEEPA provide as follows:
At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title [unusual
and extraordinary threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy
of the United States], the President may... investigate, regulate or prohibit
any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit or payments be-
tween, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such
transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a na-
tional thereof, the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and in-
vestigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest; by any person, or
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
153. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, IRAN: WHAT
You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 3 (1998) (visited Oct. 18, 1998)
<http://www.treas.gov/ofac/tlliran.pdf> [hereinafter IRAN: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW].
154. See Exec. Order No. 12,205, 3 C.F.R. 248 (1981) as amended by Exec. Order No.
12,211, 3 C.F.R. 253 (1981).
155. See Exec. Order No. 12,282, 3 C.F.R. 113 (1982).
156. See Exec. Order No. 12,276, 3 C.F.R. 104 (1982). See also Exec. Order No. 12,277,
3 C.F.R. 105 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,278, 3 C.F.R. 107 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,279,
3 C.F.R. 109 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,280, 3 C.F.R. 110 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,281,
3 C.F.R. 112 (1982).
VOL. 27:1
MEDDLING WITH THE MULLAHS
expropriation of property within Iran were to be resolved in the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal established pursuant to the Accords.1
57
Economic sanctions upon Iran were re-imposed by the Reagan Ad-
ministration. As a result of Iran's continued sponsorship of terrorist
groups, on October 29, 1987, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive
Order 12,613 imposing an import embargo on Iranian-origin goods and
services. 158 This Order prohibited the importation of Iranian-origin
goods and services either directly or through third countries. 159 Fur-
thermore, U.S. persons were prohibited from providing financing for
prohibited import transactions 160 and engaging in any transactions re-
lated to goods or services of Iranian origin.1
61
Further economic sanctions were imposed by the Clinton Admini-
stration. In response to Conoco, Inc.'s execution of a $550 million con-
tract to develop Iran's offshore Sirri A and E oil and gas fields, Presi-
dent Clinton issued Executive Order 12,957 on March 15, 1995.162 This
Order declared a national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to
IEEPA163 and prohibited the financing, management or supervision by
U.S. persons of the development of Iranian petroleum resources.
64
Conoco was thereby forced to abrogate its development contract with
Iran1 65
The Clinton Administration imposed tighter restrictions upon Iran
two months later after determining that Iran was persisting in its sup-
port of international terrorism and attempts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction and presented a threat to the continuation of the Mid-
dle East peace process. As a result, President Clinton issued Executive
157. See Exec. Order No. 12,283, 3 C.F.R. 114 (1982). See also Exec. Order No. 12,294,
3 C.F.R. 139 (1982). Thirty-four of the 3,952 cases filed with the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal remain pending as of the time of preparation of this article. See Iran-
Money Claims Against U.S. Still Unresolved, PERISCOPE-DAILY DEF. NEWS CAPSULES,
Apr. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8152041.
158. See Exec. Order No. 12,613, 3 C.F.R. 256 (1988). See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.101-807 (1997). The statutory basis for President Reagan's
Order was Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985 which provides, in part, that "[tihe President may ban the importation into the
United States of any good or service from any country which supports terrorism or ter-
rorist organizations or harbors terrorists or terrorist organizations." International Secu-
rity and Development Cooperation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9(a) (1994).
159. See Exec. Order No. 12,613, supra note 158, § 1. See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.201. Materials utilized in news publications and pe-
troleum products refined from Iranian crude oil in a third country were exempted from
the Order's import prohibition. See Exec. Order, supra note 158, § 2(a)-(b).
160. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.201.
161. See id. § 560.206.
162. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, supra note 19.
163. See IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1703(c). See also IRAN: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW, supra
note 153, at 1.
164. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, supra note 19, § 1. See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, §§ 560.206, 209(a)(1) and (b)(1).
165. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1) at 9 (1996).
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 27:1
Order 12,959 on May 6, 1995.166 This Order prohibited the export of
goods and services to Iran 167 as well as continuing the prohibition upon
the import of goods and services of Iranian origin. 168 U.S. persons, in-
cluding foreign branches of U.S. banks and trading companies, were
also prohibited from engaging in any transactions, including those in-
volving purchases, sales, transportation, financing or brokering, related
to goods or services of Iranian origin. 169 New investments by U.S. per-
sons in Iran or in property owned or controlled by the Government of
Iran were also prohibited. 170 Additionally, the Order prohibited U.S.
banks, including foreign branches, from servicing accounts of the Ira-
nian government, including banks owned or controlled by the govern-
ment or persons in Iran. 171 Finally, the Executive Order also closed the
166. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1995).
167. See id. § 1(b). See also Iranian Transactions Regulations, supra note 158, §
560.204. Excepted from this prohibition were feed grains, rice, wheat, cotton, peanuts,
tobacco, dairy products and oilseeds provided that the underlying contracts for their ex-
portation to Iran were in existence prior to May 7, 1995 and delivery occurred prior to
February 2, 1996. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.520(a)-(c).
Additionally, gifts valued at less than one hundred dollars, donations of articles intended
to alleviate human suffering and informational materials were excepted from the export
prohibition. See id. §§ 560. 506, 210(b), 210(c) and 523. Services provided by nonresident
U.S. persons outside of the United States were also excepted from the export ban. See id.
§ 560.410(d). However, services provided by a foreign branch of a U.S.-incorporated firm
were deemed to be exported from the corporation's home office in the United States. See
id. § 560.410(a)(3).
168. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 166, § l(a). See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.201.
169. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 166, § l(f). See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.206. These prohibitions also applied to transactions by
U.S. persons in locations outside of the United States with respect to goods or services
which the U.S. person knew, or had reason to know, were of Iranian origin or controlled
by the government of Iran. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, supra note 158, §
560.411(a)-(b). However, U.S. persons could engage in transactions in third countries
necessary to sell, store or maintain goods located in a third country which were legally
acquired by the U.S. person prior to the issuance of the Order on the condition that the
transactions did not result in an importation into the United States. See id. §
560.518(b)(1)-(2).
170. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 166, § 1(e). See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.207. Included within this prohibition were commit-
ments of funds or other assets, loans and extensions of credit. See Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, §§ 560.316 (a)-(b) and 560.317. Letters of credit and other
financing arrangements with respect to trade contracts in force and effect as of May 6,
1995 were excepted from this prohibition provided that the transactions contemplated
therein were completed prior to June 6, 1995. See id. § 560.210(e). However, standby let-
ters of credit which served as security for services rendered after June 6, 1995 could not
be renewed nor payment made after that date without the authorization of the Depart-
ment of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. See id.
171. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, supra note 158, § 560.517(a). However,
U.S. banks were authorized to pay interest, deduct reasonable and customary service
charges and process transfers related to exempt transactions. See id. § 560.517(a)(1)-(2).
U.S. banks could also handle so-called "u-turn" transactions which were defined as trans-
actions to cover payments involving Iran that were by order of a third country bank for
payment to another third country bank provided they did not directly credit or debit an
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loophole by which foreign affiliates of U.S. oil companies purchased ap-
proximately twenty-five percent of Iran's oil exports for overseas
trade.172
Under the Shah's regime, Iran's economy rapidly industrialized and
experienced high rates of growth. 173 However, Iran's post-revolutionary
economy is under the strict control of the government. The Iranian Con-
stitution requires the creation and implementation of "a correct and just
economic system in accordance with Islamic criteria in order to create
welfare, eliminate poverty and abolish all forms of deprivation with re-
spect to food, housing, work, health care and the provision of social in-
surance."'17 4 In order to achieve these goals, the Iranian Constitution
creates private and cooperative economic sectors in the fields of agricul-
ture, small industry, trade and services. 175 Additionally, despite its rec-
ognition of private property rights, 76 the Constitution provides for state
ownership of all economic sectors deemed vital to state security. 77 As a
result, Iran annulled all pre-revolution contracts in the oil, gas and pet-
rochemicals industries and placed these industries under state supervi-
sion. 178 The Iranian government also nationalized the banking and in-
surance industries as well as all enterprises having more than one
thousand employees.
179
The Iranian economy which emerged from the revolution and the
eight year war with Iraq suffered from several serious problems. 180 De-
spite its high literacy rate, 8 1 the population is plagued by high levels of
Iranian account. See id. § 560.516(a)(1). U.S. banks were also permitted to handle non-
commercial family remittances involving Iran provided that the transfers were routed to
or from non-U.S. non-Iranian offshore banks. See id. § 560.516(a)(4).
172. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 166, § 5. See also Iranian Transactions
Regulations, supra note 158, at § 560.513.
173. See IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 6.
174. IRAN CONST., § 1, art. 3.
175. See id. § 4, art. 44.
176. See id. § 4, art. 47.
177. See id. Included in these designated economic sectors are foreign trade, power
generation, radio, television, telegraph and telephone services and transportation. See id.
178. See Oil and Gas, at 1 (visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http://www.salamiran.org/iraninfo/
state/government/energy/oilgas/html>.
179. See Iran Economic Overview 1, (visited Sept. 20, 1998)
<http://www.salamiran.orgtiraninfo/economy/overview/html>.
180. See An Air of Optimism in Iran, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at Al. See also IRAN:
STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 6. The Iran-Iraq war commenced in September
1980 with Iraq's invasion of Iran and ended with the implementation of a cease-fire in
August 1988.
181. An estimated 79.3 percent of Iran's 62.4 million citizens are literate. See Iran's
Key Economic Indicators 1, (visited Sept. 20, 1998)
<http://www.salamiran.orgiraninfo/economy/trends/key.html>. See also U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, IRAN REPORT (April 1997)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emu/cabs/iran.html> (on file with author) [hereinafter IRAN: EIA
REPORT].
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unemployment estimated at thirty to forty percent.18 2 Estimates re-
garding the rate of inflation range from twenty-four percent to thirty-
five percent. 8 3 These deficiencies, when combined with the weakened
state of the economy, have resulted in more than twenty billion dollars
of external foreign debt.
8 4
Iran's largest economic sector and source of foreign revenue are the
oil, gas and petrochemicals industries. Iran is the second largest oil
producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
and accounts for approximately five percent of global oil output.
18 5
Iran's oil reserves account for nine percent of global reserves 86 and are
the third largest in the world. 8 7 Although production of oil is less than
seventy percent of its former total during the Shah's regime, 88 Iran still
produces 3.76 million barrels of oil per day, of which 3.65 million bar-
rels per day are crude oil.189 Iran's onshore fields produce approximately
3.2 million barrels per day' 90 while its offshore fields produce 550,000
182. See Peter W. Rodman, Dialogue with Iran?, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1997, at A13.
See also IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 6.
183. See Khatami Promises More Democracy, supra note 104. See also Faruqi, supra
note 104. Recent estimates by the Iranian Government place the annual rate of inflation
at twenty-five percent. See Iran's Key Economic Indicators, supra note 181, at 1. How-
ever, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated the annual rate of inflation
to be 35.6 percent for fiscal year 1996. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1.
184. Iran's total external foreign debt is estimated at $20.3 billion. See Iran: EIA Re-
port, supra note 181, at 1. In March 1998, the Iranian Central Bank placed Iran's foreign
debt at $16.8 billion. See Khatami: Iran Bracing For Lower Revenues From Tumbling Oil
Prices, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6645526. In late 1996, Iran
rescheduled ten billion dollars of this debt which eased its repayment schedule estimated
at in excess of four billion dollars annually. See id.
185. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1 and 4. OPEC consists of Iran, Algeria,
Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
and Venezuela. See Iran Hopes to Hold Back Increase in OPEC Oil-Production Quota,
DOW JONES ONLINE NEWS, Nov. 27, 1997.
186. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1, 4. Iran's proven oil reserves are 88
billion barrels. See id. Proven and possible reserves total 140 billion barrels. See id. at 4.
Most of Iran's reserves are located in onshore fields in the Khuzestan region and beneath
the Persian Gulf. See id.
187. See IRAN: STATE DEP'T NOTES, supra note 40, at 3.
188. See Diplomacy with Iran, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1997, at A16. Iran's crude oil pro-
duction capacity in the mid-1970s was in excess of 7 million barrels per day. See IRAN:
EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 5.
189. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 5. Iran's OPEC crude oil production
quota for the first half of 1997 was 3.6 million barrels per day. Id. This quota was in-
creased to 3.942 million barrels per day for the first half of 1998. See OPEC Dec Output-3:
Table Of Output Estimates, DOW JONES ENERGY SERV., Jan. 9, 1998. Iran's present sus-
tainable production capacity is 3.9 million barrels per day. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra
note 181, at 5. The Iranian Government has forecast that crude oil production will grow
by 3.7 percent annually. See Oil and Gas, supra note 178, at 1. However, industry ob-
servers estimate Iran's sustainable production capacity will not be able to rise above four
million barrels per day. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 5. Current daily world
output of oil is 70 million barrels. See Greg Myre, Companies Scramble In New Rush For
Oil In Caspian Sea, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14397544.
190. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 5. Approximately 2 million barrels per
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barrels per day.19' Iran has the capacity of processing 1.2 million bar-
rels per day through its eight operational refineries.' 92 In addition, Iran
exports 2.6 million barrels of oil per day.' 93 Iranian oil export revenues
were approximately $18 billion in 1996' 94 which constituted eighty-one
percent of Iran's total export revenues.' 95
Iran's natural gas and petrochemicals industries are also worthy of
note. Exceeded only by Russia, Iran possesses an estimated 742 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas reserves, fifteen percent of the world's entire
reserves. 96 Iran produces approximately 2.8 trillion cubic feet of natu-
ral gas annually, 1.3 trillion cubic feet of which is marketed.' 97 Iran's
production of natural gas is expected to rise sharply in the near future
as additional reserves are discovered and the 328 trillion cubic foot
South Pars gas field is further developed. 198 Iran's petrochemicals in-
dustry is the second largest in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia.' 99
Iran's eleven petrochemical complexes have a capacity of ten million
tons per year with plans to expand to sixteen million tons by 2000 and
thirty million tons by 2020.200
Despite its internal difficulties and tightening U.S. sanctions,
Iran's economy showed improved performance in 1995 and 1996. Gross
domestic product for both years grew in excess of four percent annu-
ally.20 1 Additionally, Iran acquired $5 billion in credits and loans from
day of onshore production was exported by Iran in 1996. See id.
191. See id. at 6. Offshore production has grown considerably since 1989 when such
capacity was 202,000 barrels per day. See Oil and Gas, supra note 178, at 1. This rapid
increase is due, in part, to foreign investment which Iran permits in its offshore oil sector.
Iran's onshore oil sector remains closed to foreign investment. See IRAN: EIA REPORT,
supra note 181, at 6. Iran hopes to raise its offshore production to one million barrels per
day by 2000. See id.
192. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 8. Iran has imported refined products
since 1982. See id. However, the new Bandar Abbas refinery located near the Strait of
Hormuz is expected to generate annual refined product exports totaling $1.75 billion an-
nually in the near future. See id.
193. See id. at 1. The remaining 1.2 million barrels of daily production are consumed
domestically. See id. Iran's major crude oil customers in 1997 were Japan (35%), South
Korea (10%), the United Kingdom (10%), Turkey (3%), the Republic of China (3%), India
(2%), Brazil (2%), Thailand (1%), Malaysia (1%) and Pakistan (1%). See id.
194. See id. at 1-2.
195. See id. at 1-2.
196. See id. at 1, 9. See also Iran Says Gas Project Oppossed by U.S. Will Earn $45
Billion, Assoc. PRESS, Oct. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4887770; U.S. Investigating
Iranian Gas Deal, supra note 30. NIOC estimates Iran's natural gas reserves at 900 tril-
lion cubic feet. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 9.
197. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1, 9.
198. See id. at 9.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. According to U.S. Government sources, Iran's gross domestic product grew an es-
timated 4.1 percent in 1996. See IRAN: EIA REPORT: supra note 181, at 1. However, the
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European countries that have been utilized to finance much-needed im-
provements to Iran's economic infrastructure. 202 Furthermore, U.S. ef-
forts to persuade its allies to economically isolate Iran met with failure.
U.S. allies did not join the trade and investment ban or abandon their
policy of constructive engagement through the maintenance of the so-
called "critical dialogue."20 3 Iranian trade with Europe, the Middle East
and Asia continued to flourish despite the imposition of U.S. sanc-
tions. 204 Of particular irritation to the United States was the growing
trade between Iran and members of the European Union. Thirty-three
percent of Iran's foreign trade is with Germany, Italy and France and
accounts for more than three billion dollars annually. 20 5 Increasing
trade and export revenues, especially in the oil, gas and petrochemical
industries, allowed Iran to post a trade surplus in excess of $8 billion in
1996.206 These developments led the U.S. Congress to conclude that the
existing sanctions regime failed to adequately isolate Iran from the
global economy and modify the behavior of U.S. allies.
20 7
As a result of these perceived failures, ILSA was introduced in the
U.S. Senate as Senate Bill 1228 on September 8, 1995 and in the U.S.
House of Representatives as House Bill 3107 on March 19, 1996.208 As
Iranian Government claimed a six percent growth rate for 1996. See Iran's Key Economic
Indicators, supra note 181, at 1. Iran's gross domestic product for 1996 was an estimated
$710.4 billion. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1.
202. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 2.
203. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I) at 10 (1996). See also Robert Wierlaard, Ties Won't
Stop, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3936437. The European
Union's policy of "critical dialogue" is contrary to U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf which is
based upon the "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq through economic isolation and the
threat of military deterrence. See William Drozdiak, EU Nations' Envoys Going Back to
Iran; Vote Spurns U.S. Appeal For Firm Stand On Iran, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1997, at
A15.
204. Iran's major trading partners are Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, Spain, Japan and Turkey. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1.
Iran's major export products are petroleum and related products, carpets (which account
for forty percent of non-oil export revenues) and pistachio nuts. See id. at 1-2. See also
Nora Boustany, EU Nut Ban Irks Iran, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at A31. Iran's major
imported products consist of machinery, military equipment, metals, foodstuffs, pharma-
ceuticals and technical services. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 1.
205. See Iran Ignoring U.S. Trade Sanctions, supra note 33. Germany is Iran's largest
Western trading partner with trade between the two countries valued at $1.8 billion. See
Drozdiak, supra note 203, at A15, available in 1997 WL 3670417. See also Wierlaard.,
supra note 203; Iraqis Wish Saddam A Happy Birthday..., WASH. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997,
at A15. Germany is also one of Iran's leading creditors with loans totaling in excess of
$2.9 billion. See EU to Send Ambassadors Back to Iran, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 3543986.
206. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 2.
207. See id. However, a NIOC executive admitted that U.S. sanctions have had a det-
rimental effect upon the Iranian economy especially in the area of foreign investment in
the oil and gas industries. See id. at 2.
208. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 13-14 (1996); see also supra text accompanying
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set forth above, the bills received little publicity until the June 25, 1996
bombing of the U.S. military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Ara-
bia and the July 17, 1996 explosion of Trans-World Airlines Flight 800
off the coast of Long Island, New York. 20 9 In the aftermath of these
events, the bill proceeded quickly through the U.S. Congress which re-
jected concerns regarding its extraterritorial reach and economic cost.
2 10
The bill was approved by the Senate on July 16, 1996 and by the House
of Representatives on July 23, 1996.211 President Clinton signed ILSA
into law on August 5, 1996.212
As previously noted, international reaction to the adoption of ILSA
was universal, immediate and hostile. 213 Most of the opposition centered
around the provision requiring the President to impose economic sanc-
tions upon persons whose investments in Iran exceed $40 million in any
twelve month period and directly and significantly contribute to the en-
hancement of Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources. Re-
sponses to ILSA included the issuance of condemnations and threats to
enact retaliatory legislation and initiate dispute resolution proceedings
pursuant to GATT.214
The reaction of private industry to ILSA was more divided. Some
private enterprises took notice of the Act's provisions and moved to
bring their policies into compliance. For example, in August 1996, Aus-
tralian industrial conglomerate Broken Hill withdrew from a $3 billion
pipeline project to transport Iranian natural gas to Pakistan and In-
dia.215 The Japanese construction firm JGC withdrew from onshore
natural gas projects in Iran.216 According to the U.S. State Department,
the threat of sanctions set forth in ILSA has discouraged foreign in-
vestment in eleven oil and gas projects in Iran.217 ILSA has also sharply
curtailed Iran's ability to obtain long-term capital to finance expansion
of its oil, gas and petrochemicals industries.218
note 4.
209. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
210. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(), at 20-22. These concerns were expressed by Repre-
sentative Lee H. Hamilton (Democrat, Indiana) and James P. Moran (Democrat, Vir-
ginia). Despite the rejection of their concerns by Congress, Representatives Hamilton
and Moran voted in favor of ILSA. See id. at 22.
211. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(I), at 11.
212. See Pianin, supra note 8, at A8.
213. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
214. See id.
215. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 3. See also U.S. Economic Offensive
Against Iran's Energy Industry is Bearing Fruit, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1997, at A8.
216. See U.S. Economic Offensive Against Iran's Energy Industry is Bearing Fruit, su-
pra note 215, at AS.
217. See U.S. Won't Bar Pipeline Across Iran, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997, at Al.
218. See U.S. Economic Offensive Against Iran's Energy Industry is Bearing Fruit, su-
pra note 215, at AS. British Petroleum executive John Browne has stated that the threat
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Conversely, the vast majority of private enterprises chose to ignore
ILSA and risk the imposition of sanctions. Several European companies
registered their disapproval of ILSA by proceeding with investments in
Iran's petrochemicals industries. In May 1997, the British petroleum
firm Pell Frischmann, in conjunction with the Canadian petroleum firm
Bow Valley, was awarded a $140 million contract to develop Iran's
Balal oil field located in the Persian Gulf.219 On September 28, 1997,
Total SA of France announced the creation of an international consor-
tium with Russia's natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, 220 and Malaysia's
Petronas 221 to develop Iran's South Pars natural gas field. 222 The con-
sortium's total investment in the project is expected to exceed two bil-
lion dollars. 223 Total also entered into negotiations to develop Iranian oil
of U.S. sanctions has "definitely limited investments" in Iran. Id. Mohsen Yahyavi of the
Iranian parliament's oil committee has admitted that ILSA is partially responsible for
decreased foreign interest in Iran's oil and gas industries. See id.
219. The Iranian Oil Ministry awarded the development contract on May 10, 1997.
See U.S. Ponders Sanctions for Oil Deal in Iran, WASH. POST, May 14, 1997, at A9. Until
the imposition of U.S. sanctions, ARCO had been negotiating for the development rights
to the 120 million barrel Balal field. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 6.
220. Gazprom is the leading producer of natural gas in the world and is Russia's larg-
est company. See Russia's Gazprom Cancels Loan Deal Over Criticism Of Iran Venture,
DOW JONES NEWS SERV., Dec. 18, 1997. Gazprom produces twenty-five percent of the
world's natural gas and accounts for six to eight percent of Russia's gross domestic prod-
uct. See id. The Russian government maintains a forty percent stake in Gazprom's own-
ership. See U.S. Investigating Iranian Gas Deal, supra note 30.
221. Petronas is Malaysia's national oil company. See Malaysian Company Says Work
In Iran Will Go Despite U.S. Protests, ASSOc. PRESS, Nov. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL
4892905. Petronas' President Hassan Marican has characterized the sanctions set forth
in ILSA as an affront and interference in Petronas' internal affairs. See id.
222. See Harry Dunphy, U.S. Opposes Pipeline, ASSOc. PRESS, Oct. 23, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 4889311. See also Iran Gas Deal Defies U.S. Sanctions, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
Sept. 30, 1997, at A4, available in 1997 WL 11849331; Iran Says Gas Project Opposed by
U.S. Will Earn $45 Billion, supra note 196. Iranian officials have estimated that the
South Pars field can produce as much as two billion cubic feet of natural gas and 75,000
barrels of liquefied gas worth $1.5 billion annually by 2002. See Iran's Oil Minister in
Moscow To Boost Ties, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4892439. See
also Iran Says Gas Project Oppossed by U.S. Will Earn $45 Billion, supra note 196. Iran's
deputy oil minister Hadi Nejad- Hosseinian has estimated that gas sales revenues will
exceed $45 billion over the life of the field. See id.
223. See Russia, Iran Sign Gas Project Pact, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1997, at A27. Total
maintains a forty percent interest in the consortium while Gazprom and Petronas each
maintain a thirty percent ownership interest. See Iran Says Gas Project Oppossed by U.S.
Will Earn $45 Billion, supra note 196. The consortium has encountered some difficulty in
obtaining financing for the project. The French government has refused to provide official
credits to finance the project. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 10 (1996). However, some
financial assistance from the French government will undoubtedly be forthcoming
through its .9 percent ownership interest in Total. See U.S. Investigating Iranian Gas
Deal, supra note 30. Gazprom has also had difficulty in obtaining financing. In Novem-
ber 1997, Gazprom postponed a $3 billion bond offering designed to raise capital for its
Iranian ventures. See Russian Gas Deal With Iran Is Put On Hold, ST. LOUIS-DISPATCH,
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fields in partnership with NIOC.224 On October 1, 1997, another French
oil company, Elf Aquitaine, announced that it was negotiating with the
Iranian government for the acquisition of production rights to the
Doroud oil field located in the Persian Gulf.225 Additionally, in Novem-
ber 1997, Germany's Siemens Corporation was commissioned by the
Iranian government to study the feasibility of an oil pipeline between
Kazakhstan and Iran.
226
Several non-European firms also chose to ignore the threat of sanc-
tions pursuant to ILSA. On September 24, 1997, the Chinese National
Petroleum Company, the state oil company of the Peoples' Republic of
China, purchased a controlling interest in the second largest oil field in
the newly-independent Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan.
227
China's $9.5 billion bid proved more attractive to the government of Ka-
zakhstan than those submitted by American companies such as Amoco,
Unocal, Texaco and Exxon in part because China promised to construct
an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to refineries in northern Iran.228 Addi-
tionally, Chinese oil officials have agreed to form a joint venture with
NIOC to explore offshore deposits in Iran and China and to upgrade
Chinese refineries in order to process more Iranian oil.229
Turkey also ignored ILSA's call for further isolation of Iran by
agreeing in August 1996 to purchase 140 billion cubic feet of Iranian
natural gas annually commencing in 1998.230 The agreement called for
Nov. 12, 1997, at A10, available in 1997 WL 3377730. Gazprom cited unfavorable market
conditions as the reason for the postponement. See id. However, the participation of U.S.
investment bank Goldman, Sachs as lead underwriter for the transaction which could in
turn trigger sanctions under ILSA may have played a role in the postponement. See id.
224. See Total Chairman Says He's Negotiating With Iraq And Iran, ASSOc. PRESS,
July 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4873315. The development contract presently under
negotiation has a purported value of $3.5 billion dollars. See id.
225. See Avoiding Brawl? U.S. And EU Cautious Over Gas Deal With Iran, ASSOC.
PRESS, Oct. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4886567. See also Elf Aquitaine Exploring Oil
Deals With Iran And Iraq, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4886125.
The Doroud field currently produces 170,000 barrels of oil per day. See IRAN: EIA
REPORT, supra note 181, at 7. NIOC hopes to reinject natural gas into the field to in-
crease its recoverable reserves by 600 million barrels and raise daily oil output to 290,000
barrels per day. See id. The estimated cost of the project is $530 million. See id.
226. See David B. Ottaway & Dan Morgan, U.S. Backs Non-Iranian, 'Eurasian' Corri-
dor West for Caspian Sea Oil, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1997, at A37.
227. See David B. Ottaway & Dan Morgan, China Pursues Ambitious Role in Oil Mar-
ket, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1997, at Al.
228. See id. See also David B. Ottaway & Dan Morgan, Deal Tests U.S. Policy on Te-
hran, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1997, at Al. The Chinese National Petroleum Company's bid
also included a promise to construct a $3.5 billion, 1800 mile pipeline from Kazakhstan to
China. See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 227, at Al.
229. See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 227, at Al.
230. See Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Decries Turkey's Gas Deal with Tehran, WASH.
POST, Aug. 13, 1996, at Al. See also Iran Signs $20 Billion Gas Deal, ASSOc. PRESS, Aug.
12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2175459.
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the joint construction of a 328 mile pipeline from Tabriz in western Iran
to Erzurum in eastern Turkey at a cost of $400 million to be divided
equally between the countries. 231 The total value of Turkish purchases
of Iranian gas throughout the twenty-two year term of the agreement is
estimated at $23 billion. 232 Turkey and Iran also signed numerous ac-
cords in December 1996 granting each other most favored nation trad-
ing status and promoting bilateral investment. 233 In addition, Iran and
Pakistan continued to discuss the construction of a gas pipeline from
the South Pars gas field in Iran to Karachi, 234 and construction com-
menced on a $135 million gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia.235
The resource-rich fledging republics of Central Asia also ignored
ILSA's prohibitions. 236 Kazakhstan concluded an agreement for crude
231. See Turkey To Receive Iranian Natural Gas In 1998, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Nov. 5,
1996, available in 1996 WL 1217302L Plans called for the pipeline to reach an ultimate
length of 680 miles to the Turkish coast at an additional cost of one billion dollars. See
Iran Signs $20 Billion Gas Deal, supra note 230. Botas, the state-owned Turkish oil com-
pany, opened the bidding process for construction of the pipeline in early 1997. See IRAN:
EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 11.
232. See Lippman, supra note 230, at Al. Pursuant to the agreement, Iran was sched-
uled to begin shipping 105 billion cubic feet of natural gas a year through the pipeline by
1998 with deliveries rising to 350 billion cubic feet in 2005. See id. However, construc-
tion of the proposed pipeline had not yet commenced, and substantial obstacles remained
to the completion of the project as of the time of the preparation of this article. See Kelly
Couturier, Turkey Aims To Satisfy Its Fuel Needs, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1997, at A17.
233. See Ignoring U.S., Turkey and Iran Sign Trade Accords, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
1996, at A31.
234. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 11. Construction of the $3 billion, 1.6
billion cubic feet per day pipeline was proposed in an January 1995 agreement between
the countries dated January 1995. See id. However, a final agreement had not been ne-
gotiated at the time of the preparation of this article. See id.
235. See id. In mid-1995, Iran and Armenia signed a renewable fifteen year contract
whereby Iran agreed to supply 100 million cubic feet of natural gas per day to Armenia.
See id. Construction of the pipeline necessary to accomplish these deliveries is underway,
and shipments of gas are expected to commence in 1999. See id.
236. The oil and gas deposits located in the newly-independent republics of Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan rival those of the Middle East. Current in-
dustry estimates place oil reserves in the region at 200 billion barrels worth $4 trillion at
current market prices. See Myre, supra note 189. The Persian Gulf contains approxi-
mately 670 billion barrels of oil. See id. Bordering the western shore of the oil-rich Cas-
pian Sea and possessing the enormous Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field, Azerbaijan has
proven crude oil reserves of 3 billion barrels with estimates of ultimate reserves as high
as 40 billion barrels. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AZERBAIJAN:
ECONOMIC AND TRADE OVERVIEW 2 (visited Oct. 13, 1998)
<http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/country/azecon.html>. Bordering the northern and
eastern shores of the Caspian Sea and possessing the lucrative Tenghiz oil field, Ka-
zakhstan produced 27 million tons of crude oil in 1997. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE: KAZAKHSTAN 1 (visited Oct. 13, 1998)
<http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/country/kzccg.html>. Turkmenistan also borders the
eastern shore of the Caspian Sea and possesses the fourth largest natural gas reserves in
the world estimated at 98 to 155 trillion cubic feet, 1.2 trillion cubic feet of which was
produced in 1996. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: TURKMENISTAN
REPORT 3, 5 (visited Oct. 13, 1998) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkmen.html>.
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oil exchanges with Iran in May 1996.237 In May 1997, Turkmenistan
signed an agreement to sell three billion cubic feet per day of natural
gas to Turkey. 238 Gas will be transported through a two thousand mile
long pipeline between the two countries including a 788 mile section
through northern Iran.239 The pipeline will be constructed at a cost of
$1.6 billion.240 The initial 125 mile segment carrying natural gas from
Korpedzhe, Turkmenistan to Kord Kuy in northeastern Iran was acti-
vated on December 29, 1997.241 Future expansion of the pipeline to
Europe is anticipated in the next several years.
242
Faced with international furor and confusion, the Clinton admini-
stration investigated several of these transactions in order to determine
their compliance with ILSA. However, despite promises to "fully and
completely" enforce ILSA, the Clinton administration has failed to im-
pose sanctions upon a single foreign firm maintaining or proposing in-
vestments in Iran.243 The United States failed to sanction Pell
Frischmann or Bow Valley for their contract with NIOC to develop the
Turkmenistan also possesses 1.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves with crude oil pro-
duction of 88,000 barrels per day. Id. Landlocked Uzbekistan is among the world's top
ten producers of natural gas and produced more than 8 million tons of crude oil in 1995.
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UZBEKISTAN: ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 3 (visited Oct. 13, 1998)
<http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/country/uzecon.html>.
237. See Kazakhstan Starts Shipping Oil Through Iran, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 18,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2042671. See also IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 4.
Under the ten year term of the agreement, Kazakhstan agreed to ship oil by tanker to
Iranian refineries on the coast of the Caspian Sea in exchange for the option of lifting ei-
ther Iranian light or heavy blend crude oil at Iran's Kharg Island facility in the Persian
Gulf. Shipments were to total two million to six million tons annually. See Report Says
Kazakhstan, Iran Temporarily Cease Oil Swap, DOW JONES ONLINE NEWS, Oct. 22, 1997.
However, the agreement was suspended by Iran in October 1997 due to concerns about
the quality of the oil received by Iran from Kazakhstan. See id.
238. See U.S. Won't Bar Pipeline Across Iran, supra note 217, at Al.
239. See id. The transaction involves a "gas swap" whereby Turkmenistan would
pump gas into Iran, and Iran would send an equal amount of Iranian gas to Turkey. Id.
Iran would reap transit fees for allowing gas to flow through its territory. Id.
240. Id. See also Clinton Won't Oppose Pipeline Through Iran, ASSOC. PRESS, July 27,
1997, available in 1997 WL 3504218.
241. See Alexander Vershinin, Iran-Turkmenistan Gas Line Opens 125 Mile Line,
ASSoc. PRESS, Dec. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14978140. The $200 million cost of
the initial 125 mile segment was financed by NIOC (80%) and the Turkmen government
(20%). See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 11.
242. See Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey Reach Caspian Gas Agreements, ASSOC.
PRESS, Dec. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4898580. Iran, Turkey and Turkmenistan
executed an agreement providing for the extension of the pipeline to Europe on December
28, 1997. See id. The leading candidate to construct the pipeline is a consortium com-
prised of Italy's Snamprogetti, Gas de France and the British-Dutch energy conglomerate
Royal Dutch Shell. See U.S. Won't Bar Pipeline Across Iran, supra note 217, at Al.
243. See Iran-France Pact Viewed as Affront to U.S. Sanctions, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 6,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2485305.
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Balal oil field.244 After receiving threats of retaliation from the Euro-
pean Union,245 President Clinton elected not to impose sanctions upon
Total for its participation in the consortium to develop Iran's South
Pars natural gas field. 246 The United States also failed to sanction Gaz-
prom for its role in the South Pars consortium after receiving protests
from the Russian government 247 and Gazprom's cancellation of a No-
vember 1994 agreement with the Export-Import Bank that guaranteed
$750 million in financing for purchases of equipment and services from
American companies.248 Additionally, after condemning Turkey's
agreement to purchase Iranian natural gas,249 the United States re-
fused to sanction the proposed alternate Turkmenistan-Turkey pipeline
route through Iran on the bases that the agreement predated the en-
actment of ILSA,250 the project did not facilitate Iranian gas produc-
tion 25 1 and Iran was paying for the portion of the pipeline passing
through its territory. 252 Rather, the Clinton administration praised the
project as delivering "Central Asian energy resources to the market in a
way that minimizes assistance to Iran."253 The Clinton Administration
subsequently condemned the project based upon the benefits that the
pipeline could confer on Iran.254 However, the Administration again re-
244. See U.S. Ponders Sanctions for Oil Deal in Iran, supra note 219, at A9.
245. See Casert, supra note 33. Sir Leon Brittan, the European Union's foreign trade
minister, stated that Total was "fully entitled" to enter into the agreement, and any inter-
ference by the United States would "set in motion a chain of events which could seriously
damage the wider relationship." Casert, supra note 32. The French government con-
demned the purported extraterritorial reach of ILSA and issued a statement that applica-
tion of the law to Total "would have serious consequences on international trade." France
Cautions U.S. Against Sanctions Over Natural Gas Deal With Iran, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept.
29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4885627.
246. See Dan Balz, U.S. Eases Stand on Cuba, Iran Sanctions; Helms Condemns,
Europe Hails Move, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998, at A15. The Clinton Administration
elected to exert more pressure on the European Union to condemn Iranian acts of terror-
ism. See U.S. Not Eager to Enforce Sanctions Over Iran Gas Deal, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 3,
1997, available in 1997 WL 4886537. U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin
rationalized this decision by stating that "[t]he objective of the legislation is not to impose
sanctions ... [but rather] to get other countries, in Europe in particular, to work with us
on the subject of tightening up the pressure on Iran." Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Defers
Sanctions on Iran Gas Deal, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1997, at Al.
247. See Iran's Oil Minister in Moscow To Boost Ties, supra note 222. Boris Nemtsov,
Russia's first deputy prime minister, stated that the Russian government would fully
support Gazprom's participation in the South Pars consortium. See id.
248. See Russia's Gazprom Cancels Loan Deal Over Criticism Of Iran Venture, supra
note 220.
249. See Lippman, supra note 230, at Al.
250. See U.S. Closely Watches Plan For Natural Gas Pipeline Through Iran, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, Dec. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13462550.
251. See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 228, at Al.
252. See Thomas W. Lippman, New Iran Leader Provides Opportunity for Change; But
Khatami Indicates No Muting of Hostility, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1997, at A23.
253. See Clinton Won't Oppose Pipeline Through Iran, supra note 240.
254. See U.S. Affirms Opposition to Energy Pipelines Crossing Iran, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, Jan. 19, 1998.
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fused to sanction any of the parties to the project. Additionally, the
Clinton administration expressed support for a multi-billion dollar
pipeline stretching westward from Kazakhstan across the Caspian Sea
to Azerbaijan and Georgia. 255
Domestic reaction to the Clinton administration's failure to impose
sanctions pursuant to ILSA has been mixed. Several members of Con-
gress expressed disappointment and outrage at President Clinton's re-
luctance to impose sanctions. The chief Congressional critic was one of
ILSA's namesakes, Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato of New York. Senator
D'Amato condemned Turkey's contract to purchase natural gas from
Iran as clearly within ILSA's parameters and "a direct challenge to
[U.S.] policy of economically isolating Iran."256 Senator D'Amato also
criticized the Clinton Administration's refusal to sanction the Turk-
meni-Turkish pipeline agreement as "send[ing] a message of weakness
to Iran," and undermining U.S. efforts to persuade its European allies
to join the economic embargo on Iran.257 Additionally, Senator D'Amato
demanded the imposition of sanctions against Total for its investment
in the South Pars gas field stating that the Administration's failure to
take "decisive action... undercut long-standing policy against Iranian
terrorism" and opened the floodgates for foreign investment in Iran's oil
and gas industries. 258 The Clinton Administration was also condemned
as overly sensitive to the negative reaction of U.S. allies regarding
ILSA.259 Finally, the decisions not to vigorously implement ILSA were
further condemned as failing to force Iran and its leaders to "actually
pay a real economic price for their sponsorship of international terror-
ism." 260 According to the Clinton Administration's critics, the Khatami
administration in Tehran had not yet earned a reprieve from U.S. eco-
nomic sanctions.
261
255. See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 226, at A37. See also Thomas W. Lippman,
Clinton Meets with Turkmen President, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1998, at A14.
256. Lippman, supra note 230, at Al.
257. Lippman, supra note 252, at A23.
258. Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Defers Sanctions on Iran Gas Deal, WASH. POST, Oct.
4, 1997, at Al. See also Sanctions On France, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1997, at A24, charac-
terizing the failure to impose sanctions on Total as inviting "a painful blow to [U.S.] inter-
est and pride." See also John Lancaster, Tehran Reacts Coolly to Sanctions Waiver,
WASH. POST, May 20, 1998, at A19; Thomas W. Lippman, Senators Ask Sanctions Over
Iranian Gas Deal, WASH. POST, May 9, 1998, at A20; Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Aides
Still Divided Over Sanctions on Foreign Investors in Iran, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1998, at
A33.
259. See Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Bridging the Atlantic Divide, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
1996, at A17. Rosenfeld concludes that "a little tension with the allies over something
extremely important where the United States has a strong position and has showed pa-
tience may not be such a bad thing after all .... [s]uch [tension] can be justified in the
face of a clear and politically uncluttered terrorist menace." Id. See also U.S. Aides Still
Divided Over Sanctions on Foreign Investors in Iran, supra note 258, at A33.
260. U.S. Ponders Sanctions for Oil Deal in Iran, supra note 219, at A9 (quoting Hil-
lary Mann, an analyst employed by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy).
261. See Peter W. Rodman, Why Ease Up on Iran?, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1996, at A25.
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However, the Clinton administration's decision was not subject to
universal condemnation. Richard N. Haass, the director of foreign policy
studies at the Brookings Institution, praised President Clinton's failure
to impose sanctions as a prudent decision designed not to send "a hos-
tile signal to the new leadership in Tehran at a time when the United
States might usefully explore establishing a dialogue."262 The Admini-
stration's decision was also praised as a recognition of the general inef-
fectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions as well as Iran's ability to
escape the harshest consequences of such sanctions. 263 Additionally, the
imposition of sanctions were also condemned as harmful to the interests
of American businesses operating overseas as well as relations between
the United States and its European and Asian allies. 264 Regardless of
their bases for praising the Clinton administration's restraint in refus-
ing to implement ILSA, all of the commentators agreed that a reas-
sessment of U.S. policy towards Iran is long overdue.
265
III. PROVISIONS OF THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
ILSA provides for three specific methods for accomplishment of the
purposes set forth in Section I of this article.266 Initially, Section 4(a)
urges the President to immediately commence diplomatic efforts in ap-
propriate international forums and in bilateral negotiations to establish
a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran including limitations upon
foreign investments in Iran's oil, gas and petrochemicals industries.
267
ILSA provides that the President's efforts in this regard be consistent
with U.S. policy towards Iran which, according to Congress, includes
the retardation of the development of "Iran's ability to explore for, ex-
tract, refine or transport by pipeline [its] petroleum resources." 268 Sec-
tion 2 sets forth four goals which should underlie the President's mul-
tilateral and bilateral efforts. Initially, the President's efforts should be
designed to inhibit Iran's development of weapons of mass destruction
and associated delivery systems. 269 Secondly, the President's efforts
Rodman is director of national security programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Free-
dom.
262. Richard N. Haass, Sanctions-With Care, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997, at C9.
263. See Shaul Bakhash, From Iran, an Understated Overture, WASH. POST, Dec. 18,
1997, at A27.
264. See Thomas W. Lippman, Politicians at Odds on Sanctions Policy, WASH. POST,
May 19, 1998, at A17. See also Robin Wright, U.S. Losing Support in 'Containing' Iraq
and Iran, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at Al.
265. See Haass, supra note 262, at C9. See also Bakhash, supra note 263, at A27;
Wright, supra note 264, at Al.
266. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
267. See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 4(a), 110 Stat. 1541, 1542-43 (1996).
268. See id. § 3(a). Section 14(15) defines "petroleum resources" as "petroleum and
natural gas resources." See id. § 14(15).
269. See id. § 2(1).
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should attempt to inhibit the Iranian Government's support of acts of
international terrorism. 270 Congress specifically determined that Ira-
nian sponsorship of such acts endanger the national security and for-
eign policy interests of the United States and those members of the in-
ternational community which share U.S. strategic and foreign policy
interests. 271 Thirdly, Congress urged the President to strive to deny
Iran the financial resources necessary to sustain its nuclear, chemical,
biological and ballistic missile weapons programs as well as its support
for international terrorism. 272 Finally, ILSA calls upon the President to
endeavor to terminate the continuing use of diplomatic facilities and
quasi-governmental institutions by the government of Iran to promote
acts of international terrorism and assist in its nuclear, chemical, bio-
logical and ballistic missile weapons programs. 273 Other than the
United Nations, ILSA does not identify the international forums in
which such efforts are to occur and leaves the means by which its goals
are to be accomplished to presidential discretion.
2 7 4
The second method by which ILSA seeks to accomplish its purposes
is through increased consultation between the President and Congress
regarding U.S. policy towards Iran. ILSA requires four separate consul-
270. See id. § 14(1) defines an "act of international terrorism" as follows:
Act of International Terrorism - The term "act of international terrorism"
means an act which is violent or dangerous to human life and that is a viola-
tion of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or that would be
a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States
or any State; and which appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a ci-
vilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kid-
napping.
See id. § 14(1).
271. See id. § 2(1).
272. See id. § 2(2). Congress was particularly concerned about Iran's efforts to develop
nuclear weapons. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. Section 14(13) defines
a "nuclear explosive device" as follows:
Nuclear Explosive Device - The term "nuclear explosive device" means any
device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an
instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear
material (as defined in Section 11 (aa) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) that
is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detona-
tion of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14(13), 110 Stat. 1541, 1550 (1996).
273. See ILSA, § 2(3). Section 14(10) defines "Iran" as the Iranian Government as well
as any of its agencies or instrumentalities. See id. § 14(10).
'Iranian diplomats, representatives and quasi-governmental institutions' are
defined as including 'employees, representatives or affiliates of Iran's For-
eign Ministry, Ministry of Intelligence and Security, Revolutionary Guard
Corps, Crusade for Reconstruction, Qods (Jerusalem) Forces, Interior Minis-
try, Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled, Prophet's Foundation, June
5th Foundation, Martyr's Foundation, Islamic Propagation Organization and
the Ministry of Islamic Guidance.'
See id. § 14(11).
274. See id. § 4(a).
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tations between the executive and legislative branches regarding U.S.
policy towards Iran. Initially, Section 4(b) requires the President to re-
port to appropriate Congressional committees on the success of his bi-
lateral and multilateral efforts to economically isolate Iran pursuant to
Section 4(a).275 The initial report must be filed with Congress no later
than one year from the date of ILSA's enactment with subsequent re-
ports to be filed on a periodic basis. 276 Each report must identify those
countries which have undertaken measures to deter Iranian support for
international terrorism, its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
and development of its petroleum resources.277 The report must include
a description of each listed countries' anti-Iranian measures. 278 Addi-
tionally, the report must include a list of those countries which have not
adopted such measures and the President's recommended course of ac-
tion with respect to such countries. 279
Additionally, the President was required to file an interim report
on multilateral sanctions against Iran with appropriate Congressional
committees no later than ninety days after ILSA's enactment.280 This
report was required to address three separate issues. Initially, the re-
port was required to determine the existence of "legislative or adminis-
trative standards providing for the imposition of trade sanctions on per-
sons or their affiliates doing business or having investments in Iran" in
the member states of the European Union, the Republic of Korea, Aus-
tralia, Israel and Japan. 281 Secondly, the report was required to deter-
mine the extent and duration of the application of sanctions against
Iran by any of the above-listed countries.282 Decisions of the World
Trade Organization or its predecessor organization regarding the com-
patibility of such sanctions with the dictates of international trade as
set forth in GATT was the third and final topic for inclusion within the
report required by Section 4(e).283
The third instance of legislatively-mandated consultation between
the President and Congress concerns the imposition, delay and waiver
of sanctions. Section 9(a)(4) of ILSA requires the President to report to
Congress no later than ninety days after electing to impose sanctions
275. See id. § 4(b). "Appropriate Congressional Committees" are defined as "the Com-
mittee on Finance, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means,
the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives." See id. § 14(2).
276. See id. § 4(b).
277. See id. § 4(b)(1).
278. See id.
279. See id. § 4(b)(2).
280. See id. § 4(e).
281. See id. § 4(e)(1). Noticeable by its absence was any reference to legislative and
administrative standards providing for the imposition of trade sanctions against Iran by
Canada, the U.S. largest trading partner.
282. See id. § 4(e)(2).
283. See id. § 4(e)(3).
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pursuant to Section 5.284 This report must disclose the status of consul-
tations with the foreign government possessing primary jurisdiction
over the sanctioned person and the reasons supporting any delays in
the actual enforcement of sanctions. 285 Additionally, Section 9(c)(1) re-
quires the President to submit a report to the appropriate Congres-
sional committees prior to waiving the initial or continued imposition of
sanctions. 286 A waiver of sanctions pursuant to this section become ef-
fective no less than thirty days after the President determines and re-
ports to Congress that the waiver is necessary to serve the national in-
terests of the United States. 287 The report must contain "a specific and
detailed rationale" for the waiver including a description of the conduct
that resulted in the threatened or actual imposition of sanctions. 28 8 In
the case of a foreign person, the report must also contain an explanation
of the President's efforts "to secure the cooperation of the government
with primary jurisdiction over the sanctioned person to terminate or, as
appropriate, penalize the activities that resulted in the [actual or
threatened imposition of sanctions] .,289
The final instance when consultations are required between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches concerns the President's initiatives to
further isolate Iran in the international community. In order to "con-
tribute to [Congress'] ability to evaluate the effectiveness of [ILSA],"290
the President is required to transmit a report to Congress no later than
six months after the enactment of ILSA and every six months thereafter
describing his efforts to initiate a multilateral campaign to pressure
Iran to cease its support of acts of international terrorism and develop-
284. See id. § 9(a)(4).
285. See id.
286. See id. § 9(c)(1).
287. See id. According to Congress, the national interests of the United States include:
cases in which imposition of sanctions would threaten U.S. intelligence
sources and methods, where a particular sanction would raise significant is-
sues under the international obligations of the U.S., and where international
cooperation in pursuit of the goals of the bill could be jeopardized, rather
than assisted, through unilateral U.S. action, or where sanctions would lead
to unacceptable costs to U.S. economic interests.
See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 18 (1996).
288. See ILSA, § 9(c)(2)(A).
289. Id. § 9(c)(2)(B). Section 14 defines "persons" to include natural person, corpora-
tions, business associations, partnerships, societies, trusts, nongovernmental entities, or-
ganizations or groups, governmental entities operating as business enterprises and any of
their successors. See id. § 14(A)-(C). "U.S. persons" are defined as U.S. citizens in the
case of natural persons and corporations or other legal entities organized pursuant to the
laws of the United States or any of its States or territories if U.S. citizens "own, directly or
indirectly, more than fifty percent of the outstanding capital stock or other beneficial in-
terest" in the entity. See id. § 14(17)(A)-(B). "Foreign persons" are defined as all persons
who do not meet the requirements set forth in the definition of U.S. persons. See id.
§14(7)(A)-(B).
290. H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 18.
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ment of weapons of mass destruction. 291 Additionally, the President's
report is required to detail his efforts to persuade other countries to re-
duce the presence of Iranian diplomats and representatives within their
respective jurisdictions and expel any such persons who participated in
the seizure of the U.S. embassy and ensuing hostage crisis.2 92 The
President's report must also describe the extent to which the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency has established regular inspections of all
nuclear facilities in Iran 293 and Iran's use of its diplomats and represen-
tatives to promote acts of international terrorism and further its devel-
opment of weapons of mass destruction.294 Finally, this section requires
the President to ensure the continued transmittal to Congress of reports
concerning Iran's military capabilities 295 and its support for acts of in-
ternational terrorism as part of the State Department's annual report
on terrorism.
296
The third method by which ILSA seeks to accomplish its objectives
is clearly the most controversial. Section 5(a) provides for the imposi-
tion of economic sanctions upon persons who, with actual knowledge,
make an investment of $40 million or more in any twelve month period
which directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of
Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources. Recognizing the Presi-
dent's primary responsibility for the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs, this
section grants "broad latitude" to the President in determining under
what circumstances sanctions would be appropriate and their ultimate
form and implementation.2 97 Nevertheless, Congress fully expected the
complete and timely implementation of sanctions having a "demonstra-
ble impact" upon all persons engaging in conduct in violation of ILSA.
298
Section 5(a) requires the imposition of two or more sanctions enu-
merated in Section 6 if the President determines that a person has,
with actual knowledge, made an investment 299 of $40 million or more
291. See ILSA, § 10(a)(1).
292. See id. § 10(a)(2).
293. See id. § 10(a)(3).
294. See id. § 1O(a)(4).
295. See id. § 10(b)(1). This report is required by Section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 and Section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993. See 22 U.S.C. § 3281 (1994) and Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2571
(1992).
296. See ILSA, § 10(b)(2).
297. H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(1), at 14 (1996).
298. Id. at 15, 17.
299. The term "investment" is defined as:
any of the following activities if such activity is undertaken pursuant to an
agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such an agreement,
that is entered into with the Government of Iran or a nongovernmental en-
tity in Iran.. . on or after the date of enactment of this Act: The entry into a
contract that includes responsibility for the development of petroleum re-
sources located in Iran... or the entry into a contract providing for the gen-
eral supervision and guarantee of another person's performance of such a
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that directly and significantly contributed to the enhancement of Iran's
ability to develop 300 its petroleum resources.30 ' The prohibited invest-
ment may be in one lump sum or may consist of any combination of in-
vestments of at least $10 million each which in the aggregate equal or
exceed $40 million in any twelve month period.30 2 In order to qualify as
sanctionable conduct, the investment must have occurred on or after
the date of ILSA's enactment.30 3 The amount of the $40 million "in-
vestment trigger" is lowered to $20 million dollars in any twelve month
period with respect to the nationals of all countries other than those
designated by the President pursuant to Section 4(c) 30 4 at any time after
the President has submitted his initial report to Congress as required
by Section 4(b).305 This $20 million investment may also be in one lump
sum or may consist of a combination of investments of at least $5 mil-
lion each which in the aggregate equal or exceed $20 million in any
twelve month period.
306
Section 5(c) identifies two classifications of persons subject to the
imposition of sanctions. Initially, sanctions must be imposed against
any person the President determines to have engaged in an investment
in Iran prohibited by Section 5(a).30 7 The President may also impose
sanctions upon any person he determines to be a successor entity, par-
ent, subsidiary or affiliate of a sanctioned person. 308 However, prior to
imposing sanctions against a parent or subsidiary, the President must
find that the parent or subsidiary, with actual knowledge, made a pro-
hibited investment in violation of Section 5(a). 30 9 With regard to affili-
ates, the President must not only find the existence of a prohibited in-
vestment made with actual knowledge but must also conclude that the
contract; The purchase of a share of ownership, including an equity interest,
in that development; The entry into a contract providing for the participation
in royalties, earnings or profits in that development, without regard to the
form of the participation. The term "investment" does not include the entry
into, performance or financing of a contract to sell or purchase goods, serv-
ices or technology.
See ILSA, § 14(9).
300. The terms "develop" and "development" of petroleum resources are defined as "the
exploration for, or the extraction, refining or transportation by pipeline of, petroleum re-
sources." See id. § 14(4).
301. See id. § 5(a).
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text. The President must identify for
Congress all countries which are exempt from the lowered "investment trigger" estab-
lished by Section 4(d)(1). See ILSA, § 4(d)(1).
305. See ILSA, § 4(d)(1). See also supra notes 295-99 and accompanying text.
306. See ILSA, § 4(d)(1).
307. See id. § 5(c)(1).
308. See id. § 5(c)(2)(A)-(C).
309. See id. § 5(c)(2)(B).
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affiliate is controlled by the sanctioned person. 310 A list of such sanc-
tioned persons and prohibited investments must be published on a peri-
odic basis in the Federal Register.3 1 Additionally, concerned persons
may request an advisory opinion from the Secretary of State as to
whether a proposed investment violates ILSA's prohibitions. 312 Good
faith reliance upon an opinion which determines that the proposed in-
vestment does not violate ILSA exempts the requesting party from
sanctions based upon its subsequent participation in the investment.
31 3
The President's decision to impose sanctions is not subject to judicial
review.
314
Once the President determines that the imposition of sanctions is
appropriate, he must impose two of the six sanctions listed in Section 6.
The actual sanctions selected are subject to the President's exercise of
discretion. 315 The available sanctions may be categorized in four sepa-
rate classifications. The first and largest classification consists of prohi-
bitions involving financial institutions. 316 Initially, the President may
instruct the Export-Import Bank of the United States to reject any
guarantee, insurance, extension of credit or participation in the exten-
sion of credit in connection with the export of any goods or services to
any sanctioned person. 317 Additionally, the U.S. Government may pro-
hibit any U.S. financial institution 31S8 from making loans or providing
credits to sanctioned persons totaling more than $10 million in any
twelve month period.3 19 Loans or credits to persons engaged in activities
to relieve human suffering are exempted from this prohibition if such
loans or credits are to be utilized for such humanitarian purposes.
320
If the sanctioned person is a financial institution, the U.S. Govern-
ment may impose one or both of two available sanctions. Initially, the
U.S. Government may bar the Federal Reserve System and the Federal
310. See id. § 5(c)(2)(C).
311. See id. § 5(d)-(e).
312. See id. § 7.
313. See id.
314. See id. § 11. Congress did not believe judicial review to be prudent given the care-
ful and deliberate fashion in which sanctions are imposed pursuant to the Act and the ne-
cessity of timely implementation given the serious national security risk posed by Iran.
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 17 (1996).
315. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(11), at 17.
316. See ILSA, § 6 (1), (3) and (4).
317. See id. § 6(1).
318. The term "financial institution" is defined to include:
(A) a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c)(1) of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Act), including a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as de-
fined in section l(b)(7) of the International Banking Act of 1978); (B) a credit
union; (C) a securities firm, including a broker or dealer;
(D) an insurance company, including an agency or underwriter; and (E) any
other company that provides financial services.
See id. § 14(5).
319. See id. § 6(3).
320. See id.
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Reserve Bank of New York from designating or permitting the con-
tinuation of a sanctioned financial institution as a primary dealer in
U.S. Government debt instruments.321 In addition, a sanctioned finan-
cial institution may not serve as an agent of the U.S. Government or
serve as a repository for U.S. Government funds. 322 The imposition of
both of these sanctions against a financial institution constitutes two
separate sanctions.
323
The second, third and fourth classifications consist of procurement
and trade sanctions. The U.S. Government may be prohibited from pro-
curing, or entering into any contract for the procurement of, any goods
or services from a sanctioned person.324 Additionally, the President may
order the U.S. Government to deny permission, authority or a license to
export any goods or technology to a sanctioned person pursuant to the
Export Administration Act of 1979,325 the Arms Export Control Act 326
and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.327 The U.S. Government may also
refuse to grant a license for the export of any goods or services to a
sanctioned person pursuant to any other federal statute that requires
its prior review and approval. 328 Finally, the President may impose
sanctions, as appropriate, to restrict imports with respect to a sanc-
tioned person in accordance with IEEPA3 29
ILSA provides the President with considerable discretion to waive,
delay or grant exceptions to the imposition of sanctions. Section 5(f) of
ILSA sets forth numerous instances when the President may except
persons from the imposition of sanctions on the basis of national secu-
rity. Specifically, the President is not required to apply or maintain
sanctions in the case of existing procurement contracts, subcontracts
and options for goods and services utilized for national defense and es-
sential to U.S. national security.330 Government procurement contracts,
subcontracts and options are also immune from sanctions if the Presi-
dent determines that the person subject to sanctions is the sole source
supplier of essential goods or services and there are no readily or rea-
321. See id. § 6(4)(A).
322. See id. § 6(4)(B).
323. See id. § 6(4).
324. See id. § 6(5).
325. See id. § 6(2)(i). See also Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §
2405 (1998).
326. See ILSA, § 6(2)(ii). See also Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2756
(1994).
327. See ILSA, § 6(2)(iii). See also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2023
(1994).
328. See ILSA, § 6(2)(iv).
329. See id. § 6(6). In order to invoke sanctions pursuant to this section of ILSA, a na-
tional economic emergency must be declared by the President pursuant to sections §
1702(a)(1)(A)-(B) of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. (1998). See also H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 17
(1996).
330. See ILSA, § 5(f)(1)(A).
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sonably available alternate sources. 33 1 Additionally, the President may
provide an exception for goods and services essential to national secu-
rity under defense co-production agreements.
332
Section 5(f) sets forth numerous other grounds for Presidential ex-
ceptions from the imposition of sanctions. In the case of government
procurement of non-defense related products, the President may pro-
vide for an exception for goods of any foreign country or instrumentality
as provided pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 333 Products,
technology and services provided under contracts entered into prior to
the date of publication of the name of the sanctioned person in the Fed-
eral Register are also excepted from the application of sanctions. 334
Sanctions also may not be applied to contracts for spare and compo-
nents parts, information and technology essential to U.S. products or
production.335 Additionally, sanctions are not required to be imposed
upon contracts for the routine servicing and maintenance of products to
the extent that alternative sources are not readily or reasonably avail-
able. 336 Finally, contracts for medicines, medical supplies and other
humanitarian items are exempt from the imposition of sanctions.
337
Two separate sections of ILSA grant authority to the President to
waive the application of sanctions. Section 4(c)(1) provides for the
waiver of sanctions by the President with respect to nationals of a coun-
try that has agreed to undertake substantial measures that will inhibit
Iran's support of international terrorism, development and acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction and utilization of its diplomats and rep-
resentatives to achieve these objectives. 338 The President must notify all
appropriate Congressional committees of his intention to grant such a
waiver thirty days prior to its effective date.339 The granting of a waiver
pursuant to Section 4(c)(1) also exempts nationals of such countries
from application of the enhanced sanctions regime set forth in Section
4(d).340 The President may also waive the initial or continued imposition
of sanctions thirty days or more after determining and certifying to
Congress that the waiver is in the national interest of the United
States.341 The President must provide "a specific and detailed rationale"
for this waiver. 342 In this regard, the President's certification to Con-
331. See id. § 5(f)(1)(B).
332. See id. § 5(f)(1)(C).
333. See id. § 5(f)(2). See also Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4)(A)-
(D), 2511 (b)(1)-(4) (1994).
334. See ILSA, § 5(f)(3).
335. See id. § 5(f)(4)-(6).
336. See id. § 5(f)(4)(C).
337. See id. § 5(f)(7).
338. See id. § 4(c)(1).
339. See id. § 4(c)(2).
340. See id. § 4(d)(1). See also supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text.
341. See ILSA, § 9(c)(1).
342. See id. § 9(c)(2).
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gress must contain a description of the conduct at issue and U.S. efforts
to obtain the cooperation of the government exercising jurisdiction in
the case of a foreign person.343 In addition, the report must provide an
estimate as to the significance of the conduct at issue to Iran's ability to
develop its petroleum resources and contain a statement as to the likely
U.S. response to future conduct by the sanctioned person in contraven-
tion of the Act.
344
Finally, Section 9(a) of ILSA establishes circumstances when the
President may delay the imposition of sanctions. If the President de-
termines that sanctions are appropriate pursuant to Section 5(a), he is
instructed to immediately initiate consultations with the government
exercising primary jurisdiction over the sanctioned person regarding
the basis for his decision. 345 In order to increase the likelihood of a suc-
cessful conclusion to these consultations, the President may delay the
imposition of sanctions for up to ninety days. 346 Following the conclu-
sion of such consultations, the President must immediately impose
sanctions unless he determines and certifies to Congress that the gov-
ernment possessing primary jurisdiction over the sanctioned person has
taken "specific and effective actions" to resolve U.S. concerns. 347 These
actions may include the imposition of appropriate sanctions by the for-
eign government in order to terminate the prohibited involvement of
the sanctioned person in Iran.348 If the foreign government initiates
such "specific and effective actions," the President may suspend the im-
plementation of sanctions for an additional ninety days upon further
certification to Congress. 349 In any event, the President is required to
submit a report to the appropriate Congressional committees on the
status of consultations with foreign governments and the basis for any
delays within ninety days of the decision to impose sanctions pursuant
to Section 5(a).350
Sanctions may also terminate as a result of Iran's actions or by op-
eration of law. Section 8(a) provides for the termination of sanctions
when ILSA's objectives are met. Two separate determinations must be
made in order for ILSA's objectives to be deemed to have been met.
First, the President must determine and certify to Congress that Iran
has ceased its efforts to manufacture or acquire weapons of mass de-
struction.351 Second, the President must certify to Congress that Iran
343. See id. § 9(c)(2)(A)-(B).
344. See id. § 9(c)(2)(C)-(D).
345. See id. § 9(a)(1).
346. See id. § 9(a)(2).
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See id. § 9(a)(3).
350. See id. § 9(a)(4).
351. See id. § 8(a)(1)(A)-(C). Included within the term "weapons of mass destruction"
are nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles and related
launch technology. Id.
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has been removed from the list of countries providing sponsorship and
support for international terrorism compiled pursuant to Section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979.352 If these two conditions are
satisfied, the President is released from his obligation to impose sanc-
tions.
Sanctions may also terminate by operation of law. Section 9(b)(1)
provides that sanctions shall remain in effect for a period of not less
than two years from the date of their imposition. 353 Alternatively, sanc-
tions may be lifted if the President certifies to Congress that the sanc-
tioned person has ceased to engage in the activities which led to their
imposition. 3 4 However, the President must receive "reliable assur-
ances" that the sanctioned person will not knowingly make prohibited
investments in Iran in the future. 355 Even if the President makes these
determinations, the sanctions must remain in effect for at least one
year. 356 In any event, Section 13(b) provides that ILSA shall cease to be
effective five years from the date of its enactment.
357
IV. THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT: SERVING U.S. INTERESTS?
Despite its purported purposes of serving the national security in-
terests of the United States and moderating Iranian behavior through
multilateral political pressure and unilateral economic sanctions, ILSA
does not serve U.S. international and national interests. The Act is in-
consistent with the U.S.'s long-standing opposition to secondary boy-
cotts and jeopardizes the leadership role of the United States in inter-
national affairs. Further, the isolationist policy toward Iran expressed
in the Act will fail without the cooperation of the international commu-
nity. In addition, the Act serves to exclude American companies from
significant portions of the lucrative Middle Eastern oil and gas indus-
tries and subjects such companies to the threat of foreign retaliation.
The Act may also serve to discourage reform in Iran by fostering con-
tinued hostility toward the United States and stoking Iranian nation-
alism. Finally, the Act minimizes potential American influence upon fu-
ture events in Iran.
Initially, ILSA is inconsistent with the long-standing opposition of
the United States to secondary boycotts. 358 For example, in 1950, the
352. See id. § 8(a)(2). See also Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §
2405(0) (1998).
353. See ILSA, § 9(b)(1).
354. See id. § 9(b)(2).
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id. § 13(b). Congress concluded that "[flive years is adequate time to gauge its
effectiveness at achieving [Congress'] objectives." H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(11), at 19 (1996).
Congress will reevaluate ILSA's provisions at the end of five years based upon Iran's be-
havior and ILSA's perceived effectiveness. See id.
358. A "secondary boycott" consists of restrictions upon international trade directed at
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Arab League Council, the executive branch of the Arab League, 359 rec-
ommended that member states compile a blacklist of third country
ships that carried Jewish immigrants or military cargo to Israel. 360 The
boycott was subsequently expanded to include all firms making a "ma-
terial contribution to the strength of Israel."361 "Material contributions"
were defined as the establishment of plants in Israel, the use of an
agent or principal office located in Israel and actions taken to develop
Israel's natural resources. 362 Entry into a partnership with an Israeli
company, holding shares of an Israeli company, supplying advice or
technical assistance to Israeli manufacturing plants and permitting an
Israeli company to use the name or trademarks of a foreign company
were also defined as "material contributions." 363 The armaments, tour-
ist, petroleum, insurance and banking industries were excepted from
the boycott. 364 Non-Israeli companies engaging in these activities were
prohibited from doing business with members of the Arab League or
companies located therein.365 The United States opposed the boycott on
the bases that it targeted an important ally and violated international
law. 366 ILSA is completely contrary to this policy of active opposition to
secondary boycotts.
ILSA also jeopardizes the leadership role of the United States in in-
ternational affairs and institutions. For example, in 1993, the United
States implemented the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) with two of its largest trading partners, Canada and Mex-
ico. 367 Article 301 of Chapter Three of NAFTA requires the United
States, Canada and Mexico to accord national treatment to each other's
one country as well as other countries and businesses located therein doing business and
maintaining relations with the primary target of the boycott. See JOHN H. JACKSON &
WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 951-52
(2d ed. 1986).
359. The Arab League was organized in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Yemen.
360. See NORMAN VANDER CLUTE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT 12 (1977).
361. Id. at 16. See also EDWARD HOTALING, THE ARAB BLACKLIST UNVEILED 18-26
(1977).
362. See VANDER CLUTE, supra note 360, at 16-17.
363. See id. at 16.
364. See id. at 17. Exceptions to the boycott are permitted where the "higher interests
of an Arab state require them." Id.
365. The resolutions of the Arab League have no legal force and effect until League
member states adopt internal laws and procedures implementing the resolutions. As
such, there is considerable variance among Arab states with regard to the boycott, and
each state maintains its own rules with regard to the enforcement of the boycott within its
territory.
366. See HOTALING, supra note 361, at 18-26. See also Lippman, supra note 18, at Al.
367. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§
3301-473 (1994).
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goods in accordance with Article III of GATT.368 In this regard, Article
301 of NAFTA incorporates by reference GATT's national treatment
provisions. 369 NAFTA defines "national treatment" as "treatment no
less favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded by such state
or province to any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods, as
the case may be, of the Party which it forms a part."
37 0
Exceptions to the requirement of national treatment are governed
by Chapters Eight and Twenty-One of NAFTA. Article 802 of Chapter
Eight of NAFTA incorporates the emergency actions provisions of Arti-
cle XIX of GATT.37 1 Chapter Twenty-One of NAFTA incorporates Article
XX of GATT setting forth general exceptions to the contracting parties'
obligations. Specifically, Article 2101(1) of NAFTA provides, in part,
that "[flor purposes of ... [t]rade in [g]oods ... GATT Article XX and its
interpretive notes ... are incorporated into and made a part of this
Agreement."372 Additionally, Article 2102(1) of NAFTA provides for an
368. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 3, art.
303(1), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Article 303(1) specifically pro-
vides, in part, that "[e]ach Party shall accord national treatment to the goods of another
Party in accordance with Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), including its interpretive notes." See id.
369. See id. Article III, § 2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provides in
part that, "[tihe products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the terri-
tory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indi-
rectly, to like domestic products." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-11, A-18, 62 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter GATT]. In addition, Article III, § 4 of
GATT provides in part that:
[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the ter-
ritory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less fa-
vourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
Id. art. III, § 4.
370. NAFTA, supra note 368, ch. 3, art. 301, § 2.
371. Article 802, § 1 of NAFFA provides in part that, "[e]ach Party retains its rights
and obligations under Article XIX of GAIT." Id. ch. 8, art. 802, § 1. Article XIX, § 1, cl. a
of GATT provides in part that:
[ilf, as a result of unforeseen developments ... any product is being imported
into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic pro-
ducers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the con-
tracting party shall be free ... to suspend the obligation in whole or in part
or to withdraw or modify the concession.
GATT, supra note 369.
372. NAFTA, supra note 368, ch. 21, art. 2101, § 1. Article XX of GATT provides in
part that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries ... or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of measures: necessary to protect public
morals; necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; relating
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exception for the maintenance of national security. 373
However, Section 6(6) of ILSA provides that one of the penalties
which the President may impose is a restriction upon imports. 374 This
penalty violates the national treatment provisions of Article 301 of
NAFTA. Goods originating from foreign persons deemed by the Presi-
dent to have knowingly made investments in excess of $40 million in
any twelve month period that directly and significantly contributed to
Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources may be absolutely and
completely excluded from the U.S. marketplace. Although U.S. compa-
nies are subject to broad prohibitions upon conducting business with
Iran, they are not subject to the same punishment as foreign firms
deemed to have improperly invested in Iran, specifically, the absolute
exclusion of their products from the U.S. marketplace. As a result, ILSA
violates the national treatment provisions of NAFTA by granting an un-
fair advantage to U.S. goods through the exclusion of goods originating
from sanctioned persons.
Section 6(6) requires that any restriction which the President
places upon imports must comply with the provisions of IEEPA. In or-
der to invoke this Act, the President must find that there exist "unusual
and extraordinary threats to the national security, foreign policy or
economy of the United States."375 Any restriction upon imports imposed
by the President pursuant to ILSA must also comply with Article 2102
of NAFTA which relates to national security exceptions. However, all
to the importation or exportation of gold or silver; necessary to secure com-
pliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this Agreement... ; relating to the products of prison labour; im-
posed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archaeological value; relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources...; involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary
to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing in-
dustry.. . as part of a governmental stabilization plan...; essential to the
acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply....
GATT, supra note 369.
373. See NAFTA, supra note 368, ch. 21, art. 2102. Article 2102 provides in part that:
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
to prevent any Party from taking any actions that it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests relating to ... transactions
in ... goods, materials, services and technology undertaken directly or indi-
rectly for the purpose of supplying a military or security establishment,
taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, or relat-
ing to the implementation of national policies or international agreements
respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices; or to prevent any Party from taking action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.
NAFTA, supra note 368.
374. See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6(6), 110 Stat. 1541, 1546 (1996).
375. IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (1998).
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but two of the national security exceptions set forth in Article 2102 are
inapplicable to import restrictions which may be imposed pursuant to
ILSA. Specifically, the import restrictions which may be imposed pur-
suant to ILSA do not relate to trafficking in armaments 376 and nuclear
weapons. 377 Additionally, any such restrictions would not be designed to
prevent Canada or Mexico from violating their obligations to maintain
international peace and security pursuant to the United Nations Char-
ter.3
78
Such import restrictions may come within the exception permitting
restrictions to prohibit the direct or indirect supplying of military or
other security establishments379 However, utilization of this provision
to support restrictions imposed upon imports as a result of investments
by foreign persons in Iran's oil and gas industries is weak absent over-
whelming evidence that revenues derived by Iran from these industries
are flowing directly to the military or other related institutions. Sanc-
tions imposed in the absence of such evidence serve to criminalize all
economic activity which results in revenues which may be used by the
Iranian government for military purposes.
The other NAFTA provision which may support import restrictions
imposed pursuant to ILSA permits restrictions imposed in time of an
"emergency in international relations."380 However, it is unclear
whether the definition of "international emergency" contained within
NAFTA is identical to that contained within IEEPA such that all "in-
ternational emergencies" declared pursuant to IEEPA would automati-
cally constitute emergencies pursuant to NAFTA. In any event, it can-
not be argued in good faith that NAFTA's national security exception
was intended to permit a declaration of emergency lasting nineteen
years as has been the case regarding U.S.-Iranian relations. Such an
interpretation by the United States would constitute a perversion of the
intended meaning of the term "international emergency" and would
permit the national security exception to swallow NAFTA's free trade
provisions wholesale.
NAFTA also contains provisions regarding government procure-
ment. Specifically, the United States, Canada and Mexico granted na-
tional treatment to each other's goods and service suppliers in matters
of government procurement pursuant to Article 1003.381 In addition to
376. See NAFTA, supra note 368, ch. 21, art. 2102, § 1, cl. b(i).
377. See id. ch. 21, art. 2102, § 1, cl. b(iii).
378. See id. ch. 21, art. 2102 § 1, cl. c.
379. See id. ch. 21, art. 2102, § 1, cl. b(i).
380. Id. ch. 21, art. 2102, § 1, cl. b(ii).
381. See id. ch. 10, art. 1003, § 1, cl. a-b. Article 1003 provides in part that:
[w]ith respect to [government procurement] ... each Party shall accord to
the goods of another Party, to the suppliers of such goods and to service sup-
pliers of another Party, treatment no less favorable than the most favorable
treatment that the Party accords to: (a) its own goods and suppliers; and (b)
goods and suppliers of another Party.
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the national emergency exception set forth in Article 2102(1), Article
1018 provides for exceptions to national treatment in the field of gov-
ernment procurement on the bases of essential security interests 382 and
the protection of public safety and morals, human, animal or plant life
or health and intellectual property.38 3 However, Section 6(5) of ILSA
permits the President to prohibit the U.S. Government from procuring,
or entering into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or serv-
ices from a sanctioned person. 38 4 There are no factual or procedural re-
quirements which the President must meet prior to the imposition of
this sanction other than a determination that the sanctioned person
knowingly made an investment in Iran's oil and gas industries in an
amount in excess of that permitted by law. Section 6(5) of ILSA violates
Article 1003(1) as it fails to treat sanctioned foreign persons in the same
manner as U.S. persons who would be subject to the procedures and
protections afforded in a federal debarment proceeding prior to the im-
position of such a penalty.38 5
Furthermore, the exceptions set forth in Articles 1018(1) and
2102(1) are inapplicable. Initially, the essential security interests ex-
ception contained within Article 1018(1) is inapplicable as it only grants
an exception for government procurement of goods essential for national
security or defense purposes. Procurement sanctions imposed pursuant
to Section 6(5) of ILSA are not imposed to protect domestic producers of
goods essential to the defense of the United States but, rather, are im-
posed in retaliation for investments by foreign persons in a long-
standing enemy of the United States. The national emergency exception
set forth in Article 2102(1) is equally inapplicable as it is unclear
whether an international emergency deemed to exist under U.S. law is
sufficient to support the adoption of emergency measures pursuant to
NAFTA. In any event, as set forth above, it can not be contended in
good faith that the national security exceptions contained within
See id. This national treatment requirement applies to contracts with federal governmen-
tal entities in excess of $50,000 for goods and services and $6.5 million for construction
services. See id. ch. 10, art. 1001, § 1, cl. c(i). For governmental enterprises, these
amounts are $250,000 and $8 million respectively. See id. ch. 10, art. 1001, § 1, cl. c(ii).
382. See id. ch. 10, art. 1018, § 1. Article 1018(1) provides, in part, that a party may
deviate from NAFTA's government procurement requirements when it is "necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms, am-
munition or war materials, or to procurement indispensable for national security or for
national defense purposes." See id.
383. See id. ch. 10, art. 1018, § 2, cl. a-c. Article 1018, § 2 also provides for an excep-
tion to NAFTA's government procurement requirements for goods and services of handi-
capped persons, philanthropic institutions and prison labor. See id. ch. 10, art. 1018, § 2,
cl. d.
384. See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6(5), 110 Stat. 1541, 1546 (1996).
385. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6106 (1994). See also Exec. Order No. 12, 549, 3 C.F.R. 189
(1987); Exec. Order No. 12, 689, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1989), reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 6106.
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NAFTA may be interpreted to encompass an international emergency
declared by only one country in the entire world for an unbroken nine-
teen year period.
ILSA also poses a threat to U.S. leadership in GATT and the WTO.
In 1994, the United States ratified the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations pursuant to GATT. Among its many provisions, the
Uruguay Round created the WTO. The Uruguay Round delegated to the
WTO the duty of enforcement of member states' obligations pursuant to
GATT.386 With regard to imports, these obligations include those set
forth in Article III which requires that contracting parties accord na-
tional treatment to each other's goods. 38 7 Exceptions to national treat-
ment are set forth in Articles XIX, XX and XXI. Article XIX permits the
implementation of temporary emergency measures in the event of un-
foreseeable import surges which cause or threaten to cause serious in-
jury to domestic producers.3 88 Article XX sets forth a wide range of cir-
cumstances which justify the imposition of measures in deviation from
the requirements of GATT.389 Finally, Article XXI provides for an excep-
tion to GATT for national security purposes. 390
The import sanction provided for in Section 6(6) of ILSA violates
Article III of GATT for the same reason it violates Article 301 of
NAFTA. Furthermore, none of the exceptions provided in Article XXI of
GATT are applicable. Article XXI's exceptions for confidential informa-
tion, fissionable materials, armaments and compliance with the United
Nations Charter do not provide justification for ILSA's import sanc-
tion.391 The only possibly applicable exception is that provided for ac-
tions taken in times of an emergency in international relations.392 How-
ever, it is unclear whether the definition of "international emergency"
contained within GATT is identical to that contained within the IEEPA.
Furthermore,-as stated above, Article XX's national security exception
386. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994).
387. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
390. Article XXI of GATT provides in part that:
[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed (a) to require any contracting
party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary
to its essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any contracting party
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests (i) relating to fissionable materials . . . (ii) relat-
ing to the traffic in arms... (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or (c) to prevent any contracting party from taking
any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security.
GATT, supra note 369, art. XXI.
391. See id.
392. See id. art. XXI(b)(iii).
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was not intended to support a unilateral declaration of an international
emergency lasting nineteen years.
U.S. obligations pursuant to GATT also include those set forth in
the Agreement on Government Procurement. 393 The provisions of
GATT's Agreement on Government Procurement is almost identical to
that set forth in the previously-cited sections of NAFTA. Article III of
this Agreement requires that contracting parties grant national treat-
ment to products, services and suppliers originating from all other con-
tracting parties. 394 Article XXIII of the Agreement creates exceptions to
its national treatment requirement for essential security purposes
395
and the protection of public morals and safety, human, animal and
plant life and health and intellectual property. 396 The procurement
sanction set forth in Section 6(5) of ILSA violates the Agreement on
Government Procurement for the identical reason it violates Article
1003(1) of NAFTA. 397 Furthermore, the national security exception set
forth in Article XXIII of the Agreement on Government Procurement
393. See Agreement on Government Procurement (1994) (visited Sept. 17, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/govt/agreem.html>.
394. Article III(1) of the Agreement on Government Procurement provides in part that:
[w]ith respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding
government procurement covered by this Agreement, each party shall pro-
vide immediately and unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers
of other Parties offering products or services of the Parties, treatment no less
favourable than: that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers;
and that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other Party.
Id. art. III(1)(a)-(b). This national treatment requirement applies to contracts with U.S.
federal governmental entities in excess of 130,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) for goods
and services and five million SDR for construction services. See id. Annex 1. These
amounts are 355,000 and five million SDR for sub-central governmental entities and
250,000 and five million SDR for all other public enterprises or authorities which procure
in accordance with the Agreement. See id. Annexes 2 and 3. Special Drawing Rights are
an international reserve asset used as the International Monetary Fund's official unit of
account. Its value is based on a trade-weighted basket of major currencies. See U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 2 THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE:
URUGUAY ROUND FINAL ACT SHOULD PRODUCE OVERALL U.S. ECONOMIC GAINS 155, n. 29
(1994). One SDR was equal to U.S.$1.37 at the time of preparation of this article. See
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 393, at Annex 1.
395. Article XXIII(l) of the Agreement on Government Procurement provides that:
[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from
taking any action or not disclosing any information which it considers neces-
sary for the protection of its essential security interests relating to the pro-
curement of arms, ammunition or war materials, or to procurement indis-
pensable for national security or national defense purposes.
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 393, art. XXIII(1).
396. Article XXIII(2) of the Agreement on Government Procurement provides, in part,
that "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from imposing or
enforcing measures necessary to protect public morals, order or safety, human, animal or
plant life or health or intellectual property." Id. art. XXIII(2). Article XXIII also permits
exceptions to national treatment for products or services of handicapped persons, philan-
thropic institutions and prison labor. See id.
397. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
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does not provide justification for ILSA's procurement sanction for the
same reasons set forth with regard to Articles 1018(1) and 2102(1) of
NAFTA.
The United States received negative reactions to these potential
violations of NAFTA and GATT from Canada and the European Union.
As previously noted, Canada amended its Foreign Extraterritoriality
Act to provide for fines or prison terms for company managers who
comply with orders entered pursuant to ILSA.398 The European Union
filed a formal protest to ILSA with the United States on August 8,
1996. 399 European Union officials warned the United States that the
imposition of sanctions against European firms transacting business in
Iran would seriously damage relations and could lead to the enactment
and enforcement of retaliatory measures against American business in-
terests. 400 The European Union also threatened to initiate a challenge
to ILSA before the WTO.401 Representatives of the United States and
the European Union immediately entered into discussions to resolve
their dispute regarding the compatibility of ILSA with GATT.402 Al-
though the negotiators failed to meet their self-imposed deadline of Oc-
tober 15, 1997 for resolution of the dispute, the parties agreed to con-
tinue discussions. 40 3 As part of this agreement, the European Union
agreed to refrain from filing a complaint with the WTO as long as the
United States refrained from imposing sanctions upon European firms
pursuant to ILSA.404 Discussions between the United States and the
European Union are ongoing at the time of preparation of this article.
405
The very existence of the dispute over the compatibility of ILSA
with GATT is not in and of itself troubling. 40 6 Trade disputes between
countries arise and are resolved on a routine basis in this era of global
commerce. The troubling aspect of this dispute is the potential Ameri-
398. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
399. See U.S. Law Punishing Foreign Firms Draws Fire from EU, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9,
1996, available in 1996 WL 2698903.
400. See Blustein, supra note 6.
401. See Casert, supra note 33.
402. See Raf Casert, EU, U.S. Fail to Settle Trade Dispute Over Cuba, Libya, Iran,
Assoc. PRESS, Oct. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2555359.
403. See id.
404. See id.
405. U.S. representatives have indicated that exemptions could be granted to compa-
nies based in European Union countries if such countries adopted measures demonstrat-
ing support for U.S. efforts to contain Iran other than ILSA. See Lippman, supra note
246, at Al.
406. But see Casert, supra note 32, wherein Sir Leon Brittan, the European Union's
chief trade negotiator, warned that ILSA "creates tension between Europe and the United
States which makes it more difficult to work together to achieve shared political objectives
in Iran." Id. See also Archie M. Bolster, The Way to Win in Iran, WASH. PoST, Nov. 10,
1997, at A20, wherein the author states that "continued emphasis on sanctions against
Iran involving punishment of foreign firms that trade there... would bring about [unfor-
tunate] 'tensions with allies and strategic partners."'
VOL. 27:1
MEDDLING WITH THE MULLAHS
can reaction to any complaint which the European Union may file with
the WTO challenging ILSA. In response to a complaint filed by the
European Union challenging the compatibility of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996407 with GATT, the Clinton Admini-
stration stated that the WTO was an inappropriate forum for the reso-
lution of political disputes such as exist with regard to U.S. policy to-
ward Cuba, 408 and the decision to proceed with such a case would pose
"serious risks" for the future of the WTO. 40 9 As such, the Clinton Ad-
ministration announced its intention to boycott any hearing held upon
the European Union's complaint.
410
As noted by the WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero, the WTO
dispute panel procedure is "the only rules-based system with enforce-
ment capacity" in the field of international trade.411 An American deci-
sion not to comply with an adverse decision of a dispute panel which
may be formed to review ILSA could undermine the effectiveness of the
WTO. 4 12 A potential U.S. challenge to the formation of such a panel
could undermine GATT's dispute resolution procedures, deny the WTO
institutional credibility and render the institution moribund.
The inconsistent use and application of boycotts by the United
States also threatens its leadership role in international affairs. For ex-
ample, the United States maintains an embargo against North Korea
but nevertheless has provided it with aid in the form of food.413 Further,
the United States has, in the past, imposed or threatened to impose
sanctions against countries engaged in human rights violations but, at
the same time, has ignored equally egregious violations in other coun-
tries. For example, the United States imposed sanctions against South
Africa in protest of its policy of apartheid but elected to ignore human
rights violations in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and South Ko-
407. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§
6021-6091 (1996). Otherwise known as the Helms-Burton Act after its chief legislative
sponsors, the Act imposes numerous sanctions upon foreign companies transacting busi-
ness in Cuba utilizing personal and real property expropriated from Americans by the
Castro regime including civil liability in U.S. federal courts and the exclusion of such per-
sons from the United States. See id. §§ 6082, 6091.
408. See Slobodan Lekic, U.S. Refuses to Recognize Trade Dispute Panel on Cuba,
Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4856941.
409. Id.
410. See Paul Blustein & Anne Swardson, U.S. Vows to Boycott WTO Panel; Move Es-
calates Fight with European Union Over Cuba Sanctions, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at
Al, available in 1997 WL 9335994.
411. See Elizabeth Wise, EU Plans New Attack on U.S. Laws, USA TODAY, Oct. 17,
1996, available in 1996 WL 2072282.
412. See id. Julius Katz, a former deputy U.S. trade representative, has characterized
the U.S. announced position to boycott the dispute resolution panel proceeding as one
which "runs a major risk of tearing down the WTO." See Blustein & Swardson, supra
note 410.
413. See Donald L. Losman, A Look at ... The Case Against Sanctions: Good Intentions
Gone Bad; Punitive Trade Embargoes are Appealing But They Don't Achieve our Goals,
WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at C3.
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rea. 414 The abandonment of sanctions against the Peoples' Republic of
China imposed after the Tienanmen Square massacre in favor of a pol-
icy of "critical dialogue" is another example of the inconsistency of U.S.
sanctions policy.
415
The use of sanctions by the United States in the Middle East has
also been plagued by inconsistency. Perhaps the best recent example of
this inconsistency is U.S. policy towards Sudan. In April 1996, Presi-
dent Clinton signed the Antiterrorism Act of 1996 into law. 4 16 Section
321(a) of the Act bars Americans from engaging in financial transac-
tions with governments on the U.S. list of states accused of supporting
international terrorism. 41 7 Sudan is included on this list due to its ac-
tive support of Islamic extremist groups and harboring of terrorists.
418
Nevertheless, on August 23, 1996, the Treasury Department granted an
exemption to Occidental Petroleum Corporation permitting it to join
Canada's Arakis Energy Corporation in the development of fields in
southern Sudan containing an estimated 3.5 billion barrels of oil.419 The
Clinton Administration's attempt to distinguish between the exemption
granted to Occidental and U.S. policy toward Iran was factually defi-
cient.420 Although Occidental was subsequently excluded from partici-
414. See id. Other potential targets of unilateral American sanctions include Indone-
sia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey based primarily on these countries' abysmal human
rights records. See Paul Blustein, Burma Campaign Has Business Fighting Trend To-
ward Sanctions, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1997, at Cl, available in 1997 WL 9337742. The
United States presently maintains a trade embargo, export or import restrictions or other
forms of economic sanctions on seventy-three countries. This proliferating use of eco-
nomic sanctions has been credited with "creating regulatory chaos, confusion about objec-
tives, strains in relations with allies and sometimes counterproductive responses - often
without achieving the purpose for which the sanctions were designed." U.S. Rethinking
Economic Sanctions; State Dept. Team Weighs Costs, Impact of Trade Restrictions, WASH.
POST, Jan. 26, 1998, at A6, available in 1998 WL 2464160.
415. See Losman, supra note 413, at C3. See also Barry Schweid, Albright Asks EU to
Curb Trade, ASSOc. PRESS, Apr. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4863925.
416. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2332
(1994).
417. Section 321(a) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 pro-
vides in part that:
[e]xcept as provided in regulations issued by the Secretary of Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, whoever, being a United States per-
son, knowing or having reasonable cause to know that a country is desig-
nated under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act ... as a country
supporting international terrorism, engages in a financial transaction with
the government of that country, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for
not more than 10 years or both.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2332d(a) (1994).
418. Sudan has been described as trailing only Iran as a training ground for Islamic
extremists involved in attacks upon pro-U.S. interests in the Middle East such as the at-
tempted assassination of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in
June 1995. See David B. Ottaway, U.S. Eased Law on Terrorism to Aid Oil Firm; Exemp-
tion Let Occidental Seek Major Deal in Sudan, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1997, at Al.
419. See id.
420. State Department officials defended the exemption on the existence of relations
MEDDLING WITH THE MULLAHS
pation in this project by the Sudanese Government in November 1996,
the Treasury Department's waiver may establish a precedent for U.S.
companies seeking to conduct business in similarly-listed countries in
the future.
421
Recent U.S. policy toward Iran is plagued with this same inconsis-
tency. Despite the characterization of current Iranian policies as a seri-
ous threat to U.S. national security interests, ILSA fails to sanction ex-
isting investments in Iran 422 and requires artificially high levels of
investment before penalties may be triggered. 423 ILSA is also rife with
provisions granting exceptions, waivers and delays from the imposition
of penalties.424 Perhaps most instructive is the complete failure of the
Clinton Administration to utilize ILSA against a single foreign firm.
Furthermore, despite the existence of ILSA's sanctions regime and
growing American concerns about Iran's influence in Europe, the Mid-
dle East and central Asia, the United States failed to condemn Iranian
violations of the Bosnian arms embargo425 and welcomed Iranian efforts
to negotiate an end to ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan.
426
The use of sanctions similar to those contained within ILSA pres-
ents a "slippery slope" for the current and future administrations. At
the time of his signature of ILSA, President Clinton failed to clearly ar-
ticulate when sanctions are a legitimate tool of U.S. foreign policy.427 In
between the United States and Sudan and the absence of such relations with Iran. See id.
However, Sudan is a close ally of Iran, actively supports Islamic extremist causes and,
according to a spokesman for the State Department's Office of Counter-Terrorism, has not
ceased its support of acts of international terrorism since the enactment of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See id.
421. See id. Representative William McCollum (Republican, Florida) characterized the
exemption as a violation of Congress' intent in enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 and a potential precedent for American companies seeking ex-
emptions from future administrations. See id.
422. See ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5(a), 110 Stat. 1541, 1546 (1996).
423. See id §§ 4(d)(1), 5(a).
424. See id. §§ 4(c), 5(f), 9(a), 9(c).
425. See U.S. Warned of Iran Efforts to Build Influence in Bosnia, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 28,
1997, at 11, available in 1997 WL 3615309. Iran is alleged to have supplied hundreds of
millions of dollars of weapons to Bosnia during its war with Serbia. Id.
426. See Busy are the Peacemakers, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1998, at A27. Iran is part of
the so-called "Six Plus Two" seeking to broker a peace agreement amongst the warring
factions in Afghanistan. The other members of the group are the United States, Russia,
Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Peoples' Republic of China. Id.
See also Barbara Crosette, U.S., Iran Talk Relations Show Signs of Thaw; Washington
Works with Tehran to End Afghans' Civil War, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1997, at 3, available in
1997 WL 16808162. State Department official Karl Inderfurth stated that "[the United
States is] hopeful that the Iranians will play a constructive role in bringing their influ-
ence to bear to see the fighting stop and negotiations begin for the establishment of a
broad-based government in Afghanistan." Id.
427. See Clay Chandler, U.S. Expects Furor Over Trade Sanctions at Summit, WASH.
POST, June 27, 1996, at A20.
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order to address this uncertainty, on January 7, 1998, the Clinton Ad-
ministration announced guidelines governing, the utilization of eco-
nomic sanctions by the United States. 428 These guidelines provided, in
part, that the United States should only resort to sanctions after the
failure of other diplomatic options. 429 Additionally, international sup-
port and participation should be sought prior to undertaking unilateral
measures. 430 Finally, the guidelines provide that sanctions should be
carefully designed to avoid unnecessary hardships to innocent par-
ties.431
ILSA violates several of these guidelines. Initially, although the
Clinton Administration as well as its predecessors attempted to per-
suade U.S. allies such as the member states of the European Union to
discontinue their policy of "critical dialogue" with the Iranian govern-
ment, there is no evidence that the United States discussed the specific
provisions of ILSA with its European allies prior to its enactment.
Rather, ILSA provided for such dialogue only after its enactment and
prior to the actual imposition of penalties upon foreign firms. 432 There is
also no evidence that the Clinton Administration tried the most direct
diplomatic option of all prior to the enactment of ILSA - specifically the
initiation of dialogue with Iran. Rather, the Clinton Administration and
Congress rushed ILSA through the legislative process after the terrorist
attack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and the downing of Trans-World Air-
lines Flight 800. 4 3 3 Additionally, as previously noted, there is a complete
lack of support for ILSA in the community of nations. 434 This lack of
support is echoed in the international business community which has
continued to conduct business with Iran in a largely unfettered fash-
ion.435 Finally, the sanctions imposed by ILSA place unnecessary hard-
ships upon innocent third parties. NIOC's qualifications as an innocent
third party may be questioned due to the role of the Iranian Govern-
ment in its ownership and operations. However, foreign persons en-
gaging in good faith business transactions in Iran in strict compliance
with their national laws may qualify as innocent third parties.
The U.S. leadership role in international affairs is threatened
through the appearance of weakness if the Clinton Administration con-
tinues in its failure to impose sanctions pursuant to ILSA. Despite as-
428. See Stuart E. Eizenstat, Undersecretary for Economic, Agricultural and Business
Affairs, Remarks before the North American Committee of the National Policy Association
(Jan. 7, 1998) (visited Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/
980107_eizenpolicyassoc.html>. See also Sanctions Policy Review, WASH. POST, Jan. 8,
1998, at A22.
429. Eizenstat, supra note 428.
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. See supra notes 267, 345-47 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 219-42 and accompanying text.
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surances that it would fully and completely implement ILSA,436 the
Clinton Administration failed to impose sanctions against numerous
companies from throughout the world which have invested or agreed to
invest billions of dollars in the Iranian oil, gas and petrochemicals in-
dustries. 437 These failures, when combined with the Administration's
apparent willingness to waive other sanctions legislation as evidenced
by its conduct in relation to the Sudan,438 do not indicate an active en-
forcement policy during ILSA's remaining three-year term. Every new
investment in Iran's oil and gas industries constitutes a "direct chal-
lenge" to the policy of Iranian isolation,439 and every concomitant U.S.
failure to impose sanctions "sends a message of weakness to Iran."
4 40
While the Clinton Administration continues to give lip service to sanc-
tions, Iran continues to develop its oil and gas industries and expand its
influence in the Middle East and central Asia.441 In this regard, Iranian
actions speak louder than idle American threats.442 An effective sanc-
tions policy should grant the executive branch considerable latitude and
not have the imposition of sanctions as its sole focus. 443 However, a pol-
icy which contains severe penalties that are never imposed is no deter-
rent at all. The net effect of such a policy is to undermine the credibility
of the policymaker.
444
ILSA also fails to serve the U.S. international interests as it bases
American foreign policy on the further isolation of Iran which will fail
without the support of the international community. Initially, although
politically popular,445 economic sanctions are generally ineffective as a
weapon against unpopular regimes. For example, the United Nations
imposed numerous economic sanctions on Saddam Hussein's Iraq sub-
sequent to its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, but none of these
sanctions achieved the goal of forcing an Iraqi withdrawal. Indeed, it
has been noted that had the sanctions been given six to twelve months
to achieve effectiveness, the Gulf War and the plunder of Kuwait may
have been prolonged, Iraqi military positions would have been rein-
436. See U.S. Sanctions may Backfire on Russia-Iran Oil Deal, Dow JONES ENERGY
SERV., Oct. 16, 1997.
437. See supra notes 243-55 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 416-21 and accompanying text.
439. Lippman, supra note 230, at Al.
440. Lippman, supra note 252, at A23.
441. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 2, 4 and 11. See also Iran Economic
Overview, supra note 179, at 2.
442. See Iran Fights Back at U.S. Moves to Isolate It, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1996, at
A24.
443. See Haass, supra note 262, at C9. See also Lippman, supra note 246, at Al.
444. See U.S. Ponders Sanctions for Oil Deal in Iran, supra note 219, at A9. See also
U.S. Aides Still Divided Over Sanctions on Foreign Investors in Iran, supra note 258, at
A33.
445. Richard N. Haass characterized sanctions as offering "U.S. policymakers and
members of Congress an attractive compromise between doing nothing and sending in the
Marines." Haass, supra note 262, at C9.
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forced, and the coalition may have fallen apart.446 Further, Saddam
Hussein remains firmly entrenched in power seven years after the end
of the Gulf War. Other examples demonstrating the general ineffective-
ness of economic sanctions include North Korea and Cuba where dicta-
torial Communist regimes remain in power despite over forty-six and
thirty-six years of U.S. sanctions respectively. 447 The U.S. military,
rather than economic sanctions, brought down the dictatorships of
Manuel Noriega in Panama and Rauol Cedras in Haiti. Economic sanc-
tions have proven to be "an imprecise and expectably ineffective tool" of
American foreign policy.
448
As specifically applied to Iran, U.S. economic sanctions have an in-
consistent record of effectiveness. Although the U.S. sanctions regime
has tightened the availability of credit to Iran, 449 depressed the value of
it currency 450 and discouraged some foreign investment, 45 1 it has not
achieved the desired effect of wholesale modification of Iranian behav-
ior.452 Furthermore, it bears to note that other factors such as the ab-
sence of favorable terms and the availability of projects in other coun-
tries posing fewer risks have contributed to difficulties Iran has
experienced in obtaining credit and attracting investments in its oil and
gas industries. 45 3 Despite these difficulties, Iran has "managed to blunt
446. See Losman, supra note 413, at C3.
447. According to former U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills, unilateral trade
sanctions against dictatorial regimes serve only to "impoverish people [without affecting]
the tyrant [who] doesn't care about the people." U.S. Rethinking Economic Sanctions;
State Dept. Team Weighs Costs, Impact of Trade Restrictions, supra note 414, at A6.
448. Georgie Anne Geyer, Castro Owes Clinton a Thank-You Letter, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
22, 1996, at 31, available in 1996 WL 2729273. See also Panel Approves Sanctions for
Foreign Firms Investing in Iran, supra note 18, at Al. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who
served as Secretary of State under President George Bush, characterized secondary boy-
cotts as "nuts... an exercise in American imperialism ... [serving only to] get our allies
mad at us." Chandler, supra note 3, at A20. Additionally, President Clinton recently
noted that "automatic sanctions legislation" such as ILSA and the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 predicates American foreign policy upon dishonesty by
placing "enormous pressure on whoever is in the executive branch to fudge an evaluation
of the facts" in order to support a decision to avoid the imposition of sanctions which do
not enjoy support in the international community. Michael Kelly, Foreign Affairs Fudge
Factor, WASH. POST, May 6, 1998, at A19.
449. See Diplomacy with Iran, supra note 188, at A16.
450. See Rodman, supra note 261, at A25.
451. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text. See also IRAN: EIA REPORT, su-
pra note 181, at 3.
452. See Thomas W. Lippman, Critics Want U.S. to Reevaluate 'Dual Containment'
Policy on Iran and Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1997, at A33. See also U.S. Economic Offen-
sive Against Iran's Energy Industry is Bearing Fruit, supra note 216, at A8. According to
the State Department's 1996 report entitled "Patterns of Global Terrorism," Iran remains
"the premier state sponsor of international terrorism and is deeply involved in the plan-
ning and execution of terrorist acts." David B. Ottaway, U.S. Considers Slugging it out
with International Terrorism, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1996, at A25.
453. See U.S. Economic Offensive Against Iran's Energy Industry is Bearing Fruit, su-
pra note 216, at A8.
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the worst effects of American sanctions."45 4 Iran's gross domestic prod-
uct and international trade continue to grow, and foreign credit remains
available. 455 Additionally, as previously noted, investment in Iran's oil
and gas industries is booming. 456 These transactions are substantial
with potential investments and revenues totaling several billion dol-
lars. Perhaps most importantly, these investments have emanated from
throughout the world, from friend and foe alike as far afield as Europe,
Asia and North America. 45 7 U.S. prospects for blocking future invest-
ments and inflicting further damage upon the Iranian economy appear
"bleak."458 As a result, several respected figures in U.S. foreign policy
including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy
have called for ILSA's scrapping and gradual reconciliation through the
forging of economic ties.
459
Current U.S. policy also fails to recognize the geopolitical signifi-
cance of Iran. Encompassing over 600,000 square miles, Iran's location
casts it as an important player in Near Eastern affairs. 460 To the north,
Iran borders upon the oil-laden Caspian Sea, the new frontier in inter-
national petroleum exploration.461 Iran's northern boundaries also
touch upon the central Asian republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmeni-
stan, a contentious area in which the West, Iran and Russia are all jos-
tling for influence. 462 Western attempts to remove these largely land-
locked fledging republics from Russia's sphere of influence will not meet
with success if they are denied ties to Iran and the Persian Gulf.463 To
the west, Iran borders upon Turkey, a staunch U.S. ally plagued with
political unrest and economic upheaval.464 Iran also shares its western
border with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, an international pariah with con-
tinuing dreams of expansion to which Iran may serve as a valuable
counterweight. 465 Iran's proximity to the Strait of Hormuz to its south
grants it a potential chokehold on oil shipments originating in the Per-
454. Bakhash, supra note 263, at A27.
455. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 219-42 and accompanying text.
457. Stuart E. Eizenstat acknowledged that the conflict in policies between the United
States and the rest of the world on Iran has created "great complexities in implementing
an appropriate sanctions policy." Wright, supra note 264, at Al.
458. U.S. Isolated in Iran Policy, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL
11923607.
459. See Lippman, supra note 452, at A33.
460. See EU Returns Envoys to Iran--with Conditions, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 30,
1997, available in 1997 WL 3285650.
461. See James Meek, China Joins Scramble for Black Gold, GUARDIAN, Sept. 29,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2402872.
462. See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 226, at A37.
463. See Drozdiak, supra note 203, at A15.
464. See Couturier supra note 232, at A17; Lippman, supra note 230, at Al.
465. See Mr. Khatami's Speech, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1998, at A24. See also Thomas
L. Friedman, New U.S. Ties With Iran Would Rattle Saddam, DENVER POST, Jan. 7, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6098418.
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sian Gulf.46 6 Iran's southern boundaries also place it in uncomfortable
proximity to vital U.S. allies in the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. 467 Finally, Iran's eastern boundaries with
Pakistan and Afghanistan provide it with the potential to influence the
discordant voices of Islam emanating from these countries as well as
blunt growing Chinese efforts to extend its sphere of influence in cen-
tral Asia. 468 Those countries which choose to overlook or disregard
Iran's strategic role in Near Eastern affairs do so at their own peril. In
this regard, current U.S. policy on Iran could use a healthy dose of "re-
alpolitik."
In any event, ILSA will not succeed without international coopera-
tion which has not been forthcoming. The State Department has con-
ceded that the response of U.S. allies to ILSA has been "disappointing
and lukewarm."469 The U.S. drive to further isolate Iran is widely per-
ceived by the international community as originating not from concerns
regarding terrorism or opposition to the Middle East peace process but,
rather, from wounded American pride resulting from the Iranian hos-
tage crisis nineteen years ago. 470 As a result, American efforts to isolate
Iran are crumbling. U.S. allies have condemned ILSA471 while private
industry has ignored American pleas to refrain from investing in Iran's
oil and gas industries. 472 These policies and U.S. failure to impose sanc-
tions are likely to result in further investment in Iran's oil and gas in-
dustries as other foreign companies scramble to avoid exclusion from
the market.473 Such defections, and their likely continuation in the fu-
ture, have left the United States alone in its attempts to isolate Iran.
Tensions arising from these defections may make it more difficult for
the United States to work with its allies to attain their shared political
objectives in Iran. Ultimately, this tension may also prove fatal to
ILSA's success.
International opposition to ILSA is primarily based upon the per-
ceived extraterritorial application of U.S. law.474 Although they ac-
466. The Persian Gulf and the surrounding countries account for approximately thirty-
one percent of the world's total oil production and have sixty-three percent of the world's
proven resources. See Iran Physical Background. Location (visited Sept. 16, 1998)
<http://www.salamiran.org/Iraninfo/General/Geography>.
467. See Fouad, supra note 36.
468 See Ottaway & Morgan, supra note 227, at Al. See also Deal Tests U.S. Policy on
Tehran, supra note 228, at Al.
469. See Rosenfeld, supra note 259, at A17. Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk
conceded that the lack of international support and cooperation with regard to ILSA could
prove fatal to the accomplishment of its purposes. See U.S. Decision on Total Sanctions
"Imminent, "AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2281135.
470. See Sanctions on France, supra note 258, at A24.
471. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
472. See supra notes 219-42 and accompanying text.
473. See Christopher Bums, U.S., E.U. Use Caution Over Total-Iran Natural Gas
Deal, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Oct. 5, 1997.
474. Hugo Paemen, the European Commission ambassador to the United States, char-
VOL. 27:1
MEDDLING WITH THE MULLAHS
knowledge that the United States is entitled to disagree with their at-
tempts to engage Iran, the international community has balked at
ILSA's perceived imposition of American foreign policy on a global
scale. 475 This imposition of American will is particularly irksome as it
penalizes foreign firms for engaging in commercial activities which are
lawful in their home countries. 476 As a result, ILSA has been subject to
sharp criticism from U.S. allies. Lionel Jospin, the French foreign min-
ister, scoffed at ILSA's purported extraterritorial reach stating that
"[n]obody accepts that the United States can pass a law on a global
scale."477 Germany's foreign minister Klaus Kinkel characterized ILSA
as a "reproach [of the European Union] for following its economic inter-
ests."478 Hassan Marican, the President of Malaysia's state-owned oil
company Petronas, criticized the Act as an attempt to interfere with his
company's right to choose with whom to transact business.479 Leveling
perhaps the strongest criticism of ILSA outside of Iran, South African
President Nelson Mandela condemned the United States for its "arro-
gance [in] dictat[ing] where [the international community] should go or
which countries should be our friends."480 It has been aptly noted that
the symbolism which the United States attempts to project through the
use of secondary boycotts such as ILSA - "that of a nation standing for
high moral principles - is regularly transmuted .... [into a foreign]
view [of the United States] as a bully who insists on getting its way."
48 1
As the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel noted in a recent cover story:
[as] American idols and icons are shaping the world from Katmandu to
Kinshasa, from Cairo to Caracas .... [t]he Americans are acting, in
the absence of limits put to them by anybody or anything, as if they
own a blank check in their 'McWorld.' Strengthened by the end of
communism and an economic boom, Washington seems to have aban-
doned its self-doubts from the Vietnam trauma. America is now the
Schwarzenegger of international politics: showing off its muscles, ob-
trusive, intimidating.
482
acterized ILSA as "an extreme case of extraterritorial legislation." Blustein, supra note 6,
at A25.
475. See EU Protests Law on Iran, Libya Sanctions, supra note 29.
476. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 20 (1996).
477. U.S. Must Grin and Bear it When Allies Dance with Foes, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct.
2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 6859439. Jospin further stated that, "American laws apply
only in the United States. They do not apply in France." Id.
478. Drozdiak, supra note 203, at A15. See also EU to Send Ambassadors Back to
Iran, supra note 205.
479. See Petronas says Iran Venture with Total, Gazprom to Continue, AFX, Nov. 16,
1997, available in 1997 WL 18133501.
480. William Drozdiak, Even Allies Resent U.S. Dominance, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1997,
at Al.
481. Losman, supra note 413, at C3.
482. Drozdiak, supra note 480, at Ai.
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Such perceptions serve to create international resistance to Ameri-
can foreign policy objectives. Such a perception clearly does not further
U.S. international interests.
The response of other countries to ILSA also sets dangerous prece-
dents for their future relations with the United States. 48 3 A unanimous
European Union expressed "deep concern" regarding ILSA's enactment
and reserved the right to retaliate against the United States in defense
of its economic interests in Iran.48 4 Subsequent to the issuance of these
threats, the European Union prepared and studied measures for eco-
nomic retaliation against the United States to be imposed in the event
of ILSA's implementation. 48 5 These measures would bar European com-
panies from complying with American legislation deemed to have an
improper extraterritorial effect and place restrictions upon the import
of American goods and services. 48 6.Perhaps more troubling is the possi-
bility of "quiet, carefully targeted reprisals" against American compa-
nies.48 7 Such retaliation could consist of unofficial attempts to discour-
age consumption of American imports or the awarding of government
contracts to American businesses. These concerns led the European-
American Chamber of Commerce to denounce ILSA as "antithetical to
U.S. economic interests" and serving to increase the risk of European
retaliation which commenced with the enactment of the Helms-Burton
Act sanctioning trade with Cuba. 488 Indeed, as Lee H. Hamilton, the
ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee has
noted, the United States has "opened a whole new ball game here...
[which] could easily come back to bite us."48
9
ILSA also encourages American trading partners to enact similar
legislation and, in so doing, perhaps reopen old wounds relating to per-
ceived past injustices. In addition to the previously-noted Arab boycott
of Israel, 490 there are several other instances when sanctions similar to
483. In response to the Clinton Administration's announcement that it would investi-
gate Total's investment in Iran's South Pars natural gas field in September 1997, French
Foreign Ministry spokesman Jacques Rummelhardt stated that "the application of [ILSA]
would have serious consequences on international trade." U.S. Investigating Iranian Gas
Deal, supra note 30. See also U.S. Aides Still Divided Over Sanctions on Foreign Inves-
tors in Iran, supra note 258, at A33.
484. See Rick Atkinson, Divergent Policies Toward Iran Strain U.S.-German Relations,
WASH. POST, June 27, 1996, at A21. See also U.S. to Investigate Total's Deal with Iran,
supra note 33.
485. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
486. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 20 (1996). See also IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra
note 181, at 3.
487. Chandler, supra note 3, at A20.
488. Blustein, supra note 6, at A25.
489. Chandler, supra note 3, at A20. Representative Hamilton called for the resump-
tion of diplomatic relations and initiation of American-Iranian exchange programs in
April 1998. Afshin Valinejad, Tehran's Top Moderate Mayor Freed from Jail by Iran's Top
Cleric, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9129233.
490. See supra notes 359-66 and accompanying text.
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those contained in ILSA could be utilized by other countries to the po-
tential detriment of the United States. For example, the Peoples' Re-
public of China could place restrictions upon imports, investments and
government purchases from countries which maintain commercial rela-
tions with Taiwan. These restrictions could be justified on the basis that
commercial relations with Taiwan serve to strengthen its economic in-
frastructure and defense capabilities. Such a result could strengthen
Taiwan's status as a "renegade province," 491 thereby thwarting reunifi-
cation and presenting a national security risk to the Peoples' Republic
of China.
Such legislation could have severe consequences for American in-
dustry which trades over $57 billion of goods and services with the Peo-
ples' Republic of China annually. 492 In addition to the loss of current
markets, such legislation could also serve to exclude American compa-
nies from future business opportunities in the burgeoning Chinese
economy. 493 From a political standpoint, the exclusion of the United
States from the Chinese economy would greatly reduce any influence
the United States could exercise over a government in Beijing eager to
flex its growing economic and military might. Such restrictions could
also exacerbate the U.S. trade deficit with the Peoples' Republic of
China which grew to $33.8 billion in 1995. 4 94 Nor is such a scenario
limited to relations between the Peoples' Republic of China and Taiwan.
Any countries with political, economic or military axes to grind such as
India and Pakistan could impose such restrictions to discourage trade
with its enemies and retard their economic development.
In addition to the threat posed to American business interests by
the adoption of retaliatory measures by its trading partners, ILSA also
serves to exclude American companies from pursuit of lucrative oppor-
tunities in the Middle Eastern oil and gas industries. American compa-
nies are not only prohibited from pursuing opportunities worth billions
of dollars within Iran but are also excluded from opportunities which
491. The Peoples' Republic of China has never recognized the independence of Taiwan.
Rather, the government in Beijing deems Taiwan to be a " breakaway renegade province."
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TAIWAN: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES (1995) (visited Sept. 16,
1998) <http://www.state.gov/wwwlbackgroundnotes/taiwan_971100_bgn.html> [hereinaf-
ter TAIWAN: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES].
492. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CHINA: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES (1996) (vis-
ited Sept. 16, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/backgroundnotes/china_1196_bgn.html>
[hereinafter CHINA: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES]. By contrast, United States-Taiwan
trade totaled $48 billion in 1996. See TAIWAN: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES, supra note 491,
at 3.
493. The World Bank estimates that China's economic output will experience an an-
nual growth rate of eight to ten percent by the year 2000 and will equal $10 trillion annu-
ally by the middle of the next century. See CHINA: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES, supra note
492, at 3. China's gross domestic product was estimated at $3.39 trillion in 1996 with an
annual growth rate of 9.7%. See World Factbook,
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/worldref/country/china.html>.
494. See CHINA: STATE DEPARTMENT NOTES, supra note 492, at 3.
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have Iranian connections. Furthermore, the sanctions required to be
imposed by the President and any retaliation in response thereto may
result in lost sales, profits and jobs for American companies. These con-
cerns were noted but ultimately disregarded by Congress in its rush to
address concerns regarding international terrorism in the wake of the
Khobar Towers bombing and the crash of Trans-World Airlines Flight
800. 4 95 Indeed, U.S. use of secondary boycotts and stringent economic
sanctions such as those contained in ILSA has become
"[i]ncreasingly... cavalier with scant regard to their actual impact on
American interests."496 Rather, the best chance of modifying Iranian
behavior while protecting American business interests abroad may be
"to resume arms-length commercial dealings with firms [in Iran] saving
demands for the international policy changes by [the Iranian] govern-
ment for the day when political dialogue can begin."
49 7
Furthermore, attempting to fortify the failing policy of economic
isolation with extraterritorial penalties which primarily harm our allies
will only serve to place American businesses at a greater disadvantage
in penetrating the marketplace in a more moderate Iran in the future.
Commercial relations simply will not spring up overnight upon the in-
evitable resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States
and Iran. American businesses will find themselves engaged in fierce
competition with well-established foreign industries deeply rooted in
the Iranian economy. As in Vietnam, American industry will enter the
Iranian marketplace with a multiyear competitive disadvantage.
The current American policy towards Iran also fails to recognize
the positive influence that private businesses may exert toward encour-
aging the kinds of behavior that the United States deems appropriate.
Although no one would argue that the presence of American businesses
in Moscow or Beijing have had a quantifiable positive effect upon inter-
national relations and the state of human rights protections in these
countries, it remains inescapable that commercial relations bring people
of differing cultural and political backgrounds together. This fact has
been recognized in diplomatic circles for years, hence the inclusion of
495. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-523(I), at 21 (1996).
496. Haass, supra note 262, at C9. See also Losman, supra note 413, at C3. For ex-
ample, in April 1998, Mobil Corporation requested that the Clinton administration grant
it a license to trade one million barrels of crude oil generated from its operations in the
Burun oil field in Turkmenistan for crude oil located in Iranian facilities on the Persian
Gulf. See Mobil Seeks License for Oil Swap with Iran, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1998, at Fl.
Mobil's partners in the operation, Monument Oil and Gas PLC of the United Kingdom
and BurrenVSTT of Bermuda, have utilized such trades with Iran to get crude oil pro-
duced from the field to market while Mobil has been required to ship its product by barge
across the Caspian Sea at considerable expense. Id. Economist Gary Hufbauer estimates
that sanctions cost U.S. businesses in excess of $20 billion per year on a global basis. See
A Case for Restraint on Trade Sanctions, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL
3908611.
497. Bolster, supra note 406, at A20.
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trade agreements and commercial exchanges in the process of normali-
zation of relations between countries. Such is the approach toward Iran
taken by the more-forward thinking U.S. allies such as the European
Union. Although it is unduly optimistic to conclude that an American
policy of commercial engagement would instantly abrogate almost
twenty years of innate suspicion and overt hostility, it most certainly
bodes better for the future of American-Iranian relations than the pres-
ent policy of stringent economic isolationism.
ILSA may also discourage reform by presenting the Iranian Gov-
ernment with expanded opportunities to appeal to Iranian nationalism
through renewed attacks upon the United States. Despite President
Khatami's proclamation of a new era for Iran upon his election, the true
meaning and implications of his surprising victory remain to be deter-
mined.498 Some analysts hailed Khatami's victory as evidence of an im-
minent collapse of Iran's particular blend of Islam and politics 499 while
others concluded that it raised questions about individual freedom, the
rule of law and the role of Islam in daily life.500 Less idealistic observers
noted that Khatami's election was merely a reflection of social realities
in a country where fifty percent of the population was born after the
Islamic revolution and has a lesser degree of devotion to its tenets. 501
Outwardly, the Clinton Administration exercised great restraint and
characterized Khatami's election as a "hopeful development" which it
would monitor with "a great deal of interest."5 2 What can be concluded
with some degree of certainty is that Khatami's election represented a
crushing blow to the previously-unchallenged power of the conservative
mullahs and their hard-line supporters.
50 3
498. See Anwar Faruqi, Khatami's Victory a New Stage in Battle of Moderate, Hardlin-
ers, ASSOC. PRESS, May 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4868019.
499. See Islam's Political Football, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL
17832709.
500. See Iran's Vote Sends Unusual Message, supra note 107.
501. See Darius, Bazargan, Iran: Regime Must Win Over the Youth to Survive, INTER
PRESS SERV., Apr. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7074812.
502. See John F. Harris, Clinton 'Hopeful' But Skeptical on New Iranian Leader,
WASH. POST, May 30, 1997, at A27. However, it bears to note that, in August 1997, the
Clinton Administration relayed a message to Iran through Swiss diplomatic channels
proposing face-to-face discussions between the U.S. and Iranian Governments. See U.S.
Proposed Direct Talks in Overture to Iran, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1998, at Al.
503. See Anwar Faruqi, President-Elect Visits Shrine of Khomeini, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, May 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7425325. However, other commentators
are less optimistic about the Khatami Administration and its purported moderate tenden-
cies. Achraf Pahlavi, the twin sister of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran,
stated that "it is a mistake to see [Khatami's] election [as] a promise of imminent change
in Iran." Achraf Pahlavi, Engaging with Iran is not the Answer, WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
1997, at A22. Khatami remains an advocate of the Islamic revolution, albeit a more
broad-minded advocate than his predecessors. See Lancaster, supra note 117, at A29. As
a result, some commentators have concluded that Iran will not modify its behavior in any
significant manner thereby providing justification for the lifting of U.S. economic sanc-
tions. See also A 'Moderate' in Tehran, WASH. POST, May 26, 1997, at A18.
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Although Iran's conservative clergy have suffered a string of de-
feats culminating in Khatami's call for dialogue with the United States
and the questioning of its legitimacy in governmental affairs, they re-
main a powerful force. 50 4 As a result, "a now-scarcely concealed struggle
for the future of the Iranian revolution" is occurring between the arch-
conservative clerical establishment and moderate supporters of Presi-
dent Khatami.50 5 Despite the overwhelming nature of his electoral vic-
tory, Khatami's triumph in this struggle is far from assured. The Is-
lamic Consultative Assembly remains firmly in the control of religious
conservatives 506 and Khatami's political allies have been subject to at-
tack.5 07 Most importantly, Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme religious
leader and highest ranking government official, has strongly rejected
Khatami's calls for dialogue with the United States. 50 8 Iran's media re-
flect this division of opinion as conservative newspapers condemned any
resumption of relations with the United States while other publications
characterized Khatami's remarks as a precursor to the resumption of
diplomatic relations.5
0 9
The outcome of President Khatami's initiative defies easy predic-
tion. At the very least, such a dialogue would be a major setback to the
conservative clergy and could alter the balance of power in favor of
504. For example, conservative opponents of President Khatami made gains in par-
liamentary by-elections held in March 1998. See Opposition Candidates Gain in Iran, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 15, 1998, at A-13. See also Lancaster, supra note 99, at A1O; Iran's New
President Breaks Taboo by Re-examining Policy on U.S., DES MOINES REGISTER, Jan. 7,
1998, available in 1998 WL 3187022.
505. Mr. Khatami's Speech, supra note 465, at A24. See also Iran President Backs Tol-
erance, ASSOC. PRESS, Apr. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6654118; Rossant, supra note
93; Iran: Pro-Khatami Backers Clash With Vigilantes, supra note 93.
506. See A Leading Hard-line Opponent of Iran's... ASSOC. PRESS, May 31, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7418612. Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, Khatami's major opposition in the
presidential election, was re-elected to the speakership of the Assembly by a vote of 211 to
32. See id.
507. See An Air of Optimism in Iran, supra note 180, at Al. In December 1997, the Is-
lamic Consultative Assembly initiated the filing of corruption charges against Gholam
Hossein Karbaschi, the mayor of Tehran and a close political ally of Khatami. See id.
Karbaschi was subsequently detained upon orders from Ayatollah Mohammed Yazdi, the
conservative head of the judicial branch. See Hard-Liners Back Off on Tehran Mayor,
WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1998, at A23. Karbaschi was released upon bail by order of Ayatol-
lah Klhamenei after thousands of his supporters clashed with Iranian riot police in the
streets of Tehran in April 1998. See Ex-Iran Leader Defends Tehran Mayor, ASSOC.
PRESS, Apr. 18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6652839. See also Tehran Mayor Returns to
Work, ASSOc. PRESS, Apr. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6653197.
508. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
509. The conservative newspaper Jomhuri Islami rejected any basis for the resump-
tion of dialogue with the United States stating that "[alny hands that reach out to Amer-
ica should be cut off." Iran's New President'Breaks Taboo by Re-examining Policy on U.S,
supra note 504. However, the conservative Tehran Times spoke favorably about the "re-
sumption of diplomatic ties." See Iranians React Cautiously to Khatami's Offer of Contacts
with Americans, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6636633. See also
Iran's Hard-line Press Speaks on Dialogue with Washington, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 17, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4897177.
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moderate voices in Iran. 510 On the other hand, tougher economic sanc-
tions, including the actual implementation of ILSA, will send a hostile
signal to the Khatami Administration, strengthen the position of its op-
ponents and further radicalize Iranian behavior.5 1' Such a policy will
provide the Iranian Government with further opportunities to demonize
the United States and may re-ignite the strident anti-American pas-
sions prevalent in the years immediately following the Islamic revolu-
tion.5
1 2
At the very least, ILSA discourages the United States from success-
fully exercising future influence in Iran. Current U.S. policy towards
Iran and in the Middle East in general has limited the U.S. role in fu-
ture political dialogue in the region.5 1 3 Several other countries, some of
which are not welcome by the United States, are anxious to fill the vac-
uum created by the absence of American influence in Iran. The U.S.
diplomatic quarantine of Iran runs the risk forging closer ties between
Tehran and Moscow and increasing Russian influence in the region.5 1 4
Such a result is clearly contrary to American objectives of denying Rus-
sian access to the Persian Gulf and fostering separation between Russia
and its former satellite states in central Asia. 51 5 This vacuum could also
be filled by the Peoples' Republic of China. Although Chinese influence
in Iran may present a less likely scenario than that of Russia due to
geographic, cultural and political distance, Chinese efforts to advance
its objectives in central Asia through ambitious investments in Iran's oil
and gas industries should not be discounted.5 16
The European Union also stands willing to fill the void created by
the absence of American influence in Iran. Despite increased tensions
regarding Iranian complicity in terrorist attacks occurring in Europe,
the European Union recognized Iran's geopolitical importance and thus
refused to sever diplomatic relations.5' 7 As a result, the European Un-
ion has maintained its influence in Iran. Hoping to expand this influ-
ence in the coming year, the European Union declared a "new begin-
510. See Rodman, supra note 182, at A13.
511. See Bolster, supra note 406, at A20. See also Haass, supra note 262, at C9; Atkin-
son, supra note 484, at A21; Lippman, U.S. Aides Still Divided Over Sanctions on Foreign
Investors in Iran, supra note 258, at A33.
512. See Losman, supra note 413, at C3.
513. See Josef Federman, Momentum Gathering for Changes in U.S. Policy Toward
Iran, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4853210.
514. See Drozdiak, supra note 203, at A15. See also EU Returns Envoys to Iran--with
Conditions, supra note 460.
515. See supra notes 475 and 476 and accompanying text. Tsalik Nayberg, the chief
representative of the U.S. oil company Unocal in Turkmenistan, has aptly noted in this
regard that "Russia's desire to control central Asia can be seen by a blind man." Myre,
supra note 189.
516. See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
517. See Afshin Valinejad, Iran Says German, Danish Ambassadors Not Welcome to
Return, Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4864238. See also EU Returns
Envoys to Iran--with Conditions, supra note 460.
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ning" in its relations with Iran in 1998 consisting of "substantial dia-
logue" concerning "critical topics."518 Although the ultimate success of
such efforts remain to be seen, the absence of American voices in this
dialogue can only serve to further isolate U.S. policy on Iran and erode
American influence in the region.
Additionally, ILSA could weaken the United States in the eyes of
the Iranian government if the Clinton Administration fails to follow
through on its threats to impose sanctions. As previously noted, the
Clinton Administration has failed to impose sanctions on a single per-
son since the enactment of ILSA two years ago.519 However, the threat
of sanctions never to be imposed loses credence and constitutes no pen-
alty or restraint upon future conduct at all.5 20 The repeated failure of
the United States to enforce ILSA may result in the loss of its restrain-
ing effect upon foreign investment in Iran's oil and gas industries and
Iranian behavior and diminution of American willpower in the eyes of
the regime in Tehran. 21 The non-implementation of the severe penal-
ties contained within Section 6 by a reluctant administration does little
more than make the United States appear indecisive and conflicted.
Such an appearance can hardly be expected to dissuade foreign busi-
nesses seeking to invest in Iran's oil and gas industries especially given
the enormous potential revenues at stake.
Finally, ILSA is an overreaction to the Islamic regime in Tehran.
This overreaction is most apparent in comparing the sanctions imposed
upon Iran with those imposed upon the Soviet Union during the Cold
War. For example, during the 1970s, American-Soviet relations were
under considerable strain as a result of the provision of Soviet weap-
onry to the Egyptian army during the 1973 Middle East War, the Soviet
intervention in the Angolan civil war, rising Soviet military expendi-
tures and human rights concerns. As a result, in 1975, the Soviet Union
was prohibited from receiving more than three hundred million dollars
in new credits from the Export-Import Bank without presidential and
congressional determinations that such new credits were in the national
interest of the United States.5 2 2 On August 1, 1978, President Jimmy
Carter placed all exports of oil and gas exploration and production
equipment to the Soviet Union on the Commodity Control List, thereby
requiring that all such exports receive a validated license from the U.S.
518. See Germany Wants "New Beginning" in Ties with Iran, ASSOc. PRESS, Jan. 9,
1998, available in 1998 WL 6636994. See also Seeing More "Constructive" Leadership, EU
Upgrades Iran Relations, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7389330.
519. See notes 243-55 and accompanying text.
520. See notes 436-44 and accompanying text.
521. See notes 436-44 and 456-58 and accompanying text.
522. See Stanley J. Marcuss, New Light on the Export-Import Bank, in UNITED STATES
FINANCING OF EAST-WEST TRADE 266 (Paul Marer ed., 1975). The restriction also included
a total prohibition upon financing for fossil fuel production and a forty million dollar limit
upon credits for fossil fuel research and exploration while the three hundred million dollar
ceiling remained in force and effect. See id.
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Department of Commerce. 523 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on
December 27, 1979 resulted in the imposition of further restrictions
upon trade with the Soviet Union. President Carter suspended all
shipments of grain to the Soviet Union beyond the eight million tons
provided for in the 1975 U.S.-Soviet Union grain trade agreement,
thereby blocking the sale of seventeen million tons of corn and wheat.524
President Carter also suspended the issuance of validated licenses for
export of high-technology products pending the drafting of new guide-
lines and invalidated all outstanding licenses. 525 Additionally, President
Carter imposed a quota upon American imports of Soviet ammonia and
banned the export of phosphates and related fertilizer products to the
Soviet Union.526 Finally, Aeroflot flights to the United States were se-
verely limited, and the Soviet fishing quota in American waters was re-
duced by 350,000 tons.527 As a result, American-Soviet trade declined
from 3.2 billion dollars in January through November 1979 to 1.2 billion
dollars during the same period in 1980.528
However, those sanctions pale when compared to the sanctions cur-
rently in place against Iran. As previously noted, these sanctions in-
clude complete prohibitions upon the import of Iranian-origin goods and
services into the United States as well the export of U.S.-origin goods
and services to Iran.5 29 U.S. persons are prohibited from making new
investments in Iran. 530 The involvement of a U.S. person in any trans-
action to develop Iran's petroleum resources is prohibited regardless of
its date of origin.531 U.S. financial institutions are prohibited from en-
gaging in any transaction related to goods or services of Iranian ori-
gin5 32 and servicing accounts controlled by the Iranian Government.533
These penalties are in addition to those imposed upon third persons
pursuant to ILSA.
523. See ERIK P. LINDELL, UNITED STATES REGULATION OF AMERICAN MULTI-
NATIONAL INVOLVEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION DURING DtTENTE 95-6 (1982). Despite
these restrictions, U.S. exports to the Soviet Union reached record levels in 1979 totaling
in excess of three and one half billion dollars. Additionally, in October 1975, the United
States and the Soviet Union signed a grain trade agreement whereby the Soviet Union
agreed to purchase a minimum of six million tons of corn and wheat from the United
States annually and an additional two million tons without prior consultation with the
U.S. Government. In September 1979, the Department of Agriculture approved the sale of
up to twenty-five million metric tons of corn and wheat to the Soviet Union, the largest
single grain purchase in American history. See id. at 98.
524. See SHAHEEN AYUBI ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY 21 (1982).
525. See id. at 22.
526. See id.
527. See id.
528. See LINDELL, supra note 523, at 99.
529. See supra notes 158-61 and 167-68 and accompanying text.
530. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
531. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
532. See supra notes 160 and 169 and accompanying text.
533. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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The charges against the government in Tehran are serious. Iran's
sponsorship of terrorist groups,5 34 efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction 535 and hostility to the Arab-Israeli peace process 536 are ma-
jor impediments to achieving peace and security in the Middle East and
fostering cordial relations amongst all peoples. As the sole remaining
superpower, the United States must accept the challenge to firmly ad-
dress and overcome these obstacles. However, a "head-in-the-sand" pol-
icy which fails to engage the cause of these impediments and alienates
U.S. allies is unrealistic and arrogant. For example, despite fighting an
eight year war which cost the lives of more than 58,000 Americans, the
United States recently began the process of normalization of diplomatic
and economic relations with Vietnam. 537 Furthermore, the United
States maintained diplomatic and economic dialogue with the former
Soviet Union even while relations were contentious, nuclear weapons
remained pointed at one another and each country pursued policies de-
signed to thwart the other in the international arena.53 Despite the se-
rious nature of Iran's aberrant behavior, it cannot be convincingly ar-
gued that the threat to world peace and global security posed by it
exceeds the one posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
V. CONCLUSION
The Islamic regime in Iran has been the bane of every U.S. presi-
dent for the last nineteen years. With the blessing of the Iranian Gov-
ernment, Islamic militants seized the American Embassy in Tehran and
held fifty-two Americans, as well as the Carter Administration, hostage
for 444 days. The hostage crisis humiliated the United States on an in-
ternational scale at a time when Cold War hostilities with the Soviet
Union were reaching new and dangerous levels. The hostage crisis also
polarized American opinions of Iran, and perhaps Islam in general, as
Americans were confronted with the nightly specter of burning flags
and chants of "Death to America." More than any other event, the hos-
tage crisis epitomized the alleged impotence of the United States during
the Carter years and succeeded in returning a Republican to the White
House.
However, the Reagan and Bush Administrations found themselves
equally incapable of quelling abhorrent Iranian behavior. Iranian spon-
sorship of acts of international terrorism continued unabated and in-
cluded alleged complicity in the bombings of the Marine barracks in
534. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
535. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
536. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
537. See Clinton to Open Full Economic Relations with Vietnam, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Dec. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13456917. See also Clinton Waives Major
Curb on Trade with Vietnam, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1998, at A6, available in 1998 WL-
WSJ 3485800.
538. See Rodman, supra note 182, at A13. See also Rodman, supra note 261, at A25.
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Beirut in October 1983 and Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988 as
well as the seizure and protracted holding of Americans as hostages in
Lebanon. The Iranian military continued to grow in strength and posed
a threat to its weaker neighbors and shipping in the Persian Gulf.
539
The Iranian Government expressed no reservations about flexing its
military might as evidenced by its cataclsymic eight year war with Iraq.
The Iranian Government also continued its efforts to export its revolu-
tionary blend of Islam and politics throughout the Middle East as evi-
denced by its sponsorship of a failed coup d'6tat in Bahrain in 1981 and
its efforts to topple the ruling monarchy in Saudi Arabia. American
humiliation at the hands of the Iranians also continued as attempts to
circumvent prohibitions upon armament shipments to Central America
through Iran by the Reagan Administration erupted into the Iran-
Contra affair. The scandal occupied much of President Reagan's time
and effort during his second term and left a permanent blemish upon
his record of achievement. Furthermore, the scandal badly damaged the
reputation of then-Vice President George Bush who incredulously in-
sisted he was "out of the loop" with regard to the American initiative to
Iran.
Although he has been able to avoid humiliation at the hands of the
Iranian Government, President Clinton has had little success in modi-
fying Iranian behavior. Iranian sponsorship of groups deemed to be ter-
rorist in nature by the United States is believed to be ongoing. Such
groups have been implicated in suicide bombings in Israel, assassina-
tions throughout Europe and the attack upon the U.S. military complex
in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Iranian efforts to develop chemical, nuclear
and biological weapons are ongoing, and the country is on the verge of
operating its first nuclear power plant. Iranian opposition to the Arab-
Israeli peace process has encouraged resistance to the process by ex-
tremist groups as well as many Palestinians. The Clinton Administra-
tion has managed to avoid the pitfalls which ensnared its predecessors
largely by eliminating dialogue, isolating the United States from con-
tact with Iran and adopting policies which operate as if the two coun-
tries exist in a vacuum.
Despite the best efforts of four U.S. administrations to bring about
the collapse of the Iranian Government through threats, sanctions and
economic isolation, the Islamic regime remains firmly in control in Te-
hran. The regime has outlasted three presidents and is well on its way
to outlasting a fourth president. The world has changed dramatically
during this period of time. The Soviet colossus to Iran's north has col-
lapsed into a rabble of fledging states vying for foreign aid on their un-
even courses to free market economies and democratic capitalism. Ira-
539. Iran's military consists of the Army (345,000 personnel), the Revolutionary Guard
(120,000 personnel), the Navy (18,000 personnel), the Air Force (30,000 personnel) and
the army reserves (350,000 personnel). Iranian defense spending totaled $4.7 billion in
fiscal year 1997. See IRAN: EIA REPORT, supra note 181, at 3.
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nian influence in the region in the absence of the deterrence of Soviet
military might will undoubtedly grow even as Russia scrambles to reas-
sert its regional dominance. The stakes mount when the region's fabu-
lous wealth of natural resources is added to the equation. In the nine-
teen years since the Islamic revolution, wars in Lebanon and Iraq have
been fought, previously unheard of alliances (such as Syrian participa-
tion in the Gulf War coalition) have been formed, Jordan, Israel and the
Palestinians have agreed to make peace (although implementation re-
mains problematic) and American influence and popularity have fluctu-
ated wildly. Yet, despite these occurrences, current U.S. policies toward
Iran remain rooted in the denial, exclusion and isolation of previous
administrations.
5 40
The time has come for the United States to reevaluate its policies
toward Iran - including its use of economic sanctions - in light of current
political and economic realities in the Middle East.541 It is time for the
United States to consign the anger and frustration arising from the hos-
tage crisis and the Iran-Contra affair to the scrap heap of history. After
all, as noted by Richard Haass, "[f]oreign policy is not about poses nor is
it a form of therapy... [but rather it] is about promoting this nation's
interests."542 How best to reorient U.S. policy remains problematic and
beyond the scope of this article. However, at the very least, this reorien-
tation should consist of three specific initiatives by the United States.
Initially, the United States should actively pursue dialogue with
the Khatami Administration. 543 This dialogue should be initiated at the
lower echelon of the diplomatic corps such as at the deputy or undersec-
retary of state levels. 544 This dialogue should address all Iranian con-
cerns including past U.S. involvement in Iranian affairs, Iranian secu-
rity concerns and the U.S. sanctions regime. This dialogue should also
address American concerns regarding Iranian sponsorship of acts of in-
ternational terrorism, efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction,
opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and regional security con-
540. See Wright, supra note 264, at Al.
541. See Murphy, supra note 1, at Cl. In this regard, Bruce Laingen, the senior U.S.
diplomat held during the hostage crisis, recently stated that "[If I had been told that
[Iranian-American relations] would be the same sixteen years later, I would have said,
'Don't be ridiculous."' Federman, supra note 513. See also Laura Myers, Former Hostages
Say it is Past Time to Patch Up Relations with Iran, ASSOc. PRESs, Feb. 9, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 6641040.
542. Haass, supra note 262, at C9.
543. See Robert S. Greenberger, Iran and the U.S. Could be Engaged in Early Stage of
a Change in Relations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1997, at A4, available in 1997 WL-WSJ
14177598. See also A Moderate Cleric's Stunning Victory in Iran, S.F. CHRON., May 28,
1997, at A18, available in 1997 WL 6698299. In this regard, U.S. Representative Lee H.
Hamilton stated that "the United States and Iran need to cool the rhetoric, end mutual
demonization, explore better ties and gradually establish a reliable and authoritative
dialogue." Lippman, supra note 452, at A33.
544. See Murphy, supra note 1, at Cl.
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cerns. 545
Secondly, the United States should reorient its policy toward Iran
from one of unilateral action to one of multilateral cooperation by com-
mencing efforts to forge a consensus on policy toward Iran with its al-
lies, especially the European Union.5 46 This consensus should "relate
diplomacy to reasonable pressures against Iran"547 by "setting concrete
standards for judging the actual efficacy of... dialogue [with Iran]
and... adopting a common policy based upon results."5 48 If Iranian
policies change during the course of this dialogue, the United States
and its allies should respond in accordance with the dictates of their
common policy. 549 In the case of the United States, these steps could in-
clude "reducing sanctions, permitting nonmilitary trade and allowing
U.S. firms into Iran. 550 The United States could offer assurances that it
would not enforce ILSA as an incentive to the European Union to enter
into discussions to forge a common policy on Iran. 551 The United States
should make it clear to its allies that it reserves the right to enforce
ILSA in the event that the parties fail to reach agreement on common
principles governing their relations with Iran.
Finally, there must be strict adherence to the principles contained
in any common policy. This policy must not reward Iran in the absence
of substantive behavioral alterations nor be subject to manipulation by
Iranian intransigence. 5 2 This is not to advocate the adoption of an in-
flexible common policy. The diplomatic realities of negotiation and com-
promise make the likelihood of achieving absolute agreement on all as-
pects of a common policy toward Iran most unlikely. Furthermore, an
inflexible policy toward Iran serves only to repeat the mistakes of recent
545. See A 'Moderate' in Tehran, supra note 503, at A18.
546. See Federman, supra note 513.
547. Henry A. Kissinger, No Deals with Iran, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 13067455.
548. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, What "Dialogue' With Iran?, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1997, at
A29.
549. See Federman, supra note 513.
550. Lippman, supra note 452, at A33.
551. Such an assurance has been criticized as an abandonment of the U.S. policy of
isolation of Iran and a tacit admission of its failure. Such an admission would have the
effect of opening the floodgates as firms which may have been deterred by ILSA would
proceed with investments in the absence of penalties. See Rodman, supra note 182, at
A13. See also New Day Coming?, TIME, Jan. 19, 1998, at 35, available in 1998 WL
7694174; Lippman, U.S. Aides Still Divided Over Sanctions Against Foreign Investors in
Iran, supra note 258, at A33. However, such a result could be avoided by requiring U.S.
allies to temporarily suspend investments by their nationals in Iran during negotiations
to develop a common policy. Additionally, any U.S. assurance that ILSA would not be en-
forced during negotiations is different from a legislative repeal as it would allow subse-
quent prosecution against persons violating the Act during negotiations in the event of
their failure to generate a common policy. In any event, the floodgates are already open as
evidenced by the multibillion dollar investments which have flowed into Iran's oil and gas
industries due, in part, to the Clinton Administration's failure to enforce ILSA.
552. See Rodman, supra note 182, at A13.
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U.S. policies. However, once agreed upon, the parties to the common
policy must implement its dictates without question in order to avoid
the mistakes of the European Union's flabby policy of "constructive
dialogue."
553
Nineteen years of hostility cannot be undone or healed overnight,
but efforts to reconcile the United States and Iran should commence
immediately. The results of these efforts cannot be predicted with any
degree of certainty. Dialogue may resolve U.S. differences with its allies
and restore opportunities for U.S. companies to participate in the Ira-
nian economy including the oil and gas industries. 554 The initiation of
dialogue may also serve to legitimize the moderate tone of the Khatami
administration and undercut the influence of Iranian hard-liners. 5 5 On
the other hand, full diplomatic relations may not be restored for years.
Economic relations may never be fully restored nor reach current levels
existing between Iran and the rest of the world. Iranian behavior may
never fully conform to international models of acceptable behavior let
alone U.S. models of such behavior. What is certain is that eventually,
either by design or as a result of an international crisis, the United
States and Iran will have to engage in direct dialogue. 5 6 Obviously, it
would be in the best interests of the United States to commence this
dialogue by design rather than in exigent circumstances thrust upon it
by the calamity of an international emergency. Until the United States
demonstrates the courage and fortitude to initiate such dialogue, it
cannot accurately determine the meaning of Khatami's election, evalu-
ate the discordant voices emanating from his government, gauge the
mood of the Iranian people or seek normalized relations. 557 Efforts to
commence this dialogue at the present time may fail, but it bears to
note that "even a hugely ambitious mission must begin with a first
step ."558
553. See EU To Press For Less Rigid Stance On Iran, supra note 130.
554. See Rodman, supra note 182, at A13.
555. See id.
556. See Bakhash, supra note 263, at A27.
557. See Murphy, supra note 1, at C1.
558. Bakhash, supra note 263, at A27.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Interdependence is an underlying factor within numerous transna-
tional environmental systems. This interdependence generates an in-
teractive decision-making setting in which a state's choice of action is
contingent upon the expected behavior of other actors in the interna-
tional arena. National decision-makers are aware that the quality and
quantity of essential environmental resources available in their territo-
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ries is determined not only by natural factors and their own behavior,
but by the actions of other states.
Attaining optimal results in an interactive situation frequently re-
quires "collective action." Collective action occurs when the efforts of
two or more individuals are needed to achieve a certain outcome, one
which will typically further the interests or well-being of the group.1 In
terms of Pareto Optimality,2 the course of action which leads to the best
outcome for the group is cooperative behavior. The main problem with
collective action occurs when a rational individual's behavior leads to
Pareto inferior outcomes. This phenomenon often happens in large
groups and in situations in which all individuals agree about the com-
mon good and the desirable means of achieving it.
3
In his seminal book, "The Logic of Collective Action", Mancur Olson
rigorously presents the basic proposition that rational self-interested
individuals frequently will not act in concert to achieve common inter-
ests. 4 The negative repercussions of Olson's proposition for interna-
tional environmental cooperation increases together with the ratio of
inter-state environmental independence. While environmental interde-
pendence has long been apparent in the international arena, it has be-
come increasingly prevalent in recent decades. In light of this rapidly
growing trend, as well as the deterioration of essential environmental
resources in most parts of the world, Olson's theory is particularly rele-
vant to the international community today.
The Middle East environmental system exemplifies both the need
for and the impediments to successful regional collective action. Sev-
eral diverse parties share the Middle East's primary environmental re-
sources. Thus, when a party takes action in one jurisdiction it fre-
Lecturer, Faculty of Law and Department of International Relations, the Hebrew Uni-
versity of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Professor Edith Brown-Weiss, Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center, for much valuable discussion and her insightful comments on earlier
drafts. Professor Shmuel Zamir, Department of Statistics, Hebrew University, and Philip
Warburg, Environmental Law Institute, Washington D.C., also contributed helpful com-
ments. Thanks are also due to Ms. Tamar Rahamimoff, for her valuable research assis-
tance. The views expressed are my own. This study is largely based on research I con-
ducted while a visiting scholar at the Georgetown University Law Center, in 1996. I am
grateful to the Center for the excellent facilities provided to me during that period. This
article was prepared with financial assistance from The Israeli National Academy for Sci-
ences, and I wish to express my gratitude for their generous support.
1. TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 1 (1992). See
also Jon Elster, Rationality, Morality and Collective Action, 96 ETHICS 136, 139 (1985).
2. "An allocation ... of resources is Pareto optimal when it is not possible to improve
the well-being of one individual without harming at least one other." SANDLER, supra
note 1, at 13-14.
3. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965);MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 19
(1987).
4. OLSON, supra note 3, at 2.
VOL. 27:1
GAME THEORY
quently affects environmental resources in neighboring areas. 5 Such
interactive features characterize the Middle East's crucial water re-
sources, marine environment and air basin. Some of the region's envi-
ronmental resources are at significant risk and future developments
may further imperil their sustainable utilization. The peace process, if
successful, is expected to generate accelerated economic development
and industrialization in the region, particularly in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. Increased economic development will place more pressure
on the region's fragile resources.
Efficient utilization of the Middle East's environmental resources
requires the parties to establish and implement cooperative arrange-
ments. In the past, armed conflicts in the Middle East precluded al-
most any environmental cooperation among the parties. Indeed, the
first elaborated cooperative arrangements only emerged in 1994. The
environmental provisions in the recently concluded agreements be-
tween Israel and its neighbors 6 have a clear bilateral character. How-
ever, optimal protection and utilization of the region's environmental
resources frequently necessitates the establishment of cooperative ar-
rangements on a regional level. Furthermore, the termination of hos-
tilities does not ensure that an optimal framework for cooperation will
emerge in the future. Recall Olson's proposition regarding collective ac-
tion failure: rational self-interested actors frequently will not act to
achieve their common interests, even when optimal results and the ap-
propriate means of attaining them are agreed upon.
Avoiding collective action failure in the Middle Eastern environ-
mental system requires an examination of the factors motivating or
hindering international cooperation.7 Identification of these critical fac-
tors helps predict which environmental domains are more susceptible to
collective action failure. Armed with an understanding of the impact of
these factors, the challenge facing scholars of international law is to de-
vise appropriate legal mechanisms to modify the structure of problem-
5. This article focuses on environmental resources available to Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The inputs of other states, like
Syria and Lebanon, are also taken into account.
6. See Articles 12, 25, 27, and 40 of the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs to the 1995
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 36 I.L.M.
551 (1997). See Moshe Hirsch, Environmental Aspects of the Cairo Agreement on the Gaza
Strip and the Jericho Area, 28 ISR. L. REV. 374 (1994), for a discussion on the environ-
mental provisions of the 1994 Cairo Agreement. See also Articles 6, 18, Annex II, and
Annex V of the 1994 Treaty of Peace between The State of Israel and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, 34 I.L.M. 46 (1995).
7. On the significance of this question, Elster states: "I believe there is no more im-
portant problem in the social sciences, and none that is more difficult. Understanding
why people cooperate and trust one another may be the first step toward bringing about
more cooperation and trust." Elster, supra note 1, at 141.
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atic settings to improve the prospects of cooperation.8
Through the use of game theory, this article explores some of the
principal factors influencing the emergence and maintenance of inter-
national cooperation in order to develop legal guidelines for establishing
an effective environmental mechanism in the Middle East. As this arti-
cle will show, game theory concepts and models provide a valuable tool
for analyzing the phenomenon of cooperation, enabling international
lawyers to shape legal norms which will enhance the prospects for envi-
ronmental cooperation in the Middle East. Part II of this article sets
forth the basic concepts and models of game theory and its relationship
to modern international relations theory. Part III presents a game
theoretical analysis of two major environmental settings in the Middle
East: marine pollution in the Gulf of Aqaba and water contamination of
the Mountain Aquifer. It then suggests some legal mechanisms to en-
hance the likelihood of cooperation in these settings. Part IV concludes
the article by exploring the options and limits of combining game theory
and international law as an instrument to improve the prospects of co-
operation. The article ultimately states that this combination offers
scholars and policy-makers important insights into better legal mecha-
nisms for long-term international cooperation.
II. GAME THEORY AND COOPERATION
A. Basic Elements of Game Theory9
Mathematicians were the first to develop game theory, primarily
for use in economics. Later, other disciplines, such as political science,
international relations, law, sociology and biology also employed game
theory concepts. Game theory is a strand of rational choice theory,1 0
"designed to treat rigorously the question of [the] optimal behavior"1 of
8. Legal rules do not always aim to support cooperation. In some cases, the major
aim of a legal mechanism is to avoid cooperation. For example, anti-trust laws or legal
rules prohibiting criminal collaboration exist for this purpose.
9. For a general introduction to game theory, see DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE,
GAME THEORY (1991); ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS (1992);
SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1995); R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS:
INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (1957); JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS (1994); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION (2d ed. 1994);
JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953).
10. See SHAUN HARGREAVES HEAP ET AL., THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A CRITICAL
GUIDE at vii-x, 3-25 (1992); MORROW, supra note 9, at 7-8, for a discussion on rational
choice theory and its basic assumptions,.
11. Oskar Morgenstern, Game Theory: Theoretical Aspects, in 6 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 62 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
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decision-makers in "strategic" situations. The term "strategic" refers to
situations in which the outcome does not depend solely on the decision-
maker's behavior or nature, but also on the behavior of other partici-
pants. An important factor shaping an individual's choice is the social
setting or "structure" of a particular situation. Game theory enables so-
cial scientists to formalize social structures and then examine the im-
plications of the structure on individual decisions.
12
A "game" is any interaction between players governed by a set of
rules specifying the possible moves for each participant and a set of out-
comes for each possible combination of moves. The decision-makers are
assumed to be rational in the sense that they have certain goals, which
they strive to attain through their actions. They have a consistent pref-
erence ordering of goals, know the rules of the game, and know that the
other players are also rational.
13
Game theory represents interactions between participants in two
principal forms: the normal (or strategic) form game and the extensive
(or tree) form game. A matrix showing each player's payoff for each
combination of strategies often represents a normal game. The normal
representation is more appropriate for simultaneous decision-making
while the extensive form is more suitable to sequential-move games.
The latter form also displays the information each player knows when
making his decisions. 14 The basic elements of the normal form game in-
clude: (1) the players - the actors who make the decisions (either indi-
viduals or collective decision-making units like firms or states); (2) the
strategy space - the range of moves available to a player in a given
situation (i.e., to cooperate or to defect); and (3) the payoffs ('utilities') -
the outcome generated for the players from a chosen move or strategy.'
5
A game theoretical analysis of social phenomena often does not al-
low for the allocation of accurate payoffs to expected outcomes. In some
cases, it is possible to assign ordinal payoffs to expected outcomes (i.e.,
to organize the various outcomes in accordance with the order of priori-
ties for the relevant player) and then to allocate a respective ordinal
number to each outcome. This method leads to interesting inferences in
numerous situations. 16 However, without knowing the "distance" be-
12. Id. See also Robert. J. Aumann, Game Theory, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: GAME
THEORY 1, 2 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); MORROW, supra note 9, at 1.
13. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 4; HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at
1, 4-31; MORROW, supra note 9, at 7-8, 16-20.
14. D.G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 50 (1994); FUDENBERG & TIROLE,
supra note 9, at 67; GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 4, 115-16; HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note
9, at 42-43 MORROW, supra note 9, at 58-69.
15. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 14, at 7-9; FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 4-5;
GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 2-4.
16. For a discussion of this method of assigning payoffs, see HEAP & VAROUFAKIS,
supra note 9, at 5-12; Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38
WORLD POL. 25, 46-48 (1985); see also STEVEN J. BRAMs, GAME THEORY AND POLITICS 13-
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tween the payoffs on an interval scale, one cannot accurately calculate
the probabilities with which each party would choose each outcome. 17
After reducing sets of interactions to a normal or extensive game,
the next step is to determine the game's solution. Finding the "solu-
tion" of a game serves a normative goal, as it may reveal the best strat-
egy for a rational player. It also serves a predictive aim, as it may indi-
cate how rational players are likely to behave in such situations. A
simple example is the notion of dominant strategy. A strategy is strictly
dominant if it is a best strategy (i.e., it maximizes a player's payoff), re-
gardless of the other player's actions. When it is possible to identify a
single dominant strategy, one can safely assume that a rational player
will adopt the dominant strategy. Conversely, by identifying dominated
strategies, one can assume that rational players will not adopt them.18
While a strict dominant strategy will not solve many games, the
Nash-equilibrium solution applies to a much broader spectrum of cases.
A Nash-equilibrium is the combination of strategies, representing the
best response of each player to the predicted strategies of the other
players. Such a prediction may be called "strategically stable" or "self-
enforcing" because no single player is interested in deviating from the
predicted strategy.19
Game theory is divided into cooperative and non-cooperative game
theory, based on the enforceability of agreements and communication.
Cooperative game theory assumes the existence of an institution capable
of enforcing the agreements concluded between the players; whereas
non-cooperative game theory assumes no such institution exists. In co-
operative games, communication between the players is allowed while
in non-cooperative games, communication may or may not be allowed. 20
Due to the lack of a central enforcement mechanism within the current
international system, this study is concerned with non-cooperative
games.
16 (1975) (using the ordinal method to analyze a specific case).
17. BRAMS, supra note 16, at 20.
18. GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 5; BAIRD ET AL., supra note 14, at 11-14; HEAP &
VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 44-45; FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 6-8. A domi-
nated strategy can sometimes be found by a process of iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies. See GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 4-8.
19. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 14, at 11-22; FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 11-
12; GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 8-9; HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 52-53.
20. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Noncooperative Games, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra




B. Game Theory and Modern International Relations Theory
The basic assumptions of game theory are compatible with the ba-
sic assumptions of modern international relations theory. Prevailing
international relations theory assumes that: (1) States are the central
actors in the international system; (2) States are not subordinated to a
central international authority to enforce cooperation; (3) States are
egoists - they constantly try to maximize their interests; and (4) States
are rational - they have consistent, ordered preferences, which derive
from calculating the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.2 1
Clearly, assumptions (2), (3) and (4) are consistent with those of non-
cooperative game theory. Meanwhile, assumption (1) in no way contra-
dicts any of the underlying premises of game theory. 22
The concepts fundamental to international regimes, game theory
and cooperation, are interrelated. 23 Game theory explains the condi-
tions under which international regimes arise as an instance of coop-
eration, suggesting conditions conducive to stable compliance with
them. Generally, international cooperation is a prerequisite to the es-
tablishment of international regimes. 24 However, cooperation, particu-
larly short-term cooperation, can take place without the existence of in-
ternational regimes. 25  Nonetheless in most cases, the creation of
international regimes facilitates the establishment of long-term coop-
erative patterns between States.
While game theory provides a valuable tool for analysis of interna-
tional cooperation, game theoretical models do not take into account
various factors which frequently affect international cooperation. Such
missing factors include the personal characteristics of decision-makers,
as well as the social and moral values prevailing in their respective en-
vironments. On the other hand, game theoretical models do not at-
21. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 18, 27 (1984); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Re-
lations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 346-50
(1989).
22. While the above assumptions largely reflect the neo-realist school in international
relations (the prevailing school today), both realists and liberals presume self-interested,
purposive and calculated behavior by states. See ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS
COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10 (1990).
23. The prevailing definition of international regimes is "implicit or explicit princi-
ples, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which the actors' expectations
converge in a given area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, Structural
Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasver ed., 1983). See also KEOHANE, supra note 22, at 57.
For other definitions, see Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International
Regimes, 40 INT'L ORG. 491, 493-94 (1987).
24. See Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and
Strategies, 38 WORLD POL. 1, 20-21 (1985).
25. Haggard & Simmons, supra note 23, at 504.
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tempt to address all factors relevant to collective action. Rather, they
aim to simplify and abstract reality by focusing on certain factors of
collective action while exploring the interplay among them. Such an
analysis seems simplistic, but the simplification proves useful in clari-
fying complex interactions. 26
Despite the imperfections which come from focusing on one set of
variables, and the difficulties associated with assigning numerical pay-
offs to expected outcomes, game theoretical analysis sets forth the ex-
pected trends of decision-makers as well as the decisions likely to be
adopted in particular settings. Furthermore, game theoretical analysis
frequently provides scholars and policy-makers with insights regarding
mechanisms designed to elicit and support stable cooperation.
C. Models of Collective Action
Each of the many collective action models presents a different pay-
off structure. This section presents the widely discussed models in
game theoretical and international relations literature. After clarifying
the basic features of each model, this section focuses on the prospects
for cooperation in each setting. It should be noted that the Middle
Eastern environmental settings do not accurately reflect the game theo-
retical models presented here. Frequently, however, it is possible to
identify a particular environmental setting which presents strong fea-
tures of a certain game theoretical model. As such, the insights drawn
from the models presented below provide important indications re-
garding the expected trends of the decision-makers in these environ-
mental settings.
1. Zero-Sum Games
Zero-sum game is one of game theory's most famous models. Par-
ticularly during the early stages of the theory's development, zero-sum
game served as a polar case and historical point of departure. The key
feature of zero-sum game is that the sum generated for the players for
each possible combination of moves is zero. A game in which the sum of
the payoffs is always constant (not necessarily zero) is called "constant-
sum game" and its strategic analysis is equivalent to zero-sum game.
In zero-sum games, whatever one player wins the other loses.27 Since
the payoffs to Player 2 are equal to the negative payoffs to Player 1, it is
possible to simplify the strategic form and only write the payoffs of
26. MORROW, supra note 9, at 8. For a discussion on the application of rational choice
models to international relations, see KEOHANE, supra note 21, at 65-74; Robert Jervis,
Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation, 40 WORLD POL. 317 (1988).
27. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 4; MORROW, supra note 9, at 74-75; VON
NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 9, at 46-47.
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Player 1 S1 2 2
S2 1 3
Figure 1: A Two-Player Zero-Sum Game
The solution to a zero-sum game, as suggested by Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, involves the Maximin Principle, which directs players
to maximize their security levels. The security level is the least amount
that a player can receive from his move. The result of this game is an
equilibrium pair in cell SiSi generating 2 payoffs to Player 1, and -2 to
Player 2.29 This cell is called the "saddle-point." However, not all zero-
sum games have a saddle-point. 30 The Maximin Principle is not only
valid for a one-shot game, but applies to iterated games as well.
31
Two-player zero-sum games represent strictly competitive situa-
tions. The players maintain opposing preferences and are considered
rivals. As such, the players are in conflict and not inclined to cooper-
ate.3 2 Zero-sum games may have more than two players (N-players
games) and some players may have an interest in cooperating against
the rest of the players (i.e., in forming a coalition).33 As one might
imagine, a two player zero-sum game represents one of the worst mod-
els for international cooperation.
Similar levels of competitiveness also exist in non-zero-sum. These
are games in which the players seek relative rather than absolute gains
28. This figure illustrates the famous Battle of Bismarck Sea in World War II; see
LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 64-65; BRAMS, supra note 16, at 3-4.
29. In the case represented in Figure 1, Player 1 (the maximizing player) should
choose S1, the strategy that assures him/ her at least 2 payoffs. Player 2 (the minimizing
player) should select S1, which would assure him no more than -2 (in comparison to -3
which may arise from S2). BRAMS, supra note 16, at 4; LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at
64-65; Michael Bacharach, Zero-sum Games, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 12, at
253. For some criticism of the Minimax principle, see Bacharach, id., at 255-56.
30. Every zero-sum game with mixed strategies, however, has a saddle point; see
Bacharach, supra note 29, at 255. In a pure strategy, a player adopts a particular strat-
egy throughout the game. In a mixed strategy, a player adopts a strategy that distributes
probability among several pure strategies; GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 30.
31. LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 103. 'One shot games' and 'iterated games' will
be explained in Part II.C(2).
32. LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 59-61; Bacharach, supra note 29, at 253.
33. MORROW, supra note 9, at 75; VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 9, at
220-22.
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(i.e., in military contexts where the aim is to achieve superiority).
When the game has only two players who are exclusively interested in
relative gains, the situation can be modeled as a zero-sum game with no
room for cooperation. The conflict diminishes significantly when there
are more than two players, or if the concern for relative gains is less
than total.
34
Pure zero-sum situations rarely arise in the international arena, if
at all. Strong features of zero-sum games are present in some interna-
tional settings such as wars or sovereignty disputes over a particular
territory. 35 Fortunately, the utilization of common environmental re-
sources almost never represents a zero-sum game. Most international
environmental resources are renewable. Thus, the sum of quantities
available to the parties is not constant, rather it depends significantly
upon the players' strategies. However, use of a shared, non-renewable
environmental resource, like fossil water reservoirs,36 may lead the par-
ties to adopt strategies commonly employed in zero-sum games.
2. The Prisoner's Dilemma
The models discussed in the remainder of this section represent
non-zero-sum games, the most famous of which is the Prisoner's Di-
lemma ("PD"). 37 The PD model attracted considerable attention from
both game theorists and scientists in various disciplines because the
game's implications apply to a wide range of social phenomena. The
normal form of PD is presented in Figure 2: let C (Cooperate) equal
34. Duncan Snidal, Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation, 85
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 703 (1991). See Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in Interna-
tional Relations Theory, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1303 (1991), for a further discussion on
relative gains.
35. See, e.g., with respect to the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians over
East Jerusalem, Moshe Hirsch, The Future Negotiations Over Jerusalem, Strategical Fac-
tors and Game Theory, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 699, 711-12 (1996).
36. On nonrenewable groundwater in the Middle East, see MASAHIRO MURAKAMI,
MANAGING WATER FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 90-103,
182-83 (1995).
37. The game nicknamed Prisoner's Dilemma, attributed to A. W. Tucker, is typically
presented with the following story. Two persons, apprehended by the police with stolen
goods, are suspected of burglary and taken into custody and separated. The district at-
torney is certain that they are guilty of burglary, but he/she does not have adequate evi-
dence to convict them at a trial. The district attorney explains to each prisoner (sepa-
rately) that he/she has two alternatives: (1) to confess to the crime of burglary, or (2) not
to confess. If both of them confess, both will be convicted of burglary and sentenced to two
years in prison. If neither confesses, both will be convicted of possession of stolen goods
and given a six-month prison sentence. If only one confesses, the confessor will go free,
while the other will get the maximum sentence of five years. See ANATOL RAPOPORT &
ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
24-25 (1965); LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 94-95; Anatol Rapoport, Prisoner's Di-
lemma, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 12, at 198.
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"not confess;" and D (Defect) equal "confess." By convention, the first







Figure 2: Prisoner's Dilemma
From Player l's perspective; if Player 2 chooses strategy C or D,
then Player 1 prefers D to C. Thus, strategy D strictly dominates strat-
egy C. The same analysis holds true for Player 2, as C is strictly domi-
nated by D. The result is that D is the dominant strategy for both play-
ers and cell DD represents the only Nash equilibrium for PD. As
explained above, in Nash equilibrium, no player is interested in devi-
ating from his predicted strategy.38 The result generated in DD (2,2) is
sub-optimal for both players who strongly prefer the result of CC (0.5,
0.5). PD represents a collective action failure. Since each rational
player is not expected to deviate from his strategy of confession, the
outcome of the combined strategies (mutual confession) constitutes a
Pareto inferior equilibrium.
A situation is defined as PD and generates the undesirable results
noted above if the following inequalities among payoffs exist:
DC > CC > DD > CD
and 2CC > CD + DC.
39
PD is by definition a non-cooperative game and communication is
not allowed between the players. Yet even allowing the players to
communicate would not significantly change the expected outcomes of
the game. If the players could communicate, they would be expected to
agree to adopt strategy CC to generate better payoffs. Even after they
agreed, the structure of the game would not change. Without an
authority to enforce the agreement, each party would have a strong in-
terest in breaching it because the payoff structure remains the same:
2CC > CD + DC.40
Increasing the number of players (N-players games) does not alter
the sub-optimal outcome of the game. In fact, the problem may even
38. See also, DAVID KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 28 (1990).
39. See RAPOPORT & CHAMMAH, supra note 37, at 34-35.
40. See RAPOPORT & CHAMMAH, supra note 37, at 25-26; LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note
9, at 96.
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worsen because each additional player obtains a higher payoff if he or
she adopts strategy D in comparison to strategy C, and D dominates
C.41
The sub-optimal outcomes generated by Nash equilibrium in one-
stage games ("one-shot games") do not necessarily occur in iterated
games. The main point in iterated games is that credible threats or
promises regarding future rounds can influence the players' behavior in
the present round. Finite iterated PD games involve situations in which
the players know when the game ends. Employing backward induction
logic, one can anticipate that players in these games will adopt their
dominant strategy of defection. When the game is iterated a finite
number of times, the players in the last stage will not concern them-
selves with how their action will affect future payoffs. Thus, rational
players will adopt their dominant strategy and "defect" in the last
round (as they are expected to do in one-shot games). On the next-to-
last move, given the solid expectation of defection in the last round,
there is no incentive for players to deviate from the dominant strategy.
The same pattern of behavior is expected until the players reach the
first round.
42
Mutual cooperative behavior is expected in infinite iterated games,
or in finite games in which the players are not certain when the last
play will occur. Without a specific date for the last stage, there is no
starting point for backward induction logic, thus inducing cooperation
in the next stages by current behavior remains a viable option. The key
factor is that choices made in the present round not only determine the
outcome of this stage, but can affect payoffs generated in future rounds.
Future payoffs are, however, probably less important than present pay-
offs. This phenomenon is referred to as the discount factor. The dis-
count factor represents the current value of a dollar to be generated at
some later stage. The discount factor (usually written as '8') falls be-
tween 0 and 1, and its relation to the interest rate (r) is 8 = 1/(1+r). 43
There is more than one strategy that can elicit cooperation in infi-
nite iterated PD. The most famous is Tit-for-Tat, which achieved the
highest score in Axelrod's well-known experiments. 44 Tit-for-Tat is a
41. Rapoport, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 12, at 199-200; LUCE & RAIFFA, su-
pra note 9, at 97; TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 15.
42. Compare HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 168-69, and FUDENBERG &
TIROLE, supra note 9, at 111, and LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 98-99, with RAPOPORT
& CHAMMAH, supra note 37, at 28-29, and GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 224 (presenting ex-
perimental evidence).
43. See GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 68, 88; MORROW, supra note 9, at 38.
44. In Axelrod's experiments, professional game theorists were invited to send pro-
grams to a computer tournament playing iterated PD 200 times. Each participant wrote
a program which included a rule for selecting the cooperative or non-cooperative choice on
each move. The program had access to the history of the game and could use this history
in making a choice. Each program was paired with another program, including its own
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strategy of cooperating on the first move and then copying the other
player's previous move. In order to motivate cooperation by Tit-for-Tat
in infinite PD games, the players must not significantly underestimate
future gains. In other words, the discount rate should be close to one.
Generally, the likelihood of cooperation in such circumstances is in-
creased together with the increase in three variables: (1) the discount
rate; (2) the payoffs associated with cooperation; and (3) the reduction
in the payoffs generated by defection. There is interplay between these
variables. For instance, when the discount factor is not high enough to
elicit cooperation through simple Tit-for-Tat strategy, using a more se-
vere contingent strategy to decrease the payoffs for defection (like the
Grim Trigger)45 may remedy this shortage and increase the likelihood of
cooperation.
When the discount factor or the number of payoffs generated by co-
operation is decreased, cooperation can be attained by decreasing the
payoffs associated with defection, particularly by harsher acts of re-
taliation. The possibilities of motivating cooperation by threats are,
however, limited. A player is not expected to take into account a non-
credible threat; that is, a threat that costs more to carry out than not to
carry out.46 A strategy involving threats is considered credible if it
yields the threatening player, and other participants, the best outcomes
in the remaining stages of the game (i.e., constitutes a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium).
47
These results regarding cooperation in two-player infinite PD
games also apply to N-player games. 48 The difference is that in N-
player infinite games, cooperation may emerge among some players
program. The program with the largest cumulated payoff won the tournament. Tit-for-
Tat, which was submitted by Rapoport, won the tournament over the other fourteen pro-
grams submitted. The results of the tournament were published and a second round was
conducted. Out of the 63 programs submitted, Tit-for-Tat, which Rapoport resubmitted,
achieved the best score. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54
(1984); Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 306 (1981); Rapoport, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 12, at 200-202.
45. The Grim Trigger answers any move of defection with defection for all future
rounds of the game; MORROW, supra note 9, at 266. See also GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 91-
99. On other contingent strategies, see Martin Patchen, Strategies for Eliciting Coopera-
tion from an Adversary, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 164, 171-81 (1987).
46. HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 115-16; KREPS, supra note 38, at 49-53.
47. GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 57, 94-99. A subgame is a part of a game, or the part
that remains to be played beginning at any point at which the complete history of the
game is common knowledge among the players. For a precise definition of a subgame see
GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 94, and HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 82. A Nash
equilibrium is subgame-perfect if the players' strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in
every subgame. See GIBBONS, supra note 9, at 95; see also HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra,
note 9, at 84.
48. HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 175-76.
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even if the rest consistently adopt a non-cooperative strategy. Such
partial cooperation is possible if the cooperative players cooperate on
the condition that the other cooperative players cooperate, and if each of
their discount rates is high enough.
49
The Prisoner's Dilemma attracted enormous attention from game
theorists and social scientists, especially after the publication of Axel-
rod's work. Many scholars believed that PD captured the problem of
collective action. PD became the paradigmatic example, as stated by
Rasmusen: "[w]henever you observe individuals in a conflict that hurts
them all, your first thought should be of The Prisoner's Dilemma."
50
Axelrod's optimistic message was that cooperation may emerge and
be sustained even among egoists operating in a system without a cen-
tral enforcement authority. As previously stated, PD has been applied
to numerous disciplines, including biology,5' economics, 52 international
trade,5 3 political science,54 international relations55 (especially arms
control) 56 and law. 57 In addition, the model effectively represents the
problem of externalities and thus has been applied to several environ-
mental collective action problems. 58 Some scholars 59 even characterized
the celebrated "Tragedy of the Commons" 60 as a PD. At some point, it
seemed that the model represented all forms of collective action prob-
49. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 82-105. In some groups, there is an inherent tendency
for exploitation of the great members (in terms of the size and extent of their interest in
the product to be generated by cooperation) by the smaller ones. See OLSON, supra note 3,
at 34-36; SANDLER, supra note 1, at 54-58.
50. RASMUSEN, supra note 9, at 18.
51. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation,
211 SCI. 1390 (1981).
52. See, e.g., KREPS, supra note 38, at 39.
53. See J. David Richardson, The New Political Economy of Trade Policy, in
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 267, 270-75 (1986).
54. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 129; see also STEIN, supra note 22, and the references
therein.
55. See, e.g., Glenn H. Snyder, Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken Models in Interna-
tional Politics, 15 INT'L STUD. Q. 66 (1971); BRAMS, supra note 16, at 26-38; STEIN, supra
note 22, at 31-35. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 360-62 (for additional references on the
subject).
56. See, e.g., STEVE WEBER, COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN U.S.-SOVIET ARMS
CONTROL 17 (1991).
57. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 14, at 167, 201.
58. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwa-
ter: The Challenges of International Water Resource Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 384, 389
(1996); CRISTINA BICCHIERI, RATIONALITY AND COORDINATION 224 (1993); William H.
Rodgers, Jr., The Evolution of Cooperation in Natural Resources Law: The
Drifter/Habitue Distinction, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 195, 199-200 (1986).
59. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 110-15 (1978);
Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International
Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923, 929 (1985) [hereinafter Coordina-
tion].
60. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
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lems, and several authors expressed the view that the logic underlying
the problem of collective action is the logic of the PD. 61 This was a
sweeping generalization. Today, it is clear that the structure of some
collective action problems is different from the structure of the PD.
3. The Assurance Game
Scholars approaching collective action problems with the tools of
game theory devoted disproportional attention to PD. Nevertheless, all
that attention should not detract from the relevance of other game
structures commonly applied in the international system. While the
Assurance game 62 presents less conflict-driven features than PD, suc-
cessful collective action remains uncertain. As shown in Figure 3, at-
taining the optimal outcome in the Assurance game requires coopera-
tion by all players.
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C 4,4 1,3
D 3,1 2,2
Figure 3: The Assurance Game
The preference ordering of the players in the Assurance game is:
CC>DC>DD>CD.
Examination of the above matrix shows that the game has two
Nash equilibriums (CC and DD) and neither dominates the other.
While CC is Pareto superior to the other possibilities, rational players
may reach the equilibrium of DD. A player may play D if he or she is
not certain whether the other will play C or D, and if he or she is de-
termined to avoid the worst outcomes of CD. In such cases, "all hare
risk-dominates all stag."63 Pre-play communication between the play-
ers may alleviate the problem in Assurance situations. A rational
61. See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Collective Action as an Agreeable N-Prisoners' Dilemma,
16 BEHAV. SCI. 472 (1971).
62. Rousseau's story of the stag hunt commonly illustrates the Assurance game struc-
ture in which two hunters must cooperate in order to catch a stag. If they catch a stag, it
will be shared between the hunters, thus generating the best outcome (CC). If both hunt
for hare, each of them will catch one hare and attain inferior payoffs (DD). The worst re-
sult for a hunter arises if he/she attempts to catch the stag while the other hunts for hare
(CD). Here, the second will catch a hare and the first will catch nothing. See FUDENBERG
& TIROLE, supra note 9, at 3; RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 167-68 (1982).
63. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 20.
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player is expected to pledge to play C, thus improving the chances that
the other player also will adopt a cooperative strategy. Such communi-
cation does not, however, completely eliminate the likelihood of defec-
tion.
64
In two-player sequential Assurance situations, a player may drive
the other to cooperate in the next move by playing C in the first stage.
A player may also accomplish this by committing to a cooperative strat-
egy in an early stage. The same is true for N-player settings regarding
all the players but the last one. If all players except the last one have
already played C , or committed themselves to cooperate, a last rational
player will cooperate to gain the optimal results of CC.
Attaining optimal results in N-player games is less likely than in
two-player sequential situations. A rational player in N-player games
is aware that the desirable result emerges only if all players cooperate.
Increasing the number of players increases the likelihood that one
player will defect. Subsequently, this decreases a rational player's in-
centive to cooperate and to take the risk of suffering the worst outcome.
In the iterated game scenario, the prospects for cooperation are fos-
tered. In iterated Assurance games, the gap between the optimal out-
comes (CC) and those generated by cautious strategies (DD) grows, in-
creasing the losses from long-term mutual defection. As the gap
increases, the likelihood that a player will take the risk of a cooperative
strategy, thereby encouraging the other player to cooperate, is in-
creased. Contingent strategies, like Tit-for-Tat, generally lead to more
cooperative results.
65
The above analysis demonstrates that a player in Assurance situa-
tions will cooperate if assured that the other players will also cooperate.
Therefore, gaining reliable information regarding the players' inten-
tions is crucial to cooperation in Assurance situations. Some scholars
argue that the Assurance game does not constitute a genuine collective
action problem, but rather presents only an "information problem."66
Lack of information occurs frequently in the international arena. Play-
ers are expected to gather information regarding the expected behavior
and expectations of the other players. This task may be realized, wher-
ever possible, through pre-play communication and examination of the
other players' records in similar situations. In iterated situations, the
players also learn about others' intentions through the moves of the
game itself. In sequential cases, the most efficient information-
64. As observed by Aumann, regardless of his/her own play, player 2 gains more if
player 1 plays C. Thus, no matter what action is intended by player 2, he/she will tell
player 1 that that he/she intends to play C. Player 1, of course, should not be assumed to
believe Player 2. See FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 21.
65. See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 1, at 83.
66. Elster, supra note 1, at 140; see also TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 19, 39; STEIN, supra
note 22, at 30.
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gathering strategy for a player is to start with cooperation. 67
Without reliable information, the variables used to determine the
probability of a player adopting a cooperative or noncooperative strat-
egy include: (1) the extent of the gap between CC and DD; (2) the num-
ber of remaining stages of the game; (3) the discount rate (in iterated
games); (4) the number of players; and (5) the magnitude of the risk
generated by CD. Increasing the value of the first three variables in-
creases the prospects for cooperative moves, while increasing the num-
ber of players and the magnitude associated with CD, decreases the
prospects for cooperative moves.
Scholars have applied the Assurance game to various international
situations in which attaining optimal results required cooperative
moves by all participants. 68 Surprisingly, the model rarely has been
applied to international environmental collective action problems. 69
4. The Coordination Game
As in the Assurance game, all players in the Coordination game 70
have to cooperate in order to attain the optimal outcome. The central
difference between these two game models is that while the Assurance
game presents only one Pareto-equilibrium position, the Coordination
game presents multiple Pareto-equilibria over which the players have
divergent preferences. The normal form of this problem is presented in
Figure 4.
67. Hugh Ward, Testing the Waters: Taking Risks to Gain Reassurance in Public
Goods Games, 33 J. CONFLICT RES. 274 (1988). In this article, Ward analyzes an Assur-
ance model in which a player is not certain whether the other players have Assurance or
PD preferences.
68. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and Extraterri-
torial Trade Controls, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (1987); Robert Jervis, From Bal-
anced to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation, 38 WORLD POL. 58, 67-68
(1985); Carlise Ford Rounge, Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in
Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154 (1984); STEIN, supra note 22, at 31; Ward, supra note 67,
at 279.
69. See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 1, at 168.
70. The story of the Coordination game, also known as "The Battle of the Sexes," in-
volves two players who wish to go to an event together but who disagree about whether to
go to a football game or to the ballet. Each player gets a payoff of 2 if both go to his or
her preferred event, a payoff of 1 if both go to the other's preferred event, and 0 payoffs if
they are unable to agree. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 9, at 18; see also the original
story in LuCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 91.
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Player 2
S1 S2
Player 1 S1 2, 1 0, 0
S2 0,0 1,2
Figure 4: Coordination Game
The preference ordering for player 1 is:
S1, S1 > S2, S2 > S1, S2 = S2, S1
And for player 2:
S2, S2 > S1, S1 > S1, S2 = S2, S1
The Coordination game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategy:
(S1, S1) and (S2, S2). Both strategies are efficient. Each one, however,
generates different payoffs to the players. The players are interested in
coordinating on one of the equilibria positions. The collective action
problem arises since they have conflicting preferences regarding the
chosen equilibrium.
71
This game represents a clear distributional problem, 72 Which im-
pedes cooperation. However, once the players agree on a cooperative
solution, there are no significant incentives to depart from the coordina-
tion point, making the solution self-enforcing.7 3 If pre-play communica-
tion exists, each rational player may announce that he or she would
follow his or her preferred equilibrium point (e.g., S1 for Player 1),
while the other player, seeking to avoid the worst results (S1, S2), is
driven to the first preferred strategy. 74 Assuming that both players are
rational and adopt this strategy, the above proposition does not aid in
solving the game. On the other hand, in sequential games the first
player to move may have a significant advantage since he or she is able
to commit himself or herself in an earlier stage to the preferred equilib-
rium position. Meanwhile, the second player has no choice but to join
the first player.
The prospects for cooperation are not necessarily decreased in N-
player games (as in PD). Indeed, in some cases, the prospects are en-
hanced. Increasing the number of players impedes communication and
71. For a discussion of situations in which players converge on some "focal point" (a
prominent position in terms of uniqueness, simplicity, or precedency), see THOMAS C.
SHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 69-72, 89, 92 (1960); RASMUSEN, supra note 9, at
28-29.
72. See Coordination, supra note 59, at 931-32; James D. Morrow, Modelling the
Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information, 48 INT'L ORG. 387,
388 (1994) [hereinafter Modelling].
73. Coordination, supra note 59, at 932; STEIN, supra note 22, at 42.
74. LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 9, at 91.
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complicates bargaining, but does not increase the players' incentives to
defect from the equilibrium point. While each player in games with a
small number of players may have an incentive to depart (or threaten to
depart) from the coordination point in an attempt to compel the others
to accept his/her preferred point, the strategy's impact decreases as the
number of players increases.
75
In contrast to PD situations, the iteration of the Coordination game
does not lead to better cooperative results. On the contrary, playing
through time may become one of the destabilizing factors in Coordina-
tion situations. The magnitude of the distributional problem corre-
sponds to the extent of the gap between the payoffs generated to the
players in the different equilibria positions. This gap is relatively small
in a one-shot game (i.e., 1 in Figure 4), but it increases together with
the iteration of the game. Thus, a player willing to give up the rela-
tively small additional benefit of his or her preferred equilibrium, in or-
der to avoid the worst results, would find it more difficult as the gap
grows with each iteration of the game.7 6 The discount factor's impact
upon the prospects for cooperation is very different from that in the PD.
Decreasing the discount rate to zero in the Coordination game brings
the players closer to the one-shot games. The decrease in the discount
rate reduces future losses arising from compromise on the unfavorable
equilibrium point. Therefore, decreasing the discount rate encourages
the players to cooperate.
Players in Coordination situations are expected to misrepresent
their private information. They are likely to attempt to convince the
others that adopting their preferred equilibrium position will also fur-
ther their own interests (i.e., that the situation is similar to the Assur-
ance game). Players in Coordination situations have incentive to dis-
semble information; conceal or underrate unfavorable information, and
exaggerate favorable data. Increasing the gap between the different
equilibria positions enhances the distributional problem and intensifies
the information problem. When the players do not trust messages con-
veyed by the other players, the likelihood of successful coordination is
reduced.
77
The Coordination game captures the essence of numerous collective
action situations, in which several ways of attaining optimal results
exist. The Coordination game is applied to various international con-
texts where the actors are interested in "meeting" each other in some
coordinated position but have conflicting preferences over the particular
meeting point. The prominent examples in the international arena in-
clude setting common standards for international communication,
75. Coordination, supra note 59, at 935-36.
76. Coordination, supra note 59, at 936. See also Modelling, supra note 72, at 411.
77. Modelling, supra note 72, at 400-06.
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agreeing on radio-emergency frequency for civil aviation, and formu-
lating an international system for the classification of goods for customs
purposes.
78
III. GAME THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST
A. The Prospects for Environmental Cooperation: Game Theoretical
Analysis
Having clarified the central notions and models of game theory,
this article now turns to an examination of the major environmental
problems in the Middle East. This Part analyzes two of the region's
principal environmental problems: marine pollution in the Gulf of
Aqaba and water contamination of the Mountain Aquifer. This section
will also briefly discuss other regional environmental problems.
1. Marine Pollution in the Gulf of Aqaba
a. Background
The Gulf of Aqaba ("Gulf') is one of two northern extensions of the Red
Sea, the other being the Gulf of Suez. The Gulf extends about 180 km
from the Israeli and Jordanian shores in the north to the Strait of Tiran
in the South, bordering the coastlines of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It is
both narrow, with an average width of only 18 km, and deep, with an
average depth of 800 meters. The water in the Gulf is calm and the
winds generally come from the north. The water is exceptionally clear,
due to a very low concentration of nutrients and plankton. The Gulfs
natural features create ideal conditions for an abundant and diverse
aquatic system. At the heart of the ecosystem are the Gulfs world-
renowned and exquisite coral reefs, which are home to myriad aquatic
life forms.
79
The four littoral states of the Gulf of Aqaba are Egypt, Israel, Jor-
dan and Saudi Arabia. Aside from the intrinsic environmental value of
78. For more situations presenting the features of the Coordination game, see STEIN,
supra note 22, at 42-43; Abbott, supra note 21, at 371-72, 374; Coordination, supra note
59, at 932; Modelling, supra note 72, at 390-93, 409-13.
79. Khalil Hosny Mancy, Gulf of Aqaba Ecological Overview and Call to Action, in
PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA 19 (Deborah Sandler et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter
PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA]; A REGIONAL PROJECT BETWEEN EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND
JORDAN: UPPER GULF OF AQABA OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PROJECT 4, 6 (Eur. Comm'n, DG
I B, External Relations, Brussels, 1995) [hereinafter UPPER GULF OF AQABA]; Grant
James Hewison & Boaz Oren, Protecting Sensitive Aquatic Habitats in the Gulf of Aqaba,
in PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA , supra, at 119.
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its unique ecosystem, there are two principal reasons why the Gulf is of
considerable importance to Egypt, Israel, and Jordan:
8 0
The first is that the Gulf is an important transportation route for
Jordan and Israel, and to a lesser degree, for Egypt. The Port of Aqaba
is Jordan's only outlet to the sea, and the Port of Eilat is Israel's only
gateway to the East. The regular ferry traffic inside the Gulf, between
Nuweiba in Egypt and Aqaba, serves tourists and Egyptian workers in
neighboring countries. Cargo traffic to Aqaba, as well as cargo and
crude oil traffic to Eilat, dominates the maritime traffic in the Gulf. In
1993, the Port of Aqaba received 1,430 of the 1,615 vessels entering the
Gulf through the Strait of Tiran. Oil tankers carrying crude oil from
Egypt make up approximately one-third of the ship's calls to Eilat.8 1
The second reason is that the Gulf harbors several very popular
tourist destinations, including unique coral reefs. The reefs attract a
significant number of tourists from around the world. Israel and Jor-
dan maintain large tourist resorts, mainly in Eilat and Aqaba. How-
ever, some facilities are found along the Egyptian coast (mainly in
Taba, Nueiba, and Dahab). All three States continue to expand their
existing resorts, rapidly making tourism the major source of employ-
ment and income in the area.
8 2
The Gulfs precious environmental resources, maritime transporta-
tion and tourist industry are interrelated. While environmental pollu-
tion rarely affects maritime transportation, maritime transportation,
and activities associated with it do affect the waters. For instance, ac-
Cidents during cargo loading and unloading or crude oil terminal opera-
tions can have a significant impact on the Gulfs extremely fragile envi-
ronmental resources. Furthermore, the success of the area's tourist
industry largely depends upon the quality of the coast's environmental
resources since most tourists engage in water activities like swimming,
diving, and snorkeling. Ironically, however, the tourist industry re-
mains one of the principal sources of marine pollution in the Gulf.8 3
80. The Gulf is of lesser importance to Saudi Arabia. There are only a few small
towns on the Saudi Arabian coast, and it seems that the government is not interested in
developing tourist resorts in the area.
81. UPPER GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 8.
82. See Roy B. Mann, Tourism and Related Development Compatible with Aesthetic
Resource Protection in the Gulf of Aqaba, in PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA, supra note
79, at 143; Fouad Sultan, Tourism Development Along the Gulf of Aqaba Coast: An Egyp-
tian Perspective, in PROTECTING THE.GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 177; UPPER GULF
OFAQABA, supra note 79, at 8-9.
83. On the sources of pollution in the Gulf, see Zihad Jaber Alawneh, Jordanian En-
vironmental Laws, Institutions, and Treaties Affecting the Gulf of Aqaba, in PROTECTING
THE GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 97, 98-102; Deborah Sandler, Environmental Law
and Policy for the Gulf of Aqaba: An Israeli Perspective, in PROTECING THE GULF OF
AQABA, supra note 79, at 69, 85-89; Mohammed I. Wahbeh, An Agenda for Scientific Re-
search in the Gulf of Aqaba, in PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 25, 28-
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The Gulf of Aqaba area is undergoing a wave of economic develop-
ment, a fact which poses significant risk to its fragile environmental re-
sources. This is particularly true because the current utilization of the
region's resources borders its carrying capacity. Given this state of af-
fairs, any significant pollution is expected to generate harmful results
to the Gulf ecosystem and, consequently, to the tourist industry.
b. Analysis: Israel and Jordan
Significant pollution originating from either Israel or Jordan gen-
erates similar negative payoffs for both parties. This is due to the geo-
graphic proximity of the two States' coasts and the marine pollution
frequently generated in the Gulf by events close to shore, like mooring
operations in the harbors, oil unloading, or sewage disposal.8 4 Large
amounts of pollutants originating from either State will first harm the
coastal ecosystem of the originating State, and several hours later, the
environmental resources of the neighboring State. An oil spill can drift
from Jordan to Israel or from Israel to Jordan within six hours. 85 This
type of pollution, especially if repeated, would significantly harm both
parties' vital tourist industry.
To simplify the game theory analysis, assume that each party has
two principal strategies, C and D. C refers to a cooperative strategy in
which a party takes the appropriate preventive measures to avoid ma-
rine pollution, while D refers to a non-cooperative strategy in which a
party does not take the required preventive measures. Significant pol-
lution occurs if one of the parties defects (CD or DC). Pollution is
avoided if both parties cooperate (CC), while serious pollution occurs if
both parties adopt non-cooperative strategies (DD). Several assump-
tions enable the presentation of the parties' ordinal payoffs in a normal
form (Figure 6). First, preventive costs are lower than the benefits gen-
erated by utilizing non-polluted environmental resources. Second, the
preventive costs and the positive payoffs in the absence of pollution are
similar for both parties. Finally, the worst possibility for each party is
to take precautionary measures while still suffering the negative pay-
offs resulting from pollution.
31.
84. The likelihood of ship collision leading to major spills in the Gulf is remote. See
UPPER GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 10-11.







Figure 6: Ordinal payoff matrix for Jordan and
Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba
Thus, the preference ordering for Israel and Jordan in this setting
is:
CC > DC > DD > CD86
The structure of the interactive sub-setting between Jordan and Is-
rael is that of the Assurance game and the attainment of the optimal
outcome (CC) requires both parties to adopt cooperative strategies.
This situation presents two Nash equilibria (CC and DD), but neither
dominates the other. While CC equilibrium is clearly Pareto superior to
DD, a rational actor cooperates only if inclined to believe that the other
party will cooperate. Since the Gulf of Aqaba system presents an infi-
nite iterated situation, the gap between the optimal and worst results
grows, thereby fostering the prospects for mutual cooperation. The dis-
count rates of Israel and Jordan are relatively high. The fact that both
parties currently invest considerable resources in developing their re-
gional tourist industries testifies to that effect. This factor increases
the likelihood that both parties' strategies will converge on the mutual
cooperative equilibrium.
The Assurance game's characteristics explain why Israel and Jor-
dan have adopted the current cooperative strategies in the Gulf, leading
to stable cooperation. In this sub-setting, a party generally departs
from its cooperative strategy only if it expects that the other party will
adopt a non-cooperative strategy. Thus, for instance, Jordan is ex-
pected to forgo its preventive measures if convinced that Israel is likely
to refrain from adopting the required precautionary measures. Here,
Jordan avoids the worst outcome of incurring both the preventive costs
and the expected harmful results from significant pollution by "defect-
ing" in advance. Information regarding the other party's expected be-
havior plays a vital role in such situations.
86. In CC, a party bears the preventive costs and benefits from utilizing Gulf re-
sources in the absence of pollution. In DC, a party does not incur the preventive costs but
sustains the damages arising from significant marine pollution. In DD, a party does not
bear the preventive costs but suffers the harmful results generated by serious pollution.
In CD, a party incurs the preventive costs and sustains the damages arising from signifi-
cant pollution.
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c. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan
The structure of the environmental setting between Egypt, Jordan,
and Israel differs from that of only Israel and Jordan. Egypt, like Israel
and Jordan, maintains a significant interest in sustaining and devel-
oping its tourist industry along the Gulf coast. The basic difference be-
tween the two settings derives from the geographic location of the par-
ties and the circulation patterns within the Gulf. The prevailing winds
are from north to south and the currents run from Jordan and Israel
southward to the Egyptian coast. Thus, while pollutants from Jordan
or Israel can travel to Egypt within 12 hours,87 most pollutants from
Egypt are not expected to even reach either Jordan or Israel.
Though significant pollution originating from the Egyptian coast is
unlikely to pollute Israeli or Jordanian coasts, it may well cause some
harm to other southern Egyptian coasts. The negative effects on other
Egyptian coasts change in accordance with the location of the pollu-
tion's source. Pollutants originating in the northern Egyptian coasts
(e.g., Taba) are likely to harm the originating coast, and then travel
southward, inflicting environmental damage on the Egyptian coastal
resorts in the south (e.g., Dahab). Pollutants originating in the south-
ern coasts (e.g., Ras Nasrani), will travel southwards to the Red Sea
and are not likely to harm other Egyptian coastal resorts. Thus, the
further south the pollution's source, the greater is Egypt's externaliza-
tion rate.
Externalization changes according to the geographic location of the
pollution's source, generating different payoff structures for various
Egyptian coasts. To simplify, the payoff structures of two representa-
tive cases are examined below: (a) the source of pollution is on Egypt's
northern coast; and (b) the source of pollution is on Egypt's southern
coast. The similar interests of Israel and Jordan vis-a-vis Egypt enable
the insertion of either one as a player in the following matrices. The
assumption is that Israel and Jordan converge on the same position, ei-
ther CC or DD, supra. Employing the same assumptions and notations
as in Figure 6, the normal form of the parties' ordinal payoffs for pollu-
tion originating in the northern Egyptian coast is presented in Figure 7.








Figure 7: Ordinal payoff matrix for pollution origi-
nating from Egypt's northern coasts.
Two prominent features arise from this matrix. First, from Israel
or Jordan's point of view, Egypt's strategy will not affect their behavior.
Israel or Jordan will cooperate as long as the other cooperates, regard-
less of whether Egypt cooperates. Under the present circumstances,
CC > DD is true for both Israel and Jordan. Thus, C is the dominant
strategy for each of them. Second, since Egypt is aware that C is the
dominant strategy for Israel and Jordan, and since CC > DC for Egypt,
C is also the dominant strategy for Egypt.88 Egypt's preference ordering
in this case reflects the Assurance game. If Jordan or Israel changes its
current strategy and adopts a non-cooperative approach, D becomes the
dominant strategy for Egypt (DD > CD for Egypt).
As one moves southward down the Egyptian coast, Egypt can ex-
ternalize more of its pollutants to the Red Sea, thus changing the rela-
tionship between CC and DC. While it is clear that CC > DC remains
true for pollution originating from northern coasts, the gap decreases as
one moves southward. At some "critical point," CC will be equal to DD.
When crossing the "critical point" on Egypt's southern coasts, DC be-
comes greater than CC. Figure 8 sets forth the normal form of the par-







Figure 8. Ordinal payoff matrix for pollution
originating in Egypt's southern coasts
88. In CC, Egypt bears the preventive costs and benefits from utilizing the Gulf in
the absence of pollution. In DC, Egypt does not incur the preventive costs but sustains the
damage arising from significant marine pollution on the southern coasts. In DD, Egypt
does not bear the preventive costs but suffers the harmful results generated by serious
pollution. In CD, Egypt incurs the preventive costs and sustains the damage arising from
significant pollution.
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Egypt's ordering preference in this case is as follows:
DC > CC > DD > CD
In contrast to pollution originating from Egypt's northern coasts,
Egypt's optimal combination in the present case is CD. Egypt's order-
ing preferences reflect the Prisoner's Dilemma structure. Jordan and
Israel's positions, however, remain the same as for pollution originating
in Egypt's northern coasts (Assurance preferences between themselves).
In this case, C is still the dominant strategy for Israel and Jordan.
Egypt, knowing their preference ordering, is expected to adopt its opti-
mal strategy (DC), choosing not to invest significant resources to pre-
vent pollution originating from its southern coasts. 89 Israel and Jordan
will not be affected by Egypt's non-cooperative strategy and are not ex-
pected to press the latter to take preventive measures. Furthermore,
even if Israel and Jordan threaten to employ retaliatory measures
against Egypt for pollution originating from Egypt's southern coasts,
such threats will be considered "noncredible"90 and are unlikely to per-
suade Egypt to divert from its expected strategy. Clearly, the equilib-
rium resulting from the above matrix does not favor the protection of
the environmental resources in the southern part of the Gulf.91
d. Future Development and the Need for Common Standards
Current utilization of the Gulfs resources stretches the limits of its
environmental carrying capacity. As the three coastal States launch
various projects to expand their tourist industries, the risk of overload-
ing the region's natural resources remains acute, while the need for
greater coordination increases. The seeds of cooperation already exist
in the recent "Upper Gulf of Aqaba Oil Spill Contingency Project,"92 but
much more is needed to counter the expected environmental degrada-
tion.
Further measures should set common and more stringent stan-
dards for sewage discharge, (particularly industrial), prevention of
leaks and spills from port facilities, and reduction of emissions of air-
borne chemicals like phosphates, potash, and bromide. There should be
common rules to prevent dumping of wastes from private boats and for
89. Egypt externalizes its pollution from the southern coasts. It is possible that
Egypt's relationships with the other coastal states outside the Gulf of Aqaba (in the Red
Sea) will be similar to those in the Prisoner's Dilemma. That subject, however, exceeds
the limits of this study.
90. As explained above, a player is not expected to take into account non-credible
threats, i.e., threats that if carried out, cost more to the player who issues them than if
they are not carried out. See discussion supra Part II.C(2).
91. Some methods to modify the current structure of settings susceptible to collective
action failure will be dealt with, infra, in Part III.B.
92. See UPPER GULF OF AQABA, supra note 79, at 18-23; Ministry of the Environment,
Upper Gulf of Aqaba Oil Spill Contingency Project, 18 ISR. ENVTL. BULL. 10 (1995).
VOL. 27:1
GAME THEORY
the establishment of adequate port facilities to collect these wastes. 93
Establishing common standards is expected to generate an interactive
situation characterized by the Coordination game's features, a subject
dealt with later in Part III(C).
2. Water Contamination of the Mountain Aquifer
a. Background
Water is essential for survival and economic development in the
semi-arid climate of the Middle East, and this is one of the scarcest re-
sources in the region. According to water experts, Jordan, Israel, and
the Palestinians are much below the "Water Stress Level" of 500 cubic
meters per person per year.94 Not surprisingly, the parties in the region
have struggled fiercely over control and allocation of this precious and
scarce resource.
95
The Mountain Aquifer represents the largest water resource in the
region, supplying 600 million cubic meters of water per year ("MCMY").
The Aquifer supplies approximately a third of Israel's annual water
consumption and 90% of the Palestinians' consumption. The under-
ground reservoir lies beneath the West Bank's mountains in the central
part of the mountain ridge. The Aquifer consists of three major basins:
the Yarkon Taninim basin (360 MCMY), the Nablus-Gilboa basin (140
MCMY), and the Eastern basin (100 MCMY). Of the 600 MCMY from
the entire Aquifer, Israel and its Jewish settlements in the area use
about 495 MCMY, while the Palestinians use about 105 MCMY.96
93. In addition, a reduction in the number of active ports and marinas will save re-
sources and enable better supervision over the port facilities which constitute a source of
frequent pollution in the Gulf. Thus, the proposal to close Eilat Port and the proposal
that the Aqaba Port will serve both Jordan and Israel may well lead to desirable results.
See Dany Morgenstern, Implementing Jordanian Option, GREEN-BLUE-WHITE J. ENVTL.
PROTECTION IN ISR. 8, 10-11 (Jan-Feb. 1995) (in Hebrew).
94. Hillel I. Shuval, Approaches to Resolving the Water Conflicts between Israel and
her Neighbors: A Regional Water-for-Peace Plan, 17 WATER INT'L 133 (1992).
95. For a discussion on the history of the struggle over the allocation of water among
the Middle Eastern States, see KATHRYN B. DOHERTY, JORDAN WATERS CONFLICT 3
(1965); MIRIAM R. LOWI, WATER AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF A SCARCE RESOURCE IN THE
JORDAN RIVER BASIN 79-203 (1993); J. W. Eaton & D. J. Eaton, Water Utilization in the
Yarmuk-Jordan, 1192-1992, in WATER AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 93 (J. Isaac & H.
Shuval eds., 1994) [hereinafter WATER AND PEACE]; Aaron Wolf & John Ross, The Impact
of Scarce Water Resources on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 919, 926-48
(1992); Aaron Wolf, Water for Peace in the Jordan River Watershed, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.
797, 799-806 (1993).
96. Eyal Benvenisti & Haim Gvirtzman, Harnessing International Law to Determine
Israeli-Palestinian Water Rights: The Mountain Aquifer, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 543, 550-
59 (1993); Haim Gvirtzman, Groundwater Allocation in Judea and Samaria, in WATER
AND PEACE, supra note 95, at 205, 208-14. A slightly different assessment of the issue
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Two central terms need definition before continuing the article.
First, the feeding area is the surface area composed of permeable rock
outcrops through which both rainwater and pollutants can penetrate
the aquifer. Second, the storage area is that part of the aquifer where
surface rocks are impermeable, serving as a "roof' covering the ground-
water reservoir. Pumping water from the storage area is stable and
cheap, and most of the wells pumping water from the Aquifer are in this
area. The majority of the Mountain Aquifer's feeding area is outside Is-
rael's pre-1967 borders, and is predominantly inhabited by Palestini-
ans. However, a greater amount of the Aquifer's water volume is con-
tained within Israel's 1967 borders.
97
The physical properties of the particular aquifer determine its
groundwater vulnerability to pollution.98 The "DRASTIC" model, devel-
oped by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, assesses an aqui-
fer's sensitivity to contamination using seven factors. 99 In light of the
Mountain Aquifer's importance to the region, it is surprising that no
one, using either DRASTIC or any other model, has completed a com-
prehensive assessment of the Mountain Aquifer's vulnerability to con-
tamination. The available information regarding some of the DRASTIC
central factors indicates, however, that most of the Aquifer remains
highly vulnerable to anthropogenic pollution. For one, the Aquifer's
hydraulic conductivity is relatively high. 100 The aquifer media includes
appears in Hillel I. Shuval, Geopolitical Aspects of Shared Aquifers: A Case Study of a
Conflict, in GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION AND CONTROL 661 (Uri Zoller ed., 1994). See
also Hillel I. Shuval, Proposed Principles and Methodology for the Equitable Allocation of
the Water Resources Shared by the Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese and Syri-
ans, in WATER AND PEACE, supra note 95, at 481-86 (discussing the same issue); Wolf &
Ross, supra note 95, at 924-25. For a more meticulous analysis of the structure of the Aq-
uifer's sub-basins, see Dror Avisar, The Impact of Pollutants from Anthropogenic Sources
within a Hydrologically Sensitive Area; the Wadi Rabba 44 (1996) (in Hebrew).
97. Gvirtzman, supra note 96, at 208, 212-13; Benvenisti & Gvirtzman, supra note
96, at 552-57.
98. Yehuda Bachmat and Martin Collin define groundwater vulnerability to pollution
as "the sensitivity of its quality to anthropogenic activities which may prove detrimental
to the present and/or intended usage-value of the resource." Yehuda Bachmat & Martin
Collin, Mapping to Assess Groundwater Vulnerability to Pollution, in VULNERABILITY OF
SOIL AND GROUNDWATER TO POLLUTANTS 3, 297 (W. van Duijvenbooden & H. G. van Wae-
geningh eds., 1987).
99. D.R.A.S.T.I.C. refers to the initial of each factor: Depth to water table, Recharge
amount, Aquifer media, Soil media, Topography, Impact of the vadose zone, and Conduc-
tivity of the aquifer. See LINDA ALLER, DRASTIC: A STANDARDIZED SYSTEM FOR
EVALUATING GROUND WATER POLLUTION POTENTIAL USING HYDROGEOLOGIC SETrINGS
14-22 (1985); see also Sara Secunda, et al., Composite DRASTIC Land-Use Vulnerability
Assessment of Groundwater in Israel's Sharon Region Utilizing GIS Technology 4, in
HYDROLOGICAL REPORT 1996 (Water Comm'n Hydrological Serv. & Ministry of the Env't,
1996).
100. BOYKO ET AL., UNDERGROUND WATER CONTAMINATION POTENTIAL IN WESTERN
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many cracks and fractions, which create "short-cuts" through the geo-
logic system, 10 1 while the soil media consists of primarily limestone and
dolomite rock formations, allowing rapid infiltration of the soil by vari-
ous pollutants.
102
The three principal sources of water pollution within the Mountain
Aquifer include, in order of their polluting impact: domestic, industrial,
and agricultural pollution. 0 3 An inadequate infrastructure for treating
wastewater in the inhabited parts above the aquifer is responsible for
most of the domestic wastewater10 4 The population in this area in-
cludes approximately 1,121,900 Palestinians and 133, 200 Israeli set-
tlers. 0 5 Most Palestinian cities and rural areas do not have adequate
wastewater collection or treatment systems.10 6 On the other hand, most
SAMARIA 33 (1993) (in Hebrew, summary in English); Haim Gvirtzman, The Hydrology of
Judea and Samaria, in JUDEA AND SAMARIA RESEARCH STUDIES-PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 269, 278 (1995) (in Hebrew, summary in English) [hereinafter
Hydrology]; Haim Gvirtzman et al., Water Reservoirs on the Western Slopes of Samaria for
Preventing Floods in the Dan Region, in JUDEA AND SAMARIA RESEARCH STUDIES-
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING 315, 325 (1994) (in Hebrew, summary in
English) [hereinafter Water Reservoirs].
101. V. RUDESKY ET AL., GROUNDWATER POLLUTION HAZARDS FROM THE BARKAN
INDUSTRIAL ZONE 11 (The Geological Survey of Israel, 1993) (in Hebrew).
102. V. Rudesky, The Impact of Barkan Industrial Zone Wastewater on Groundwater
Quality, in JUDEA AND SAMARIA RESEARCH STUDIES-PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH
ANNUAL MEETING, supra note 100, at 328; Gvirtzman, Hydrology, supra note 100, at 269-
70.
103. See generally JEAN J. FRIED, GROUNDWATER POLLUTION 1 (1975) and UNITED
STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GROUNDWATER HANDBOOK 97 (2d ed.,
1992) (discussing sources of groundwater pollution in general).
104. Feitelson and Abdul-Jaber state in their joint study that "[m]ost of the sewage
generated in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, by Jews and Arabs alike, is not treated.
Moreover, much of it flows over aquifer recharge areas." ERAN FEITELSON & QASEM
HASSAN ABDUL-JABER, PROSPECTS FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN
WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND RE-USE IN THE JERUSALEM REGION 1 (1997).
105. Central Bureau of Statistics, Pub. No. 573, Statistical Abstract of Israel-1996, at
55 (1996).
106. See Jad Isaac et al., The Palestinian Environmental Dilemma 14 (International
Conference on Ecological Development in the Middle East Paper, Feb. 7-14,
1995) [hereinafter Dilemma]; ISRAEL-PALESTINE CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND
INFORMATION, Workshop Session: Water Quality in Israel's Central District and the West
Bank, in OUR SHARED ENVIRONMENT: THE 1995 CONFERENCE 67, at 72-73 (Robin Twite &
Robin Menczel eds., 1996). See THE APPLIED RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JERUSALEM (ARIJ),
ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE FOR THE WEST BANK: HEBRON DISTRICT 55 (1995) [hereinafter
ARIJ, HEBRON DISTRICT]; ARIJ, ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE FOR THE WEST BANK:
BETHLEHEM DISTRICT 46-49 (1995) [hereinafter ARIJ, BETHLEHEM DISTRICT] and 24 THE
BIOSPHERE 26 (No. 3-4, Dec.-Jan. 1994-95) (in Hebrew), for a discussion on the situation
in the Palestinian cities of Hebron and Bethlehem. Most of the Palestinian rural popula-
tion and the inhabitants in the refugee camps dispose their wastewater into cesspits, sep-
tic tanks, absorption pits and open sewage channels. When these installations fill up, the
raw wastes are disposed into the open wadis and fields. This wastewater directly infil-
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Israeli settlements in this area have some collection systems, but in
many the wastewater is dumped into the surrounding wadis and open
fields. 107
Agricultural activities above the Mountain Aquifer also harm its
water quality, largely due to extensive utilization of agrochemicals, pes-
ticides, fertilizers, and fluents for irrigation.1 08 A significant part of the
resident Palestinian population (about 50%) benefits directly from the
intense agricultural activities undertaken in the area. l0 9 Farmers cul-
tivating lands above the Aquifer regularly use agrochemicals. As a re-
sult, some underground contamination has already been traced. 110 In
addition, the rural population above the Aquifer uses untreated sewage
for irrigation, threatening the reservoir's water quality."'
Information on industrial pollution is scarce. Water experts con-
sider factories owned by the Israeli population (especially in the Barkan
industrial zone) the principal sources of industrial pollution." 2 The Is-
raeli factories generate wastewater, some of which includes heavy met-
als and other dangerous substances. Many of the Israeli factories dump
the wastewater into the wadis. 113 There are some Palestinian factories
trates the aquifer or is carried into the water reservoir by the rain; ARIJ, BETHLEHEM
DISTRICT, id. at 46-49. See also Mohammed Said AI-Hamaidi, Palestinian Policy and Re-
gional Environmental Cooperation, PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. 15, 16-17 (1998).
107. BoYKO ET AL., supra note 100, at 3. See, e.g., on Barkan settlement, Avisar, supra
note 96, at 13-15. Some settlements have established purification installations but many
of them are poorly maintained, see, e.g., Avisar, supra note 96, at 13-15; THE BIOSPHERE,
supra note 106, at 29; Workshop Session: Water Quality in Israel's Central District and the
West Bank, id. at 72-73 (regarding the El-Kana settlement).
108. See, e.g., Lea Muszkat, Groundwater Quality: Problems and Solutions, in OUR
SHARED-ENVIRONMENT: THE 1994 CONFERENCE 70 (Robin Twite & Robin Menczel eds.,
1995) [hereinafter THE 1994 CONFERENCE].
109. Agriculture accounts for 20 to 30% of the Palestinian GDP and the population's
employment, see THE WORLD BANK, DEVELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: AN
INVESTMENT IN PEACE 1 (1993) [hereinafter DEVELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES];
Issac et al., Dilemma, supra note 106, at 5, 7-8; Jad Issac, Sustainable Development and
the Palestinians, in THE 1994 CONFERENCE, id at 33, 36 and Jad Issac, Environmental
Protection and Sustainable Development in Palestine, in OUR COMMON ENVIRONMENT
7,15 (Robin Twite & Jad Issac eds., 1994).
110. Karen Assaf, Palestinian Water Resources-Water Quality, in OUR COMMON
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 109, at 279, 291-92; Issac et al., Dilemma, supra note 106, at 7-
10; Said Assaf, Overview of Some Traditional Agricultural Practices Used by Palestinians
in the Protection of the Environment, in THE 1994 CONFERENCE, supra note 108, at 17.
111. See ARIJ, BETHLEHEM DISTRICT, supra note 106, at 49 and ARIJ, HEBRON
DISTRICT, supra note 106, at 57.
112. See BOYKO ET AL., supra note 100, at 25; Interview with Professor Hillel
Shouval, Department of Environmental Studies, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
(July 3, 1997) [hereinafter Shouval interview]; Interview with Dr. Stuart Wollman, De-
partment of Environmental Studies, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (July 4, 1997)
[hereinafter Wollman interview].
113. See Avisar, supra note 96, at 15; BOYKO ET AL., supra note 100, at 21-25 and
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that generate industrial wastewater, particularly in the tanning and
stonecutting industries, which is not pre-treated and is disposed of in a
central network of cesspits.1
4
b. Analysis
The Palestinian Authority ("PA") currently controls only a small
portion of the lands located over the Mountain Aquifer, though its ju-
risdiction is expected to expand significantly. Here, the central ques-
tion concerns the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation once the
PA gains control over a substantial part of the West Bank. Analyzing
the prospects for cooperation in order to avoid water contamination re-
quires an examination of two principal factors: (1) each party's positive
payoffs from the use of uncontaminated water and (2) the negative pay-
offs associated with the implementation of the required preventive
measures.
In terms of the latter, it is plain that the Palestinians hold the
brunt of the burden. For the most part, avoiding contamination of the
Aquifer involves an investment designed to prevent the infiltration of
domestic wastewater into the underground reservoir. This requires the
establishment of an adequate infrastructure for collecting and treating
sewage. The financial resources needed to establish the system de-
pends upon the number of people residing in the area. As noted above,
almost 90% of the population in the area is Palestinian. According to
experts, the required investment in an adequate sewage system in the
West Bank is approximately $500 per person, which amounts to more
than $600 million for the entire project.11 5 With Palestinians making
up almost 90% of the population, they would incur the greater share of
the costs.
The Palestinians would also incur the greater share of costs associ-
ated with preventive measures against water contamination resulting
from agricultural activities. Palestinian farmers perform most of the
agricultural activities in this area. Agriculture plays a greater role in
the Palestinian economy than in the Israeli economy." 6 Consequently,
Rudesky, supra note 102, at 25.
114. See ARIJ, HEBRON DISTRICT, supra note 106, at 54-55 and ARIJ, BETHLEHEM
DISTRICT, supra note 106, at 46.
115. Shouval interview, supra note 112.
116. 2.9% of the employed population in Israel works in the agricultural sector, which
contributes about 4% to the Israeli GDP. See ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF PRODUCTIVITY,
PRODUCTIVITY IN ISRAEL: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 62 (1997) [hereinafter
PRODUCTIVITY IN ISRAEL]; DEVELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 109, at
57. Agriculture accounts for 20 to 30% of the Palestinian GDP and employment. See su-
pra text accompanying note 109. It is expected that the share of the agricultural sector in
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the Palestinians' investment in the required preventive measures re-
lated to agricultural activities would be higher than the Israelis' in-
vestment.
Currently, industrial operations constitute the smallest source of
water pollution in the Mountain Aquifer. Yet the detrimental effects of
industrial operations may grow over the next decade. At present, most
of the polluting factories in the area are Israeli owned. Under the cur-
rent analysis, Israel would bear the greater share of preventive costs
associated with industrial discharges. However, care should be taken
not to overestimate these numbers, as industrial operations in this area
constitute only a small share of Israel's overall industry. In addition,
anticipated industrialization in the territories under the PA's jurisdic-
tion suggests that the present allocation of preventive costs in the in-
dustrial sphere may increase, thus increasing the Palestinian's share of
those costs.
An overall assessment of the parties' negative payoffs resulting
from the implementation of the required preventive measures shows
that the Palestinians would incur substantially more expenses than the
Israelis. The gap is considerable with respect to the vast resources
needed for the establishment of an adequate sewage system to avoid
domestic pollution, and less substantial (but still significant) regarding
agricultural pollution. At the moment, the Israelis would bear more
preventive costs for industrial pollution.
One can estimate the positive payoffs generated to the parties from
using uncontaminated water by examining the expected damage to each
party from pollution of the Aquifer. Significant discharge of pollutants
into the reservoir by either party will generate negative payoffs for
both, since both parties share the same pool. The pollutants in the un-
derground reservoir know no political boundaries. This does not mean
that the positive payoffs generated to the parties from using uncon-
taminated water are the same.
Comparison of the quantities of water used by the parties does not
lead to a clear answer. Indeed, two important factors lead to different
conclusions. On the one hand, the fact that Israel's share in the Aqui-
fer's waters is much greater than the Palestinians (currently 5:1) sug-
gests that significant water pollution in the Aquifer will entail greater
negative payoffs to the Israelis than to Palestinians. On the other
hand, the Aquifer supplies 90% of the Palestinian annual consumption
and only about a third of Israel's consumption. This indicates that the
the Palestinian economy will decrease in the future, together with the processes of agri-
cultural industrialization. In light of the current major role of agriculture in the Pales-
tinian economic life, however, we may well anticipate that its share in the GDP will be
much greater than the Israeli's share over the next decades.
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loss sustained by Palestinians following a significant contamination will
be larger than the loss sustained by Israel. Analysis of the timeframe
in which the harmful results are anticipated and the parties' discount
rates regarding such future losses, reveals asymmetric preferences.
It is precisely known how long it will take from the pollution's dis-
charge until the Aquifer's extracted waters exhibit significant detrimen-
tal effects. Water experts claim this period will vary from several years
to several decades in most cases of pollution.117 The time interval in-
troduces an important variable of the parties' discount rate regarding
future losses. The discount factor has a major influence upon a party's
willingness to cooperate in infinite iterated games.'18 The utilization of
the Mountain Aquifer constitutes an infinite iterated situation,11 9 and
the economic resources available to the parties affect their respective
discount rates. As Brown-Weiss observes in her book, "In Fairness to
Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony and
Intergenerational Equity," poor communities are not inclined to cooper-
ate to secure future environmental gains and "desperate actors" are
more predisposed to adopt short-term strategies.
1 20
Recent economic data shows that Israel is considered a developed
State, while the Palestinians are considered a developing nation. 121 In
light of the considerable and pressing problems of unemployment and
poverty faced by the Palestinian Authority,1 22 it is clear that the Pales-
tinians' discount rate regarding water contamination, expected to occur
within several years to decades, is quite low. The situation in the Gaza
Strip exemplifies the Palestinians' loW discount rate regarding future
water sources. Over-exploitation of the aquifer in the Gaza Strip,
where one of the poorest communities in the Middle East lives, has led
117. Wollman interview, supra note 112; Interviews with Dr. Yehuda Bachmat, Israel
Hydrological Service (Sept. 25, 1996) and Dr. Dror Gilad, Israel Hydrological Service (Jul.
3, 1997). See also Karen Assaf, supra note 110, at 291.
118. On the role of the discount rate in infinite games, see supra Part II.C(2-4).
119. The Aquifer is replenishable and allows infinite utilization. A persistent extrac-
tion beyond the replenishment rate, however, will terminate its existence. In the latter
case, the structure of the setting will be similar to a zero-sum game.
120. EDITH BROWN-WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY. AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 162-63 (2d ed. 1989). See
generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (discussing common-pool resources and ways that they
can be organized to avoid excessive consumption and administrative costs).
121. In 1992, the Israeli's annual GDP per capita was estimated at $16,600 while the
Palestinian's annual GDP per capita was approximately $1700. See SHARIF S. ELMUSA,
INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES, NEGOTIATING WATER: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS
22-23 (1996); The Palestinian Economy, PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. 106-07 (1998); and
PRODUCTIVITY IN ISRAEL: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 116, at 82.
122. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE ECONOMY 1-5 (Fourth
Meeting of the Consultative Group for the West Bank and Gaza, 1996).
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to saltwater intrusion into the reservoir and increased salinity. 123 Gen-
erally speaking, a low discount rate decreases the value of future gains
or losses for a party.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis.
First, the Palestinians' expected preventive costs are substantially
greater than those of Israel. Second, the Palestinians' discount rate is
significantly lower than that of Israel. Finally, as a result of the second
conclusion Israel's future positive payoffs are greater than the Pales-
tinians.
Assuming that both Israel and the Palestinians have two principal
strategies, C (cooperate) and D (defect), significant pollution results if
one party cooperates and the other does not cooperate (CD or DC).
Pollution is avoided if both parties adopt cooperative strategies (CC).
Serious contamination takes place if both adopt non-cooperative strate-
gies (DD). Figure 9 sets forth the normal form of the parties' ordinal
payoffs for water contamination of the Mountain Aquifer.
The Palestinians
C D
Israel C 4, 2 1, 4
D 3,1 2,3
Figure 9: Ordinal payoff matrix for Israel and the
Palestinians re-garding water contamination of the
Mountain Aquifer.
The matrix reveals asymmetric preferences. The Palestinians' or-
der of priorities is:
DC> DD > CC > CD124
123. See Karen Assaf, supra note 110, at 286-89; Reitse Koopmans, Environmental
Problems in the Gaza Strip, in THE 1994 CONFERENCE, supra note 108, at 126, 128-29;
Gaza Isam R. Shawwa, Water Situation in the Gaza Strip, in WATER AND PEACE, supra
note 95, at 251; Ephraim Ahiram & Hanna Siniora, The Gaza Strip Water Problem: An
Emergency Solution for the Palestinian Population, id. at 261.
124. In DC, the Palestinians do not bear the expensive costs of preventive measures
but will suffer from significant pollution in the future. As explained above, future nega-
tive payoffs are significantly discounted by the Palestinians. In DD, the Palestinians do
not incur the expensive preventive costs but will sustain serious water pollution in the
future; the latter negative payoffs are significantly discounted. In CC, the Palestinians
bear the expensive costs of preventive measures but will benefit from clean water for the
long range; future gains, however, are significantly discounted. In CD, the Palestinians
incur the expensive costs of preventive measures and will suffer significant pollution in




Note that the Palestinians' order of priorities is quite similar to a
player in a PD game.'
25
Israel's order of priorities is:
CC > DC > DD > CD1
26
Israel's order of priorities is the same as in the Assurance game.
1 27
An analysis of the above matrix reveals that strategy D is the
dominant strategy for the Palestinians (DC>CC and DD>CD). In other
words, the Palestinians are likely to prefer D regardless of Israel's ac-
tion. Israel, aware that D is the Palestinians' dominant strategy, is
likely to prefer strategy D as well (DD>CD). Thus, the resulting equi-
librium is DD in which both parties prefer not take preventive meas-
ures. This equilibrium point represents the Palestinians' second-best
alternative and Israel's third-best alternative. Needless to say, the DD
equilibrium represents the worst environmental alternative.
Characterizing the Palestinians' ordering preferences as similar to
a player's in an infinite iterated PD game may suggest that Israel
should employ contingent strategies (like Tit-for-Tat), which normally
motivate cooperation in such settings. 28 An analysis of the above ma-
trix and the parties' particular properties reveals that Israel's exercise
of a contingent strategy (polluting the aquifer if the Palestinians do so)
is not likely to stimulate the Palestinians into cooperation. The Pales-
tinians will feel the harmful consequences only after several years or
decades. Motivating cooperation by contingent strategies in infinite it-
erated PD requires the players to have high discount rates.' 29 As dis-
cussed above, the Palestinians' discount rate regarding future water
contamination is quite low. More importantly, even if Israel attempts
to remedy the problem of the Palestinians' low discount rate by threat-
ening to employ harsh contingent strategies, such as the Grim Trig-
ger,130 the Palestinians' choice is not expected to change. Regardless of
whether Israel cooperates, since D is the Palestinians' dominant strat-
125. The difference is that in the PD game CC>DD, and in our case DD>CC. See su-
pra Part II.C(2) for a discussion of the PD game and its special properties.
126. In CC, Israel bears the preventive costs but will benefit from future uncontami-
nated water; Israel's future payoffs are not significantly discounted. In DC, Israel does
not incur the preventive costs but will sustain the harmful results of significant water
pollution in the future. In DD, Israel does not bear the costs of the preventive measures
but will suffer a serious water contamination. In CD, Israel incurs the preventive costs
and will sustain significant water pollution.
127. See supra Part II.C(3) for a discussion of the Assurance Game and its special
properties.
128. See supra Part II.C(2) for a discussion on the role of contingent strategies, in-
cluding Tit-for-Tat, in PD situations.
129. See supra Part II.C(2).
130. See supra Part II.C(2) for a discussion on the Grim Trigger strategy.
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egy, they are unlikely to be motivated to cooperate in response to a
harsh contingent strategy.
131
In summary, the structure of the setting between Israel and the
Palestinians is clearly asymmetric. The above analysis suggests that
the prospects for cooperation regarding the aquifer setting are unlikely.
Moreover, employment of contingent strategies is not likely to change
the parties' preferences. Unfortunately, the lack of cooperation could
result in long-term damage to the environment.
B. Employing Legal Mechanisms to Avoid Collective Action Failure
The above game theoretical analysis indicates that cooperation is
not expected to be easily elicited regarding the use and maintenance of
the southern part of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Mountain Aquifer.
Having employed game theory's tools, it may be possible to suggest
some international legal mechanisms to modify the structure of settings
susceptible to collective action failure. The challenge revolves around
creating international settings that are more favorable to international
cooperation and exploring legal techniques available to international
lawyers to further this end.
The most frequent tool employed by international law to change
payoff structures is the formulation of substantive norms, which create
new rights and obligations for States. Establishing a legal obligation to
follow a particular course of action modifies the payoff structure to a
party, who then must contemplate whether or not to pursue the legally
required course of action. Although States usually react unfavorably to
another State's harmful activities, their reaction is compounded when
the detrimental act violates rights prescribed under international
law. 132 Thus, a new legal norm binding parties to a cooperative strategy
in a given sphere increases the negative payoffs generated to a player
who breaches an obligation. For this reason, establishing a legal obliga-
tion to cooperate, for instance in a treaty, improves the likelihood of co-
operation.
The importance of contingent strategies in eliciting cooperation 33
highlights the role of international rules regarding "countermeasures"
designed to enhance cooperation. International treaty law and custom-
ary international law set particular limitations on the use of retaliatory
measures.134 As illustrated below, widening or narrowing the possibil-
131. This conclusion applies a fortiori to a milder contingent strategy, like Tit-for-Tat.
132. See, e.g, LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed., 1979).
133. See supra Part III.C(2-4) for a discussion of the role of contingent strategies to
support cooperation.
134. See, e.g., Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969); Article 30 of the International Law Commissions' Draft Articles on
State Responsibility; (1979) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 115-22 (Vol. II, Part 2); (1992) Y.B.
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ity of retaliation in a given area is likely to affect the prospects for coop-
eration in that sphere.
International law also supports the prospects for cooperation by it-
eration of interaction among the parties. 35 The establishment of joint
institutions may be realized by enlarging the "shadow of the future".136
Information is crucial to cooperation in some settings, such as Assur-
ance situations. Indeed, as described below, legal mechanisms facili-
tating collection and dissemination of information have significantly
contributed to the emergence and maintenance of international coop-
eration.
The mechanism of linkage may be of great importance to the future
environmental regime in the Middle East. When a particular interna-
tional setting is susceptible to collective action failure (for instance
when it presents strong features of zero-sum or Chicken game),137 in-
ternational law can alter the structure of the game by establishing a
linkage between several issue-areas. The structural features of the new
setting, composed of the formerly separated domains, may provide the
parties with adequate incentives to cooperate. As noted above, the en-
vironmental settings of the Mountain Aquifer and the southern part of
the Gulf of Aqaba are significantly asymmetric, and the parties are not
likely to adopt cooperative strategies.
Similar asymmetric features are prevalent in other environmental
spheres in the Middle East, such as air pollution. Scientific evidence
gathered in the recent decade, along with well-known data regarding
the general air flow patterns in the Middle East, show that Israel "ex-
ports" significant amounts of particulate sulfate and ground-level ozone
(03) to the West Bank, and probably to Jordan. 138 The wind regime in
INT'L L. COMM'N 31-55 (Vol. II, Part 2).
135. See supra Part II.C(2-3) for a discussion on the role of iteration to elicit coopera-
tion. See generally John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of
International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L. J. 139 (1996)
(discussing iteration in the international law of treaties).
136. Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Insti-
tutions, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND
COOPERATION IN TWO DOMAINS 47 (Robert 0. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995)
[hereinafter LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE]. See Benvenisti, supra
note 58, at 410-13 (discussing the role of institutions and how they can cooperate to inten-
sify interactions, especially regarding the utilization of shared freshwater resources).
137. On the Chicken Game, see generally Hugh Ward, Three Men in a Boat, Two Must
Row: An Analysis of a Three-Person Chicken Pregame, 34 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 371 (1990);
Barton L. Lipman, Cooperation Among Egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken
Games, 51 PUBLIC CHOICE 315, 316 (1986); Ward, supra note 67, at 354, 367-69.
138. See Menachem Luria et al., TRANSPORTATION OF AIR POLLUTANTS FROM ISRAEL TO
THE JORDAN VALLEY 56 (1996) (in Hebrew); Yossi Sachi et al., Airborne Measurements of
Ozone Levels over Central Israel, in JUDEA AND SAMARIA RESEARCH STUDIES-
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the region, mostly from northwest or northeast to the east, 139 and Is-
rael's eastern neighbors' modest level of industrial activity results in a
situation in which transboundary air pollution in the opposite direction
is negligible (from the Palestinian territories and Jordan to Israel).
Asymmetric environmental settings occur regularly in the interna-
tional arena, frequently inhibiting the emergence of cooperation. 140
Asymmetric preferences often lead the less-interested parties to reject a
legal regime binding them to significant costs.141 If they do join, they
often tend not to comply with the agreement's main obligations. When
any of the major polluting parties adopt this strategy, the overall effec-
tiveness of the environmental regime is significantly undermined. In-
ternational law may enhance the prospects for cooperation in such
asymmetric settings by creating a link between the legal regimes to be
established for each particular environmental sphere. For instance, a
regime aiming to reduce transboundary air pollution in the Middle East
may be linked to a regime designed to avoid water contamination of the
Mountain Aquifer.
The technique of legal linkage addresses two basic problems arising
in asymmetric environmental settings. First, a legal regime that com-
bines several environmental spheres can provide the less-interested
party in each domain with an incentive to join the comprehensive re-
gime. Second, the establishment of a combined regime widens the op-
portunities for contingent strategies, which are capable of eliciting co-
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 339, 340-341 (1995) (in Hebrew; summary
in English); 2 Mordechai Peleg et al., Airborne Measurements of Ozone Levels over Central
Israel, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH WORLD CLEAN AIR CONGRESS 292, 294 (1995); Men-
achem Luria et al., The Formation of 03 over Israel: A Growing Concern and a Potential
International Issue, in PRESERVATION OF OUR WORLD IN THE WAKE OF CHANGE 13-16
(1996).
139. Uri Dayan, Climatology of Back Trajectories from Israel Based on Synoptic Analy-
sis, 25 J. CLIMATE & APPLIED METEOROLOGY 591 (1986).
140. Asymmetric preferences, however, may support cooperation in some settings. For
articles discussing conflicting views on whether heterogeneity impedes or supports the
emergence of environmental cooperation, see Lisa L. Martin, Heterogeneity, Linkage and
Commons Problems, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 136,
at 73; Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actoers, Heterogeneity and Insti-
tutions, id. at 47 and Ronald B. Mitchell, Heterogeneities at Two Levels: States, Non-State
Actors and International Oil Pollution, id. at 239-40.
141. For example see the position of the United Kingdom, one of the main exporters of
sulfur in Europe, regarding the agreement concluded under the auspices of UNECE to
reduce sulfur emissions. Armin Rosencranz, The Acid Rain Controversy in Europe and
North America: A Political Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 173-
85 (1988); Johaan G. Lammers, The European Approach to Acid Rain, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLLUTION 265, 273 (1991); Amy A. Fraenkel, The Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution: Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation, 30
HARV. INT'L L. REV. 447, 463, 473-74 (1989).
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operation in competitive settings. A party who cannot adopt retaliatory
measures within a particular sphere 142 may find new opportunities in
an expanded regime. These factors suggest that, generally, the broader
the scope of the regional environmental regime in the Middle East (in
terms of the amount and diversification of interests involved), the more
the parties are likely to undertake and comply with its provisions.
Establishing a legal link between the Middle East's various envi-
ronmental issues enhances the probability that more parties will im-
plement the provisions of the regional regime. Still, such legal linkages
cannot always remedy the problem of asymmetric preferences. One
particular party may be relatively disinterested in all environmental
issues covered by the regional regime. Transboundary air pollution
from Israel, for instance, is not expected to significantly affect Syria and
Lebanon. They represent the "upstream parties" in the Jordan River
basin and the Mediterranean Sea, and they have no significant interest
in the Gulf of Aqaba. Pulling such "persistently" disinterested parties
into the regional effort may require a legal linkage between the regional
environmental regime and a non-environmental regime.
143
While legal linkages may significantly enhance the effectiveness of
any future environmental regime in the Middle East, they also raise
numerous questions. For instance, which legal field is most appropri-
ately to be linked with the environmental sphere? Clearly, the linked
field should be of significant interest to all parties who are likely to af-
fect the quality of the region's principal environmental resources. It
must also represent a relatively stable domain, in that it acknowledges
the parties' long-standing interests.
The field of commercial relations among the Middle Eastern parties
generally meets the above criteria. 144 The legal linkage between issues
of trade and the environment is well established in international envi-
ronmental treaties, such as the Ozone Layer agreements.1 45 While
much attention has recently been devoted to the legal problems accom-
142. For example, Israel, with regard to water contamination of the Mountain Aquifer
(see Part III.A(2)), or the Palestinians, with regard to air pollution (see Part III.B).
143. See, infra, for a discussion on the possible issue-areas to be linked with the future
environmental regime.
144. On the current and prospective commercial relations between the parties in the
Middle East, see Hisham Awartani, Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations: Is Coopera-
tion Possible?, in THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE: VIEWS FROM THE REGION 281
(1993) [hereinafter THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE]; Natan Zusman, Trade
Agreements as a Part of Peace Agreements-An Historical View, 4 ECON. Q. 630 (1994);
Ephraim Kleiman, Some Basic Problems of the Economic Relationships between Israel, the
West Bank and Gaza, in THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE, id. at 305; Tal Sadeh,
THE ECONOMIC DESIRABILITY OF MIDDLE EAST EASTERN MONETARY COOPERATION 15-18
(The Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies Working Paper 1/97, 1997).
145. See, e.g., Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987).
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panying the linkage between environment and trade, 146 the option re-
mains a viable one for the Middle Eastern environmental regime. The
commercial sphere offers relatively significant and stable benefits to all
parties in the region. Moreover, its importance is expected to grow,
thereby enlarging the range of contingent measures to support effective
cooperation.
Yet establishing a linkage between the environmental and commer-
cial spheres may expose environmental resources to adverse effects
triggered by cross-sector retaliations. A party within the regional
framework may invoke another party's alleged violation of an agree-
ment's commercial provisions in order to justify noncompliance with its
environmental obligations. If frequent enough, such cross-sector re-
taliatory measures could significantly harm the region's environmental
resources. The problem, however, has a legal solution.
Legal norms may allow cross-sector retaliation in one direction.
With respect to the environment, this means admission of retaliatory
measures for protecting the environment, with a prohibition to operate
such measures against environmental resources. For example, the
technique of "one-way retaliation" frequently occurs under international
human rights law. While various countermeasures, including trade
sanctions, are admissible to protect human rights, reprisals involving
human rights violations are strictly forbidden. 147
C. Information and Environmental Cooperation in the Middle East
Information plays a major role in game theoretical analysis. The
collection and dissemination of reliable information often 14s fosters the
prospects for cooperation. This part of the article examines the role of
information in the Middle East's environmental settings and suggests
some legal means for improving the flow of information between the
parties.
146. Among the endless list of publications on this subject, see DANIEL ESTY,
GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE 3 (1994); C. FORD RUNGE,
FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT 5 (1994); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free Interna-
tional Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict? 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
700 (1992); Edith Brown-Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable De-
velopment, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1992).
147. See Article 60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 134; (1979) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 134, at 116; (1992) Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N, supra note 134, at 32-33; OMER YOUSIF ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-
FORCIBLE COUNTER-MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 99-104 (1988).
148. It should be noted that complete information may hinder cooperation in some set-
tings. This is clearly the case in PD situations in which cooperation may arise where the
parties lack information regarding the number of the remaining rounds to be played; on
infinite PD games, see Part II.C(2).
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1. Environmental Standards and Coordination Games
Current use of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Mountain Aquifer is
stretching their respective environmental capacities. Moreover, the ex-
pected wave of economic development in the region poses significant
perils to their sustainable use. The need for regional environmental
standards in the Gulf of Aqaba 149 applies a fortiori to the crucial water
reservoir of the Mountain Aquifer. Ensuring future sustainable use of
the Aquifer's water requires standards for establishing and maintaining
adequate sewage infrastructure, as well as for the content of irrigation
fluents in the areas above the aquifer. 150
The formulation of common standards for Middle Eastern parties in
the environmental field should generate an interactive setting, charac-
terized by the features of the Coordination game. Such a setting cre-
ates multiple Pareto equilibria positions over which the players have
divergent preferences. Different equilibiria positions generate a distri-
bution problem since each player wants the other to converge on his or
her preferred position. In the Gulf of Aqaba, for instance, Israel is ex-
pected to require strict emission standards regarding pollution emitted
from phosphates (transmitted from Jordan),15 1 while Jordan is likely to
insist on more stringent standards for port facilities dealing with load-
ing and unloading crude oil (located in Eilat's Port). The fact that the
Gulf of Aqaba represents an infinite iterated situation, and that the
parties have relatively high discount rates, intensifies the distribution
problem.
15 2
Parties in Coordination settings are expected to misrepresent their
private information. 53 This leads to a situation in which a party does
not trust the information provided by the other players, thus decreasing
the prospects for successful coordination. The tense and suspicious re-
lationships in the Middle East, particularly between the Israelis and
the Palestinians, exacerbate this problem. Entrusting the task of col-
lection and analysis of relevant information to a professional third
party may mitigate the informational problem (e.g., a private consult-
ant or research institute specializing in the particular environmental
field). These specialists must be authorized to travel freely within the
territories of the relevant parties, in order to accomplish their objec-
tives. Needless to say, the parties should be bound to facilitate these
operations by, among other things, providing the specialists with all
149. See supra Part ILI.A(1).
150. For more detail on this problem, see supra Part III.A(2).
151. See Maher F. Abu-Taleb, Environmental Management in Jordan: Problems and
Recommendations, 21 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 35, 36 (1994).
152. On the impact of the discount factor and iteration on the prospects for cooperation
in the Coordination game, see supra Part II.C(4).
153. See supra Part II.C(4).
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necessary data. Finally, in order to foster trust in the specialists, the
parties' representatives should be present in both information gather-
ing and analysis.
The process of agreeing upon environmental standards features
elements found in the Coordination game, but their implementation is
another matter. In a classic Coordination game, once the players agree
on a cooperative solution, their incentive to depart from the coordina-
tion point diminishes, and the solution becomes self-enforcing.1 5 4 This
is not necessarily the case when implementing environmental stan-
dards in different environmental settings. For instance, the implemen-
tation of standards to set up a sewage infrastructure in the Palestinian
cities above the Mountain Aquifer represents the features of the Pris-
oner's Dilemma. In such cases, the standards are not "self-enforcing"
and their implementation requires relatively strong monitoring and en-
forcement mechanisms. 
155
2. Conveying Assurances and Information
The above analysis of the structure of the Middle Eastern environ-
mental settings reveals that the Assurance game reflects the relation-
ships between Israel and Jordan in the Gulf of Aqaba. The Assurance
game also reflects the relationship between Egypt and Israel or Jordan
in the northern part of the Gulf; and Israel's preferences regarding the
Mountain Aquifer. Information regarding the other party plays a cru-
cial role in Assurance situations. A player in such a setting is likely to
cooperate if he or she expects the other players to cooperate as well. A
cooperating party is likely to depart from his or her cooperative course
if he or she expects the others to adopt a non-cooperative strategy. 156 A
lack of information and the resulting atmosphere of uncertainty might
lead a player to adopt a non-cooperative strategy. 157
The importance of information in Assurance situations demon-
strates the need for an adequate mechanism to ensure transparency.
For example, an effective legal mechanism should prescribe explicit and
detailed provisions binding the parties to prepare a comprehensive En-
vironmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regarding any planned measure
with a potentially transborder environmental impact. Parties should
transmit copies of the EIAs to the other parties in each environmental
setting. Establishing a forum for the exchange of information and con-
sultations on planned projects is also highly desirable.
154. For detail, see supra Part II.C(4).
155. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 59, at 938.
156. See supra Part III.C(3).
157. That may be the case, for instance, where the negative payoffs generated to the
cooperative party in CD are substantial and the expected damage is irreversible.
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3. Contingent Strategies and Information
As in Assurance situations, information plays an essential role in
the operation of contingent strategies to support cooperation, like infi-
nite PD situations. As noted above, the possibility of effective retalia-
tory measures is crucial for attaining environmental cooperation in the
comprehensive Middle Eastern regime. 158 Countermeasures are trig-
gered when there is information indicating that the other player has
adopted a non-cooperative strategy. In the absence of reliable informa-
tion regarding measures taken by the other parties, the effectiveness of
contingent strategies decreases. Similarly, unreliable information may
generate unjustified "retaliatory" measures against a cooperative party.
This may result in the collapse of an otherwise successful cooperation.
These observations lead to the conclusion that a reliable monitoring
mechanism is imperative to ensure environmental cooperation in the
Middle East. The first step is to set out detailed provisions requiring
the parties to provide data on the state of environmental resources un-
der their jurisdiction, as well as the relevant measures to protect the
environment they have already undertaken. Farming out some of the
central functions to a panel of specialists (e.g., for inspections and data
analysis) would enhance the reliability of the information gathered. In
turn, this would promote the prospects for cooperation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates that combining game theory and interna-
tional law enhances the prospects of international environmental coop-
eration. The concepts and models of game theory often assist scholars
and policy-makers in identifying why cooperation failed in a given in-
ternational setting. It may also aid them in predicting settings that are
more susceptible to collective action failure. More importantly, game
theoretical tools can be used to alter the current competitive settings,
while serving as a planning tool for the construction of international re-
gimes more suitable to stable cooperation. Legal mechanisms that
draw on game theory's insights can increase the likelihood of future co-
operation in the Middle East. These mechanisms include legal linkage
between particular issue-areas, adequate rules regarding retaliation,
and norms regarding dissemination of information. If the respective
parties adopt these legal mechanisms it will unquestionably promote
environmental cooperation in the Mountain Aquifer and the Gulf of
Aqaba.
As with any handy tool, users should be aware of game theory's
limitations. The advantages of combining game theory and interna-
158. See supra Part III(B).
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tional law should not disguise its inherent imperfections. 15 9 Game
theoretical analysis does not always lead to a unique equilibrium. In-
deed, in many cases, multiple equilibria exist. When this occurs, as in
the Coordination game, game theory does not help direct one to the par-
ticular outcome of the game. 160 Nonetheless, game theoretical analysis
frequently narrows the number of possible solutions and provides a
limited range of possible outcomes.
Game theory assumes, inter alia, that the players have predeter-
mined goals and that they strive to attain these goals through their ac-
tions.161 The theory does not explain which factors motivate a player to
adopt a certain preference and how this preference is modified over
time. The process of emerging and changing preferences is exogenous
to game theory. Additionally, some collective action failure situations
are not amenable to structural alteration designed to support coopera-
tion. In others, the cost of structural change is prohibitive. 162 Where
this is the case it would be more realistic to explore methods of modify-
ing the players' preferences, rather than changing the payoffs aimed at
satisfying these preferences.
Game theory does not aim to explain how preferences are formed.
As noted above, game theory focuses on one set of variables (payoffs,
strategies, information, iteration, discount factors, etc.) influencing de-
cision-makers, but it does not represent a comprehensive theory ex-
hausting all factors involved in international cooperation. Factors such
as the personal characteristics of the decision-makers or social values
prevailing in their community, which may affect the decision-makers'
choices, are exogenous to game theoretical analysis. The absence of
these factors is a central shortcoming of game theory. Yet it also un-
derscores the theory's essential goal of simplifying and abstracting
complex social phenomena into formal models. Focusing on one set of
variables facilitates rigorous analysis and the exploration of interplay
between the variables involved in collective action, such as discount fac-
tors and cooperative behavior.
Legal mechanisms, such as retaliatory rules and linkage arrange-
ments, are valuable tools in encouraging international environmental
cooperation. However, the law's capacity to modify existing structures
159. For detail regarding the limitations of game theory, see KEN BINMORE, ESSAYS ON
THE FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY 5-21 (1990); KREPS, supra note 38, at 91-132, 177-83;
HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 12-18.
160. See MARTIN HOLLIS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 137 (1994); KREPS, su-
pra note 38, at 95-102.
161. See supra Part II.A. This assumption reflects the instrumental sense of rational-
ity. See SHAUN H. HEAP, RATIONALITY, IN THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A CRITICAL GUIDE, 4-5
(1992); HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 9, at 5.




depends upon numerous factors. These include the scope of the par-
ticular setting and the gap between the payoffs generated to the players
from cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. Generally, the smaller
the setting's dimensions in terms of the extent and the value of the in-
volved resources, the actors' strength, etc., the easier it is to change its
structure. Similarly, legal intervention to support cooperation in com-
petitive settings is more viable when there is a minimal payoff gap (in
favor of non-cooperation). Establishing a legal linkage between several
issue-areas, however, can remedy the problems associated with large-
scale settings and substantial payoff gaps. Linkage makes it possible to
mobilize adequate resources from different domains to support coopera-
tion in problematic settings.
In conclusion, both game theory and international law have inher-
ent limitations. These limitations occasionally limit their ability to
modify the structure of international settings susceptible to collective
action failure. Nevertheless, the combination of game theoretical
analysis and international law offers scholars and policy-makers impor-








With the proliferation of international economic treaties over the
last decade, many of the traditional hallmarks of state sovereignty con-
tinue to erode. Each new round of negotiations on transnational eco-
nomic integration, such as those surrounding the Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment' and the creation of the World Trade Organization
("WTO"),2 challenges the very constitutional structures of the negotiat-
ing parties. As the states of the European Union have learned, many of
the benefits of cross-border economic integration cannot be realized
without relinquishing some of the old characteristics of independent
statehood. In many instances, the new economic order requires signifi-
cant reinterpretation of (or outright judicial amendment to) national
constitutions. 3 This same dilemma now faces the countries of North
America: what conflicts exist between their international trade obliga-
tions created by treaty and their national constitutions and how will
these incongruities be resolved?
In December 1992, the governments of Canada, the United States,
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ternazionale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fir Getreide und Fut-
termittel, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 37, 271
(1974) (F.R.G.), [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (1974); SpA Granital v. Amministrazione delle Fi-
nanze dello Stato, Corte costituzionale [Corte cost.] [Italian Constitutional Court], 8 jun.
1984, n.170, Guir. It. 1984, I, 1521, [1984] 21 C.M.L.R. 756 (1984) (Italy); Case 213/89,
Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex Parte Factortame, Ltd., [House of Lords]
1990 E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (1990) (Gr. Brit.).
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and Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"),4 creating a North American trading bloc. NAFTA was de-
signed to phase out tariffs and establish a free market framework be-
tween the signatories. Its objectives include eliminating barriers to
trade, promoting conditions of fair competition, increasing investment
opportunities, and establishing procedures for the resolution of dis-
putes.
5
Since NAFTA was signed, several articles have been written on the
compatibility of certain NAFTA obligations with the national constitu-
tions of the signatory states. Primarily, the debate has focused on
whether the Articles of NAFTA which allow countries to settle certain
trade disputes before Binational Panels violate the American 6 or Mexi-
can constitutions.7 In addition to the significant academic debate, this
issue has generated two formal proceedings in the United States Fed-
eral Courts challenging the constitutional validity of NAFTA on the ba-
sis that the Chapter 19 Binational Panels process amounts to an uncon-
stitutional relinquishment of sovereign powers.8  Although these
challenges did not succeed, the controversy has not been resolved. De-
spite the legal activity in the United States, thus far the issue of the
consistency between NAFTA obligations and the Canadian Constitution
has not generated much interest. However, two recent legal decisions
may spark interest in this issue north of the 49th parallel.
Part of the reason that NAFTA has not been challenged in Canada
is that public sentiment has not reached the level of animosity regard-
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 7, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) & 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFrA].
5. Id. art. 101.
6. See Ethan Boyer, Article I1, the Foreign Relations Power, and the Binational
Panel System of NAFTA, 13 INT'L TAX AND BUS. LAW 101 (1995); Denis J. Edwards,
NAFIA and Article III. Making a Drama Out of a Crisis, NAFTA: LAW & BUS. REV. AMS.,
vol. 1, No. 2, 69 (1995); Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Constitutional Dimensions of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 141 (1994); Gregory W. Carman,
Resolution of Trade Disputes By Chapter 19 Panels: A Long-Term Solution or Interim Pro-
cedure of Dubious Constitutionality, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1997); Bruce Ackerman &
David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Laurence H.
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
7. Luis Manuel Perez de Acha, Binational Panels: A Conflict of Idiosyncrasies, 3 Sw.
J.L. & TRADE AM. 431 (1996).
8. The first case was Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports v. United States, No. 94-
1627 (D.C. Cir. Ct. App. filed Sept. 14, 1994, withdrawn by voluntary motion to dismiss
Jan. 5, 1995) arising out of the Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) proceeding, In
re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, ECC-94-1904-01USA (Aug. 3, 1994).
This action was withdrawn on the basis of the settlement reached in "Lumber IV." The
second case was American Coalition for Competitive Trade (ACCT) v. United States, No.
97-1036 (D.C. Cir. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1997) (complaint and petition for summary judg-
ment). The case was dismissed unanimously by the U.S. Court of Appeals on the basis
that ACCT did not have legal standing to bring the case against President Clinton or the
U.S. government. See Timothy Burn, Judges Dismiss Challenge to NAFTA, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1997, at C1, available in 1997 WL 3689516.
VOL. 27:1
CANADIAN CONSTITUTION
ing international trade agreements that it has in the United States.
However, in May of 1997, Canada lost an appeal before the WTO Ap-
pellate Body. The case, Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,9 held
that several measures Canada was using to protect its magazine indus-
try from the onslaught of American competitors violated obligations un-
der the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").10 The deci-
sion was viewed by many Canadians as an affirmation of their fears
that the cost of free trade with the United States would be the eventual
loss of Canadian culture. For many Canadians, that is a price not worth
paying, and the response to the decision was harsh.1' While Canada has
had many bitter trade disputes with the United States (e.g. softwood
lumber,12 durum wheat, 13 pacific salmon,' 4) they have generally in-
volved goods that do not directly affect the average Canadian. Because
the decision in the Periodicals case threatened the commercial viability
of many Canadian magazines, it demonstrated to the Canadian public
the potential impact of international trade agreements on Canadian
identity. 5 As such, it is probably only a matter of time before the storm
brewing in America over NAFTA's constitutionality blows into Ottawa.
The second decision that may bring NAFTA's constitutionality into
question in Canada is less well known. In 1995, the Supreme Court of
Canada decided the case of MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson,16 which held
that the Canadian Parliament could not delegate core functions of the
superior courts to inferior courts or administrative tribunals. 7 As will
be discussed below, this decision raises serious doubts as to the consti-
tutionality of the NAFTA dispute resolution process.
In anticipation of a constitutional challenge that is likely to come
before a Canadian court in the near future, this article examines
NAFTA's binational dispute resolution system and its compatibility
with Sections 96 to 100 of the Canadian Constitution. Part II describes
the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism, while Part III briefly out-
lines constitutional concerns over NAFTA in Canada, the United States,
9. Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS31/AB/R, June 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 432125, 1 (W.T.O.).
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
11. See Marci McDonald, Menacing Magazines: Ottawa Faces Another Threat From
Washington, MACLEAN'S, March 24, 1997, at 54; John Schofield, Publish or Perish: Can-
ada's Magazine Industry Faces an Uncertain Future, MACLEAN'S, June 2, 1997, at 44.
12. See In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, Extraordinary Chal-
lenge Committee (ECC) proceeding, ECC-94-1904-01USA (Aug. 3, 1994).
13. See Marjorie Benson, The NAFTA Durum Dispute and the Canada Grain Act: A
Case Study in Institutional Development, 5 CONST. F. 82 (1994).
14. See In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and
Herring, United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, Panel
No. CDA-89-1807-01 (Oct. 16, 1989), 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1026 (1991).
15. See Laura Eggertson et al., Copps Sets Stage for War Over Culture, GLOBE AND
MAIL, Feb. 11, 1997, at Al.
16. MacMillan Bloedel, Ltd. v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725 (Can.).
17. Id. at 757,1 43.
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and Mexico. Part IV outlines the constitutional structure of Canada and
its system of courts. Part IV also examines the constitutional limits on
the ability of the Canadian Parliament to take power away from the su-
perior courts and give it to other adjudicative bodies. Part V discusses
the application of the constitutional limits on the delegation of decision-
making power to the NAFTA binational tribunals. Part VI concludes
that unless Canada addresses the implications of international free
trade agreements as they relate to traditional notions of sovereignty
and adjudication, it will not be able to reap the full benefits of the
emerging global market.
II. THE NAFTA DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS: CHAPTER 19
A. Canada's Non-NAFTA Antidumping Procedures
Chapter 19 of NAFTA creates a procedure for settling disputes in-
volving antidumping and countervailing duties between NAFTA coun-
tries. In order to understand the significance of this change to Canadian
law and procedure, it is important to examine the procedures used in
Canada for disputes with non-NAFTA parties and compare them with
the regime created by Chapter 19.
1. Dumping and Antidumping
Goods may be considered "dumped" when the price that exporters
charge to their foreign consumers is less than the normal value of the
goods or the price charged to customers in their domestic market.'
8
Dumping exporters often subsidize these low export prices with high
prices in the home market where the producer may have a monopoly. In
this respect, dumping can be seen as the international equivalent of
predatory pricing. Antidumping laws seek to prevent exporters from
selling their products at unfairly low prices in other countries. In Can-
ada, the offense of dumping contains two elements: (1) an export to
Canada priced at less than its fair value that (2) results in injury or
threat thereof to a Canadian industry.19 The penalty that can be im-
posed in response to such practices is an "antidumping duty," a tariff
placed on the good designed to restore the export price to its fair
value.20
2. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
Subsidies are financial contributions made by governments to local
18. See Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15, § 2(1) (1985) (Can.).
19. Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15, § 5 (1985) (Can.).
20. Id. § 3(1).
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producers. 21 Companies that receive subsidies can sell their goods in
foreign markets at prices lower than competing firms that do not re-
ceive government assistance. A countervailing duty seeks to prevent the
importation of subsidized goods into Canada at prices that are unfairly
low. A successful countervailing duty action requires: (1) a subsidy
given by the exporter's government; and (2) a resulting injury to a Ca-
nadian industry.22 The penalty is a "countervailing duty," a tariff in-
tended to offset the government subsidy.
23
The following discussion on the procedures for antidumping duties
applies equally for countervailing duties. However, for the sake of brev-
ity and to avoid repetition, only antidumping duties will be discussed.
3. Procedures for Imposing Antidumping Duties in Canada
The legislation regarding antidumping is set out in the Canadian
Special Import Measures Act (SIMA)24 and the Canadian International
Trade Tribunal Act (CITTA).25 Under these Acts, in order to impose an
antidumping duty, there must be a finding of dumping and serious in-
jury.26 The institutional responsibilities for determining these issues
are separated, with "dumping" determinations being made by the Dep-
uty Minister of National Revenue (DMNR),27 and "serious injury" de-
terminations being made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal
(CITT).28 Antidumping complaints can be initiated by the industry al-
legedly affected by the dumped good, which is usually a local competi-
tor.
29
If there is evidence of dumping, the DMNR makes a provisional de-
termination of the dumping margin and imposes provisional anti-
dumping duties equal to the margin of dumping on the imports. 30 The
CITT then undertakes a thorough injury inquiry.31 If the CITT makes a
finding of material injury, anti-dumping duties are imposed which re-
flect the DMNR's final margin of dumping determination. 32 If the CITT
does not find material injury, the investigation is terminated and any
provisional duties paid are refunded. 33
21. Id. § 2(1).
22. Id. § 6.
23. Id. § 3(1).
24. Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15 (1985) (Can.).
25. Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, R.S.C., ch.47 (4th Supp.) (1985)
(Can).
26. Id. § 26(4). See also Special Import Measures Act § 5.
27. Special Import Measures Act §§ 38-41.
28. Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act § 20.
29. Id. §§ 22-30.
30. Special Import Measures Act § 38(1).
31. Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act §§ 22-30.
32. Special Import Measures Act § 41.
33. Id. § 43.
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While the CITT's decision is "final and conclusive," the CITT may
review its own findings if it is satisfied that such a review is war-
ranted.3 4 For disputes between parties from Canada and a non-NAFTA
country, there are also appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal and then
to the Supreme Court of Canada on questions of law. 35
B. Changes to the Canadian Procedures Under NAFTA
Under NAFTA, the substantive domestic antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws and procedures of the NAFTA countries are pre-
served,36 but two new institutions have been created. The first entity is
the Binational Panel that reviews final antidumping and countervailing
duty determinations by domestic agencies. 37 The second entity is the
Extraordinary Challenge Committee that reviews Binational Panel de-
cisions.3 8 The effect of these two tribunals is to replace judicial review
by national courts with Binational Panel review for antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations. 39 The SIMA and the CITTA have
been amended to reflect the changes required by NAFTA obligations.
1. Policy reasons behind NAFTA Chapter 19
In the negotiations under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment,40 and later under NAFTA, Canadian trade representatives were
eager to take the final decision-making authority over antidumping and
countervailing duties away from the courts of the United States. They
believed that Canadian firms were subject to unfair treatment at the
hands of American judges influenced by their national politics.41 The
Canadians sought to eliminate the American antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws as they applied to Canada and replace them with a
new set of laws to be interpreted and enforced by a binational tribu-
nal. 42 When the Americans rejected any changes to U.S. law, the com-
promise reached was the creation of the Binational Panels and the Ex-
traordinary Challenge Committees discussed in detail below.
34. Id. § 76.
35. Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 28 (1985) (Can.).
36. See NAFTA, supra note 4, at art. 1902.1. Each Party reserves the right to apply
its antidumping law and countervailing duty law to goods imported from the territory of
the other party.
37. Id. art. 1904(1).
38. Id. art. 1904(13). See also id. annex 1904.13.
39. Id. art. 1904(1).
40. Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-
Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1989).
41. See Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Constitutional Dimensions of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141, 145 (1994).
42. See Gregory W. Carman, Resolution of Trade Disputes By Chapter 19 Panels: A
Long-Term Solution or Interim Procedure of Dubious Constitutionality, 21 FORDHAM INT'L




Once the CITT issues a final determination, an "involved party"
from a NAFTA country has 30 days to request a review by a NAFTA
Panel. 43 The term "involved party" is defined as the importing party or
the party whose goods are the subject of the final determination.44 Upon
a request for Binational Panel review, that process begins and the tra-
ditional path of judicial review is unavailable. The Panel first obtains
the administrative record from CITT. A representative of that agency
can appear before the Panel. 45 Interested parties with standing to ap-
pear in a traditional appeal can submit briefs and present oral argu-
ments. 46 Based on this evidence, the Panel assesses the agency's deter-
mination to see if it complied with the substantive law of the country.
47
The Panel then decides whether to uphold the agency's decision or re-
mand the proceeding for action not inconsistent with the Panel's deci-
sion.48 A written opinion with reasons for the decision is provided along
with dissenting opinions. The standard of review, and the legal princi-
ples to be applied by the Panel are those that a court of the defendant
party would use.49 The decision is binding with respect to the parties
and the particular matter before the Panel.50 In the event of an adverse
finding, a defendant state is required to change its laws to conform to
the Panel's determination of the requirements of NAFTA.5 1 Article
1904(11) states that:
A final determination shall not be reviewed under any judi-
cial review procedures of the importing Party if an involved
Party requests a panel with respect to that determination
within the time limits set out in this Article. No Party may
provide in its domestic legislation for an appeal from a
panel decision to its domestic courts.
52
The purpose of this section is to avoid Panel decisions that contra-
dict rulings by federal courts with respect to the same final determina-
tions. By way of example, suppose an American producer is exporting to
Canada and is accused of dumping. If the CITT rules against her, an
antidumping duty is levied against her products. She may then request
a Binational Panel review. In this case, all Canadian importers bound
to pay the antidumping duty would have to appear before the Bina-
tional Panel and would thereby be unable to go before the Canadian
43. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(4).
44. Id. art. 1911
45. Id. art. 1904(7).
46. Id. art. 1904(14).
47. Id. art. 1904(8).
48. Id.
49. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(3).
50. Id. art. 1904(11).
51. Id. art. 1904(15).
52. Id. art. 1904(11).
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courts to challenge the ruling.
Now suppose that the Binational Panel decides in favor of the
American exporter and her Canadian competitors believe that the Panel
exceeded its jurisdiction or applied the wrong standard of judicial re-
view. In such an instance, there would be no recourse to the Canadian
courts. As is often the case with international adjudication, the Panel's
decisions are made by ad hoc judges who are appointed from a roster for
a particular case. 53 There are no permanent clerks or research assis-
tants.54 So unlike an appellate court, the Binational Panels have no in-
stitutional longevity, increasing the likelihood of poor reasoning or in-
consistent decisions.
Each of the three NAFTA countries is to select at least 25 candi-
dates for membership on Binational Panels.55 The Agreement expresses
a preference for sitting or retired judges as panelists. 56 Each Panel is to
consist of five members; two selected by each country involved in the
dispute and the final panelists selected by agreement between the two
countries.57 If no agreement can be reached as to the final panelist, the
countries are to decide by lot which of them will select the fifth panelist,
excluding candidates eliminated by peremptory challenges.58
Additionally, the Binational Panels serve one function other than
judicial review. Under Article 1903, a NAFTA country may request that
an amendment to another Party's antidumping or countervailing duty
laws be referred to a Panel for a declaratory opinion on whether the
amendment is consistent with the GATT and NAFTA.59
3. The Extraordinary Challenge Committee ("ECC")
NAFTA allows a limited right of appeal to the ECC that reviews
certain Panel decisions. 60 However, appeals are only permitted when:
(1) there has been gross misconduct, bias, serious conflict of interest, or
other material misconduct on the part of a panelist; (2) there has been a
serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (3) a Panel
manifestly exceeds its powers, authority or jurisdiction, for example, by
failing to apply the appropriate standard of judicial review. 61 It must
also be established that the action materially affected the Panel's deci-
sion, and that the decision threatens the integrity of the Binational






59. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1903.
60. Id. art. 1904(13).




Each NAFTA country selects five sitting or retired judges as poten-
tial ECC members. 63 From this roster, the two opposing countries in a
dispute pick a committee of three.6 4 After each country selects one
member, the two countries draw lots to determine which side gets to
choose the third member. 65 The ECC either affirms the Panel decision
or vacates it for remand to a new Panel.66 The ECC's rulings are bind-
ing with respect to the matter and the parties involved.67 As is the case
for the Binational Panels, Chapter 19 of NAFTA expressly prohibits any
Party to the Agreement from establishing legislatively a procedure to
challenge ECC determinations in their respective court systems. 68
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM POSED BY CHAPTER 19
A. United States
Several articles have been written as to whether Chapter 19 of
NAFTA violates Article III of the U.S. Constitution, with no consensus
having been reached as to the correct answer.69 The principal issue is
whether NAFTA Binational Panels are without authority to review de-
cisions of the United States' Department of Commerce and the United
States' International Trade Commission by virtue of Article III Section
1 of the United States Constitution. That Section reads: "The judicial
power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."
70
By entering NAFTA, Congress and the President may have ex-
ceeded the authority granted to them respectively by Articles I and II of
the Constitution, having unlawfully ceded powers encompassed within
the sovereignty of the United States to an international tribunal.
62. Id. art. 1904(13)(b).





68. Id. art. 1904(11).
69. For example, Demetrios Metropoulos concludes that Chapter 19 of NAFTA does
violate Article III of the United States' Constitution. See Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Con-
stitutional Dimensions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L.
L.J. 141 (1994). Denis J. Edwards reaches the opposite conclusion. Denis J. Edwards,
NAFTA and Article III: Making a Drama Out of a Crisis, NAFTA: LAw & Bus. REV. AMS.,
vol. I, No. 2, 69 (1995). For other articles on this topic, see supra note 7.
70. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
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B. Mexico
Article 13 of the Mexican Constitution states that, "[n]o one shall
be judged based on special laws or statutes."71 The second paragraph of
Article 17 provides that, "[aill persons have a right to the administra-
tion of justice by expedite courts that shall administrate justice in the
time and terms established by law and the decisions of such courts shall
be issued in a prompt, complete and impartial manner."72 It has been
suggested that by removing judicial review from the Mexican courts,
Article 1904(11) of NAFTA is inconsistent with the above-mentioned
sections of the Mexican Constitution.
73
C. Canada
The same type of contention could be raised in Canada. A strong
argument can be made that Chapter 19 of NAFTA takes away the
power of judicial review of administrative tribunals from the Canadian
superior courts in violation of Section 96 of the Canadian Constitution.
What follows is a detailed description and evaluation of this argument.
IV. LIMITS ON THE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWERS
Before addressing the constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 19 Bina-
tional Panels, it will be helpful to review Canada's constitutional and
judicial structures. This will assist in illustrating the limitations the
Canadian constitution places on Parliament's ability to relocate deci-
sion-making powers from the superior courts to administrative tribu-
nals.
A. Constitutional Structure of Canada
The Constitution of Canada is composed of written documents and
constitutional customs. 74 The written documents consist of what was
formerly known as the British North America Act of 1867 (the BNA Act)
75 and the more recently adopted Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms (the Charter).
76
The BNA Act is the imperial statute that triggered the confedera-
tion of the British Colonies that became Canada. It divides legislative
power in the Canadian federal system between the Federal Parliament
71. CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOs, art. 13 (Mex.).
72. Id. art.17.
73. See Luis Manuel Perez de Acha, Binational Panels: A Conflict of Idiosyncrasies, 3
Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 431, 434 (1996).
74. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, ch. 1 (3d ed. 1992).
75. British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.) (now referred to as the Con-
stitution Act, 1867).
76. Schedule B Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
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and the Provincial Legislatures. 77 Section 92 of the BNA Act sets out
the enumerated classes of subjects over which the provinces have exclu-
sive legislative competence and Section 91 outlines the areas in which
the federal Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction. 78 In 1982 two devel-
opments occurred. First, the BNA Act was renamed the Constitution
Act 1867. Second, the Charter came into effect and entrenched a num-




One of the principal foundations upon which the Canadian Consti-
tution rests is its unified national judiciary, the result of a compromise
between federal and provincial powers made by the Fathers of Confed-
eration in 1867. While the provinces were given responsibility for the
administration of justice under Section 92(14) of the constitution, 80 un-
der Section 96, the Governor General was given the power to appoint
judges to the superior, district and county courts in each province. 81
Section 100 obliges the Parliament of Canada to fix and pay the salaries
of these judges. 82 The possible overlap of federal and provincial consti-
tutional power with respect to the courts has led to cooperation between
the levels of government in maintaining a strong unified judicial pres-
ence throughout Canada.
1. Nature of the Superior Courts
The Canadian Constitution applies a British parliamentary model
for government to a federated state. At the time of Confederation in
1867, each of the uniting provinces' own courts were modeled on the
English system. 83 The superior courts had jurisdiction throughout the
province.84 Upon the creation of Canada, it was decided that the courts
already existing in the provinces would continue to operate.8 5 This gave
rise to the general jurisdiction trial courts that are now the superior
courts in the provinces.8 6 As direct descendants of the English superior
courts, the Canadian provincial superior courts (often referred to as the
Section 96 courts), possess "inherent jurisdiction," which means they
77. Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., App. No. 5, §§ 91-92 (1985) (Can.). See also
ALBERT ABEL, LASKIN'S CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 1 (4th ed. 1973).
78. Constitution Act, 1867 §§ 91-92.
79. Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C., App. No. 44, § 53(2) (1985) (Can.).
80. Constitution Act, 1867 § 92(14).
81. Id. § 96.
82. Id. § 100.
83. T.A. Cromwell, Aspects of Constitutional Judicial Review in Canada, 46 S.C.L.
REV. 1027, 1029 (1995).
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have original jurisdiction in any matter unless it is clearly taken away
by statute.
8 7
As discussed in the next section, the Supreme Court of Canada has
recently held in MacMillan that the Section 96 courts possess a consti-
tutionally guaranteed core of jurisdiction that cannot be removed by ei-
ther provincial or federal legislation.88 The Court also held that neither
the federal nor the provincial government could confer on an inferior
court or tribunal the powers of a superior court.8 9 It is these two limita-
tions on the delegation of adjudicative power that question the constitu-
tional validity of Chapter 19 of NAFTA in Canada.
Because the Section 96 courts have general jurisdiction, there is no
need for separate federal courts to decide "federal" issues.9 0 This gives
rise to a largely unitary court system operating within the federal state.
In Canada, the jurisdiction of a court does not depend on whether the
law to be applied emanates from the federal or the provincial govern-
ments. As a result, while contract law is within the provincial sphere of
jurisdiction, contract cases are presided over by federally appointed
judges in the provincial superior courts. The courts are creatures of
provincial legislation, with facilities and staff provided and paid for by
the provinces. 91 Appeals from the superior courts go to provincial courts
of appeal and can then be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 92
Section 101 of the Constitution of Canada permits Parliament to
create "a General Court of Appeal for Canada" and "any additional
Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada."93 The Su-
preme Court of Canada and the Federal Court were created by the fed-
eral Government pursuant to Section 101. The Canadian Supreme
Court is a general court of appeal for Canada, having jurisdiction over
all laws within the legislative competence of both the federal or the pro-
vincial legislatures.9 4 Appeals lie from all courts to the Supreme Court
of Canada, which thereby exercises a unifying influence.95
The Federal Court has a trial and an appellate division.96 Its juris-
diction is limited to administrative judicial review of federal tribunals,
certain areas of federal law such as copyright and admiralty, and ac-
tions involving the federal Crown.97 The Federal Court does not have
"ancillary" jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction is largely concurrent with
87. T.A. Cromwell, Aspects of Constitutional Judicial Review in Canada, supra note
83, at 1031.
88. MacMillan Bloedel, Ltd. v. Simpson [19951 4 S.C.R.725, 740,1 15 (Can.).
89. Id.
90. T.A. Cromwell, supra note 83, at 1030.
91. Id.
92. PETER W. HOGG, supra note 74, at 162-166.
93. Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., App. No. 5, § 101 (1985) (Can.).
94. T.A. Cromwell, supra note 83, at 1029.
95. Id.
96. Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 4 (1985) (Can.).
97. Id. §§ 16, 18, 20, 22, 28.
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the provincial superior courts.98
2. Delegation of Judicial Powers
As Canadian society has grown more complex, the number of dis-
putes involving Canadians has increased dramatically. To cope with the
greater demand for the judicial settlement of disputes, Parliament and
the legislatures have created many specialised tribunals to supplement
the work of the Section 96 courts.99 Each new social structure created
has given rise to new conflicts, which the government has addressed
through regulation. This in turn has often resulted in the creation of
new administrative tribunals. 100 Several factors can explain the prefer-
ence of Parliament and the legislatures for administrative tribunals
with decision-making powers: the desire for a specialist body; the need
for a comprehensive investigative, adjudicative and policy-formation
approach to certain problems; and lack of another way to address the
sheer volume of disputes which arise in certain sectors.
Little attention was paid to Sections 96 through 101,101 the "judica-
98. Quebec N. Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pac., Ltd., (1977) 2 S.C.R. 1054, 1065-66
(Can.).
99. MacMillan Bloedel, Ltd. v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R at 761, 1 53.
100. Id.
101. Sections 96 to 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provide:
96. The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District,
and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate in
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
97. Until the Laws relative to Property and Civil Rights in Ontario, Nova
Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the Procedure of the Courts in those Prov-
inces, are made uniform, the Judges of the Courts of those Provinces ap-
pointed by the Governor General shall be selected from the respective Bars
of those Provinces.
98. The Judges of the Courts of Quebec shall be selected from the Bar of that
Province.
99. (1) Subject to subsection two of this section, the Judges of the Superior
Courts shall hold office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the
Governor General on Address of the Senate and House of Commons.
(2) A Judge of a Superior Court, whether appointed before or after the
coming into force of this section, shall cease to hold office upon attaining the
age of seventy-five years, or upon the coming into force of this section if at
that time he has already attained that age.
100. The Salaries, Allowances, and Pensions of the Judges of the Superior,
District, and County Courts (except the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick), and of the Admiralty Courts in Cases where the Judges
thereof are for the Time being paid by Salary, shall be fixed and provided by
the Parliament of Canada.
101. The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act,
from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organiza-
tion of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of
any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada.
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.).
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ture sections" of the Constitution at the time of Confederation.10 2 How-
ever, since the 1930s, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Can-
ada have attached considerable significance to these Sections, extend-
ing the scope of their application beyond the mere appointment of
judges. 1
03
The conferral of judicial functions on bodies that are not superior
courts is not expressly prohibited by the judicature sections of the Con-
stitution. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted Sec-
tions 96 to 100 as a limit on the power of the provincial legislatures to
delegate decision-making power. 104 The Court has held that the provin-
cial legislatures may not confer on a body other than a superior court,
judicial functions analogous to those performed by a superior court. 105 A
tribunal that is given such functions is illegally constituted unless it
meets the requirements of Sections 96 to 100 (i.e. members must be ap-
pointed by the federal Government, drawn from the bar of the appro-
priate provinces and receive salaries that are fixed and provided for by
the federal Government). 106 Recently it has been made clear that the
same restrictions apply to the federal Parliament at least to the extent
that it cannot take certain "core" functions away from the superior
courts and give them to inferior courts or administrative tribunals. 10 7
It should be noted that as the courts of inherent jurisdiction, Cana-
dian superior courts seem to have no limits to their jurisdiction. There-
fore, they can be given novel jurisdiction or they can adjudicate disputes
that were traditionally heard by inferior courts. 0 8
3. History of the Section 96 Cases up until MacMillan
Initially, Canadian courts refused to accept that Parliament or the
legislatures could transfer any adjudicative powers of the superior
courts to inferior courts or tribunals. 0 9 However, as modern society led
to a proliferation of economic relationships that required regulation by
specialised administrative agencies, the courts gradually relaxed their
grip on adjudication.1o In order to preserve the constitutional role of
the Section 96 courts, Canadian judges developed a test that sought to
102. See REESOR, supra note 50, at 251.
103. See discussion of cases infra pp. 114-16.
104. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 7.3(a) (3rd ed. 1992).
105. See Reference re Residential Tenancies Act (N.S. 1992), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 186.
(Can.); Sobeys Stores Ltd. v. Yeomans [1989] 1 S.C.R. 238 (Can.); Attorney Gen. of Que. v.
Grondin [1983] 2 S.C.R. 364 (Can.); Re Residential Tenancies Act [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714
(Can.).
106. Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., App. No. 5, §§ 96-100 (1985) (Can.).
107. See the majority decision in MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson [19951 4 S.C.R. 725,
discussed infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
108. See HOGG, supra note 56, at 7.3(d).
109. MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R. 1 55.
110. MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R. 1 57.
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balance the need to maintain a strong constitutional position of Section
96 courts with the need to provide sufficient scope for the creation of ef-
fective administrative tribunals.'
The "no-delegation" position was entrenched law in Canada as late
as 1938, when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that
the Ontario legislature could not confer any judicial powers on the On-
tario Municipal Board by virtue of Section 96 of the Constitution. 112 But
that doctrine proved to be unworkable. In Reference re Adoption Act, 113
the Supreme Court rejected the "no-delegation" approach and held that
increases in the jurisdiction of inferior tribunals were permitted so long
as their new power broadly conformed to the jurisdiction exercised by
inferior courts. 1 4 In light of the need for more adjudicators, the legisla-
tures and the courts continued to expand the provinces' power of judi-
cial delegation. In 1949, the Privy Council held that as long as a judicial
power had not been one that was traditionally exercised by the Section
96 courts, the legislatures could delegate it to an inferior tribunal.
1 5
The next major development in this doctrine occurred in 1977 when
the Supreme Court of Canada decided Tomko v. Labour Relations
Board (Nova Scotia).116 In Tomko, the Nova Scotia Labour Relations
Board issued a 'cease and desist' order. 117 That order was challenged
under Section 96 because it was analogous to a mandatory injunction,
which was within the traditional jurisdiction of the superior courts. 118
The Supreme Court ruled that, in determining whether a delegation of
judicial power violated Section 96, the transferred power must be con-
sidered in the context of the tribunal's object and purpose."19
The test from Tomko was refined by the Supreme Court of Canada
in 1980 in the decision of Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979.120 The
Justices in Residential Tenancies held that courts must examine the in-
stitutional setting of a tribunal in order to determine whether a par-
ticular power or jurisdiction can validly be conferred on a provincial
body. The Court wrote:
An administrative tribunal may be clothed with power
formerly exercised by Section 96 courts, so long as that
power is merely an adjunct of, or ancillary to, a broader
administrative or regulatory structure. If, however, the
impugned power forms a dominant aspect of the func-
111. See Madam Justice McLachlin in MacMillan, supra note 58.
112. See Toronto v. York [1938] 1 D.L.R. 593 (Can.).
113. Reference re Adoption Act, 1938 S.C.R. 398 (Can.).
114. Id. at 421.
115. See Labour Relations Bd. of Sask. v. John East Iron Works, Ltd. [1949] 3 D.L.R.
488 (Can.).
116. See Tomko v. Labour Relations Bd. (N.S.) [1977] 1 S.C.R. 112 (Can.).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 113.
119. Id. at 120.
120. Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 (Can.).
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tion of the tribunal, such that the tribunal itself must be
considered to be acting 'like a court', then the conferral
of the power is ultra vires.
121
Under this approach, an administrative scheme is only invalid
when adjudication is the sole or central function of the tribunal, such
that the tribunal can be said to be operating like a Section 96 court.
122
Justice Dickson laid down a three-step approach to determining
whether a transfer of power from a Section 96 court to an inferior court
was constitutional.123 The first step is to determine if the power given to
the inferior tribunal historically fell within the jurisdiction of the Sec-
tion 96 courts. 24 The second step is to determine whether the power is
judicial.1 25 If the power is judicial and was exercised exclusively 126 by
the superior courts at the time of confederation, the inquiry moves to
the third step, the consideration of the institutional setting in which the
judicial power is employed. 127 If the exercise of power is subsidiary or
ancillary to what is predominantly an administrative function, or is in-
cidental to the achievement of a broader policy goal of the legislature,
the transfer of Section 96 judicial power is nonetheless valid. 128 If, how-
ever, the superior court power conferred on the tribunal is a dominant
part of its function, the tribunal will be seen as acting like a Section 96
court and will be found to be unconstitutional. 129
While the above Section 96 case law clearly binds provincial legisla-
tures, the applicability of this analysis to the federal Parliament was an
undecided issue in Canada for some time. 130 In 1992, in the case of
Chrysler Canada v. Canada (Competition Tribunal),'3 the majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada decided not to rule on whether Section 96
limited the powers of Parliament.1 32 However, this issue now seems to
have been resolved with MacMillan and the decisions that have
121. Id. at 733-34.
122. Id. at 736.
123. Id. at 734-35.
124. In Sobeys Stores Ltd. v. Yeomans [1989] 1 S.C.R. 238 (Can.), Madam Justice Wil-
son suggested that the issue was not the remedies exercised by the superior courts at the
time of Confederation, but whether the dispute was one which fell within their jurisdic-
tion.
125. Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 734 (Can..).
126. The requirement that the imputed power had to have been exercised exclusively
by the superior courts at the time of confederation in order to be unconstitutional was laid
down by the Supreme Court in Attorney General of Que. v. Grondin, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 364
(Can.).
127. Addy v. Queen [19851, 22 D.L.R. (4th) 52 (Can.).
128. Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 [1981] 1 S.C.R. at 735-36.
129. Id.
130. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 7.2 (3d ed. 1992).
131. Chrysler of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Competition Tribunal) [1992] 2 S.C.R. 394
(Can.).




C. MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson
In MacMillan, the defendant Simpson was a minor who was 17
years of age at the time of his arrest. 34 Simpson violated an injunction
issued by the British Columbia Supreme Court prohibiting certain pro-
tests. 135 As a result, Simpson was charged with contempt of court.136 At
trial, Simpson made an application to be tried in youth court pursuant
to Section 47(2) of the Young Offenders Act, an Act of the Parliament of
Canada, which transfers jurisdiction over contempt of court committed
by a minor to the youth court. 137 That section reads:
47... (2) The youth court has exclusive jurisdiction in
respect of every contempt of court committed by a young
person against the youth court whether or not commit-
ted in the face of the court and every contempt of court
committed by a young person against any other court
otherwise than in the face of that court.
38
The application was dismissed and Simpson was convicted. 39
Simpson appealed on the ground that the British Columbia Supreme
Court had no jurisdiction to try him.140 The Court of Appeal upheld the
conviction holding that 47(2) of the Young Offenders Act was unconsti-
tutional. 141 It reasoned that because the contempt power is within the
core jurisdiction of the superior courts, it is beyond the competence of
Parliament to remove any part of the contempt powers from those
courts. 142 In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling
of the Court of Appeal.
On the basis of the Residential Tenancies test, the Supreme Court
held that the grant of jurisdiction to youth courts was permissible.
First, on the historical test, the contempt of court charge was clearly
within Section 96 jurisdiction at the time of Confederation. 4 3 Second,
jurisdiction of the youth court was unquestionably to be exercised judi-
133. In Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), [1994] 3
S.C.R. 3 at 68 the majority of the Supreme Court affirmed that section 96 did apply to tri-
bunals created by Parliament as did the majority of the Supreme Court in Reference re
Residential Tenancies Act (N.S. 1992), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 186 1 73.




138. Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., ch. Y-1, § 47(2) (1985) (Can.).
139. MacMillan Bloedel at 734, J 5.
140. Id. at 736, 1 8.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. MacMillan Bloedel at 747, 1 26.
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cially.'" However on the third test, the institutional setting test, the
grant of jurisdiction was found to be constitutional.145 The Court con-
cluded that the institutional setting of the transfer of power was the
youth courts, which were part of a novel approach to curbing criminal
conduct. 146 These courts have an expertise in providing procedural pro-
tections appropriate for youths and in deciding punishments for con-
victed young offenders. The Court held that the power to punish youths'
contempt of superior courts was merely ancillary to those primary func-
tions.147 Accordingly, granting jurisdiction to punish youths for con-
tempt of superior courts did not infringe upon Section 96 of the Consti-
tution Act, 1867.148 On that issue, the entire Court agreed. The real
issue in the case was whether the delegation of contempt power over
youths to an inferior court could be exclusive, such that superior court
jurisdiction was completely removed. 149 On this issue the court split five
judges to four.
Chief Justice Lamer wrote the majority decision that made two
dramatic changes to the law regarding Section 96. First, the majority
decision made clear for the first time that Section 96 limits the powers
of both Parliament and the provincial legislatures, since the case in-
volved a delegation of judicial power by Parliament. The dissent did not
take any objection with this innovation and subsequent cases have af-
firmed this principle.1 50 Second, the majority held that under Section
96, jurisdiction to decide certain matters could never be taken away
from the superior courts, and that contempt of court was part of that
"core" jurisdiction. 151 Chief Justice Lamer wrote:
The superior courts have a core or inherent jurisdiction
which is integral to their operations. The jurisdiction
which forms this core cannot be removed from the supe-
rior courts by either level of government, without
amending the Constitution. Without this core jurisdic-
tion, s. 96 could not be said either to ensure uniformity
in the judicial system throughout the country or to pro-
tect the independence of the judiciary. Furthermore,
the power of superior courts to fully control their own
process is, in our system where the superior court of
general jurisdiction is central, essential to the mainte-
nance of the rule of law itself.
15 2







150. See Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.) 68; Ref-
erence re Residential Tenancies Act (N.S. 1992), 1 73.




of the Section 96 courts. Instead, he quoted Keith Mason with approval
to the effect that the "ubiquitous nature" of inherent jurisdiction "pre-
cludes any exhaustive enumeration of the powers which are thus exer-
cised by the courts." 153 Chief Justice Lamer was of the opinion that in-
herent jurisdiction is that which is integral to the operations of the
superior courts. 15 4 For such jurisdiction, no part of it could be removed
by either level of government in the absence of a constitutional amend-
ment. 155 The majority was of the opinion that adjudicating contempt of
court proceedings was part of the "core functions" of the Section 96
courts. 156 Therefore, Section 47(2) was valid to the extent that it con-
ferred jurisdiction on the youth court but was inoperative in depriving
the superior court of its jurisdiction to convict the appellant of con-
tempt.157
Lamer quoted from I. H. Jacob's "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the
Court" and concluded:
While inherent jurisdiction may be difficult to define, it
is of paramount importance to the existence of a supe-
rior court. The full range of powers which comprise the
inherent jurisdiction of a superior court are, together, its
"essential character" or "immanent attribute". To re-
move any part of this core emasculates the court, mak-
ing it something other than a superior court. 158
Madam Justice McLachlin wrote for the four dissenting judges. The
dissenting opinion viewed the Residential Tenancies test as sufficient
for preserving the functions of administrative tribunals without violat-
ing the constitution. Justice McLachlin rejected as unnecessary the ad-
ditional condition that the transfer of judicial power to inferior tribu-
nals not involve any aspect of the "core" powers of the superior courts.1 5 9
The dissenters wrote that the proposed "core test" needlessly derogated
from the functional approach of the Residential Tenancies test. 60
153. Keith Mason, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 57 AUSTL. L.J. 449, 449
(1983), as quoted by Justice Lamer in MacMillan, supra note 75, 1 33.
154. MacMillan, 4 S.C.R. at 754, 1 38.
155. Id. at 757, 42.
156. Id. at 754, 1 38.
157. Id. at 757, 1 43.
158. Id. 1 30, Justice Lamer quoting Isaac H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the
Court, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 23, 27 (1970).
159. MacMillan 4 S.C.R. at 780, 1 93
160. Id. at 779, 91.
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V. APPLICATION OF SECTION 96 JURISPRUDENCE TO THE NAFTA
PANELS
A. Constitutionality of Chapter 19 Panels
1. Does Section 96 Jurisprudence Apply to the Federal and
Supreme Courts?
A threshold question concerns the applicability of cases like Mac-
Millan to the federal courts. An argument can be made that the cases
discussed above address the unconstitutional creation of provincial su-
perior courts or the removal of power from provincial superior courts.
Since NAFTA Binational Panels remove the power of judicial review
from the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, and not the
provincial superior courts, there is no constitutional difficulty, at least
not as defined above. This argument is not completely without merit.
There has been some debate in Canada as to whether the Federal Court
and the Supreme Court of Canada, as creations of federal statute, are
"superior courts" such that the limitations of Sections 96-100 of the
Constitution apply to them.
The issue was first raised in an article by W.R. Lederman,1 6 1 where
he argues that the term "superior court" in Section 96 of the Constitu-
tion applies to the federal superior courts created under Section 101.162
According to Lederman, the Federal and Supreme Court are subject to
the same constitutional limitations regarding delegation of decision-
making authority as are the provincial superior courts:
[I]ndeed the General Court of Appeal for Canada would
necessarily and pre-eminently be a superior court on the
English model. To consider that Section 101 could mean
anything else would be so incongruous as to be absurd.
Surely the B.N.A. Act necessarily implies that the "Gen-
eral Court of Appeal for Canada" must be a superior
court in the fullest sense, and it is guaranteed typical
and appropriate superior court appellate jurisdiction.
When one realizes that the guaranteed jurisdiction of
the provincial superior courts rests upon a wider basis
of necessary implication than the "mere" federal ap-
pointing power in section 96, as explained earlier, then
it follows that the same wider basis of implication is
equally relevant to the federal superior courts and
should confer on them a similarly guaranteed jurisdic-
161. William. R. Lederman, The Independence of the Judiciary, 34 CAN. B. REV. 1139,
1176 (1956).




This view was rejected by Justice Laskin as follows: "It has been
suggested by Lederman that the limitations of ss. 96 to 100 of the
B.N.A. Act may properly be imported into Section 101 so as to restrict
federal courts in the same way, but there is no tenable ground of history
or text to support the suggestion."164
Under the Lederman approach, Parliament can take "core" jurisdic-
tion away from the provincial superior courts and give it to the federal
superior courts, but it cannot take it away from all superior courts and
give it to an inferior tribunal.165
This issue seems to have been resolved in favor of the Lederman
approach in the case of Addy v. The Queen. 166 In Addy, the plaintiff was
a judge of the Federal Court who was 69 years of age.167 The Federal
Court Act provided that judges of the Federal Court must cease to hold
office upon attaining the age of seventy years. 168 Section 99(2) of the
Constitution provided that judges of the superior courts could hold of-
fice until they reached the age of 75.169 Addy argued that the mandatory
retirement provision of the Federal Court Act was inconsistent with
Section 99(2) of the Constitution and therefore was of no force and ef-
fect. 170 The Federal Court agreed, holding that the Supreme Court of
Canada and the Federal Court of Canada were superior courts within
the meaning of Section 99(2). The Court quoted from Blackstone's
Commentaries:
A superior court as distinguished from an inferior court pos-
sess broad supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals
and keeps them within the bounds of their authority by re-
moving their proceedings to be determined in such superior
court or by prohibiting their progress in the inferior tribu-
nal.
171
If the federal courts are "superior" for the purposes of Section 99,
they must also be "superior" for the purposes of Section 96, as Sections
163. Id.
164. See BORA LASKIN, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 76 (4th ed. rev. 1975).
165. Justice Lamer in MacMillan seems to reject the notion that inherent powers
could always be transferred between superior courts. At paragraph 42 of that decision he
wrote: The full panoply of contempt powers is so vital to the superior court that even re-
moving the jurisdiction in question here and transferring it to another court with judges
appointed pursuant to s. 96 would offend our Constitution." See MacMillan Bloedel, 1 42.
166. Addy v. Queen [19851, 22 D.L.R. (4th) 52 (Can.). The federal Government did not
appeal the decision, and section 8 of the Federal Court Act was amended to raise the age
of retirement for federal court judges to 75 years. S.C. 1987, ch.21, §7.
167. Addy v. Queen [1985] 22 D.L.R. at 53.
168. The Federal Court Act R.S.C. ch. 10 (2d Supp.) § 8(2) (1970) (Can.).
169. Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., App. No. 5, § 99(2) (1985) (Can.).
170. Addy v. Queen [1985], 22 D.L.R. at 55.
171. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 43-46 (1768), cited in Addy, 22 D.L.R. at 58.
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96 to 100 have consistently been read together to form the "judicature
sections" of the Canadian Constitution. As a result, the constitutional
restrictions of Section 96 apply equally to the federal and provincial su-
perior courts.
Having established that Section 96 applies to Chapter 19 of
NAFTA, two similar but distinct questions must be addressed. The first
is whether it is a violation of Section 96 of the Canadian Constitution to
give the Binational Panels the power of judicial review in antidumping
cases. The second is whether taking the power of judicial review away
from the Federal Court violates Section 96. Each of these will be ad-
dressed in turn.
2. Is the Grant of Jurisdiction to the Binational Panel
Unconstitutional?
According to recent Canadian case law on Section 96, before ap-
plying the Residential Tenancies test, the essential nature of the infe-
rior tribunal and the power being delegated must be determined. Only
after the court has properly categorized the pith and substance of the
legislation, can it proceed with the three-part test laid down in Residen-
tial Tenancies.
a. Characterization of the Law
The implementing legislation for Chapter 19 of NAFTA creates a
Binational Panel that reviews antidumping decisions of federal tribu-
nals. This can only be characterized as judicial review. The scheme cre-
ated may be considered judicial review in the broad sense or, alterna-
tively, could be characterized more specifically as judicial review of
antidumping and countervailing decisions. In either case, the primary
nature of the issue in question revolves around the question of the lim-
its on Parliament's ability to delegate judicial review power.
b. Historical Inquiry Test
The Historical Inquiry Test is the first part of the inquiry laid down
in Residential Tenancies. It asks whether the subject matter at issue is
one which is "broadly conformable" to the exclusive jurisdiction exer-
cised by section 96 at the time of Confederation. 172 There can be no
doubt that this is true of judicial review. But that does not end the his-
torical inquiry. In Reference re Young Offenders Act, Chief Justice
Lamer added a qualification to the "historical inquiry" test. 173 Justice
Lamer suggested that the legislative purpose of the grant of power, and
172. Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 734 (Can.).
173. Reference re Young Offenders Act (P.E.I.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 252, 269 (Can.).
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the nature of the scheme in question, should be considered. 74 If what
appeared to be a power that was traditionally exercised by the superior
courts, forms part of a new legal regime, it will not violate Section 96.
Applying this approach to Reference re Young Offenders Act, Justice
Lamer concluded that the powers granted to youth courts, and the ad-
ministrative scheme set up under the Young Offenders Act, could be
viewed as having created "new powers or jurisdiction." Such jurisdiction
was not within the power of the superior courts at the time of Confed-
eration and therefore the transfer of power was held valid.1
75
Using this analysis it could be argued that Chapter 19 of NAFTA
also forms part of a novel jurisdiction, as there was no antidumping or
countervailing duty laws in Canada at the time of Confederation. It was
not until 1904 that Canada amended its Customs Tariff Act 176 to pro-
vide for antidumping duties, making it the first country to establish
such a regime. 177 A related argument that can be made is that had the
drafters of the BNA Act thought about international trade disputes in
1867, they would have created Binational tribunals rather than giving
the power to the Section 96 courts. Some evidence for this assertion can
be found in the International Joint Commission (IJC) created under the
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between Canada and the United
States.178
However, it could also be argued that there is nothing novel about
judicial review, a power that was exclusively in the hands of Section 96
courts at the time of Confederation. 179 In Reference re Young Offenders
Act, the tribunal's power of contempt was one small part of its overall
function to provide a different scheme of criminal justice for youth of-
fenders. By contrast, the primary function of the Binational Panel is ju-
dicial review. Therefore, it can be argued that Chapter 19 does not form
part of a novel jurisdiction, and as such, the analysis must continue.
c. Judicial Function
In discussing the judicial function part of the Section 96 test, the
Court in Residential Tenancies wrote:
... the hallmark of judicial power is a lis between par-
ties in which a tribunal is called upon to apply a recog-
nized body of rules in a manner consistent with fairness
174. Id. at 269-72.
175. Id. at 271.
176. Act to Amend Customs Tariff 1897, S.C., ch.11, (1904) (Can).
177. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 101 (1995).
178. See THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON, (R. Spencer, et
al. eds., 1981); S. Wex, Boundary Waters Treaty, Article VIII: The Legal Status of the In-
ternational Joint Commission under International and Municipal Law, XVI Can. Y.B.
Int'l. L., 276 (1978).
179. T.A. Cromwell, supra note 83, at 1032.
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and impartiality. The adjudication deals primarily with
the rights of the parties to the dispute, rather than con-
siderations of the collective good of the community as a
whole.
8 0
The exercise of judicial review by Chapter 19 Binational Panels is
clearly a judicial function. Some authors have tried to characterize the
Chapter 19 Panels as arbitration boards and not super-national tribu-
nals in order to ensure that these Panels are not prevented from set-
tling disputes under the Mexican constitution. i 18 In light of their proce-
dures and functions outlined above, this argument is not convincing.
d. Institutional Setting
It is a long established principle of Canadian constitutional law
that the constitutionality of legislation is to be determined by its sub-
stantial essence rather than by its minor or incidental characteris-
tics.1 82 For this part of the Residential Tenancies test, court must ex-
amine the features of the scheme that have been attacked in the context
of the overall institutional setting.
With Chapter 19, the primary function of the tribunal is judicial
review. It would seem that the institutional setting therefore leads to
the conclusion that the Binational Panel process is unconstitutional.
The minority's judgment in MacMillan, highlights the difficulties the
Binational Panel system will face in trying to meet the "institutional
setting" test:
The Residential Tenancies test is based on the premise
that any judicial power can be transferred from a s. 96
court to an inferior tribunal, provided that the power is
ancillary to the tribunal's larger mandate. Shadow
courts, devoted exclusively or primarily to rendering
judgments which s. 96 courts have traditionally ren-
dered, are forbidden. 8 3
Like the Young Offenders Act case, one could argue that the Chap-
ter 19 Panels form part of international agreement so they are ancillary
to the NAFTA as a whole. But that is not the test. The requirement is
that the judicial function is only a small part of the tribunal's man-
date. 8 4 Here it is virtually the tribunal's entire mandate, as was the
case in Residential Tenancies.
Therefore it would seem that the NAFTA Binational Review Panels
180. Re Residential Tenancies Act [1981] 1 S.C.R. at 743.
181. See Luis Manuel Perez de Acha, Binational Panels: A Conflict of Idiosyncrasies, 3
Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 431, 433.
182. PETER W. HOGG, supra note 74, at 377-79.
183. See Madam Justice McLachlin in MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson [1995] 4 S.C.R.
70.
184. Re Residential Tenancies Act [1981] 1 S.C.R. at 736.
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may indeed violate Section 96 by conferring judicial power on an infe-
rior tribunal. The best argument against this position is that such a
conferral is not unconstitutional because the jurisdiction over anti-
dumping disputes is novel. In any event, as the next section illustrates,
it is the removal of judicial review power from the superior courts that
is the most constitutionally indefensible aspect of NAFTA's Chapter 19
Panels.
B. Is the Removal of jurisdiction from Section 96 Courts
Unconstitutional?
In order to answer this question it is first necessary to determine
whether judicial review is one of the "core functions" of the Section 96
courts. In Crevier v. A.G. Quebec, 85 the Supreme Court held that judi-
cial review of administrative decisions was part of the essential func-
tions of the Section 96 courts and could not be exercised by another tri-
bunal.18 6 Chief Justice Laskin wrote for a unanimous Court: "I can
think of nothing that is more the hallmark of a superior court than the
vesting of power in a provincial statutory tribunal to determine the
limits of its jurisdiction without appeal or other review."
187
In Crevier, the Profession Code of Quebec governed several profes-
sional corporations in that province. 188 It required each corporation to
establish a Discipline Committee to deal with allegations of miscon-
duct.18 9 Upon a finding of guilt, the Committee had the power to impose
a broad range of sanctions. 190 Two members of a professional corpora-
tion were convicted by the Discipline Committee and appealed that de-
cision to the Professions Tribunal.19 ' The Tribunal quashed the convic-
tion on the basis that the Discipline Committee had exceeded its
authority. 192 The complainants then brought a writ before a Quebec Su-
perior Court challenging the constitutionality of the Tribunal. That
court found that the Tribunal had wide powers to confirm, alter or
quash any decision of the Discipline Committee, and was able to make
almost any determination of law, fact or jurisdiction. The Quebec Supe-
rior Court concluded that the Tribunal's powers were such as to offend
Section 96 of the Constitution. 193 The Supreme Court of Canada agreed,
holding that an attempt to insulate a statutory tribunal from any re-
view of its adjudicative functions is unconstitutional under Section
185. Crevier v. Attorney Gen. Que. [19811 2 S.C.R. 220 (Can.).
186. Id. at 237-39.
187. Id. at 237.
188. Id. at 222.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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96.194 A statutory tribunal may not, in the face of Section 96, determine
the limits of its own jurisdiction without appeal or review. 195
Apparently a significant factor in the Court's decision was the fact
that the sole function of the Tribunal was to hear appeals, 196 as opposed
to exercising final appellate authority as part of an institutional ar-
rangement by way of a regulatory scheme. Chief Justice Laskin wrote:
"The Professions Tribunal is not so much integrated into any scheme as
it is sitting on top of the various schemes and with an authority de-
tached from them .... "197
The Court cited Residential Tenancies with approval holding that a
scheme will be invalid "when the adjudicative function is the sole or
central function of the tribunal so that the tribunal can be said to be op-
erating like a section 96 court."'198
In Attorney General v. Farrah,199 the Quebec provincial Legislature
established a statutory tribunal of appeal with jurisdiction, to the ex-
clusion of any other court, to hear and dispose of an appeal on any ques-
tion of law. 20 0 This had the effect of transferring the supervisory juris-
diction of the Quebec Superior Court to the Tribunal, which the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled was beyond the power of the provincial
legislature by virtue of Section 96. Commenting on Farrah, the Court
in Crevier wrote:
In short, what the Farrah case decided was that to give
a provincially-constituted statutory tribunal a jurisdic-
tion in appeal on questions of law without limitation,
and to reinforce this appellate authority by excluding
any supervisory recourse to the Quebec Superior Court,
was to create a Section 96 court.201
Applying these cases to the NAFTA Binational Panels, it would
seem that there is little doubt they are unconstitutional. Like the tribu-
nal in Crevier, they sit on top of the Canadian antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty regime. Their primary purpose is judicial review. It
could be argued that their judicial review function is an ancillary part
of their role of reviewing legislation, however, it is far more likely the
case that this supervisory role over legislation is incidental to its dis-
pute settlement function.
The only plausible retort would be that judicial review is not part of
194. Id. at 234.
195. Id. at 238.
196. Crevier [1981] 2 S.C.R. at 233.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 233 (citing Tomko v. Labour Relations Bd. (N.S.) [1977] 1 S.C.R. 112
(Can.)).
199. Attorney Gen. Que. v. Farrah, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 638 (Can.).
200. Id. at 641-42.
201. Crevier, [19811 2 S.C.R. at 238.
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the "core functions" of Section 96 courts and therefore the Binational
Panels are not unconstitutional. There is some support for this position
in the academic literature. Speaking about the English superior courts,
I.H. Jacob wrote: "The jurisdiction of the High Court to review the deci-
sions of an inferior court cannot, however, nowadays be said to be part
of its inherent jurisdiction, for this jurisdiction is exercised by virtue of
prerogative orders."
202
Whether Justice Lamer's "core functions" of the provincial superior
courts are co-extensive with Jacob's "inherent jurisdiction" is unclear.
In Residential Tenancies (N.S. 1992), Chief Justice Lamer, writing for
the minority, concluded that jurisdiction over residential tenancy dis-
putes was not part of the "core" jurisdiction protected by Section 96.203
Justice Lamer held that core jurisdiction is very narrow and includes
"only critically important jurisdictions which are essential to the exis-
tence of a superior court ... and to the preservation of its foundational
role within [the Canadian] legal system."20 4 Perhaps this definition is so
narrow that it excludes judicial review. However, MacMillan itself sug-
gests that judicial review would be a "core function."
In upholding the constitutionality of the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Youth Courts to try minors for contempt, the dissenting judges in
MacMillan wrote: "[T]ransfers of s. 96 jurisdiction to inferior tribunals
have not ousted the power of the superior courts, but merely elevated it
one remove. Administrative tribunals deal with the factual minutiae of
multitudinous disputes; the superior courts ensure that the law is fol-
lowed and fair process maintained." 205
This would suggest that with respect to the constitutionality of
Chapter 19 of NAFTA, even the minority in MacMillan would be con-
cerned over Chapter 19 since it completely ousts the judicial review
power of the superior courts in antidumping and subsidy cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely the Supreme Court of Canada will strike down the
legislation that implements Chapter 19 of NAFTA as unconstitutional,
as it is well aware that the results would be devastating for Canada and
the NAFTA system. The Chapter 19 process is an essential part of the
free trade regime between Canada and the United States and its de-
mise might spell the end of the entire NAFTA project. 206 If Canada
202. I. H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 23,
49 (1970).
203. Reference re Amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act (N.S. 1992), [1996] 1
S.C.R. 186, 224, 1 56 (Can.).
204. Id.
205. MacMillan Bloedel [1995] 4 S.C.R. 1 83.
206. A U.S. official described Chapter 19 as the linchpin of the FTA. See Remarks by
John 0. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, United States-Canada Free Trade
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could not carry out its international responsibilities under Chapter 19,
it would likely be in fundamental breach of its treaty obligations and
either the United States or Mexico could legally withdraw from NAFTA
under Article 2205. Even a decision that the Binational Panels were
constitutional so long as they did not remove the power of judicial re-
view from the superior courts would be a disaster for Canada-U.S. trade
relations.
Instead, the Court will likely utilize one of the arguments outlined
above to find that Chapter 19 is either outside the scope of the Section
96 jurisprudence or that it does not violate that section. This can be
achieved by finding that the Panels have a novel jurisdiction exercised
by no court at the time of confederation, that they are not "judicial" in
nature or they are an ancillary part of the entire NAFTA scheme. A
court upholding NAFTA's constitutionality would also have to decide
that judicial review is not a "core function" of the superior courts or that
the "core function" test does not apply to the Federal Courts. All of
these arguments are weak, but plausible. However, such judicial acro-
batics will only create more confusion in Canadian constitutional law
while postponing the real issue for another day. Canada, including the
courts, the government and the people, must address the looming con-
frontations between their constitution and the global economic order -
an issue of critical importance that has thus far been ignored.
Chapter 19 is not the only part of NAFTA that raises constitutional
problems for Canada. The Canadian Government can bind the country
to international obligations under international law. However, interna-
tional treaties are not self-executing in Canada and do not automati-
cally become Canadian law upon accession. Instead, as a result of the
principle of parliamentary supremacy, if the implementation of a treaty
requires changes to Canadian law, legislation is necessary. However,
the constitutional power to legislate is divided between the federal and
provincial governments. The federal Government's trade and commerce
power enables Ottawa to regulate interprovincial and international
trade, whereas the provincial governments have the power to regulate
intra-provincial trade. There is no supremacy clause like there is in the
U.S. Constitution that would similarly bind the provinces to the accord.
As international trade agreements shift their focus from tariff to
non-tariff barriers, the role of Canadian provinces has increased in the
international sphere because of their constitutional jurisdiction over
services, labor and investment. 207 These activities fall under provincial
jurisdiction that can resist Parliamentary interference, even to imple-
ment international law obligations. 208 In the 1937 Labour Conventions
Agreement: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary on the Constitutionality of
Establishing a Binational Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Cases, 100 th Cong., 2d, Sess. 96 (1988).
207. Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., App. No. 5 § 92 (1985) (Can.).
208. James P. Mcilroy, NAFiTA and the Canadian Provinces: Two Ships Passing in the
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case209 , the Privy Council, struck down legislation enacted by the fed-
eral Government pursuant to its obligations under an ILO convention
on constitutional grounds. 210 It held that there was no general federal
power in Canada to implement international treaties. Instead, Cana-
dian courts are to look at the substantive subject matter of the imple-
menting legislation. 21' If that legislation deals with a matter allocated
to the federal Parliament, then Ottawa had the power to implement the
treaty.212 If however, the subject matter is allocated to the provincial
legislatures, then Ottawa could not enact treaty-implementing legisla-
tion.2
13
With the rising importance of international trade agreements,
Canada may soon not be able to afford to have its federal Government
without the power to implement legislation in order to comply with in-
ternational trade obligations when such obligations relate to matters
within the provincial jurisdiction. In time, Canada's trading partners
may become reluctant to enter agreements With Canada if it cannot
guarantee provincial compliance. This potential dilemma is not without
possible remedies. The first is obtaining provincial approval before ne-
gotiating any international agreement. However this would substan-
tially impede Canada's ability to negotiate and is therefore undesirable.
Moreover, it will also lead to provinces withholding their approval in
the hopes of gaining some benefit from the federal Government. The
second solution is to have the Supreme Court rehear the issue. It is
likely that the Supreme Court would depart from the 1937 Labour Con-
ventions case if given the opportunity to do so. That case was decided
more than sixty years ago, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council at a time when international treaties did not have the same
importance to domestic economics as they do now. The third possibility
is a constitutional amendment, expressly granting Parliament the
power to implement treaties, regardless of their subject-matter, through
legislation that bind the provinces. Which of these three approaches is
most appropriate is beyond the scope of this paper but it is another one
of the issues Canada must face due to its economic integration through
NAFTA.
The dubious constitutionality of the NAFTA Chapter 19 binational
tribunals can be resolved through adept judicial maneuvering if re-
Night?, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 431, 433 (1997).
209. Attorney Gen. Can. v. Attorney Gen. Ont. (1937] 1 D.L.R. 673, (Labour
Conventions). Until 1949, Canada's highest court was the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (J.C.P.C.), which is in fact the House of Lords under another name convened for
the purpose of hearing and determining matters originating outside the United Kingdom
in the former British Empire. Canada abolished appeals to the J.C.P.C. in 1949, at which
time the Supreme Court of Canada became Canada's highest court.
210. Id. at 684.
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quired. But it forms part of the larger debate that is best not decided by
the courts alone. The questions Canada must face as a nation are: how
much sovereignty is it willing to relinquish to the international system
in the hopes of economic benefit and when is loss of Canadian identity
or culture too high a price to pay?
Chapter 19 of NAFTA is probably not a real threat to Canadian
sovereignty and the benefits of free trade under NAFTA surely out-
weigh the small infringement on the jurisdiction of the Canadian supe-
rior courts. However, as NAFTA widens in scope and deepens in com-
mitments, similar issues will arise where the losses and gains may be
more evenly balanced. It is important for Canada to face the conflict be-
tween free trade and national sovereignty while there is adequate time
for significant consultation, debate and reflection. Soon court chal-
lenges or international pressure may make a thoroughly considered de-
cision on these issues much more difficult.
"ACCREDITO"ERGO SUM: REFLECTIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the shadow land between the procedural rules of the United Na-
tions General Assembly concerning the accreditation of individual dele-
gates' and the substantive rules of admission of States contained in the
Orna Ben-Naftali, LL.B. (1981) Tel-Aviv Law School, Israel; M.A.L.D. (1985) The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; A.M. (1986) Harvard University; Ph.D (1990) The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Dr. Ben-Naftali served as a staff member of the
United Nations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) until 1996 and currently
teaches international law, international organizations and jurisprudence at the Law
School of the College of Management in Tel-Aviv, Israel. Antigoni Axenidou, LL.B. (1981)
Law School of the University of Thessaloniki, Greece; M.A.L.D. (1984) The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, is a Legal Officer in the Office of Legal Affairs, United Na-
tions. The views expressed in the article are entirely those of the authors and do not nec-
essarily represent those of the Organization.
1. The Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly do not contain a definition of
credentials. Generally, however, credentials may be defined as the documentary evidence
of a person's authority. Credentials are usually in the form of letters which on their face
indicate the authority and capacity of the bearer. Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure of the
General Assembly provides, inter alia, that "[tihe credentials [of representatives] shall be
issued either by the Head of the State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs." Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, at 6, U.N. Do. AI520/Rev.15 (1985)
[hereinafter Rules of Procedure]. Thus, credentials for the General Assembly may be de-
fined as a document issued by the Head of State or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a
State Member of the United Nations submitted to the Secretary-General designating the
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Charter, 2 lurks the unruly, quasi-rule political validation of representa-
tion by governments. Recently, Cambodia found itself obscured by these
shadows once again and its seat in the fifty-second session of the Gen-
eral Assembly was vacant. 3 The case of Cambodia offers a starting
point for an analysis, both comparative and critical, of the problem of
representation in the United Nations. The analysis suggests that, if the
issue is to receive appropriate consideration, it must be brought to light
as a substantive problem of legitimacy, rather than as a procedural
matter of accreditation. It is further proposed that the time may have
come for the United Nations to play its proper role as a collective le-
gitimizing agent.A vacant seat means that while Cambodia remains a
member State of the United Nations, the Cambodian people have no
government authorized to represent them in the General Assembly as
well as in other organs of the United Nations.4 This is a situation of
persons entitled to represent that Member at a given session of the General Assembly.
Unlike the acceptance of credentials in bilateral relations, the question of recognition of a
Government of a Member State is not involved, and substantive issues concerning the
status of Governments do not [normally] arise. See 1971 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 169-71, para. 3.
See also Scope of Credentials in Rule 27, U.N. GAOR, Legal Counsel, 25th Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Item 3, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/8160 (1970) [hereinafter Statement by the Legal Coun-
sel].
2. See U.N. CHARTER art. 4, which sets out the principles of membership of States in
the Organization and provides, inter alia, that membership "is open to all other peace-
loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the
judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations." On the
procedure for admitting new members into the Organization, Article 4 stipulates that
such admission is to "be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recom-
mendation of the Security Council."
3. Two sets of credentials were presented to the Credentials Committee in Septem-
ber 1997, which was convened immediately after the opening of the Assembly session for
the sole purpose of considering the question of Cambodia's accreditation. Following con-
sideration of the issue, the Committee decided that the consideration of the Cambodian
credentials should be deferred. In the United Nations, the issue of Cambodia's represen-
tation has surfaced in 1997 for the third time. The legitimacy of that Member State's rep-
resentation was challenged first in 1973, and then in 1979. For a detailed discussion of
those challenges, see discussion infra section III.
4. The effect of the decision of the Credentials Committee to defer a decision on the
Cambodian accreditation is that, as no credentials for any Cambodian representatives
have been accepted by the Committee or the General Assembly, and because the previous
representative cannot automatically represent his country at the 52nd session, no repre-
sentative of Cambodia can be seated provisionally pursuant to Rule 29 of the Rules of
Procedure of the General Assembly. See infra notes 11, 37. As regards the other organs
of the United Nations, each principal organ has its own rules and procedures for review-
ing credentials of representatives authorized to participate in its work. See Practice of the
General Assembly with regard to the examination of credentials submitted by Member
States, 1985 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 128 U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/23. Consequently, decisions
of the General Assembly concerning credentials are not automatically binding on the
other principal organs. However, the decisions of the General Assembly with regard to
the credentials of representatives of member States to sessions of the General Assembly
provide authoritative guidance to other United Nations organs and conferences and, in
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substantive consequences to the Cambodian people, to the status of
Cambodia and to the authorities purporting to be the representative
and legitimate government of Cambodia, yet one occasioned by a proce-
dural decision to defer a decision as to which of the two rival delega-
tions professing to represent Cambodia in the United Nations is to be
accredited. 5 The silence of the Charter on the highly political matter of
representation has thus once again reverberated in the corridors of
power, as the echo of the procedural decision underscores its substan-
tive nature.
The issue of representation is substantively political because it
arises whenever there is a challenge to the authority of a government.
That challenge can be either internal (i.e., emanating from a situation
of competing authorities within the State), or external, when the legiti-
macy of a government is challenged from sources outside the country,
(i.e., governments of other States), but in both cases it questions the le-
gitimacy of the government concerned. 6 The legitimacy of a government,
in turn, arguably rests both on its ability to control effectively the terri-
tory and receive habitual obedience from the bulk of the population and
on the perception that the control it exercises and the obedience it re-
ceives signify that its order is worthy of acceptance and thus of recogni-
tion. v Whereas effective control and routine obedience present variables
open to a relatively objective verification process, the perception of the
worthiness of a political order is a far more subjective standard. Never-
practice, the decisions adopted by these organs and conferences always conform to the at-
titude adopted by the General Assembly in dealing with questions concerning representa-
tion and credentials. See also infra text accompanying note 28.
5. See supra note 3.
6. An internal challenge concerns the situation in which two or more authorities,
each claiming to be the lawful government of a member State, issue documents accredit-
ing a delegation to the United Nations. In order to determine which delegation's creden-
tials to accept, it must first be determined which of them is entitled to issue documents of
accreditation on behalf of that State. However, the accreditation process has also been
used to challenge the legitimacy of a government and its right to represent a member
State in the United Nations even when no other rival government or authority exists.
Thus, for example, following the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, the legitimacy of the
credentials of that State's representation was challenged in the United Nations by the
West. See Farrokh Jhabvala, The Credentials Approach to Representation Questions in
the United Nations General Assembly, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 615, 621-22 (1977); See also
infra note 72. For further discussion concerning the types of challenges to the representa-
tive nature of an authority purporting to be the legitimate government of a Member State
of the United Nations, see infra text accompanying notes 14-15. Similarly, the legitimacy
of the government of South Africa was challenged by the majority of the member States of
the United Nations. In that case, the Assembly voted to reject the credentials of the
South African delegation and to bar the delegation from participating in its work See also
infra text accompanying note 25.
7. J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 178-79 (T.
McCarthy trans., 1979), quoted in Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International
System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 709 (1988).
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theless, subjectivity is not tantamount to arbitrariness, and it is possi-
ble to construct yard-sticks for assessing the worthiness of a govern-
ment.
The use of rules of procedure to provide solutions to substantive
problems is not a phenomenon unique to the international legal system.
In the context of the institutional framework of the United Nations, the
silence of the Charter on matters of representation, arguably necessi-
tates resort to other available means, including procedural rules, to en-
able the Organization to relate to developments in the international
arena.8 It is true that the application of procedural rules to substantive
problems may not provide for a smooth legal ride, but it does not neces-
sarily follow that the procedural tires are flat and cannot reach their
destination safely: if there is a legal framework which provides for fairly
determinate rules and, if said rules are applied in a manner that is co-
herent and consistent, they can persuasively claim to offer a legitimate
solution to the problem of legitimacy of governments described above.
But can the legal arena for the political contests be thus character-
ized? In attempting to answer this question, section II proceeds to out-
line the contours of the legal framework. The three challenges to the le-
gitimacy of the Cambodian government offer an interesting perspective
regarding the manner in which the rules within the legal framework
have been applied over time in the Organization and are the focus of
section III. The context of this discussion further allows for a compara-
tive analysis with other cases where the United Nations was called
upon to validate the legitimacy of alleged governments of Member
States. This analytical review of practice allows for an assessment, in
the concluding section, of the procedural resolution: is it but a legal
mantle, designed to cover the nakedness of power-politics, 9 and achiev-
ing that objective with as much success as the Emperor's new clothes,
or is it a legitimate, even if imperfect, solution? Can it be improved?
8. According to Jhabvala,
[a]lthough the Charter is silent on this contingency [e.g., questions of rival
governmental representations] and, in this sense has a 'gap', it cannot ignore
such developments. The United Nations, being not only an important part of
the international diplomatic scene, but also being composed of sovereign
equal member-states, and being an arena where legal and political battles
are waged, should develop procedures and rules to deal with this 'gap' within
its constitutional framework.
Jhabvala, supra note 6, at 618.
9. Brierly's description of international law as no more than "an attorney's mantle
artfully displayed on the shoulders of arbitrary power" may well apply to the procedural
resolution of the accreditation question. J. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL
LAW 13 (quoting Sir Alfred Zimmern), quoted in Franck, supra note 7, at 706.
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I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
There are three aspects of States' participation in the political or-
gans of the United Nations: membership of States, representation of
governments and credentials of delegates.10 The first aspect is regu-
lated by relevant provisions in the Charter of the United Nations as
well as by procedural rules;1 the second aspect is regulated by rules of
procedure; 12 and the third representation aspect is unregulated in ei-
ther the Charter or the rules of procedure.
1 3
Theoretically, the silence of the Charter on the question of repre-
sentation may be construed in two ways: either there is no lacuna and
that which appears unregulated, in substance does express a legal re-
gime wherein the United Nations is not empowered to pronounce on the
10. See, e.g., R. Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political
Organs of the United Nations, 151 (1963).
11. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 1. See also Rules of Procedure, supra note 1, at
29-30, comprising Rules 134 through 138, and dealing with the admission of new mem-
bers to the United Nations.
12. Rules 27 through 29 of the Rules of Procedure entitled "Credentials" provide as
follows:
Rule 27: Submission of credentials
The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a
delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General if possible not
less than one week before the date fixed for the opening of the session.
The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or Gov-
ernment or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Rule 28: Credentials Committee
A Credentials Committee shall be appointed at the beginning of each
session. It shall consist of nine members, who shall be appointed by
the General Assembly on the proposal of the President. The Commit-
tee shall elect its own officers. It shall examine the credentials of rep-
resentatives and report without delay.
Rule 29: Provisional admission to a session
Any representative to whose admission a Member has made objection
shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representa-
tives until the Credentials Committee has reported and the General
Assembly has given its decision.
Rules of Procedure, supra note 1, at 6-7.
13. This aspect of representation of governments, however, involving a decision as to
the legitimacy of an authority purporting to be the government of a Member State of the
United Nations ha s arisen several times in the history of the Organization, as is detailed
below. Since the United Nations is composed of sovereign Member States and provides
the arena where political, legal and procedural battles are waged, there is a need for a
legal regime to regulate the decision on the legitimacy of such an authority. Without such
a regime, the substantively political issue of representation is dealt with in the same
manner and by the same rules governing the procedural and formal issue of credentials,
to the detriment of the ability of the Organization to deal with both issues satisfactorily.
On the relations between approval of credentials of a representative by the General As-
sembly and the legitimacy of the government issuing the credentials, see, for example, H.
KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 947 (1964).
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representational rights of governments, or, there is a lacuna which
cannot be tolerated and has to be filled. Ironically, while the first ap-
proach rests on an expansive view of law, as it deems that nothing is
ever beyond law's reach, its application in practice has an effect as re-
strictive as it is unsatisfactory: it deprives the Organization of the abil-
ity to respond to challenges to the representational rights of govern-
ments. As such challenges do arise in practice and require a
determination on the part of the United Nations, lest it loses its viabil-
ity to react to important developments, the second approach has been
overwhelmingly embraced, and the main effort had been directed at de-
vising ways and means for bridging the gap. 14 This effort has produced
a legal regime designed to deal with problems of representation. 15
Our analysis suggests that a legal regime governing questions of
representation has to relate to the following elements: (i) definition of
the problem: the type of challenges to representation to which the re-
gime applies; (ii) determination of the best available means within the
existing institutional framework for resolving challenges to representa-
tion; (iii) articulation of the criteria to be applied in making a decision;
(iv) choice of the appropriate forum for decision-making; and, (v) delimi-
tation of the type of actions to be taken and the consequences to be
emanating therefrom. A determination of each of these elements affects
the rest. The remaining part of this Section offers an analysis of each of
these elements, as well as of the manner in which they are interrelated.
As regards the definition of the problem, two types of challenges to
the representative authority of a purported government may arise: an
internal challenge emanating from a situation of competing authorities
each claiming to be the legitimate agent for the State, and an external
challenge to the legitimacy of a sole authority. 16 The latter may be di-
vided into two subcategories: 1) doubting the very existence of the objec-
tive prerequisites of the authority, and 2) questioning its subjective
qualifications. 1 7 Each and every type of challenge raises the issue of
14. The need for the distinction between credentials and representation and the sub-
sequent need to fill the lacuna, was initially brought up by Cuba in the context of the
Chinese representation problem. For Cuba's letter to the Secretary-General stating, inter
alia, that "the distinction between credentials and representation is an undeniable legal
and political reality," see U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 61, U.N. Doc. A.1308 (1950).
Thereafter, there have been several attempts to devise a legal regime. See, e.g., Letter
Dated 8 March 1950 from Secretary-General to President of Security Council Transmitting
a Memo on Legal Aspects of Problems of Representation in United Nations, U.N. SCOR,
5th Sess., Supp. Jan.-May 1950, U.N. Doc. S/1466 (1950) [hereinafter Secretary General
Letter]; Recognition by the United Nations of the Representative of a Member State, G.A.
Res. 396(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950); Statement by
Legal Counsel, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. See supra note 6.
17. See supra note 7. This is so because legitimacy is based on both the objective cri-
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representation and arguably all have to be determined by the applica-
tion of identical criteria,1 8 but only the internal challenge arises directly
in the context of the accreditation process. 19 One consequence of this
categorization is that both the means and the forum best suited to deal
with representation issues should be able to encompass all types of
challenges to representation.
Within the institutional framework of the United Nations, the
means best suited for resolving the problem as defined above would
have been an amendment to the Charter, supplemented by an amend-
ment to the rules of procedure of both the Security Council and the
General Assembly. 20 . Such an amendment could have encompassed all
types of challenges to representation, related accordingly to the other
relevant aspects of the issue, including the substantive criteria for the
determination of each type of challenge and an indication of the appro-
priate forum to apply said criteria. Such an amendment could have fur-
ther eliminated the risk of a legal regime wherein procedural rules are
extended to respond to substantive political issues in a manner that
may contravene the basic principles of the Charter, ranging from inter-
vention in the domestic affairs of States to the separation of powers be-
tween the Security Council and the General Assembly. Alas, this po-
tentially most comprehensive, determinate and coherent option is yet to
be translated into a reality in the institutional life of the United Na-
tions.
21
terion of the governments' ability to exercise effective control over the territory and enjoy
habitual obedience from the bulk of the population and the subjective criterion involving
the perception of the worthiness of its control over the land and the people.
18. Jhabvala, supra note 6, at 630.
19. Malvina Halberstam, Excluding Israel from the General Assembly by a Rejection
of its Credentials, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 183 (1984).
20. Jhabvala, supra note 6, at 619.
21. It should be noted, however, that the Charter may be construed as providing a
legal guidance for dealing with questions of representation whereby the Security Council
is empowered to determine, in the context of its discussion on matters affecting peace and
security, that a government does not exist or, perhaps, even that it is not otherwise le-
gitimate. Thus, for example, in the case of Somalia, the position of the Security Council is
that no government is currently functioning in Somalia. See, for example, S.C. Res. 897,
U.N. SCOR, 3334th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/897 (1994) and S.C. Res. 954, 49th Sess., U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3447th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/954 (1994), in which the Security Council
referred to "exceptional circumstances, including, in particular, the absence of a govern-
ment in Somalia." See also S.C. Res. 865, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3280th mtg. at 2, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/865 (1993), in which the Security Council noted with great concern "the ab-
sence of law enforcement and judicial authorities and institutions in the country as a
whole." As a result, there is no government which can represent Somalia in the United
Nations, and credentials issued by authorities claiming to represent Somalia would not be
accepted by the Secretariat. Such determination by the Security Council, however, while
affecting representation, is incidental to the main issue before the Security Council and
cannot be construed as representing a legal regime designed specifically to deal with mat-
ters of representation.
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A second best alternative in terms of normativity would have been
an amendment to the rules of procedure. In practice, however, the
means adopted as the vehicle articulating the legal regime to be applied
to the question of representation was a General Assembly resolution.
22
Consequently, the legal regime thus established was constrained ab ini-
tio by that which is within the competence of the General Assembly to
decide upon in light of the principles and provisions of the Charter.
23
Indeed, the General Assembly seems to have been cognizant of this con-
straint when it limited the applicability of the regime established in its
resolution to "whenever more than one authority claims to be the gov-
ernment entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations
and this question becomes a matter of controversy in the United Na-
tions."24 It follows that the legal regime that was being established to
regulate representation questions was consciously limited to one type of
challenge to the representative authority of a government, that ema-
nating from within. This limitation was further emphasized by the Le-
gal Counsel of the United Nations in his statement on the "scope of
'Credentials' in Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure of the General As-
sembly." Here the point was made that the rejection of credentials of a
22. G.A. Res. 396(V), supra note 14, at 24-25. The operative parts of the General As-
sembly resolution read as follows:
1. Recommends that, whenever more than one authority claims to be
the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United
Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the
United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the
Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each
case;
2. Recommends that, when any such question arises, it should be con-
sidered by the General Assembly, or by the Interim Committee if the
General Assembly is not in session;
3. Recommends that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or
its Interim Committee concerning any such question should be taken
into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the special-
ized agencies;
4. Declares that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its
Interim Committee concerning any such question shall not of itself af-
fect the direct relations of individual Member States with the State
concerned;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution
to the other organs of the United Nations and to the specialized agen-
cies for such action as may be appropriate.
23. The legally binding nature of the General Assembly's resolutions in general, and
in this context in particular, has been amply discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Christopher C.
Joyner, UN General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Con-
temporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 445 (1981); B. Sloan, Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later) 58 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 39 (1987);
P.C. Szasz, General Law-Making Processes, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 35, 62-67
(Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995).
24. See G.A. Res. 396(V), supra note 14, at para. 1.
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delegate of a government where there are no rival claimants is outside
the scope of Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure and would, in effect, vio-
late the Charter.25 This conclusion remains valid today despite the ex-
istence of various instances where external challenges to the legitimacy
of governments have been raised in the context of examining the cre-
dentials of their delegates by the General Assembly. 26 This is so be-
cause the only common denominator of that practice is that it has been
as inconsistent as it has been contested. Such a practice lacks the es-
sential characteristics of a legal regime.
27
25. The statement by the Legal Counsel on the "Scope of Credentials in Rule 27 of the
Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly," which was submitted to the President of the
General Assembly at its request, separates the issue of credentials to an international
organization from that of recognition of a government of a Member State. It further dis-
tinguishes between cases where there are rival claimants and where there are no such
rivals and asserts that,
[s]hould the General Assembly, where there is no question of rival
claimants, reject credentials satisfying the requirements of Rule 27 for
the purpose of excluding a Member State from participation in its
meetings, this would have the effect of suspending a Member State
from the exercise of rights and privileges of membership in a manner
not foreseen by the Charter... [Tihe participation in meetings of the
General Assembly is quite clearly one of the important rights and
privileges of membership. Suspension of this right through the rejec-
tion of credentials.., would.., be contrary to the Charter.
Statement by the Legal Counsel, supra note 1. This statement by the Legal Counsel has
been criticized by Jhabvala, supra note 6, at 633-35.
26. Thus, for example, the South African government representatives were prevented
from representing that country in the General Assembly in 1974 and 1981 by a rejection
of their credentials by a majority in the General Assembly. Consequently, South Africa
found itself in a position similar to that of a Member State suspended from the exercise of
the rights and privileges of membership under Article 5 of the Charter. On the South Af-
rican question and the rejection of South Africa's credentials, see, Abbott et al., The De-
credentialization of South Africa, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 576 (1975); Dan Ciobanu, Creden-
tials of Delegations and Representation of Member States at the United Nations, 25 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 351 (1976); Gerhard Erasmus, The Rejection of Credentials: A Proper Exer-
cise of General Assembly Powers or Suspension by Stealth?, S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 40 (1981);
Jhabvala, supra note 6, at 633; E. McWhinney, Credentials of State Delegations to the UN
General Assembly: A New Approach to Effectuation of Self-Determination for Southern
Africa, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 19 (1976); M.E. Muller, Discussions and Resolutions on
South Africa in the United Nations - 1979, 5 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 164 (1979). A similar,
albeit unsuccessful attempt was made in 1982 to exclude Israel from participating in the
United Nations through the accreditation process. See Halberstam, supra note 19.
27. Thus, for example, the decision of the majority of the General Assembly to pre-
vent the participation of South Africa in its work at the 29th session was not consistent
with the previous practice of that body in the years 1970 to 1974, in which South Africa
continued to participate under the 1970-ruling from E. Hambro, the Norwegian President
of the General Assembly, even after the delegation's credentials had been rejected. See
supra note 25. The previous practice of the Assembly so far does not demonstrate an
opinio juris of its members as to the legal effect of the rejection, or even the challenge, of
the credentials of a delegation. Instead, "[g]enerally speaking, member States have
adopted one stand or the other according to the circumstances of individual cases, and it
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The General Assembly, having thus undertaken to establish a legal
regime governing challenges to representation stemming from the exis-
tence of more than one authority claiming to be the government of a
member State, proceeded to articulate the criteria by which a decision
will be made. According to paragraph 1 of resolution 396 (V), such
questions shall be considered "in light of the Purposes and the Princi-
ples of the Charter and the circumstances of each case."28 The indeter-
minate nature of this standard, achieved after more concrete proposals,
ranging from a detailed articulation of the objective test 29 to the enu-
meration of yard-sticks for the evaluation of the subjective aspect of le-
gitimacy 30 have been rejected. 31 This indicates that member States
have opted for a political, rather than a principled, decision. 32 Indeed,
the resolution stands in stark opposition to a 1950 memorandum of the
Secretary-General on "the Legal Aspects of the Problem of Representa-
tion in the United Nations."33 This memorandum suggested that the
decision on representation should favour the claimant which exercises
seems that in making their decisions they were motivated by political, rather than legal,
considerations." See Ciobanu, supra note 26, at 368. Ciobanu further observes that, not
only is the practice far from settled or undisputed, but Member States "have changed
their legal position on the issue from one session to another" and "on several occasions, in
one and the same meeting of the Credentials Committee or the General Assembly, repre-
sentatives of States have advocated the power. .. [to inquire into the matter of represen-
tation] and denied it in another." Id. at 367. Accordingly, such inconsistent practice can-
not be said to provide for a legal regime.
28. See G.A. Res. 396(V), supra note 14.
29. Thus, for example,
[a] British proposal had recommended that 'the right of a government
to represent the Member State' in the United Nations be recognized if
it 'exercises effective control and authority over all or nearly all the
national territory, ... in such a way that this control, authority and
obedience appear to be of a permanent character.'
See Jhabvala, supra note 6, at 631 (citing U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item
61, at 6, 8, U.N. Doc. A/1308 (1950)).
30. It is also worth noting that, pursuant to a proposal by Cuba,
representation questions [would] be decided in the light of (1) effective
authority over the national territory, (2) the general consent of the
population, (3) ability and willingness to achieve the purposes of the
Charter, to observe its principles, and to fulfill international obliga-
tions of the state, and (4) respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
Id. (citing U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 61, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/1308
(1950)). Also see the recommendations of the subcommittee, to which the question of the
representation of a Member State had been referred, "that 'effective control over the terri-
tory,' general acceptance by the population, willingness to accept Charter responsibilities,
and the extent to which the authority in question had been established through 'internal
processes in the Member State' be 'among the factors to be taken into consideration."' Id.
at 631-32.
31. Jhabvala, supra note 6, at 630-35.
32. Id.
33. Secretary General Letter, supra note 14.
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effective control over the territory and enjoys habitual obedience by the
bulk of the population. 34 This document thus proposed to limit the deci-
sion to the objective component of the legitimacy of an authority claim-
ing to represent a member State and competent to issue credentials.
The resolution of the General Assembly, however, is otherwise predis-
posed. The indeterminacy of its standard does allow for flexibility, but
forfeits the very objective of establishing criteria for decision-making
that can be viewed as legitimate.
Nevertheless, there are several limits to the free reign of politics in
determining questions of representation inherent in both the definition
of the subject-matter and in the competence of the organs establishing
the legal regime. The authority of the General Assembly is limited by
the normative superiority of the provisions and principles of the Char-
ter, as indeed is acknowledged in resolution 396 (V). It follows that the
Charter's delineation of powers between the General Assembly and the
Security Council, as well as the principle enshrined in Article 2(7) of the
Charter safeguarding the domestic jurisdiction of States from interven-
tion by the United Nations, would operate to limit its capacity to deter-
mine the issue of representation. 35 Furthermore, the consequence of de-
fining the subject-matter as relating exclusively to an internal
challenge to the legitimacy of a purported government, was that what-
ever substantive criteria were to apply, their application would be lim-
ited to the need to decide between rival authorities. 36 That need arises,
as a matter of course, during the accreditation process which requires a
determination on representation.3 7 This process is governed by existing
Rules of Procedure, which thus present a further limitation on the
decision-making process.38  Indeed, the genesis of the General
Assembly's resolution 396(V) points to the link between the subject-
matter and accreditation, 39 and the above-mentioned statement of the
34. Id.
35. See Marc B. Dorfman, et al., United Nations 28th Session, Notes: Cambodian Rep-
resentation, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 495, 498-500 (1974).
36. See G.A. Res. 396(V), supra note 14, at para. 1 (referring to the situation in which
"more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member
State in the United Nations.').
37. See supra note 12 for Rules 28-29 of the rules of Procedure of the General Assem-
bly. The issue of the appropriate forum for the determination of representation questions
is discussed infra text accompanying notes 44-65.
38. Id.
39. General Assembly Resolution 396(V) is the offspring of the Chinese representa-
tion question. At the request of the Cuban representative, the question of recognition by
the United Nations of the representation of a government was placed in the agenda of the
5th session of the General Assembly. In his letter, the Cuban representative explained
that,
[tihe item proposed to the General Assembly's consideration does not
refer only to the formal problem of credentials, but to the problem that
arises with regard to the legality of the representation of a Member
1998
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Legal Counsel regarding the scope of Article 27 of the Rules of Proce-
dure further emphasized the limiting effect of this link. 40 The Legal
Counsel's statement defined "credentials" as "a document issued by the
Head of State or Government or by the Minister of Foreign Affairs des-
ignating the persons entitled to represent that Member at a given ses-
sion of the General Assembly," and proceeded to draw a distinction be-
tween the substantive issue concerning the status of a Government of a
member State and the issue of credentials. 41 It further affirmed the
practice of piercing beyond the technical issue of credentials into the
identity of the authority issuing them in instances involving rival
claimants, and, in light of Article 5 of the Charter, limited that action
only to such instances.
42
Implicit in the Legal Counsel's reference to the precedents of the
Congo and Yemen, where the question as to which claimant represented
the true government of a State arose in connection with the examina-
tion of credentials, was the acceptance of the objective criterion that
had been employed in both instances to answer that question.43 The
preference accorded to the objective criterion is further underscored by
the conspicuous absence of any reference to the General Assembly's
resolution 396(V) in the statement of the Legal Counsel. The analysis
of the Statement by the Legal Counsel thus suggests that it had at-
tempted to strengthen the nexus between the internal challenge to the
legitimacy of a government and the procedural aspect of accreditation of
individuals and to weaken the link between that challenge and the sub-
stantive aspects of membership of a State. As resolution 396(V)
adopted language quite reminiscent of the language of Article 4 of the
Charter, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the Legal
Counsel attempted subtly to limit recourse to the broadly subjective cri-
teria of the resolution and to encourage resort to the narrower objective
State; that is when the United Nations has to decide which govern-
ment has the right to represent that State in the Organization.
Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State, U.N. GAOR,
5th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 61, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/1308 (1950). Following considera-
tion of and debate on this item by the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assem-
bly and a subcommittee, the Assembly adopted the report that was submitted to it by the
Ad Hoc Political Committee which also included the draft that became General Assembly
Resolution 396(V). See supra note 14. In the absence of guidelines both in the Charter
and the Rules of Procedure in matters of rival claimants and contested representation,
the Resolution was intended to fill the lacuna, but it contains only general, vague criteria
for such determination.
40. See Statement by the Legal Counsel, supra note 1.
41. Id. at para. 3.
42. Id.
43. On the question of the Congo representation, see infra text accompanying notes
106-113; on the matter of the Yemen representation, see infra text accompanying notes
103-105.
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criterion of effectiveness in resolving matters of representation.
The nexus between representation and accreditation is also appar-
ent in the choice of the appropriate forum for determining which rival
authority represents the State. The question of representation may
come up before any of the organs of the United Nations or those of its
Specialized Agencies. In order to prevent conflicting decisions, the
General Assembly appointed itself as the organ whose determination of
such questions "should be taken into account in other organs of the
United Nations and in the Specialized Agencies." 44 In the General As-
sembly, the issue may arise as a separate agenda item in the Plenary
Session, 45 or in a Special Committee appointed by the General Assem-
bly to consider the matter, or in the Credentials Committee. 46 A deci-
sion taken by each such forum ultimately must decide between the
comparative merits of the competing claims. However, the competence
of the Credentials Committee is limited by the Rules of Procedure gov-
erning its consideration in ways in which the deliberations of the Gen-
eral Assembly or of a Special Committee created by the General Assem-
bly are not.
47
The net result of the above is that if the decision is channeled to the
Credentials Committee, the applicable standard should be limited to
44. See G.A.. Res. 396(V), supra note 14, at para. 3. Indeed, in practice, such ques-
tions are referred to the General Assembly by both the Security Council and the Special-
ized Agencies.
45. The question of rival credentials and the legitimacy of the authority issuing them
can be presented either as a credentials question at the annual review of credentials by
the Credentials Committee or be considered under a separate agenda item by the General
Assembly. The former has the advantage of providing an already existing forum which
would consider the question as a procedural issue, rather than as a substantive question
of representation which might be blocked by the restriction in Article 2(7) of the Charter
concerning intervention in the domestic affairs of a member State. On the manner in
which this issue was dealt with in the first phase of the representation of Cambodia, see
infra text accompanying note 113. See also Statement by the Legal Counsel, supra note 1,
at para. 4, which states that,
[w]hile the examination of credentials, both in the Credentials Committee
and in the General Assembly, is a procedural matter limited to ascertaining
that the requirements of Rule 27 have been satisfied, there have neverthe-
less been a few instances involving rival claimants where the question of
which claimant represents the true government of the State has arisen as a
substantive issue. This issue of representation may, as in the case of the Re-
public of Congo (Leopoldville) at the fifteenth session and Yemen at the six-
teenth session, be considered in connection with the examination of creden-
tials, or it may, as in the case of China, be dealt with both in connection with
credentials and as a separate agenda item.
46. See Statement by the Legal Counsel, supra note 1, at para. 4.
47. This is so because the only relevant rules of procedure, i.e., those concerning cre-
dentials, apply to the Credentials Committee and not to the General Assembly or its Spe-
cial Committee. Accordingly, the deliberations of those latter organs are not limited by
those procedural rules.
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the objective aspect of the legitimacy issue, inquiring into the compara-
tive effectiveness of the claimants. 48 If, however, the issue comes up be-
fore the General Assembly or before a Special Committee, the more
vague criteria of resolution 396(V) are likely to be employed. While the
concept of legitimacy does encompass both objective and subjective as-
pects, the application of the objective criteria does not necessarily yield
the same result as the application of the subjective standard. This is so
because, analytically, a claimant may be both effective and worthy of
the obedience it commands; it may be either effective or worthy of obe-
dience and it may be neither. While it is possible to minimize the po-
tential for conflicting results by a clear determination of the compo-
nents comprising the subjective standards, resolution 396(V) did not
make this determination.
The final element in the construction of a legal regime to govern
the question of representation concerns the delimitation of the types of
action that may be taken and the consequences emanating therefrom.
Here, the governing rules are the following: if a problem of representa-
tion is raised in the context of the Credentials Committee, the Commit-
tee may decide that a claimant authority is a representative govern-
ment and approve the credentials of its delegates. The Committee may
also decide that the claimant authority is not a representative govern-
ment and reject the credentials of its delegates, or it may decide to defer
its decision.49 Having determined the matter in any of these ways, the
Committee reports its decision to the General Assembly and includes in
its report a draft resolution.50 The General Assembly proceeds to re-
solve whether to approve the report as is, to amend it, or to reject it.51
The Committee does not, however, resolve on matters of representation
that have come before the Credentials Committee prior to the latter's
submission of its report.52 A similar process occurs if and when a Spe-
cial Committee is entrusted with deliberating a matter of representa-
tion.53 Finally, the General Assembly may discuss representation as a
special item on its agenda and, in this case, its determination is not
contingent upon submission of a report by the Credentials Committee.
54
The consequence of a decision to accept the representative nature of
an authority is that the credentials issued by said authority entitle its
delegates to represent the State in the organs of the United Nations
and its Specialized Agencies, according to the particular specifications
48. On the components of 'legitimacy," see supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
49. See Dorfman, supra note 35, at 501-02. For the practice of the Credentials com-








of the credentials. 55 The result of a negative decision on representation
is that the State will not be represented in the United Nations system.56
Pending a decision, and pursuant to Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure
of the General Assembly, the delegates whose participation has been
challenged continue to represent the State on a provisional basis.
57 It
follows that a decision not to decide at a particular point in time, often
motivated by a wish to await for the conclusion of a domestic battle, it-
self expresses a choice which favors the incumbent authority.5 8 If, how-
ever, the delegates whose participation is challenged have not been
fully and specifically authorized prior to the challenge to represent the
State in all organs of the United Nations, no representative of the State
may be seated provisionally pursuant to United Nations practice.59 The
practical result in this latter circumstance is identical to that emanat-
ing from a negative decision on the representational nature of the
authority purporting to be a government, though the symbolic signifi-
cance of each decision may be quite distinct.60 In summary, it appears
that the legal framework established for resolving the issue of represen-
tation provided for the following: 1) it defined the issue as one emanat-
ing from an internal challenge and did not give guidance for dealing
with external challenges; 2) it was set up in the form of a General As-
sembly resolution and was thus inherently limited in both scope and
substance by the normative superiority of the Charter; and 3) it deter-
mined that the most appropriate forum for deciding the issue is the




57. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 1. For the text of the Rule, see supra note 12.
58. The incumbent delegate continues to participate so long as no determination is
made on challenged credentials. While such participation is indeed provisional, it is nev-
ertheless the candidate that continues to represent the State and not the delegate of the
rival government.
59. This is, for example, the case of Prince Sisowath Sirirath, whose credentials had
been signed in 1993 by King Norodom Sihanouk, and who had been for the following four
years Cambodia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Prince Sisowath Siri-
rath was one of the supporters of the former First Prime Minister, Prince Ranariddh.
Pursuant to his credentials, Prince Sisowath Sirirath was accredited only to the United
Nations, which in United Nations usage means that he was not per se accredited to ses-
sions of the General Assembly. He could not, therefore, automatically benefit from the
application of Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure in his case and be seated provisionally at
the 52nd session of the General Assembly. See Representation of a Member State in Or-
gans of the United Nations - Requirement of Full Powers under the Rules of Procedure of
the Principal Organs of the United Nations - Designation in the Credentials of Permanent
Representatives of the Organs before which they are authorized to act, 1977 U.N. Jurid.
Y.B. 191, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG.SER.C/15.
60. This is so because a negative decision, unlike a deferment of a decision, in effect,
delegitimizes the previous government and confers legitimacy on the new government.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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The most relevant committee in both theory and practice is the
Credentials Committee and thus the link between the representative
nature of a government and the credentials of its individual delegates
was strengthened, whereas the link between the representational na-
ture of a government and the membership of the State it purports to
represent was weakened. The net result of the above was that the
means most likely to determine the issue of representation were proce-
dural and a further limitation on the decision-making process thus
emanated from the existing Rules of Procedure which govern the delib-
erations of the Credentials Committee. However, the substantive crite-
ria according to which the determination was to be made were inconsis-
tent with the procedural means adopted and, potentially, with the
substantive provisions of the Charter and the institutional structure of
the United Nations. 62 Decisions on representation made "in light of the
Principles and Purposes of the Charter and the circumstances of each
case"63 are bound to generate more political heat than legal light. In-
deed, the impregnation of existing procedural rules with political seeds
tends to produce rather androgynous off-springs and more problems
than solutions. In lieu of clarifying the decision-making process, the
standard articulated in resolution 396(V) further confused the relative
positions of the components of the "unholy trinity" of membership
(States), representation (governments) and accreditation (individuals)
and, in the process influenced the composition of the Credentials Com-
mittee and rendered it contentious. 6
4
The legal framework thus appears to be somewhat short of achiev-
ing its objective. Insofar as the very purpose of establishing a legal re-
gime is to provide such guidance, it is our understanding, to paraphrase
Gertrude Stein, that the General Assembly has undertaken to over-
62. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
63. See supra text accompanying note 23.
64. In accordance with Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure, the Credentials Committee
consists of nine members appointed at the beginning of each session by the General As-
sembly on the proposal of the President. Rules of Procedure, supra note 1, at 6. Rule 28
does not mention any geographical distribution. However, for more than twenty years, the
Committee has traditionally consisted of representatives from China, the Russian Federa-
tion/USSR, the United States, two Member States each from Africa and Latin America,
and one Member State each from Asia and from Western Europe. During the 51st ses-
sion, the President of the Assembly, Mr. Razali Ismail, Permanent Representative of Ma-
laysia to the United Nations, had questioned what he termed the permanent membership
on the Committee of China, the Russian Federation and the United States, and the ab-
sence from the Committee of representatives of Arab States. Nevertheless, the member-
ship of the Credentials Committee for the 52nd session of the General Assembly was com-
prised of representatives from countries of the same geographical regions and consisted of
representatives from the following Member States: Argentina, Barbados, Bhutan, Cote
d'Ivoire, Norway, Russian Federation, United States of America and Zambia. See U.N.
GAOR, Cred. Comm., 52d Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/52/719 (1997).
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throw its undertaking. 65 Nevertheless, a legal framework, imperfect as
it was, had been established. It remains to be determined whether the
practice of the United Nations has enhanced principled consistency or
political expediency, and whether it has augmented or diminished the
United Nations' ability to command respect for the validation it bestows
on governments. It is into the review of this practice, through the prism
of the question of Cambodia's representation, that we now turn.
III. THE REPRESENTATION OF CAMBODIA
It was once observed that the people of Crete make more history
than they can consume. 66 That observation holds true of many other
countries and peoples and the story of Cambodia is one such case. In
the context of the United Nations' validation of representative govern-
ments, Cambodia is thus far the only State the representative authority
of which was challenged from within on three occasions.67 The analyti-
cal review of these challenges, interwoven with other cases for compara-
tive purposes, thus offers a comprehensive perspective for the study of
the practice of the United Nations as it relates to matters of representa-
tion involving rival claimants.
A. First Challenge - 1973
The roots of the 1973 challenge to the representative nature of the
government of Cambodia were grounded in a coup staged by the then
Prime Minister, General Lon Nol, against the then Head of State,
Prince Sihanouk.68 Economic discontent and political disquiet gener-
ated by hostility towards the presence of the North Vietnamese and
Viet-Kong troops in the Eastern provinces of the country weakened the
Prince's hold over the country and prompted the American-backed Gen-
eral to use the opportunity of the Prince's absence from the country to
oust him as Head of State on March 18, 1970. The action was unani-
mously endorsed by the National Assembly and the symbolic seal of the
new order was the change of the name of the State to "The Khmer Re-
public." 69 The new government issued the credentials of its delegates to
the United Nations.7 0 They met with no challenge, were accepted by
65. One of Ms. Stein's famous quips was: "I understand you undertake to overthrow
my undertaking." BARNES & NOBLE, BOOK OF QUOTATIONS, 201 (R.I. Fitzhenry ed.,
1987).
66. "SAKI" (H.H. MUNRO), THE CHRONICLES OF CLOVIS (1911).
67. The first challenge to the representative authority of the Cambodian Government
occurred in 1973 and is analyzed.
68. For a factual account, see Dorfman, supra note 35, at 496-97.
69. Id. at 495; John Norton Moore, Legal Dimensions of the Decision to Intercede in
Cambodia, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (1971).
70. G.A. Res. 2636 (XXV), UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/8028
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the Credentials Committee and endorsed by the General Assembly. 71
This acceptance of the credentials issued by a new government
which came into being following a radical change of regime reflected
common practice in the United Nations. In all previous such instances,
including cases where the new government clearly owed its being to the
armed intervention of a foreign power, the government was regarded as
the legitimate authority of the State. This practice underscores the
preference given to the objective criterion of effective control over other
conceivable considerations.7 2 The situation when there is an internal
(1970), revised by U.N. Doc. A/8028/Corr. 1.
71. Id.
72. Following a coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and in Cuba in 1959, the new
governments sent their delegates to the United Nations and, as there was no internal
challenge to their legitimacy, the delegates were accredited as a matter of course. See,
e.g., Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly: Verification of Credentials, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., Res., pt. I, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). In the case of Czechoslovakia, the
Security Council, following a Chilean initiative, did adopt a resolution inviting the ousted
Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to participate in its deliberation. It did so
under Rule 39 of its Rules of Procedure, which concerns the Security Council's right to
invite members of the Secretariat or other persons to supply it with information in the
examination of matters within the Council's competence. See Provisional Rules of Proce-
dure of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. SI96/Rev.7 (1982). Accordingly, no issue of repre-
sentation was further raised. See U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., No. 36-51, 268th mtg., at 106-110
(1948). Note further that the same practice continued in later years, as illustrated, by the
acceptance of the credentials of the delegates of Chile's Pinochet Government in 1973.
Indeed, even when the new government owed its power and was in effect set up by a for-
eign State, subject to snide comments made by States on the opposite side of the political
fence, the credentials issued by these governments were normally accepted by the Or-
ganization without much ado about representation. This was evidenced in the cases of
Afghanistan following the armed intervention by the Soviet Union. For the case of Af-
ghanistan, see U.N. GAOR, Cred. Comm., 35th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, addendum
1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/351484 (1980). For the case of Grenada, following the armed interven-
tion by the United States in 1983, see U.N. GAOR, Cred. Comm., 35th Sess., Agenda Item
3, addendum 1, U.N. Doc. A/39/574/Add.1 (1984), which was approved by the Assembly in
G.A. Res. 39/3B (1983). Note also that, in the case of Panama following the 1989 fall of
Noriega, the Security Council met at the end of 1989 to discuss the situation and was re-
quested by representatives of both the new government and the previous government to
be invited to the discussion. The Secretary-General reported that he was not in a position
to assess the factual situation. See U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/21047 (1989).
The issue was resolved when both claimants gave up being heard. See U.N. SCOR, 44th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S[PV.2902 (1989). The General Assembly took no action on the report of
the Credentials Committee in its 45th session and, by its Decision 45/55 taken at its 72nd
plenary meeting on December 21, 1990, it decided to retain item 3(b) in its agenda. Item
3(b) concerned the report of the Credentials Committee. For the report of the Credentials
Committee, see U.N. GAOR, Cred. Comm., 45th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc.
A/45/674 (1990). For the Assembly decision, see U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., vol. I, Supp. No.
49A, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990). The only exception to be noted in this context concerns the
challenge to the credentials issued by the Government of Kadar, established with the
support of the Soviet armed forces in Hungary in 1956. Beginning at the eleventh session
of the General Assembly and for seven years thereafter, the representative nature of the
Kadar government was challenged by Chile. In each instance the General Assembly de-
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challenge to the legitimacy of a revolutionary regime is, however, far
less clear.
Such a challenge was presented to the government of Lon Nol
when, on May 5, 1970, the ousted Prince Sihanouk announced from his
Peking refuge, the formation of a rival government, the Royal Govern-
ment of National Union in Cambodia (hereinafter RGNUC).7 3 The
situation on the ground at the time was unclear. General Lon Nol, as-
sisted by both South Vietnam and the United States was attempting to
drive the North Vietnamese troops from the Eastern provinces of Cam-
bodia. 74 The latter joined forces with native Khmer forces in a fight
against Lon Nol's army and it was on their allegiance that Prince Siha-
nouk relied in forming RGNUC. While it was clear that Lon Nol con-
trolled the capital, whereas the Prince remained in Peking, it was also
evident that both sides controlled substantial portions of the country
and that neither could claim effective control over all the territory much
less habitual obedience on the part of the bulk of the population. 75 It
was against this background that the Secretary-General received a let-
ter, dated October 8, 1973, from Prince Sihanouk, requesting that an
additional item, providing for the "restoration of the lawful rights of the
Royal Government of the National Union in Cambodia in the United
Nations" 76 be included on the agenda of the twenty-eighth session of the
General Assembly. The letter was accompanied by a draft resolution
proposing the substitution of a RGNUC's delegation for the delegation
of the Khmer Republic in the General Assembly.7 7 The General Assem-
bly was thus faced with two rival claimants each purporting to be the
legitimate representative of a Member State.
cided to defer a decision on the regularity of the Hungarian credentials. Pursuant to Rule
29 of the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure the representatives of the Hungarian
government continued to participate in the work of the Assembly on a provisional basis.
See U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1202d plen. mtg., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1202
(1961); U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 995th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 3, at 498-504, U.N. Doc.
AIPV.995 (1960); U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 852d plen. mtg., Agenda Item 3, at 710-14, U.N.
Doc. A/PV.852 (1959); U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., 792d plen. mtg., Agenda Item 3, at 608-14,
U.N. Doc. A/PV.792 (1958); U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., 726th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 3, at
561-77, U.N. Doc. AIPV.726 at 561 (1957); U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., 658th plen. mtg.,
Agenda Item 3, at 1186, U.N. Doc. A/PV.658 at 1186 (1957). While the Hungarian case
deviates from common practice, the result in this case, as well as in all above-mentioned
cases, was that a government that came into being in a radical fashion was accepted as
the legitimate authority representing the State. This includes a government which owed
its being to foreign military intervention but against which there was no internal chal-
lenge.
73. See supra note 30.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Letter Dated 8 Oct. 1973 from Members... to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR,
28th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 106, addendum pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9195 (1978).
77. Id.
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This was not the first time in the history of the United Nations that
an internal challenge to representation was raised. Indeed, the ques-
tion of representation in a somewhat subtler form, had come up already
before the League of Nations. 78 But was the practice engaged in by the
United Nations consistent enough to allow for a prediction on the deci-
sion the General Assembly would make? Was it possible to discern a
pattern in that practice?
The international organization's practice regarding representation
began with the 1935 Italian invasion and consequent annexation of
Ethiopia, a fellow-member of the League of Nations.7 9 When the Cre-
dentials Committee of the League of Nations met, it expressed its doubt
as to the order of the credentials issued by Haile Selassie, the Emperor
of Ethiopia, noting that he was no longer the effective authority in con-
trol of the State, that his government was not in the capital and that, at
the time he had issued the credentials to his delegates, he was residing
in another country.8 0 Nevertheless, in view of documents stating that
the Selassie government functioned in part of the country, the Commit-
tee resolved to give the delegation "the benefit of the doubt" and ac-
cepted its credentials. 81 The underlying rationale for this decision
seems, however, to have emanated from a mixture of guilt and a politi-
cal desire to condemn the Italian aggression.
The legal grounds for such condemnation had their origins in the
Stimson Doctrine, born as a reaction to the 1931 Japanese invasion of
Manchuria, and announcing that the United States would not recognize
territorial gains achieved in contravention of the 1928 Pact of Paris. 82
The Stimson doctrine was subsequently adopted as a collective policy by
the League of Nations and a resolution of the League's Assembly of
March 11, 1932, required States not to recognize any "situation, treaty
or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the
Covenant of the League of Nations or the Pact of Paris."8 3 That resolu-
78. The question which had come before the League of Nations concerned the repre-
sentation of Ethiopia and is discussed infra text accompanying notes 79-87. The reference
to the subtler form of challenge stems from the fact that Italy, which had invaded, occu-
pied and annexed Ethiopia, made it known that while it would not challenge the creden-
tials issued by the ousted Emperor, it would nevertheless regard their acceptance as a
reason for not sending its own delegates. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Credentials of the
Abyssinian Delegation to the Seventeenth Assembly of the League of Nations, 18 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 184 (1937).
79. For a description of the League of Nation's actions, see Spencer, The Italian-
Ethiopian Dispute and the League of Nations, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 614 (1937).
80. Id.
81. See Lauterpacht, supra note 78, at 185 (quoting League of Nations Doc. A.41.1936
(1936)).
82. See The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellog-Briand Pact), August
27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
83. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 101, at 8; W.W. Willoughby, Far
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tion was subsequently reiterated in various declarations.8 4
Since the Italian invasion of Ethiopia was clearly in contravention
of Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as of the
Pact of Paris, the Italian conquest created a "situation" that was not to
be recognized.8 5 The absence of any reference to the policy of collective
non-recognition of this situation in the decision of the Credentials
Committee is quite conspicuous, but it does not follow that the decision
was not influenced by that policy. It is quite possible that the Commit-
tee refrained from relating to the policy because such a substantive de-
termination was bound to be considered outside the scope of its proce-
dural function. Further, this omission expresses the Zeitgeist and the
heralding of the meek acceptance of the policy of appeasement that was
soon to become the hallmark of the political discourse at that time. In
fact, in 1938 the United Kingdom requested that the Secretary-General
include on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the League's Coun-
cil an item pertaining to the situation in Ethiopia due to the anomalous
situation created by the fact that five of the members of the Council
recognized the sovereignty of Italy over Ethiopia. 86 Later that year
Ethiopia withdrew from participating in the proceedings of the Assem-
bly.8 7
Taken from the Cambodian perspective, the Ethiopian precedent
seems to have offered Prince Sihanouk some grounds for claiming
authority over at least part of the country, despite his and his govern-
ment's absence from the country and lack of control over the capital.
The significance of the Ethiopian precedent is, however, broader, and
rests on the following: it initiated the practice whereby the Credentials
Committee inquires into the issue of representation and it exposed the
tension between substantive questions of policy and procedural matters
and the artificiality in the attempt to squeeze the former into the
straight-jacket of the latter. Furthermore, while acknowledging the
importance of effective control as the relevant test for representation,
the decision of the Credentials Committee, in effect, refused to allow
brute force to take over principle.8 8 However, the Committee did not
Eastern Policies of the United States, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp., 193, 197 (1940).
84. Id.
85. For an analysis of the resolution of the Assembly of the League in the context of
collective non-recognition, see JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS,
32-35 (1987).
86. 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 535 (1939). Haile Selassie reacted by requesting to
be present in the Council's deliberations indicating that he would transmit the credentials
of his delegates in due course and the Council approved this request.
87. 17 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 658 (1937), cited in BENEDETTO CONFORTI, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 56 (1996).
88. See CONFORTI, supra note 87, at 56.
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consider itself competent to thus rationalize its decision.8 9 Thus, a dia-
lectical stage was set: will further practice favor the objective or the
subjective components of legitimacy? How will the procedural nature of
a determination by the Credentials Committee affect this choice? Which
direction was preferable in terms of the credibility of the validating or-
ganization? It remains for the United Nations to deal with these ques-
tions.
The United Nations was confronted for the first time with the need
to determine which authority is the legitimate government of a member
State in 1950 when the question of Chinese representation arose. 90
This remained a vexing problem until 1971.91 This case is sui generis in
many ways ranging from the geopolitical magnitude of China, to its
permanent seat in the Security Council, and to the issue of member-
ship.92 Therefore, its value as a precedent should be construed care-
fully. The intricate web of political and legal maneuvers with respect to
the question of Chinese representation is beyond the scope of this paper
and has been discussed extensively elsewhere. 93 For our purposes,
three issues were significant with relation to the issue of Chinese repre-
sentation: 1) the classification of the representation problem; 2) the cri-
teria applied; and 3) the lessons learned insofar as the credibility of the
United Nations was concerned.
With regard to classification, the problem was dealt with initially
as a procedural matter under the applicable Rules of Procedure of the
relevant organs of the United Nations. 94 For a change to be effected,
the problem was then classified as an "important question" requiring a
two-thirds majority vote of the members present and voting. The prob-
lem was then reclassified as an unimportant question. 95 Underlying
these classifications and ensuing procedural tactics lay attempts to deal
with the issue as a substantive matter and counter-attempts, sponsored
89. As is evidenced in the discrepancy between the rationale and language of its de-
liberation against its substantive decision. See supra note 71.
90. See generally ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 152-158 (1963); Herbert W.
Briggs, Chinese Representation in the United Nations, 6 INT'L ORG. 192 (1952); L.C.
Green, Representation Versus Membership: The Chinese Precedent in the United Nations,
10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 102 (1972); H. Arthur Steiner, Communist China in the World
Community, 533 INT'L CONCILIATION 389 (1961); Quincy Wright, The Chinese Recognition




94. See Ciobanu, supra note 26, at 362.
95. See G.A. Res. 2025 (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 2, U.N. Doc.




by the United States, to classify the issue as a procedural matter.96
The political clout of the United States was responsible for the fail-
ure to recognize the government of the People's Republic of China as
"the only legitimate representative of China" until 1971. 97 Significantly,
support for this position was steadily, albeit gradually, dissipating, and
the argument pertaining to the link between representation and effec-
tive government persistently advanced. 98 Indeed, the enormity of the
divergence between the reality of the Communist government in China
effectively controlling one-fourth of the world population and the sym-
bolic non-validation of this reality by the United Nations could hardly
have contributed to the viability of the latter.99 Viewed from the per-
spective of the 1973 Cambodian problem, it would appear that while
Prince Sihanouk had the Chinese precedent in mind when he requested
the inclusion of the issue as a separate item on the agenda of the Gen-
eral Assembly, no doubt wishing to emphasize the subjective aspect of
legitimacy, he must have also been mindful of the main lesson to be
drawn from the Chinese case: the importance of being earnest in the
appreciation of the level of effective control exercised by a claimant
authority for the sake of both the people and the United Nations.
The lesson learned from the Chinese representation question was
already evident in the 1962 case of Yemen. The facts of this case bore
close similarities to the 1973 case of Cambodia. Forces headed by
Brigadier E1-Sallal and assisted by Egyptian troops overthrew the mon-
archical government of the Imam. 100 At the time the revolutionary
authority issued credentials for its delegates to the General Assembly,
the battle on the ground was yet to be concluded: the revolutionary
forces were in control of most of the territory, including the capital, and
enjoyed the support of large segments of the population. 10 1 However,
the Imam forces, supported by Saudi Arabia, continued to control a
small portion of the territory and enjoyed the allegiance of some seg-
ments of the population. 10 2 The Credentials Committee decided, with-
out much ado, to accept the credentials issued by the revolutionary gov-
96. See Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,
1965-66, U.N. GAOR, XXI, Supp. 1, U.N. Soc. A/6301, at 35-37.
97. G.A. Res. 2758, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
The resolution was then adopted by the Security Council and by the various Specialized
Agencies. See Questions Relating to Asia and the Far East: Representation of China in
United Nations, 1971 U.N. Y.B. 126, U.N. Sales No. E.73.I.1.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., T.M. Franck, supra note 7, at 738-39.
100. See generally J. CORTADA, THE YEMEN CRISIS (1962). See also, Dorfman, supra
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ernment. l0 3 This decision indicated a strong, if implicit, preference for
the objective component of legitimacy: an authority which controls most
of the territory, including the capital, is validated as the representative
government of a member State. It is quite conceivable that the decision
of the Credentials Committee may have been facilitated by the absence
of a formal competing claim by the government of the Imam. However,
this could not have been the decisive factor, especially in view of the ac-
cepted preference for established governments in inconclusive cases, a
preference expressed a mere four years earlier in the case of Iraq.
10 4
The report of the Credentials Committee, recommending the acceptance
of the credentials issued by EI-Sallal, was approved by the General As-
sembly though not without a fairly heated debate pointing, inter-alia, to
both the subjective component of legitimacy and to the inconclusiveness
of the effective control of the revolutionary government.
10 5
The Yemen case attested to a further development in the manner in
which the Credentials Committee related to the issue of representation:
in 1962, the Committee expressed its willingness to lift the veil of cre-
dentials to assess the effective control of the authority issuing them, a
step it was unwilling to take two years earlier when confronted with ri-
val sets of credentials from the Congo (Leopoldville).10 6 That case arose
when the then Head of State, Kasa-Vubu, and the then Prime Minister,
Lumumba, had mutually ousted each other, shortly after Congo was
admitted to the United Nations and before its government was repre-
sented in the United Nations. The Security Council was the first organ
to be confronted with the rival claimants, each appointing a different
delegation and requesting to participate in its proceedings. 107 Having
103. U.N. GAOR, Cred. Comm., 17th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/5392 (1962).
104. In 1958, Iraq was radically transformed from a monarchy into a republic. The
new government appointed its delegates to the political organs of the United Nations.
Much like in the Yemen case, there was no internal challenge to the credentials issued by
the revolutionary government, but the delegates of the old regime continued to participate
for several weeks after the issuance of credentials to the delegates of the new government
in the sessions of the Security Council of which Iraq was at the time a member. Unlike
the Yemen case, the temporal discrepancy between the fact of control and the validation
of the government exercising it in the case of Iraq, worked to support the government es-
tablished prior to the revolutionary change. See U.N. SCOR, 13th Sess., 838th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/PV.838 (1958); U.N. SCOR, 13th Sess., 834th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.834 (1958);
U.N. SCOR, 13th Sess., 827th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.827 (1958).
105. For the debate, see G.A. Res. 1871, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No.17, at 1,
U.N. Doc A/5217 (1962).
106. See U.N. Doc. A/4579 (1960). For a general factual account of the troubled birth
of the Congolese Republic, leading eventually to the United Nations Operation in the
Congo (ONUC), see THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING,
215-22 (2d ed. 1990).




rejected a Polish proposal to accept the credentials of the Prime Minis-
ter Lumumba, the Security Council did not accept any of the creden-
tials, and did not allow any representative of the Congo to participate in
its deliberations.
10 8
Thereafter, the General Assembly referred the matter to the Cre-
dentials Committee, and the latter, awaiting clarification of the situa-
tion, did not report back until mid November 1960.109 At that time the
Credentials Committee recommended that the credentials issued by
Kasa-Vubu be accepted."1 0 While this postponement indicates that due
regard was paid to the effectiveness of the representative authority, the
Committee refrained from delivering a substantive assessment of the
situation."' The Committee also refused to pass judgment on the con-
tention of the Prime Minister that the Kasa-Vubu government was con-
travening the Congolese constitution, because it did not want its actions
to be construed as "an intervention in the domestic affairs of the
Congo."112 The Credentials Committee thus accepted the credentials
issued by the Head of State on the formal grounds that they were is-
sued by the primary organ empowered to accredit delegates according to
the language of Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure of the General As-
sembly. 113 The General Assembly approved the report of the Commit-
tee, despite a minority opposition which claimed that, from the point of
view of effectiveness, no decision should be taken at the time. 114
The above analysis thus leads to the following conclusions regard-
ing the practice of the Organization on matters of representation by
1973: first, issues concerning representation were dealt with primarily,
though not exclusively, by the Credentials Committee; second, the
Committee was increasingly willing to not only assess the representa-
tive nature of the authority issuing credentials but to admit that such
assessment was undertaken; third, the assessment was made according
to the standard of effective control; fourth, while this standard seems
susceptible to a fairly objective determination, the credentials process
itself remained political. The net result was that whenever the factual
situation surrounding the newly formed government either remained,
or was presented as inconclusive, the representation determination was
108. Id.
109. U.N. GAOR, Cred. Comm., 15th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc A/4578





114. The minority position, much like the majority position, was politically motivated
and the opinions were divided against the great divide of the Cold War. Eventually, the
Kasa-Vubu government did establish its effective control over the Congo. G.A. Res. 1498,
U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, vol. I, at 2, U.N. Doc. A14684 (1960).
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made according to the political support each of the rival parties was
able to mobilize. In that sense, the legal regime did seem increasingly
to be but a transparent robe adorning the muscles of the body-politic.
Nevertheless, practice indicates that the mere existence of a legal
regime did impose rules by which the political contest for representa-
tion was to be fought. Both parties in the 1973 Cambodian case mas-
tered these rules. RGNUC's request that the matter be considered as a
separate item on the agenda of the General Assembly, and the Khmer
Republic's preference that the matter be relegated to the Credentials
Committee can both be seen as procedural maneuvers designed to en-
hance the respective positions of the rival claimants. The Khmer Re-
public preferred a discussion in the Credentials Committee since it
stood to benefit from a formal reading of the Rules of Procedure gov-
erning the deliberations of the Committee, as well as from the Commit-
tee's employment of the effective control test to determine legitimacy.
The effective control test consists of the arguments that: 1) the issue of
representation is procedural and was determined when the Committee
first approved the credentials of its delegation; 2) that any other course
would contravene the Rules of Procedure and amount to an intervention
in the domestic affairs of the Khmer Republic, a matter clearly beyond
the scope or the powers of the Credentials Committee; and 3) that a
claimant absent from the capital and the country cannot be said to ex-
ercise effective control. 115 These factors all explain why General Lon
Nol wanted the issue to be determined by the Credentials Committee
and why Prince Sihanouk found it more advantageous to have the Gen-
eral Assembly discuss it.
In the General Assembly, unencumbered by said Rules of Proce-
dure, RGNUC wished to further accentuate the criteria of resolution
396(V) at the expense of the more restrictive application of the effec-
tiveness standard in an attempt to point out that the General Assembly
cannot sanction foreign intervention and that to do so would amount to
an unacceptable endorsement of an intervention in the domestic affairs
of a member State and a reward for foreign aggression. 116
The General Assembly agreed with RGNUC's request, but decided
to postpone its consideration of the matter until its twenty-ninth ses-
sion.117 This decision was due to a procedural maneuver by the support-
ers of Lon Nol, led by the United States, attempting to channel the
matter to the Credentials Committee." 8 Not surprisingly, in its report
115. See Dorfman, supra note 35, at 511-12.
116. See id. at 498-99.
117. U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., 2191st plen. mtg., vol. III, Agenda Item 106, U.N. Doc.
AIPV. 2191, at 96 (1973).
118. Pursuant to the Rules of Procedure, the matter was in effect transferred to the
Credentials Committee, because it would be considered there as a matter of course at the
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of December 12, 1978, the Credentials Committee recommended the ac-
ceptance of the credentials issued by the Khmer Republic. 119 The report
of the Committee was then approved by the General Assembly. 120 In its
twenty-ninth session, the General Assembly decided to wait for the re-
port of the Secretary-General on his efforts to resolve the dispute, and
thus did not take any further action on the matter before the submis-
sion of the Secretary General's report. 121 This postponement, too, was
orchestrated by the Khmer Republic and its supporters, resulting in
continued representation of Cambodia in the General Assembly by the
delegates of the Khmer Republic.
122
Civil war continued to ravage the country, and a year later the
Government of General Lon Nol was defeated and replaced by a Khmer
Rouge government adorned by Prince Sihanouk as its Head. 123 The
thirtieth session of the General Assembly accepted the representatives
of the new government to the seat of the newly renamed Cambodia,
which was soon to be baptized yet again as "Democratic Kampuchea."'
124
While the fields of Cambodia were turning into graveyards, the dele-
gates of that government continued to represent Democratic Kampu-
beginning of the 29th Session.
119. U.N. GAOR, Cred. Comm., 28th Sess., Agenda Item No. 3, Annexes XXVIII, ad-
dendum pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9179 (1973), revised in A/9179/Corr. 1. The debate in the
Committee testifies to the importance of mastering the procedural game: supporters of
the Khmer Republic argued that the Rules of Procedure confine the Committee to a de-
termination of whether the requirements of Rule 27 have been met, that the representa-
tive nature of a government is a domestic matter and that the claim to effective control
advanced by RGNUC is defied by its absence from the country. See id. at 2-3 for argu-
ments advanced by the US, Japan, Nicaragua, Greece and Uruguay. Supporters of
RGNUC (China, Senegal, Tanzania) refrained from relating to the criterion of effective-
ness. Id. Instead they argued that there is nothing in Rule 27 to prevent the Committee
from determining the representative nature of an authority issuing credentials; that the
procedural channeling of the matter to the Credentials Committee should obscure neither
its substance nor the position of the majority of States favouring RGNUC as is indicated
by the initial vote to consider the matter as a separate item on the agenda, and that the
Lon Nol government does not represent the people of Cambodia and therefore to allow it
to represent them is an intervention in the domestic affairs of Cambodia, a point further
underscored by its reliance on foreign troops. Id.
120. A motion to amend the report and substitute the credentials of RGNUC for those
of the Khmer Republic failed. See U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess. 2204th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/PV. 2204, at 76-77 (1973).
121. See G.A. Res. 3238 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, Agenda Item
25, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
122. This was in accordance with Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure which provides for
the provisional seating of a representative until the General Assembly reaches its decision
on the matter. For the text of Rule 29, see supra note 12.
123. See The United Nations and Cambodia 1991-1995, in 2 THE UNITED NATIONS
BLUE BOOK SERIES 5 (1995).
124. G.A. Res. 3367 A &B, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
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chea in the General Assembly in an uncontested manner until 1979.125
B. Second Challenge - 1979
"What's in a Name?", asks Juliet. "That which we call a rose by
any other name would smell as sweet."'126 Alas, in the case of Cambo-
dia, a.k.a. the Khmer Republic (1973), a.k.a. Democratic Kampuchea
(1974), a.k.a. the People's Republic of Kampuchea (1979), no sweet
smell of roses lingered over the killing fields, and in the country which
was called by so many names, people were dying in a bloody civil war.
In December 1978, the Khmer Rouge government of Democratic
Kampuchea, headed by Pol Pot, was overthrown. 127 Over 100,000 Viet-
namese troops, invaded the country and installed a new governing
authority, headed by Heng Samrin, under the name "Kampuchean Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Council." The new government took control of the
capital and most of the countryside, while the ousted government con-
tinued to control a small area near the Thai border.128 Both the gov-
ernment of Democratic Kampuchea and the Government of the People's
Republic of Kampuchea claimed to be the representative authority of
the State. 129 Like the case of the Congo,130 the question as to which of
the rival claimants represented Kampuchea was first faced by the Secu-
rity Council. 131 On January 3, 1979, the representative of Democratic
Kampuchea requested that the Security Council hold an urgent meeting
on the situation to "condemn the Vietnamese aggression and to take
such measures.. .to ensure that Vietnam ceases its aggression and re-
spects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea." 132 On January 9, 1979, the Permanent Representa-
tive of Vietnam transmitted to the President of the Security Council a
telegram from Heng Samrin informing him that the Kampuchean Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Council is performing the functions of a government
in Kampuchea, that the government of the "Pol Pot clique" had ceased
to exist and that therefore meeting with a representative of that pur-
125. As evidenced by the Reports of the Credentials Committee between the 30th and
34th sessions, see U.N.GAOR, 33rd Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/33/350
and U.N. Doc. AI33/Add.1 (1978/1979); U.N. GAOR, 32nd Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3,
U.N. Doc. A/321336 and U.N. Doc. A/32/Add.1 (1977); U.N. GAOR 31st Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/31/308 and U.N. Doc. A]31/Add.1 (1976); and U.N. GAOR,
30th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/10270 and Add.1 (1975).
126. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET, act II, sc. 1.
127. FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 181ff. (1993); C. Warbrick,
Kampuchea: Representation and Recognition, 30 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 234, 234 (1981).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 106-114.




ported government is a "flagrant intervention in the political affairs of
the Kampuchean people and a violation of the principles of the Char-
ter."133 Pursuant to Article 31 of the Charter, the delegates of both
claimants requested to participate in the debate in the Security Coun-
cil.1
34
The Security Council concerned itself first with the determination
of the agenda and then with the question of representation.13 5 Pre-
dictably, the representatives of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia
argued that the item should be deleted from the agenda as its inclusion
was requested by a regime no longer in control of the state.136 To do
otherwise, it was contended, would be an intervention in the domestic
affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.137 Equally predictable
was the position held by China that: 1) a foreign armed aggression by
Vietnam against Democratic Kampuchea is not a matter of internal af-
fairs, but one which requires the intervention of the Security Council;
and 2) the temporary setback suffered by the government of Democratic
Kampuchea due to foreign aggression has no effect on its legal status,
and as the representative of that government, was duly accredited to
the General Assembly during its thirty-third session, he retains this
status.13 8 The agenda was adopted without a vote and the Security
Council turned to debate the question of representation under Rule 37
of its Provisional Rules of Procedure.
139
In this context, and pursuant to Rule 15 of its Provisional Rules of
Procedure, the Security Council requested that the Secretary General
report on the credentials of the two delegations. 140 The Secretary-
General's report stated that the credentials issued by the government of
Democratic Kampuchea were considered to be in order as they had been
approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session. 4 1 The
Security Council approved this report without a vote and invited the
delegate of Democratic Kampuchea to participate in its discussion.
142
In the resumed session of the General Assembly, the credentials of the
delegate of Democratic Kampuchea were not formally challenged and
133. U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., Supp., Jan-Mar. 1979, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/13013 (1979).
134. U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., Supp., Jan-Mar. 1979, U.N. Doc. S/13019 (1979). See also
U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., Supp., Jan-Mar. 1979, U.N. Doc. S/13021 (1979).





140. U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., Supp., Jan-Mar. 1979, U.N. Doc. S/13021 (1979). See also
G.A. Res. 33/9 A, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 45, U.N. Doc. A/33/350, which ap-
proved the report of the Credentials Committee. U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Annexes, Agenda
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consequently he continued to represent the State in the General As-
sembly. Several States, however, reserved their position on the question
of Kampuchea's representation. 14 3 This matter was bound to emerge as
a major issue in the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.
The United Nations was thus caught between the hammer and the
anvil. Recognizing Heng Samrin's government meant the application of
the test of effectiveness, while at the same time, legitimizing the result
of a continuous armed intervention. Conversely, recognizing the Pol
Pot government meant defying the test of reality, and at the same time
legitimizing a regime which by all accounts was unworthy of recogni-
tion. In this case, the choice between principle and expediency was not
tantamount to a choice between good and evil but between two evils.
When the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly opened of-
ficially on September 18, 1979, the seat of Kampuchea was indicated by
a plate marked "Democratic Kampuchea" and on it sat the representa-
tive of that government. 144 However, the government of the People's
Republic of Kampuchea also issued credentials to a delegation headed
by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hun Sen and, at the request of the
Permanent Representative of Vietnam, the issuance of these credentials
was circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under
item 3 of its Provisional Agenda referring to credentials of representa-
tives to the thirty fourth session. 145 It was thus clear that the new gov-
ernment was planning to base its claim on the legal test of effective-
ness. Indeed, at the end of the second plenary meeting of the General
Assembly, the representative of Vietnam requested that the General
Assembly "refuse to authorize the Pol Pot.. .clique illegally to occupy
Kampuchea's seat in this Assembly and immediately restore the seat to
the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea." 146 Having been
presented with a challenge, the President of the General Assembly,
acting under Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, referred the matter to
the Credentials Committee, asking it to report back to the Assembly on
September 21, 1979.147
The Credentials Committee met and reported back recommending
the acceptance of the credentials issued by Democratic Kampuchea. 148
Viewed from the perspective of both the legal regime and its own prac-
tice, this decision is surprising as it clearly does not reflect the principle
of effectiveness. The minority view in the Committee, argued the case of
143. Id.
144. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34/472 (1979).
145. Id.
146. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess, 2d plen. mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. A/34/PV.2 (1979).
147. Id.
148. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/34/500 (1979). The
recommendation was reached by a vote of 6 to 3. Id.
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Heng Samrin's government on the legal ground of effective control. 149
The majority retorted that that government's very existence was a vio-
lation of law, that as a matter of principle aggression should not be re-
warded; and that delegates of a government already accredited continue
to be accredited in subsequent sessions, even if the government is no
longer effective, until a "superior claim" is advanced by another gov-
ernment, and a claim by a puppet government is by no means supe-
rior. 
150
When the General Assembly met to consider the matter, it had be-
fore it three texts: the draft resolution of the Credentials Committee; a
new proposal sponsored by Bulgaria and other Socialist States whereby
the Assembly was to disregard the report and invite the representatives
of the People's Republic of Kampuchea to take their seat as representa-
tives of the legitimate government of that country;151 and an amend-
ment to the draft resolution of the Credentials Committee, proposed by
India and several African States, proposing that the General Assembly
suspend its consideration of the report. 152 The effect of this proposal
would have been to leave the Kampuchean seat vacant, 153 a solution
which had a great appeal to states which were reluctant to regard as
legitimate either claimant.1
5 4
The appeal of the Indian proposal was enhanced by the fact that it
was advanced in the form of an amendment. 155 According to Rules 90
and 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, an amend-
ment is to be voted on prior to a vote on the text proposed to be
149. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 4th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/34/PV.4 (1979).
150. This was the argument of the United States. See id. For the report of the Creden-
tials Committee of 20 September 1979, see U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item
3, U.N. Doc. A/34/500 (1979).
151. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34/L.2 (1979).
152. The Indian proposal was designed to leave the seat of Kampuchea vacant, a result
achieved a couple of weeks prior to the opening session of the General Assembly, in the
sixth summit conference of the non-aligned group held in Cuba. There, Cuba proposed
that the delegation of Pol Pot would be expelled and the delegation of Heng Samrin in-
vited instead. Some other States, mainly from South-East Asia, refused to recognize a
government which came to power - and held its power - as a result of foreign aggression.
The conference settled on a compromise solution whereby until a report of a special com-
mittee was submitted to the 1981 scheduled meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the non-
aligned group, Kampuchea's seat will remain vacant. This solution was accepted precisely
because states felt uncomfortable protecting, in the name of principle, an unprincipled
regime as the government of Pol Pot had been. For the text of the Indian proposal, see




155. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 4th plen. mtg., Agenda Items 3 and 8, at 101, U.N. Doc.
A/34/PV.4 (1979).
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amended. 15 6 This order of voting is often considered to be advantageous
to the amendment, and South East Asian States, insisting on the need
to delegitimize power seized as a result of armed aggression, feared that
an outcome that would fall short of this delegitimization would be se-
cure. 157 Thus, the South East Asian States resorted to a procedural
maneuver designed to ensure that the text of the Credentials Commit-
tee would be voted upon first. They proposed that the Legal Counsel
render an opinion as to whether the Indian proposal is indeed an
amendment.158 This proposal was contested, put to a vote and ap-
proved. 159 The Legal Counsel opined that past practice of the General
Assembly indicates that its understanding of what constitutes an
amendment is quite flexible and that, therefore, regarding the Indian
proposal as an amendment falls well within that practice. 160
Nevertheless, a proposal may be considered an amendment if it
adds to, deletes from, or revises part of a proposal, but not when it ad-
vances a new proposal.' 61 In this sense, the Indian proposition consti-
tuted in fact a new proposal. 62 The General Assembly then voted to
consider the Indian amendment as a new proposal, whereupon the In-
dian representative moved to propose that the Indian proposal be given
priority over other proposals in the voting. 163 At this stage the Bulgar-
ian representative removed his proposal, and the Assembly proceeded
to reject the Indian motion to prioritize its proposal and approved the
draft resolution of the Credentials Committee. 64
From the 1979 resolution until 1989, the General Assembly contin-
ued to ignore the representative nature of the government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of Kampuchea, which was eventually led by Prime Minis-
ter Hun Sen, and to accept the credentials of the delegates of
Democratic Kampuchea. 65 Each time the credentials of the delegates
of Democratic Kamupchea were challenged, the President of the Gen-
eral Assembly referred the matter to the Credentials Committee. 166
156. Id.
157. See Warbrick, supra note 127, at 240. See also supra note 152.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Warbrick, supra note 127, at 240. See also supra note 152.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. G.A. Res. 34/2, 34th Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979).
164. Id.
165. Democratic Kampuchea had evolved into a coalition comprising the Khmer Rouge
led by Pol Pot, a neutral faction led by Prince Sihanouk, and a noncommunist faction led
by Son Sann. See KIRGIS, supra note 127, at 183.
166. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.32 (1989); U.N. GAOR, 43d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/43/PV.33 (1988); U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/42/PV.36 (1987);
U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/38/PV.32 (1984); U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc.
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The Committee considered the credentials in connection with other cre-
dentials, and recommended their acceptance. In each session of the
General Assembly, an amendment was moved to approve the Commit-
tee's report "except with regard to the credentials of Democratic Kam-
puchea." Each time this amendment was rejected.
167
The United Nations thus refused to recognize a government im-
posed from outside and sustained by the presence of foreign troops, but
exercised effective control over most of the country, and did validate a
government which operated from outside the territory of the country
and had little to recommend in terms of the subjective aspect of legiti-
macy. This result deviated from the legal prescription as well as from
past practice and further failed to secure the supremacy of principle
over politics or the viability of the United Nations. It is true that in the
case of Ethiopia, a similar determination was made to accept the cre-
dentials of a government that was no longer exercising effective control
over the country, but that decision was grounded in considerations of
principle, law, and morality, that were mostly absent from the case of
Cambodia.168
Other governments installed as a result of armed intervention in
the affairs of member States have been recognized as representative,
and their credentials accepted.' 69 Thus, it was difficult to justify the
decision not to recognize the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea on
the grounds of a new rule whereby a government thus installed is de-
nied recognition. It was further quite problematic to base the legiti-
macy accorded to a government headed by Pol Pot on moral grounds,
and indeed no such attempt was ever made. 70 Finally, the continued
recognition of the representative status of the government of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea indicates that the test of effectiveness which has
been hitherto favoured by both rule and practice, and to the application
of which the Credentials Committee was ostensibly confined, was dis-
carded.
Viewed from the perspective of the legal regime, the inescapable
conclusion from all this is that only the proviso of the criteria for de-
termination incorporated in resolution 396(V), providing that questions
of representation shall be considered in the light of "the circumstances
A/37/PV.43 (1982); U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.42 (1982).
167. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 78-87.
169. One example is the government of Afghanistan installed by the Soviet Union in
1980. For the report of the Credentials Committee see U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A135/484 (1980); Id. at addendum pt. 1; Id. at addendum pt. 2.
170. During Pol Pot's regime approximately 1 million Cambodians perished. See The
United Nations and Cambodia 1991-1995, in 2 THE UNITED NATIONS BLUE BOOK SERIES,
supra note 123, at 5.
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of each case," could serve as a basis for the decision regarding represen-
tation. 171 This basis is quite obviously political, not legal. The net result
of the previously mentioned representation problems was that the
United Nations could claim neither a legal, nor a moral, nor a political
victory. It was thus hardly surprising that a gap was created between
the validating process in the United Nations, the real world, and the
ability of the United Nations to function effectively in this world.
172
Consequently, the United Nations' own claim to legitimacy, in confer-
ring legitimacy on governments, was damaged.
C. Third Challenge - 1997
The government of Hun Sen, supported by the military presence of
Vietnam, continued to control Cambodia for a decade. 173 Throughout
this period, the delegation of the coalition of the three opposition fac-
tions headed by Pol Pot, Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, continued to
represent Cambodia in the General Assembly. 74 In 1989, the Vietnam-
ese announced their withdrawal from Cambodia. 175 In 1990, a frame-
work for a political settlement in Cambodia was agreed upon between
the permanent members of the Security Council and the rival Cambo-
dian parties. 176 A Supreme National Council, consisting of said parties,
was formed pursuant to this settlement. 177 The main function of the
Supreme National Council was to lead the country to free elections,
with the support of the United Nations. 7 8 That year the Supreme Na-
tional Council could not agree on the composition of Cambodia's delega-
tion to the United Nations and consequently the Cambodian seat in the
General Assembly remained vacant. 179 A year later, the Supreme Na-
tional Council agreed that Prince Sihanouk would lead the Cambodian
delegation.
180
The United Nations' intensive engagement in the peace efforts in
Cambodia began in earnest with the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement.'
8 '
171. G.A. Res. 396(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 24-25, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950).
172. All relief and humanitarian activities the United Nations wished to undertake in
Cambodia required negotiation with the government it did not validate, but whose good-
will and assistance were required. See generally Franck, supra note 7 (discussing the cir-
cumstances surrounding nation-states compliance with international law).








181. U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/48/1 (1993).
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By 1992, the four parties had delegated to the United Nations all neces-
sary powers to implement the accord.18 2 The resulting peace-keeping
operation, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC), faced a formidable task: rebuilding the torn country on
democratic underpinnings. The civilian facet of UNTAC's mandate
called for promoting human rights, organizing and conducting free and
fair elections, maintaining law and order, overseeing civil administra-
tion, repatriating refugees and rehabilitating essential infrastruc-
ture. 8 3 In addition to these civilian functions, UNTAC had military
tasks ranging from the supervision of the cease-fire to the demobiliza-
tion and disarming of over 200,000 armed forces and militia. 8 4 In May
1993, 90% of the electorate went to the polling booths to elect a govern-
ment, and UNTAC became the jewel in the crown of United Nations
peace-keeping operations.18 5
The elections resulted in the formation of a fragile coalition gov-
ernment, led by Prince Ranariddh, son of Sihanouk, who won the elec-
tions, as First Prime Minister, and by Hun Sen, who had enough real
power to threaten the result of the elections, as Second Prime Minis-
ter. 8 6 It was a moment where a glimmer of hope seemed to have light-
ened the Cambodian nightmare. This was not to last long. On July 5,
1997, the Cambodian four-year flirt with democracy ended when the
Second Prime Minister launched a successful coup d'etat against Prince
Ranariddh, and replaced him as First Prime Minister with Mr. Ung
Huot. 8 7 This action was endorsed by the Cambodian National Assem-
182. Id. at 51.
183. Id. at 50.
184. See Annex 1 of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, reproduced in The United Na-
tions and Cambodia 1991-1995, in THE UNITED NATIONS BLUE BOOK, supra note 123, at
133.
185. At its height, by mid-1992, UNTAC numbered 21,000 military, police and civilian
personnel. Id.
186. The internal Cambodian politics leading to what some observers have termed to
be an inescapable consequence of a Siamese - twin government are beyond the scope of
this paper. Suffice to note that the power-sharing formula whereby the Prince had politi-
cal seniority, but Hun Sen remained with real power, did not augur well for the nascent
democracy. Instability generated by the disintegration of the Khmer Rouge, and the first
Prime Minister's negotiations with them as well as with Hun Sen's most vehement critic
and opposition leader, Sam Rainsy, reached its critical point when Hun Sen decided to act
in early July 1997. See A Coup in Cambodia, ECONOMIST, July 12, 1997, at 33; Anthony.
Speath et al., Haunted By Ghosts: A Coup Brings the Black Night of Despair Back to Tor-
tured Cambodia, TIME, July 21, 1997, at 48. On August 6, 1997, the Cambodian National
Assembly voted to strip Prince Ranarridh of his parliamentary immunity and to elect
Foreign Minister Ung Huot as the new First Prime Minister. The constitutionality of
these proceedings is questionable under the Cambodian Constitution, but this is a matter
that since the Congo precedent has been deemed irrelevant to a decision by the United
Nations as regards matters of representation. A Coup in Cambodia, supra.
187. See Press Conference by Prince Ranariddh of Cambodia, PC/1997/09/17 (1997)
[hereinafter Ranariddh Conference].
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bly.' 88 Soon thereafter the United Nations was faced yet again with the
question of Cambodian representation.
When the Credentials Committee met on September 17, 1997, it
had before it two sets of credentials for two delegations to represent the
Royal Government of Cambodia at the fifty-second session of the Gen-
eral Assembly. 189 One set of credentials was signed on September 2 by
King Sihanouk, the Head of State, presenting a delegation headed by
the new First Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and In-
ternational Cooperation, Ung Huot. The other set of credentials was
signed on August 25 by the exiled Prince Ranarridh and presenting a
delegation headed by himself as First Prime Minister.' 90 To complicate
matters still, in a letter dated September 5, 1997 from King Norodom
Sihanouk to the Representative of his son, Prince Norodom Ranarridh,
the King stated that he continued to recognize the Prince as the legal
First Prime Minister of Cambodia. 191
Prior to the meeting of the Credentials Committee, and throughout
most of July, August and early September, 1997, the respective posi-
tions of the parties were presented to the Security Council, to other
Permanent Missions, to the United Nations, and to the Press. 92 These
positions rested on familiar grounds, fertilizing the political soil with
factual and legal seeds. Prince Ranarridh, in exile, based his position
against the legitimacy of the new government in Phnom Penh on sev-
eral related arguments all pertaining to the subjective component of le-
gitimacy. Prince Ranarridh emphasized that the government of which
he was First Prime Minister was "born of free and fair elections organ-
ized and supervised by the United Nations" that was brought down by a
"violent coup d'etat," and that "no elected government official anywhere
on earth should be brought down by the force of arms."' 93  Prince
Ranarridh further stressed that Hun Sen's "bloody seizure of power is
an affront to democracy and a flagrant violation of the 1991 Paris Peace
Agreement." Urging the United Nations to withhold recognition from
the "new puppet First Prime Minister," he stressed that the matter
188. Id.
189. See Report of the Credentials Committee, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/52/719 (1997).
190. Id.
191. The King, the acknowledged symbol of unity in Cambodia, seems to have recog-
nized Ung Huot as the de facto First Prime Minister, but continued to refer to his son as
the legal First Prime Minister. See, e.g., Ranariddh Conference, supra note 187; Press
Conference by Cambodia, PC/1997109112 (1997) [hereinafter Cambodia Conference]. In
these communications, it is contended that the King was not exercising free choice when
he signed the letters of credence at the request of Hun Sen.




cannot be seen as "an internal affair of the Cambodian people."194
It was argued that the coup was but a violent indication of Hun
Sen's fears of being implicated in drug and terrorist activities, the trial
of Pol Pot, and, most importantly, losing the elections scheduled for
May 1998 in a free and fair political contest. 195 All these arguments
stressed the connection between the democratically elected government
of which the Prince was First Prime Minister, and the role of the inter-
national community, acting through the United Nations, in bringing
about a democratically elected government at great financial cost and
human sacrifice. 196 If the United Nations were now to recognize the le-
gitimacy of Hun Sen's government, all this effort would have come to
naught and would be regarded as a waste since the United Nations
could have done so long ago.197 The refusal of the United Nations to
recognize Hun Sen's government, even prior to the 1993 elections, fur-
ther supports the argument against legitimizing it now.
The contest for representation was taking place within the Cambo-
dian Permanent Mission itself when the new government recalled the
Permanent Representative of Cambodia, Prince Sisowath Sirirath
home, and handed over the leadership of the Mission to his Deputy,
Ambassador Ouch. 198 From a constitutional perspective, Prince Siri-
rath claimed that as he was appointed to his position as Permanent
Representative by both the First and the Second Prime Ministers, he
could not be recalled without the approval of the First Prime Minister,
194. Id. In this case also, the Security Council was the first organ to be faced with the
question of Cambodian representation. The quotes in the text are taken from a letter
dated July 18, 1997, from Prince Ranariddh to the President of the Security Council and
transmitted a day later by Ambassador Sirirath, Cambodia's Permanent Representative
to the United Nations. The Prince was received by the President of the Security Council
on July 10. For the presidential statement issued by the President of the Security Council,
see id.
195. U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., at 2-3, U.N. Doc. SPRST/1997/37 (1997).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. The situation with the Permanent Mission of Cambodia to the United Nations
was itself torn between the rival claimants: on August 2, all Permanent Representatives
and Observers received a letter whereby they had been informed by Ambassador Ouch
Borith, formerly the Deputy to the Permanent Representative, Sisowath Sirirath, that the
latter had been recalled from his post as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
and as Permanent Representative. On August 4, they received a letter from Ambassador
Sirirath, notifying them that the letter of August 2 was false, that his previous Deputy,
Ambassador Ouch, had been relieved of his duties, having supported the coup and that
he, Prince Sirirath, remains the legal Permanent Representative of the only legal first
Prime Minister. Attached to this letter was a letter from Prince Ranariddh, dated July
24, and addressed to the Secretary-General, confirming Ambassador's Sirirath's position
on the basis of the unconstitutionality of the coup. The letter is referenced as
RC/MP/0483/97; see also Cambodia Conference, supra note 191.
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Prince Ranariddh.' 99 On July 21, the Permanent Mission of the King-
dom of Cambodia sent to all Permanent Representatives and Perma-
nent Observers of the United Nations an appeal to refrain from recog-
nizing the legitimacy of Ambassador Ouch, claiming that his
appointment was but an illegal reward for having supported a "bloody
Coup d'etat."200 On the same day, in a letter addressed to the Secre-
tary-General and requesting that it be circulated as an official docu-
ment under agenda items 109 and 110 of the fifty-first session of the
General Assembly and of the Security Council, Prince Ranarridh rather
pointed out that the situation in Cambodia is now characterized by
"endless crimes of political harassment, intimidation and threat," and
requested that an investigation into these charges be conducted by the
Secretary-General's Special Representative on Human Rights in Cam-
bodia. 201 This position was taken, inter-alia, to delegitimize both the
claim of effective control and of the constitutionality of the actions un-
dertaken by the new government. 202 The request that the issue be dealt
with as a substantive issue in the Security Council and the General As-
sembly under items pertaining to self-determination and human rights
indicate that Prince Ranarridh was preparing to ground his claim - and
to counterattack the claim of his rival to be recognized as the legitimate
representative of Cambodia - on the subjective element of legitimacy.
The position taken by Hun Sen was equally predictable, and em-
phasized the constitutionality of his government and its continuity,
both internally and internationally, within the democratic frame-
work.20 3 Hun Sen explained that what happened on July 5 was "sudden
events," and not a coup. Hun Sen further claimed that these events
were a direct result of provocation on the part of Prince Ranariddh
whose forces shelled the capital and necessitated a counter attack by
the government, 204 and the government's action was "a necessary
measure to solve the anarchy by the Ranariddh group."205 The Prince,
it was stated, was acting as a war-lord rather than as a Prime Minister,
was collaborating with Khmer Rouge forces despite the fact that the
government was still fighting them; was building up armed forces loyal
to him - not to the government; and was engaged in the illegal importa-
tion of weapons to arm his new soldiers. It follows that the govern-
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess, U.N. Doc. A/51/947 (1997). U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/1997/570 (1997). Agenda items 109 and 110 of the fifty-first session of the General
Assembly refer to the rights of people to self determination and human rights questions.
202. See supra note 199.
203. See Press Conference by Deputy Permanent Representative of Cambodia,





ment's success "liberated the people from the danger of returning to the
Khmer Rouge's genocidal regime and paved the way for fair and free
elections on May 28, 1998."206
Indeed, the government in Cambodia was not new: it was a con-
tinuation of the coalition of Cambodia, the outcome of the 1993 elec-
tions.20 7 The change in some functionaries was but "some small reshuf-
fling of the government," quite common in most democratic
governments. 208 The constitutionality of the government was further
confirmed when the National Assembly of Cambodia, decided in a
"democratic, free and sovereign vote," to replace Prince Ranariddh with
Ung Huot as First Prime Minister.20 9 The Royal Decree of'August 7,
which finalized the decision of the National Assembly, and was signed
by the acting Head of State who had been granted full powers to do so
by the Head of State, King Norodom Sihanouk, was equally valid. 210
Thus, despite the King's non-recognition of the legality of the new first
Prime Minister, it was nevertheless maintained that while the King
was free to hold his own opinion, that opinion lacked legal merits in
view of the above-mentioned delegation of powers to the acting Head of
State.211
Referring specifically to the representation of Cambodia in the
United Nations, it was further claimed that both the recalling home of
Ambassador Sirirath, and the nomination of a new Permanent Repre-
sentative were perfectly within the power of the First Prime Minister,
Ung Huot.212 The problems faced by the Cambodian Permanent Mis-
sion were thus a result of an "open rebellion" against the government by
the former Permanent Representative who further defied the action of
the acting Head of State to terminate his mission and return to Phnom
Penh.213 The international community should remember that while
Cambodia has two Prime Ministers, it has only one government. That
Government is "located in Phnom Penh, not in Aix-en-Provence,
France,"214 and is recognized by 185 member States. 215 Refusing to rec-
ognize the delegation, the government accredited would thus be "an un-
acceptable interference in the internal affairs of Cambodia."
216
206. Id.
207. See Press Conference by Deputy Permanent Representative of Cambodia,




211. See Deputy Conference 1, supra note 203.




216. See Deputy Conference 2, supra note 207.
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Insofar as Cambodia's international relations are concerned, the
government pointed out that it continues to be recognized by all mem-
ber States, and maintains diplomatic relations with them. In addition,
embassies, non-governmental organizations and United Nations pro-
grammes and funds such as UNDP and UNICEF, all continue to func-
tion normally in Cambodia, and the government continues to exercise
effective control over the country and to abide by its international obli-
gations in full respect of the Paris Peace Agreement and the outcome of
the UN sponsored 1993 elections. Finally, the government reiterated
its commitment to the 1998 elections and welcomed the United Nations
as the coordinator of election-observers. 217 The implication of these ar-
guments was that the withholding of validation of the government
would have its symbolic effect collide with reality much to the detriment
of the validating United Nations.
Before the issue of representation of Cambodia reached the Creden-
tials Committee, the United Nations faced an embarrassing possibility:
a show of force between the two rival delegations at the closing cere-
mony of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly, scheduled for
September 15, 1997. Prince Sirirath was the currently accredited Per-
manent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations, but the
authority purporting to be the only government of Cambodia had re-
called him back to Phnom Penh, a recall he claimed was lacking legal
validity. 218 At the same time, Ung Huot, as the Cambodian Minister for
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, was accredited as the
Head of the Cambodian Delegation to the fifty-first session. 219 An ap-
peal made by the President of the General Assembly to both parties
yielded a compromise solution whereby neither was to attend the cere-
mony and both would await the resolution of the question by the Cre-
dentials Committee. 2
20
The Credentials Committee met to consider the credentials of
Cambodia on September 17, 1997. In light of past practice it could have
followed various roads leading to different destinations. If the Commit-
tee took a technical stand, it could have accepted the credentials signed
by King Sihanouk as Head of State. According to rule 27 of the Rules of
Procedure of the General Assembly, the credentials of representatives
217. Id.
218. See supra note 199.
219. For the report of the Credentials Committee, see U.N.GAOR, 51st Sess., Cred.
Comm., U.N. Doc. A/51/548 (1996), and id at addendum pt. 1. It was approved by the
General Assembly in Resolution 51/9. G.A. Res. 51/9, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda
Item 3(b), 43rd and 87th plen. mtgs., U.N. Doc. A/51/9 (1996).
220. See Cambodia Conference, supra note 191. Prince Sirirath stated that he agreed
to the compromise out of respect for the President of the General Assembly but that his
absence should not be construed as relinquishment on his part of his claim to be the Per-
manent Representative of Cambodia. Id.
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can be issued either by the Head of State or Government, or by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 221 The rule is silent on the relative worth
of each in cases of competing claims, and this means that they are equal
in value. Nevertheless, past practice indicates that the balance would
have been tipped in favor of the credentials issued by the King. For ex-
ample, in the case of the Congo, the Committee refrained from inquiring
into the constitutionality of the letters of credence claiming that to have
done so would have been an intervention in the domestic affairs of the
Congo, and finally accepted the credentials issued by the Head of State
and not the Prime Minister. The Committee based its decision on the
formal grounds that the credentials were issued by the primary organ
empowered to accredit delegates according to the language of rule 27.222
Another argument in support of accepting the credentials issued by
the Head of State is based on the legal principle that a later document
supersedes an earlier one, and because the letters of credence issued by
the Prime Minister were dated August 25, 1997, whereas those signed
by the Head of State were dated September 2, 1997, the latter super-
sedes the former. The same result could have been achieved on the ba-
sis of the test of effective control, as by that time it was clear that Hun
Sen's government was in control of the country, and enjoyed the obedi-
ence of the population.
223
Conversely, the Committee could have determined, without an in-
quiry into the Cambodian Constitution, that the letter, dated Septem-
ber 5, from King Sihanouk nullified the validity of his letter of credence
of September 2, and indicated that the letter of credence was signed
under some form of duress. The same result could have been achieved
if the Committee followed the spirit, if not letter, of its decision regard-
ing the representation of Democratic Kampuchea. In the present case
there was no foreign intervention, but the government of Hun Sen and
Ung Huot existed by virtue of a violent coup, and as a matter of princi-
ple, a government, the very existence of which is a testimony to a viola-
tion of the democratic framework achieved at great cost to the interna-
tional community, should not be rewarded. This was the position of the
United States, a position quite contrary to its insistence on the techni-
cal function of the Credentials Committee in the first round of the
Cambodian representation question. 224
221. See supra note 1.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 106-114.
223. See, e.g., B. Crossette, Cambodian Says He May Bar U.N. From Vote If Denied
Seat, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1997, at A10 (clarifying that Hun Sen exercises the effective,
though not necessarily legitimate, control in Cambodia, an assessment which the fifteen
following months validated).
224. See Anthony Goodman, Cambodia's UN Seat Stays Vacant; Ruling Put Off, (Sept.
19, 1997) <Reuters@http://www.infoseek.com>. See also U.S.: Cambodia Should Not Get
U.N. Seat, (Sept. 17, 1997) <http//www.upi.com>.
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This inconsistency merely underscores the fact that the legal
straightjacket cannot constrain the political nature of the decision. It is
true that the argument that an authority which came into power as a
result of a violent coup should not be recognized as a legitimate gov-
ernment could have relied on both the second round of the Cambodian
representation question and on the precedent of Ethiopia. Neverthe-
less, there is a crucial difference between these precedents and the 1997
Cambodia round: in the former cases, an armed intervention by a for-
eign government generated the coup and supported the new authority.
This, however, was not the case in the coup undertaken by Hun Sen.
The third route which the Committee could, and indeed did, follow
was to defer a decision. The decision not to decide could have been
based on the Committee's conception of itself as a technical body which
cannot enter into the political determination required and should thus
await developments that would allow it to decide otherwise. Such a ra-
tionale was used by the Credentials Committee when it first considered
the question of Congolese representation. 225 Deferment of decision was
also utilized by the Credentials Committee in 1996 when faced with the
question of Afghanistan representation. 226 In that case, there were two
documents: a formal letter of credence signed by President Rabbani, as
he had done the previous year, and a note verbale issued by the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs in Kabul challenging the credentials issued by
President Rabbani, but refraining from submitting alternative creden-
tials.227 While the Committee could have decided that it was presented
with only one set of credentials within the meaning of rule 27, it took a
different course, and decided, both in its first meeting of October 23,
1996, and in its subsequent meeting of December 12, 1996, to defer a
decision on the credentials of Afghanistan. 228 The effect of the decision
225. See supra text accompanying notes 106-114.
226. At the 52nd Session of the Assembly, the Credentials Committee was informed by
the Legal Counsel on December 5, 1997 that two communications had been received con-
cerning the credentials of Afghanistan: one was signed by Professor Burhan-u-ddin Rab-
bani, "President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan," and presented a delegation headed
by Dr. A. G. Ravan Farhadi who was identified as "Permanent Representative," and the
other was signed by Alhaj Mull Mohammad Rabbani, "Head of the Government of the Is-
lamic State of Afghanistan," and presented a delegation headed by Mr. Abdul Hakeem
Mujahid who was identified as "Designate Permanent Representative." The Committee
decided to defer a decision on the credentials of Afghanistan "on the understanding that
the current representatives of Afghanistan accredited to the United Nations would con-
tinue to participate in the work of the General Assembly pursuant to the applicable rules
of procedure of the Assembly." See U.N. GAOR, 52d. Sess., supra note 64, at paras. 9-10
(1997).
227. Id.
228. For the report of the Credentials Committee see U.N. GAOR 51st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/51/548 (1996) and id at addendum pt. 1. It is interesting to note that, at the first
meeting of the Committee, the representative of The Netherlands considered that, "the
Government of Afghanistan which had submitted credentials for its representatives at the
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was that, pursuant to rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the General
Assembly, the delegates representing the Rabbani government would
continue to represent Afghanistan on a provisional basis.
229
Other cases that arose between the second and third challenges to
Cambodian representation failed to allow for the development of a dis-
cernible pattern. Following are a number of examples of this pattern.
First, in the case of Somalia, and pursuant to the Security Council's
resolution to that effect, the United Nations determined that since
there is no government in Somalia, no authority can represent it in the
United Nations. 230 Second, in the case of Burundi, despite a condemna-
tion by the Security Council of the overthrow of the legitimate govern-
ment and the constitutional order in that member State, the represen-
tatives of the revolutionary government were allowed to participate
without challenge, in the work of the political organs of the United Na-
tions.231 Third, in the case of Sierra Leone, the Security Council's con-
demnation, through a series of Presidential Statements, of the military
junta which overthrew the elected government of President Kabbah on
May 25, 1997, seems to have had no averse effect on the consideration,
50th Session of the Assembly was still the Government, and that therefore there was no
reason not to accept the credentials as presented to the Secretary-General." This view
was supported by the representative of the Russian Federation who, however, cautioned
that, "although the decisions of the Committee were technical and not political in nature,
the situation in Afghanistan was confused and any hasty decision by a United Nations
body could be counterproductive." Eventually, the Committee accepted the compromise
solution suggested by the Chairman of the Committee that, "on the understanding that
the current representatives of Afghanistan could continue to participate fully in the work
of the General Assembly," the proposal by the United States representative to defer the
Committee's decision regarding the credentials of the representatives of Afghanistan was
accepted. The decision of the Committee to defer its decision on the above understanding
was approved by the General Assembly in Resolution 51/9 A and B, id.
229. See supra note 226.
230. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 897, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3334th mtg., supra note 22; Re-
port of the Secretary General of September 16, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/1997/715 (1997); Report of the Secretary General of February 17, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess,
U.N. Doc. S/1997/135 (1997); Report of the Secretary General of April 29, U.N. SCOR, 51st
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1996/325 (1996); Report of the Secretary General of January 19, U.N.
SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1996/42 (1996); Report of the Secretary General of March
28, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/231 (1995); Report of the Secretary General
of January 6, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Supp. for Jan. - Mar., U.N. Doc. S/1994/12 (1994).
Note that an absence of government in effect may be understood to mean that a Member
State of the United Nations has ceased to qualify for membership inasmuch as Article 4
requires that Members of the United Nations be States and the existence of a government
is a sine qua non condition for the existence of a State. This issue, however, is beyond the
scope of this paper.
231. See S.C. Res. 1072, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3695th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res1072
(1996). The credentials of the representatives of Burundi to the 52nd Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly were examined and accepted by the Credentials Committee at its meeting
of 5 December 1997. See U.N. GAOR, Cred. Comm., 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/52/719, supra
note 64, at paras. 7 and 11.
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and subsequent acceptance, by the Credentials Committee of the cre-
dentials of the representatives of Sierra Leone.232 The Chairman of the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and Head of State, Major Koroma,
notified the Secretary-General of the recall of the Permanent Represen-
tative of Sierra Leone, but the credentials of the Permanent Represen-
tative were not challenged in the General Assembly, and the communi-
cations from Major Koroma were not acted upon.
The Permanent Representative of Cambodia, Prince Sirirath re-
ferred to the precedents of both Sierra Leone and Afghanistan to sup-
port an outcome he deemed preferable. However, the rationale and cir-
cumstances of such precedents were different from the present case of
Cambodia where there were two rival sets of credentials, and no con-
demnation was made by the Security Council. 233
The effect of the decision to defer the consideration of the Cambo-
dian credentials was that no credentials for any Cambodian representa-
tives have been accepted and thus no one represents Cambodia in the
General Assembly. 234 This happened because the Permanent Represen-
tative, Prince Sirirath, was previously accredited only to the United Na-
tions, but not to the General Assembly and could not, therefore, rely on
the applicability of Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the General As-
sembly to represent Cambodia on a provisional basis in that organ.
235
The effect of this deferment was thus similar to the result in the case of
the Congo, though for different reasons. In the Congo case, there was
never any representative previously accredited to the United Nations. 23 6
Conversely, in the case of Cambodia, the credentials of the previously
accredited representative were not specific enough to allow for his pro-
232. See, Security Council Calls on Military Junta in Sierra Leone to Take Steps for
Unconditional Restoration of Democratically Elected Government, SC16408,
S/PRST/1997/42 (1997); Security Council Calls for Immediate and Unconditional Restora-
tion of Constitutional Order in Sierra Leone, SC/6394, S/PRST/1997/36 (1997); Security
Council Strongly Deplores Attempt to Overthrow Democratically Elected Government in
Sierra Leone, SC/6374, S/PRST/1997/29 (1997). For the decision of the Credentials Com-
mittee, see U.N. GAOR, Cred. Comm. 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/52/719, supra note 64.
233. Cambodia Conference, supra note 191.
234. Pursuant to the Organization's practice, if a delegate is not specifically accredited
to the General Assembly, s/he cannot continue to represent the government on a provi-
sional basis. See 1977 U.N. Jurid. Y.B., U.N. Doc. ST.LEG./SER.C/15, supra note 59.
235. Prince Sirirath's participation in the 51st Session was based on his inclusion in
the list of the Cambodian delegation to that Session as deputy head of the delegation. See
the report of the Credentials Committee for the 51st Session of the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A151/548, supra note 219. See also id at addendum pt. 1. Note that in the
Tenth Emergency and the Nineteenth Special Sessions of the General Assembly, held in
April and June 1997, respectively, it was confirmed that those Permanent Representa-
tives who did not have credentials authorizing them to represent their governments in all
sessions of the General Assembly, needed to be specifically accredited to these sessions.
236. See text accompanying notes 106-114. See also Jhabvala, supra note 6, at 622.
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visional participation in the General Assembly.237
The choice to defer a decision in the case of Cambodia seemed to
make eminent political sense: the prime political objective was to facili-
tate a reconciliation process in Cambodia, and a decision on credentials
at this stage might have hampered, rather than facilitated, this objec-
tive. Should reconciliation take place, an outcome members of ASEAN
and other States were clearly trying to encourage, the door was always
open for the rival parties to decide on a combined delegation. Choosing
a combined delegation would have allowed Cambodia to be represented
in the General Assembly on a provisional basis, pending a reconsidera-
tion by the Credentials Committee. Further, the elections, scheduled
for May 1998, did provide a time-framework within which a reconcilia-
tion process could take place, and the commitment of the Phnom Penh
government to free and fair elections supervised by the United Nations
could be put to the test.
238
The political sense of a particular decision, however, still has to re-
flect a principled process of decision-making in order to provide for a le-
gitimate legal regime. Had such a regime existed, the election process
in Cambodia, and perhaps its results, might have been different, and
Cambodia would have been represented in the Fifty-second session of
the General Assembly.239 A proposal for the creation of such a regime,
institutionalizing the collective legitimization function of the United
Nations is made in the final section.
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND A PROPOSAL: THE FABRIC OF THE PAST
AND THE DESIGN FOR THE FUTURE
The discussion thus far leads to the conclusion that neither the le-
gal framework nor the substantive content poured into it by the practice
of the United Nations offer clear, consistent and coherent guidance for
determining the legitimacy of representative governments in cases
where said legitimacy is challenged. This conclusion indicates a state of
237. See supra note 235.
238. Cambodia's elections took place on Sunday July 26, 1998 and more than 90 per-
cent of the country's 5.4 million registered voters took part. The voting went smoothly
and international election observers reported that it was "almost entirely free of serious
irregularities." See Cambodians Counting Votes Amid Measured Optimism, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 1998, at A7.
239. The results of the elections gave the victory to Hun Sen, however, such victory
was disputed by the opposition and primarily by Sam Rainsy, who denounced the election
as "rife with fraud," though few independent observers shared that view. See Cambodia's
Voters Have Spoken, But Silence Doesn't Reign, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at A9. It
should also be noted that no credentials were presented by Cambodia to the Secretary-
General for the 53rd Session and thus the Cambodian seat remained vacant during that
Session, too.
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affairs that needs to be rectified if the United Nations is to play a viable
role in conflict-resolution processes emanating from such challenges.
Put differently, and responding to the question raised in the introduc-
tory section, the current legal regime appears to be but a legal mantle
designed to cover the nakedness of the body-politic. Nude Emperors,
however, do normally prefer to be clothed, even at a cost, and current
exposure may well reflecta defect in design and in the choice of mate-
rial. It is thus important to reassess their quality.
In resolving issues pertaining to the representative nature of gov-
ernments, the United Nations is assuming a function of collective le-
gitimization. In that sense, the hope, once expressed by Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht,
that the political integration of the international
community, which, in the long run, is the absolute con-
dition of the full development of the potentialities of
man and humanity in general, may, alongside other im-
provements, render possible the collectivization of the
process of recognition as best in keeping with its nature
and purpose
240
has been realized. While Lauterpacht was referring to the recognition
of States, not of governments, the legitimizing function of the United
Nations is quite similar. In both cases, the United Nations is conceived
of as a dispenser of a politically meaningful approval or disapproval of
claims relating to the political, moral and legal justification of power.
Indeed, while it remains debatable whether States have conferred on
the United Nations the power to recognize States, 24 1 it does appear that
they have endorsed its collective legitimization of governments, par-
ticularly in light of their reluctance to engage directly and individually
in this process vis-a-vis other governments.2 42
240. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1947).
241. DUGARD, supra note 85. Professor Dugard's thesis is that the practice of the
United Nations indicates that collective recognition of States through the Organization
has become the common mode of operation. Note, however, that in order to justify this
claim, the term "recognition" is limited only to its cognitive facet. Id.
242. For example, in 1977 the United States Department of State declared that its
practice has been "to de-emphasize and avoid the use of recognition in cases of changes of
governments and to concern.. with the question of whether we wish to have diplomatic
relations with the new governments. The Administration's policy is that the establish-
ment of relations does not involve approval or disapproval but merely demonstrates a
willingness on our part to conduct our affairs with other governments directly." L.
THOMAS GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS: THE PRACTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES 20 (1978). In 1980, the United Kingdom announced a similar policy. See,
C.R. Symmons, United Kingdom Abolition of the Doctrine of Recognition of Governments:
A Rose By Another Name?, PUB. L. 249 (1981). For criticism of this stand, see, M.J. Peter-
son, Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1983).
Note, however, that for governments reluctant to pursue a policy of individual recognition
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It should also be noted that the United Nations has assumed le-
gitimizing functions in various areas (i.e., in the area of decolonization,
even at a time when its ability to actually support its words with deeds
was quite limited).243 As the above review indicates, however, the mere
assumption by the United Nations of the function of collective legitimi-
zation does not in itself ensure that the legitimizing process works well.
The coupling of these observations with new political realities that al-
low for a wider measure of action in support of judgment, indicate that
the time has come to revisit the manner in which the United Nations
bestows its collective legitimization function in the context of deter-
mining the representative nature of an authority purporting to be the
government of a member State.
The legitimacy of governments was defined, for our purposes, as
comprising relatively objective and subjective elements. The implica-
tion is that the search for legitimacy is a search for congruence between
the fact of might and the principle of right; between power and author-
ity. This search is based on the insight, derived from both theory and
practice, that legitimacy and power are not antithetical; they are inter-
dependent and indeed reinforce each other in much the same way that
language requires both a grammar and a vocabulary if it is to allow for
meaningful expression. If the United Nations is to discharge its collec-
tive legitimizing function in a meaningful way, it has to take account of
this insight and to assess the facts of effective power in light of its le-
gal, moral and political dimensions. It is in this manner that a correla-
tion may be achieved between the content of the legitimizing standard
and the identity of the collective agent applying the standard. Such
correlation is required for the United Nations, as the collective legiti-
mizing agent, to achieve its objective in this context in a manner that
augments rather than undermines its viability.
It follows that neither the legitimizing standard nor the legitimiz-
ing agent should be positioned in a legal straightjacket any more than
they should allow for the free reign of political exigencies. Rather, both
should enable the development of rules that are capable of consistent
application in practice in a manner that renders the law more respected
and more worthy of respect. How, then, is the legal regime governing
questions of representation to be reconstructed? How should the proc-
ess of legitimization work?
Relatively recent developments in the European Community in the
of foreign governments, transferring that role to the United Nations and transforming the
act of recognition from an individual to a collective act, is a rather attractive option. It is
the reluctance of governments to give up the right to recognize new States on an individ-
ual basis which prevented the clear assumption of this function by the United Nations.
243. See, I.L. Claude Jr., Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the
United Nations, 20 INT'L ORG. 367 (1966).
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law and practice of recognition of States may be instructive in this con-
text. On December 16, 1991, the European Community Foreign Minis-
ters meeting in Brussels issued a "Declaration on the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union"
[hereinafter Declaration on Guidelines]. 244 Accompanying this Declara-
tion on Guidelines was a "Declaration on Yugoslavia." 245 The basic ten-
ets of the Declaration on Guidelines were four-fold. First, they ex-
pressed an intention to recognize the new States. Second, they replaced
individual recognition with a collective recognition by the European
Community. Third, they discarded the legal straightjacket, according
to which recognition was but a formal statement of facts, and reposi-
tioned it in the realm of foreign policy.246 Fourth, they articulated con-
ditions which States wishing to be recognized had to meet. 247 The
Declaration on Yugoslavia went further to design a method by which an
application for recognition is to be submitted and considered.
2 48
These developments were criticized for having bred instability. It
was claimed that: 1) whereas the traditional criteria for recognition of
statehood provided consistency and a defense against doubtful claims,
the new stand by the European Community introduced "a new level of
ad-hoc decision making that runs the risk of making recognition uncer-
244. Focus, Special Issue, Jan. 14, 1992, 92, reproduced in 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 72 (1993).
245. 4 EUR. J. INT'L L., at 73.
246. In declaring that recognition is "subject to the normal standards of international
practice and the political realities of each case." Id. at 72, Annex 1.
247. States wishing to be recognized had to constitute themselves on a democratic ba-
sis; accept appropriate international obligations; commit themselves in good faith to a
peaceful process and to negotiations; respect the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and the Charter of
Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights; guarantee
the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the CSCE; re-
spect the inviolability of frontiers that can only be changed by peaceful means and by
common agreement; accept relevant commitments regarding disarmament, nuclear non-
proliferation, security and regional stability; commit to settle by agreement, including,
where appropriate by arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and regional
disputes. The Guidelines further stated a policy of non recognition of entities which result
from aggression. Finally, the Guidelines stated that account shall be taken of the effects
of recognition on neighboring States. Further conditions pertained exclusively to the
situation in Yugoslavia and, in addition to conditions in the Declaration on Guidelines,
further conditioned recognition on acceptance of provisions laid down in the draft Conven-
tion under consideration by the Conference on Yugoslavia, especially those relating to
human rights and the rights of national and ethnic groups as well as on continued sup-
port for the efforts of the Secretary- General, the Security Council and the Conference on
Yugoslavia. See Focus, supra note 244.
248. A state seeking recognition had to submit an application by a certain date; the
application was to be examined by the arbitration commission (the Badinter commission
established on 27 August 1991) and the latter was to render a decision by a certain date.
See supra note 245, at 74, Annexes, 2-4.
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tain and unpredictable";249 2) this risk was augmented by the value
judgment inherent in the subjective nature of the conditions; and 3) in-
deed the application of the guidelines in practice was inconsistent, as
for instance, in the decision to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina de-
spite the anarchic situation there, and the dependence of this entity on
the presence of foreign troops, as opposed to the decision not to recog-
nize the Republic of Macedonia despite the Commission's decision that
it did satisfy all the requisite conditions. 250 We believe that the criti-
cism is unmerited. There is little reason, from both a legal and political
perspective to lament the demise of the traditional requirements of
statehood that were discarded long ago as being incompatible with the
expectations of States as well as with modern practice.
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The Guidelines did not change the nature of the recognition from a
legal to a political decision. They simply admitted that it was a political
decision, and sought to articulate standards to guide that decision to
achieve a laudable objective: a principled, collective, foreign policy de-
signed to facilitate peaceful resolutions of bloody conflicts. 252 In most
cases, the criteria were applied consistently, and the decisions of arbi-
tration commissions were accepted, the only exception being the case of
the Republic of Macedonia. 25 3 It is quite true that the overall objective
was not always achieved, but it does not follow that this failure was due
to the introduction of new guidelines for recognition or to the measure
of flexibility they retained in order to allow for a perfectly legitimate
use of recognition as a diplomatic tool.
249. Roland Rich, Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Un-
ion, in Symposium: Recent Developments in the Practice of States Recognition, 4 EUR. J.
INT'L L., 36 (1993).
250. Id.
251. For a discussion, see DUGARD, supra note 85, at 78-89.
252. Even those critical of the recent practice of recognition adopted by the European
Union admit that the adoption of conditions leading to recognition "is an attempt to intro-
duce a greater moral dimension," and their criticism is directed more at the inconsistent
implementation of the new recognition regime, and less at its substantive standards. See
Rich, supra note 249, at 64; D. Turk, Recognition of States: A Comment, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L.
66 (1993).
253. In opinion number 6, the Commission found that the Republic of Macedonia satis-
fied all conditions and that the use of the name "Macedonia" did not imply any territorial
claims against another State. The European Community met on January 15, 1992, but its
members declined to extend recognition to the Republic of Macedonia. On May 2, the
European Community stated that it shall be willing to extend recognition but "under a
name that can be accepted by all parties concerned." See Rich, supra note 250. The
President of the Republic of Macedonia declined to meet this condition on the grounds
that it is both unprecedented and brings into question the "identity and dignity" of the
people of the country. See Rich, supra note 249. The European Community, due to the de
facto veto of Greece over its policy, did not extend recognition. See id. at 52. It should be
noted that had the collective recognition function been assumed by the United Nations,
the decision might have been different as Greece could not exercise the same relative
power in the international arena.
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The use of recognition, of either States or governments, as a diplo-
matic tool is not new. Its use as a collective means expressing a princi-
pled stand by the international community acting through the United
Nations with respect to the legitimacy of an authority purporting to be
the representative government of a member State may well be a wel-
come innovation. Its translation into a practical reality calls for a
change in the legal regime applicable to this situation.
The elements comprising a legal regime governing questions of le-
gitimate representation need not change. Their content, however, is in
need of such change. The following is an initial proposal designed to
serve as a basis for consideration of a new regime governing the collec-
tive legitimization process exercised by the United Nations in the con-
text of determining the representative nature of governments.
(a) Definition of the problem: the type of challenges to representa-
tion to which the regime governing questions of legitimate representa-
tion applies: The regime should govern both internal and external
challenges to the representative nature of a government. This should be
the case because each and every type of challenge raises the issue of
representation and a comprehensive legal regime should offer criteria
applicable to the issue at hand in its entirety.
(b) Determination of the best available means within the existing
institutional framework for resolving challenges as defined in (a) above:
It is proposed that the most feasible means - as distinct from the abso-
lute best means - within the institutional framework for resolving
challenges to representation as defined in (a) above, are the Rules of
Procedure of the General Assembly. The Rules, however, would have to
be amended to allow for: 1) the definition of the problem of representa-
tion, 2) the articulation of the criteria relevant for its resolution, 3) the
forum that would be entrusted with the application of those criteria,
and 4) the detailing of its powers and procedure.
(c) Articulation of the criteria to be applied in making a decision:
The criteria would have to be based on the following considerations:
First, is the decision made in a fluid political context, and designed to
bring certain political results, conducive to a better order. Second, does
that better order have both objective and subjective characteristics such
as: 1) encompassing effective control; 2) ensuring stability; 3) constitu-
tionality; and 4) ensuring that power is exercised in a principled, rather
than an arbitrary, manner in accordance with the goals of the interna-
tional community. Third, is the decision confined to the normative hi-
erarchy of the Charter, and cannot therefore contravene its provisions.
Finally, the criteria should be determinate enough to encourage their
consistent application and indicate in as clear a manner as possible the
expectations of the international community. In light of these consid-
erations, it seems to us that, in determining the issue of representation,
the following requirements are to be met for an authority to be recog-
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nized as a representative government of a member State:
(i) The authority purporting to be the representative government
of a member State has effective control of the country. This require-
ment concerns the objective component of legitimacy. It is a necessary,
yet insufficient, condition for recognition;
(ii) The authority meeting requirement (i) above was neither in-
stalled by the intervention of foreign troops nor is it maintained by the
presence of such troops. This requirement expresses a positive devel-
opment in the practice of the Organization and should be transformed
from a trend into a principled stand;
(iii) The authority meeting requirements (i) and (ii) above was
elected in free and democratic elections. In cases where the authority
meeting these requirements has not assumed power as a result of free
and democratic elections, its representative nature will not be recog-
nized until and unless such elections take place. This requirement ar-
ticulates an objective standard for the measurement of the subjective
element of legitimacy of governments. It is not concerned with the re-
sult of the election, and does not prevent the recognition of an authority
whose political platform is undemocratic as the representative govern-
ment of a member State, but it does require that the people thus repre-
sented have been given a fair chance to articulate their preference.
These conditions express minimal requirements in terms of the
goals of the international community. Unlike the European Commu-
nity which represents governments that share a wide consensus on val-
ues and could therefore demand conformity to such values by new
States seeking recognition from the European Community, the interna-
tional community enjoys no such consensus. Had it existed, it would
have been possible to articulate additional requirements. For instance,
the international community could have required that an authority
meeting conditions (i) - (iii) not engage in illegal acts in violation of per-
emptory norms of international law. This requirement would have en-
sured that the regime seeking legitimacy is not merely an organized
power which was elected democratically, but that it exercises that
power for making and executing decisions that good government en-
tails. 254 The reference to "good government" in this context would have
remained minimal insofar as it would have had a negative content: a
regime that violates norms having the character of jus cogens, a regime
that obstructs the basic goals of the international community, is simply
not a regime worthy of recognition. Such a requirement, alas, is not
presently feasible because it is not determinate enough, and the lack of
consensus surrounding the concept of jus cogens would have prevented
a meaningful enumeration of such norms, on the one hand, and the con-
254. See J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE LAW OF NATIONS 38-39 (1968).
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sistent application of the standard, on the other hand.255
Nevertheless, the conditions enumerated above present a step for-
ward in allowing for a global alignment on the basis of principle, that
takes politics into account while transcending specific factions. It al-
lows for the expression, albeit modest, of a committed and collectivist
stand with respect to the issue of representation, as well as, for the de-
velopment of a politically fair and accountable organization of interna-
tional relations in a manner that befits its present evolutionary stage.
It further accords the issue of representation its proper outfit: it takes
account of both the objective and the subjective components of legiti-
macy, but does so according to the measurements of the body-politic of
the international community as is, rather than as it should be, in the
eye of a particular beholder.
(d) Choice of the appropriate forum for decision-making: The defi-
nition of the problem, the identification of the best available means for
the decision-making process, the articulation of the considerations on
which the applicable criteria should be based as well as of the criteria
themselves, indicate that the appropriate forum should not be the Cre-
dentials Committee, but rather a Special Committee of the General As-
sembly. Such a Committee would not be confined by the Rules of Proce-
dure applicable to the Credentials Committee, and could be empowered
to determine issues of representation as defined in (a) - (c) above. The
composition of the Special Committee should reflect the political nature
of the decision it is requested to make in the heterogeneous community
of States.
(e) Delimitation of the type of actions to be taken and the conse-
quences emanating therefrom: Here, there is no change from the exist-
ing regime. The Special Committee should be empowered to make a de-
cision favorable to the challenging party, make a decision favorable to
the challenged party, or to defer a decision pending the fulfillment of its
substantive criteria. The decisions of the Special Committee would
then be submitted to the decision of the General Assembly. As a deci-
sion on representation determines whether or not a member State will
be represented in the United Nations, it is an important decision for the
State concerned, for its people, for the authority purporting to be the
government and for the international community acting through the
United Nations. As such, questions of representation should be classi-
fied as an "important question" category within the meaning of article
18(3) of the Charter, and should be decided by a two-thirds majority of
members present and voting.
If the proposed regime were applied to the latest round of Cambo-
255. For a discussion on the possibility of collective non-recognition of states and jus
cogens, see DUGARD, supra note 85, at 132-170.
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dia's representation debate, the resulting decision may have been the
same as the one that was actually reached. Its message and impact,
however, would have been quite different, as it would have expressed a
principled, rather than an expedient, decision. If the international
community is to emerge from the shadow-land of tactical maneuvers
into the promised land of strategic vision, it has to become a community
of principle.
The existence of a legal right to democratic governance may be de-
batable,256 but the need for the United Nations to assist peoples in
achieving their aspirations is less so. The Charter of the United Na-
tions begins with reference to 'We the Peoples of the United Nations,"
25 7
and proceeds to state that the peoples have resolved through their "re-
spective Governments"258 to establish the United Nations to further
their aims. A Government that betrays its people, as determined by the
criteria and methodology proposed above, is not worthy of respect and
consequently, of recognition. The United Nations as a collective legiti-
mizing agent will be acting both within its powers and in a manner that
remains true to its promise if it withholds legitimacy in such cases.
Making this change may be a step in the development of a legal right to
democratic governance but, perhaps more fundamentally, it is a condi-
tion for "the full development of the potentialities of man and humanity
in general,"259 and an expression, an "inclusive vision"' in a "world that
remains divided by many and diverse interests and attributes."260 Such
an expression remains the fundamental role of the United Nations.
256. See, Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46 (1992).
257. See U.N. CHARTER Preamble.
258. Id.
259. LAUTERPACHT, supra text accompanying note 240.
260. Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/950 (1997).
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